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This thesis explores how sovereignty is performed through appeals to the concepts of 
civilisation and savagery. In the discipline of International Relations (IR), most scholars still 
consider sovereignty as a largely unproblematic (if now socially constructed) concept. 
Following post-colonial scholars this thesis argues that a compelling understanding of the 
concept requires a questioning of its universality and objectivity. Sovereignty needs to be 
re-connected to the cultural context and to the civilisational values that contribute to its 
emergence. 
 
Although they have rightly pointed at the Western origin of the concept of 
sovereignty post-colonial scholars have rarely engaged with how the civilised and sovereign 
identity of Western states is produced. In order to provincialise European sovereignty, they 
have focused their research primarily on the external side of the construction of civilised 
sovereignty. In other words, their interest has lain in the relations between the Western 
sovereign states and the ‘uncivilised’ Rest that was denied sovereignty. References to the 
contemporaneous internal construction of Western civilisation and sovereignty have been 
scarce and underdeveloped. What is missing is an explanation of how the Europeans dealt 
with their own civilisational doubts and how they constructed their own civilised 
sovereignty at the same time as they were denying it to others. Indeed, this specific focus 
has engendered a disconnection between the analysis of the ‘domestic’ task of statecraft 
and the ‘international’ affirmation of sovereignty. 
 
This thesis offers a non-Eurocentric approach to sovereignty that captures both the 
internal and international dimensions of ‘writing civilised sovereignty’. It reveals the 
inherent ambiguities and unexpected similarities of the process of statecraft in both 
spheres. Such a re-integration of the domestic ‘colonial encounter’ of the West with its 
own Others is important for our understanding of sovereignty. First, it shows how 
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sovereignty must be seen as a site of political struggle irrespective of where (or upon 
whom) it is claimed. In particular, the construction of sovereignty is attached to the 
differentiation of the civilised with the savage. As such, sovereignty is inextricably and as 
much bound to savagery as it is to civilisation: actors claiming sovereignty require the 
presence of a savage that can in turn threaten their very claim and from whom they must 
differentiate themselves. Second, considering the ‘internal’ side along the ‘external’ one 
enables the identification and comparison of two colonial frontiers, i.e. two demarcations 
between the civilised and the savage. One is performed ‘inside’ the sovereign state and one 
‘outside’ of it. These two frontiers function in similar ways and have the same purpose: 
allocating an indisputable sovereignty to the representatives of the Western state. Because 
they separate the civilised from the savage, these frontiers are crucial political tools in the 
legitimation of claims to sovereignty. Finally, and interlinked with the above, juxtaposing 
the ‘internal’ and ‘international’ processes of statecraft reinforces the critique of the image 
of the sovereign state as unitary and culturally uniform (an image that mainstream IR 
strives to preserve). 
 
This thesis thus questions the usual and common-sense association between 
sovereignty and independence and argues that sovereignty promotes (at best) the 
independence of the sovereign elite adhering to the values considered as civilised in the 
West. Through the analysis of more than 300 archival sources, I demonstrate how the 
sovereign agency of the West and the task of statecraft require an appeal to civilisational 
superiority that can only be established through the identification of familiar (yet 
degenerated or underdeveloped) similarities between the civilised West and the savage 
non-West. The discourses of sovereignty in fact represent a resolution of civilisational 
ambiguities in order to (re)produce the illusion of a unified, civilised and sovereign Self. The 
theoretical conclusions of this thesis are informed by an extensive exploration of claims to 
sovereignty in 16th century France. This focus is justified for two reasons: the Age of 
Discovery is usually taken as the beginning of the modern practice of colonialism (and thus 
the extension of European sovereignties to new territories) and in Europe claims to 
sovereignty strengthened and were more often successful during that period. 
 
 In essence, then, this thesis provides a richer understanding of sovereignty and of 
its role in the creation and management of ‘difference’ in international relations. Through 
its interrogation of sovereignty this thesis also possesses a broader resonance for some key 
concepts of international relations and IR as a discipline. As shown in the review of the 
literature on sovereignty, the role of culture is overwhelmingly silenced by IR scholars 
through different strategies despite the fact that international relations are essentially 
intercultural relations. As such, the way cultures perceive each other (as different) is crucial 
to the functioning of our international ‘society’. Looking at sovereignty and at its links with 
civilisation also highlights the importance of colonial frontiers in international relations. 
These frontiers correspond to the differentiation established and constantly reproduced 
between the civilised and the savage. Such frontiers are both internal and external to the 
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sovereign state, which means that the internal Other is never far from the external one. 
These civilisational hierarchies are not only relevant for sovereignty: they also shape other 
international practices such as war or state-building. All these areas are informed by these 
colonial logics of differentiation and hierarchical ordering. But all are equally troubled by 
the lack of stability and permanence of these colonial frontiers between civilised and 
savage. More generally, these international practices seem to create the very problem that 
they are designed to solve or reduce: difference. This is ironic since difference is also the 
source of the dangers and problems that these practices are designed to deal with. Finally, 
this thesis contributes to the literature on encounters and the Age of Discovery and 
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Difference seems an inescapable fact of our international reality. Whether it is established 
between individuals, groups or states, the presence of Others seems to impose itself as an 
undeniable ‘limit’ to a wide range of aspirations and desires (harmony, concord or peaceful 
coexistence). As a result, our international system is built around these irreducible 
differences and has been designed to manage the existence of self-differentiated units. But 
difference is not a natural fact; it is constructed and (re-)produced through a variety of 
practices. In essence, then, this thesis is an attempt at understanding the construction of a 
difference that subsequently constrains our international imaginary. This is an important 
task since differences are the building blocks upon which discriminatory politics are based. 
In this thesis, I try to ‘recover’ a genuine difference or diversity despite the narrow and self-
validating identity usually attached to the Other. I do not seek to transcend differences or 
abolish them; rather, I want to question the way they are established and maintained. Such 
an enterprise is informed by a belief in the intrinsic value of difference as a tool for critique 
or self-reflection. I am thus interested in recovering difference, i.e. in establishing whether 
the ‘different’ Other can be perceived in her own terms and as she is. One assumption 
guiding this thesis is that the Other has always been perceived through (and by opposition 
to) the Self, which has resulted in a distorted image of what difference really is. But if there 
is an intrinsic value in diversity, we first need to recover the ‘real’ identity of the Other in 
order to benefit from it. This thesis, therefore, is interested in the positive outcomes that 




Whether this objective is imperialist, utopic or realistic will have to be established 
through this analysis. Nevertheless, and despite all the anti-colonial sentiments of its 
author, this thesis could be read as yet another instrumental use of the Other for one’s 
own purpose. This thesis is thus at risk of reproducing the imperialist drive towards 
difference motivated by a necessity to question and/or validate one’s own worldview.1 
After all, maybe the Other does not want to be recovered and would rather be left in peace 
instead of being included in yet another ‘scientific’ system of beliefs. Furthermore, 
recovering the Other implies the idealisation of an uncontaminated form of difference. 
Such a view, however, could prove illusionary in a relational approach to difference, i.e. 
when the Self is always already involved in the construction of the Other.  
 
This thesis will address these questions – and consider the afferent dangers that 
they bring – in a reflexive way and by looking at one of the central concepts of the 
discipline: sovereignty. Sovereignty both serves to differentiate and to manage relations 
between units (or states) constructed as independent because different. In this thesis, I am 
concerned with providing a convincing account of the workings of sovereignty thanks to an 
emphasis on one crucial aspect that most scholars studying international relations have 
been reluctant to acknowledge: the importance of civilisational differentiation and of 
cultural hierarchies for the identification of the sovereign state. Building upon the work of 
scholars interested in the role of culture(s) in world politics (Inayatullah and Blaney, 1996; 
Jahn, 2000) I thus want to re-assess the way sovereignty participates in and depends on the 
establishment of difference in what are, essentially, intercultural relations. 
 
Studying sovereignty is hardly a new endeavour in the discipline of International 
Relations (IR). In the last few decades, sovereignty has indeed been re-assessed as a 
question rather than as a given. As argued by Cocks (2014: 18) “[a]fter years as a relatively 
untroubled term of political discourse, “sovereignty” has come to agitate scholars of 
politics”. Linked to a broader questioning of “modernity’s accomplishments and prospects” 
(Onuf, 1991: 425) and to the introduction of new epistemologies and methods in IR, this 
new wave of studies on sovereignty has undoubtedly been beneficial in refuting the claim 
that sovereignty is a timeless and universally valid concept. In the past twenty years, 
numerous analyses have described how sovereignty is historically contingent and depends 
on the dominant values, ideologies and norms of each period (Thomson, 1995; Philpott, 
2001a; Glanville, 2011). Additionally, sovereignty has been shown to be a socially 
constructed idea influenced by the practices of the agents themselves (James, 1986; 1999; 
Wendt, 1992; Sikkink, 1993; Biersteker and Weber, 1996b; Zaum, 2007). Nevertheless, 
these valuable analyses have remained limited in their ability to problematise the use of 
sovereignty in international relations and IR alike. More specifically, most scholars have 
overlooked how sovereignty perpetuates exclusions and inequality at the international 
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 One example of this imperialist tendency can be seen in the ‘noble savage’ approach to difference 
in which the Other is idealised in order to question one’s own society. Crucially, of course, the 
qualifying ‘noble’ does not erase the ‘savage’ character of the Other. 
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level and how the identification and construction of the sovereign Self can only be achieved 
inside of a specific cultural framework. Thus, by leaving “largely unchanged the 
conventional picture as portrayed by mainstream theorists” (Hobson and Sharman, 2005: 




The traditional (or minimalist) understanding of sovereignty 
 
In particular, what most of this new wave has failed to reveal and challenge is the 
traditional, Westphalian, or minimalist definition of sovereignty as a higher authority 
awarding independence and protecting a population and territory from outside 
interference. This (almost mythological) conceptualisation of sovereignty is built upon a 
series of inter-connected assumptions that have become commonsensical in IR. The first is 
the idea that sovereignty refers to an absolute power or authority which in turn implies an 
absence of responsibility (in particular towards the population of the sovereign state). 
Morgenthau (1948/1973: 329 and 318), for instance, writes that “[s]overeignty signifies 
supreme lawgiving and law-enforcing authority” and that “[t]he individual nation has the 
right to give itself any constitution it pleases, to enact whatever laws it wishes regardless of 
their effects upon its own citizens, and to choose any system of administration”. 
Sovereignty here entails “the absence of responsibility or accountability” (Glanville, 2014: 
2). This “perfectly unqualified state sovereignty as a natural or original condition” 
mythology (Morgan, 2007: 26) is so widespread in IR that some have called it the 
‘traditional’ understanding of sovereignty. 
 
As a consequence, and because sovereignty is supposedly not attached to 
responsibility (or responsibilities) it is also free of internal ‘content’. When sovereignty is 
defined as a “final and absolute authority in the political community” (Hinsley, 1986: 1) it 
takes on a generic meaning and as such can supposedly accommodate a great variety of 
political authorities. In this approach arguably any form of political authority and any way 
of exercising political power could qualify as sovereign. For Spruyt (1994: 56), for instance, 
“[s]overeignty per definition consists of internal hierarchy and territorial demarcation” but 
nothing more. In its traditional Westphalian meaning, then, sovereignty is unrestrained and 
remains unspecified.3 It is thus supposedly unconditional. The idea of absoluteness also 
                                                          
2
 This is exemplified, inter alia, in the state-building literature: recent and on-going discussions about 
‘fragile states’ continue to take sovereignty as an unproblematic concept and desirable end, thus 
overlooking its strong normative side and the consequences that follow. For a critique of the ‘fragile 
state’ concept see Grimm et al. (2014).  
3
 These silences, I argue in chapters 1 and 3, find their origin in the reluctance (and yet 
inescapability) of looking at the cultural or civilisational content of sovereignty. 
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implies that sovereignty is equivalent to ‘independence from outside interference’. Hence 
Peters (2009: 518) argues that “[n]on-intervention” in the domestic sovereign spheres is “a 
corollary of sovereignty”. Finally, and because sovereignty is usually understood in its 
traditional or minimalist sense, “juridical equality can be seen as a logical corollary of 
sovereignty” (Peters, 2009: 516). Since any form of final political authority exercised over a 
population and territory can potentially fit with the traditional definition, sovereignty is 
associated with the existence of an egalitarian international order. Aalberts (2014: 783) 
criticises how such an approach to sovereignty leads us to see “the universalisation of 
sovereignty [at the time of decolonisation] as the right to be different and equal at the 
same time”. This is one of the classic assumptions of IR. Morgenthau  (1948/1973: 321) 
supports it when he estimates that “[t]he actual inequality of nations and their dependence 
upon each other have no relevance for the legal status called sovereignty”.4 The fiction of 
international equality in turn ascribes to sovereignty its universal character (devoid of any 
cultural particularities). And as stated by Prokhovnik (2007: 24) “the fact that no political 
community since the late sixteenth century has in practice had the uncontested power and 
authority promised by the definition of sovereignty, has not in itself been enough to 
undermine as a myth the existence of sovereignty” as traditionally understood. 
 
But Morgenthau himself, like most IR scholars, necessarily touches upon another 
(and arguably more convincing) way of approaching sovereignty. Indeed, he adds that 
“each nation is free to manage its internal and external affairs according to its discretion, in 
so far as it is not limited by treaty or what we have earlier called common or necessary 
international law” (Morgenthau, 1948/1973: 318, my emphasis). From this statement it 
becomes evident that scholars using the traditional definition of sovereignty have to 
adhere to the fiction of a culturally neutral international legal system (and to the way the 
rules of ‘international’ relations are usually described, i.e. as devoid of cultural bias). Doing 
so necessarily obliterates the long imperial history of international law itself (Koskenniemi, 
2001; Anghie, 2005). It is thus “the empirical thesis of a uniform international morality” 
that makes this “Westphalian commonsense” (Grovogui, 2002: 316) so pervasive.5 But the 
mythology of the traditional Westphalian (and universal) meaning of sovereignty clashes 
with the ways sovereignty is granted or denied in international politics. When the 
traditional definition of sovereignty is confronted by the reality of international relations 
contradictions and quandaries are inevitable. Waltz (1979: 95-96), for instance, supports 
the traditional or minimalist definition of sovereignty: “To say that a state is sovereign 
means that it decides for itself how it will cope with its internal and external problems”. But 
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 Undoubtedly the traditional approach to sovereignty has largely been maintained thanks to the 
disciplinary boundary between IR and International Law. Hence, IR scholars have repeatedly turned 
to International Law to support the view of sovereignty as a supposedly objective, neutral and 
universal because juridical concept.  
5
 Some even fail to recognise that ‘different’ international systems are actually more similar than it 
seems. Oksenberg (2001: 89), for instance, describes the Chinese international system as follows: 
“The participants were not equals. Boundaries were not well demarcated. The purpose of the 
system was to foster virtuous rule”. He then concludes that a “stark contrast” exists between the 
Western and Chinese international systems when most of these ‘Chinese’ characteristics are equally 
valid to describe the international/Western system. 
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he is also forced to recognise the existence of a strong normative international order and 
thus adds: “To say that states are sovereign is not to say that they can do as they please”. 
This type of contradiction cannot be avoided so long as scholars remain attached to the 
traditional, minimalist and universalist understanding of sovereignty. This approach indeed 
obscures some of the key features that characterise the concept and in particular its 
dependence on a normative (or civilisational) ideal. 
 
 
Post-colonial approaches and the idea of ‘civilised 
sovereignty’ 
 
Following scholars interested in the Western origin on the concept of sovereignty, this 
thesis argues that a compelling understanding of the concept requires a questioning of its 
universality and objectivity. Indeed, if sovereignty is to be accepted as the “final and 
absolute authority in the political community” (Hinsley, 1986: 1), these scholars have 
shown that this final and absolute authority – i.e. an authority that is worth respecting and 
that will ensure the independence of the entity concerned – can only be identified inside of 
a cultural or civilisational framework. As post-colonial scholars have recently argued, 
sovereignty is based on civilisational elements that celebrate a specific ‘model’ of 
statehood (Doty, 1996; Anghie, 2005; Hobson, 2012). More precisely, post-colonial authors 
have explained how Western states have a ‘natural’ ability to construct sovereign standards 
that they allegedly achieve – an ability that subsequently “endows them with the capacity 
and wisdom to know the standards of conduct to which others must conform” (Grovogui, 
2002: 322). For Anghie (2005: 37 and 103), “sovereignty became identified with a specific 
set of cultural practices to the exclusion of others” and as such has been “aligned with 
European ideas of social order, political organization, progress and development”.6 The 
appearance of ‘civilised’ sovereignty on the international stage is usually associated with 
the 16th century encounters between Europeans and the Amerindian populations of the 
‘New World’. These populations were described as living in a ‘state of nature’ and in need 
of the ‘civilised’ teaching of more ‘advanced’ nations. This intellectual and political 
construction continues to inform the way we think about sovereignty today (Jahn, 2000; 
Anghie, 2005; Aalberts, 2014). 
 
 The impossibility of separating sovereignty from its civilisational content and the 
use of the term ‘civilised sovereignty’ call for some clarifications. I am not arguing here that 
sovereignty can be defined outside of a civilisational framework (so that there could be a 
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 On this question, see more generally Seth (2000), Dunn (2003), Keene (2004), Simpson (2004), 
Pateman (2007), and Suzuki (2009). On the question of sovereignty as an exclusionary concept see 
more specifically Walker (1993) and Campbell (1997). 
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‘non-civilised’ sovereignty). In contrast, this thesis supports the view that sovereignty refers 
to a ‘final form of authority in the political community’7 but argues that this form of 
authority is always defined in relation to a specific civilisational framework. Put differently, 
sovereignty is legitimate (and hence exists) only when it is seen to respect a normative 
cultural or civilisational framework. As such, trying to find a pure form of sovereignty (a 
minimal and universal concept that would be defined outside of a specific cultural context) 
is illusionary at best, dangerous at worst. This search for a minimal definition of sovereignty 
has pushed IR scholars to disregard the discriminatory consequences of treating 
sovereignty as a culturally-undefined concept. Additionally, it has also fuelled the 
conviction that sovereignty was not defined in a universal and culturally-neutral way in the 
past but that such a conceptualisation was achieved or achievable today.8 As an answer to 
this misconception, this analysis will reveal how the cultural or civilisational values of 
particular societies have always been central to substantiate the meaning of – and thus to 
identify – sovereignty. Unsurprisingly, and given the dominance of the West, these values 
and the content of sovereignty have mainly been attached to Western notions of good 
government and civilisation. 
 
 Secondly, bringing the concepts of sovereignty and civilisation together does not 
imply that they become identical or indistinct. Rather, the two concepts are interlinked in 
two ways. Sovereignty can be defined as a final or superior form of political authority 
designed to achieve a civilised order, and the political authority that sovereignty refers to is 
central in identifying Civilisation (i.e. a superior form of society). Civilisation therefore has 
two meanings. First, it is used to ‘describe’ the cultural traits of a given population and its 
socio-political organisation.9 In this first understanding, a plurality of civilisations can 
coexist. In its second meaning, civilisation is necessarily singular – there can be only one 
civilisation – and it is used in a normative way to establish a superior and desirable form of 
these cultural traits and subsequently to classify societies depending on their achievement 
of this standard.10 As argued by Dickason (1997: xi) “[t]he word “civilized” is usually applied 
to societies possessing a state structure and an advanced technology; the general 
presumption is that their members must therefore have attained a relatively high degree of 
refinement in their manner of living”. Civilisation is thus at the heart of the division of men 
“into higher and lower forms of humanity” (White, 1972: 9) due to a strong belief in the 
superiority of an ideal and universal model that is not achieved (or has been corrupted) by 
some. As such, the notion of civilisation is intrinsically attached – and necessarily defined 
by opposition to – the idea of savagery. How the civilised and the savage can coexist is then 
usually explained by the notions of degeneration (of the civilised into the savage) or 
                                                          
7
 I purposefully leave aside the idea of ‘absoluteness’ that Hinsley mentions in his seminal definition. 
Associating sovereignty to absoluteness is misleading since the ‘absolute’ lies in the (civilisational) 
values that support sovereignty, and not in sovereignty itself. See chapter 3 for a more detailed 
explanation of this argument. 
8
 See the conclusion of Glanville’s analysis for a recent example (Glanville, 2014). 
9
 In this sense ‘civilisation’ is an equivalent to ‘culture’. The concepts of ‘culture’ and ‘civilisation’ will 
be used interchangeably when talking about the French (civilisational or cultural) values. 
10
 On the definition of civilisation see for instance Bowden (2009: Chapter 2) and Bettiza (2014). 
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underdevelopment (of the savage into a civilised state). In this thesis I reflect the 
widespread use of ‘civilisation’ in its normative sense and, unsurprisingly, it is the values of 
Western civilisation and societies that are taken as superior and desirable. It is in this sense 
that I refer to ‘civilised sovereignty’. Crucially, though, distinguishing between the two uses 
of the concept of ‘civilisation’ is only possible in theory. In practice, ‘describing’ social 
characteristics can hardly be detached from a broader belief in the superiority of one’s own 
societal features. In other words, description and assessment are always interlinked when 
one uses the concept of c/Civilisation. This is why these two meanings should not be 
separated too strictly. 
 
 
Domestic and international constructions of civilised 
sovereignty 
 
This thesis defends a post-colonial perspective on the concept of sovereignty and supports 
the view that sovereignty has always been linked to Western civilisation. Sovereignty is 
inseparable from the civilisational values that make it legitimate, hence true. But I also 
suggest that despite the large amount of research conducted by critical scholars we still 
lack a full understanding of the workings of civilised sovereignty. Indeed, post-colonial 
scholars have rarely engaged with how the civilised and sovereign identity of Western 
states is produced. In order to provincialise European sovereignty, they have focused their 
research primarily on the external side of the construction of civilised sovereignty. In other 
words, their interest has lain in the relations between the Western sovereign states and a 
(clearly constructed) ‘uncivilised’ Rest that was denied sovereignty. References to the 
contemporaneous internal construction of Western civilisation and sovereignty have been 
scarce and underdeveloped (Jahn, 2000: 63-64; Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 70-73; 
Anghie, 2005: 22-23). This emphasis on the encounters of the West with the non-West has 
been fruitful for it has revealed the intrinsic link between claims to sovereignty and claims 
to civilisation.  
 
But this analytical choice could mislead one into believing that an internalist 
account of the construction of sovereignty is necessarily Eurocentric while only the external 
encounter between Europeans and ‘savages’ could reveal Eurocentrism. What is missing is 
an explanation of how the Europeans dealt with their own civilisational doubts and how 
they constructed their own civilised sovereignty at the same time as they were denying it 
to others. Indeed, this specific focus has engendered a disconnection between the analysis 
of the ‘domestic’ task of statecraft and the ‘international’ affirmation of sovereignty. A 
‘two-tier’ game of sovereignty is thus created with sovereignty being constructed 
differently in the West and in/over the non-West. ‘Domestic’ sovereignty has not been 
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shown to be equally reliant on discourses of civilisation and savagery as ‘international’ 
sovereignty. In other words, the establishment of the sovereign Self could be expected to 
follow different rules in what will become the internal sphere of the sovereign state. The 
colonial frontier thus established – the demarcation established between the West and 
Rest – strangely mirrors the colonial discourses of the West. The Western state appears as 
perfectly in control of civilisational norms so that the ‘domestic’ task of statecraft does not 
seem to rely on constructed civilisation. By opposition, the emphasis of the ‘international’ 
manufacturing of sovereignty could lead to restrict the savage to the external – hence 
producing the savage as being a necessarily non-Western entity. 
 
In this thesis I offer a sympathetic critique of post-colonial analyses of sovereignty 
by revealing how the concepts of civilisation and savagery are at the centre of the 
‘domestic’ and ‘international’ construction of the sovereign state. Civilisation transcends 
the internal-external frontier: it is an internal construct influenced by external encounters 
and applied both internally and externally. As such a focus on the constant re-construction 
and re-creation of civilisation enables me to question the internal/external divide that 
emerges from an exclusive focus on the external claims to sovereignty of Western states. 
Because civilisation is a notoriously ambiguous construct and because civilised identities 
are never easily or naturally achieved, an exploration of the very construction of civilisation 
and savagery in the ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ spheres reveals the unexpected 
similarities and doubts that pervade the establishment of civilised sovereignty on both 
sides. More specifically, this thesis proposes that a non-Eurocentric approach should 
capture both the internal and international dimensions of ‘writing civilised sovereignty’ in 
order to reveal inherent ambiguities and unexpected similarities of the process of 
statecraft conducted in both spheres.11 If sovereignty indeed “acquired its character 
through the colonial encounter” (Anghie, 2005: 29), the internal side of this encounter 
needs to be reintegrated into the picture so as to account both for the creation of the 
uncivilised Other and of the civilised Self. By focusing on one example of the construction 
of the civilised sovereign in the West this thesis adds a missing dimension to the post-
colonial deconstruction of sovereignty. Indeed, integrating the internal side of civilised 
sovereignty reveals how a similar grammar of civilisation is used to support claims to 
sovereignty inside the West. Additionally, it reveals how savagery is as much present in the 
‘civilised’ West as in the ‘savage’ Rest. In other words, colonial encounters also happened 
‘in’ the West and were equally important for the question of the sovereign state. Thanks to 
the reintegration of the internal side, the establishment of a civilised Western identity is 
shown to be the fragile and temporary result of a difficult process designed to present 
savagery as ‘outside’ the sovereign state. This thesis reveals how a similar (and similarly 
discriminatory although with different consequences) application of the notion of 
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 This is all the more important in a context where similarities between the ‘civilised’ and ‘savage’ 
are regularly noticed by scholars. Pagden (1982: 36, 97, 150, 161) for instance repeatedly mentions 
how, during the ‘Discovery’ of America, the Spanish drew links and parallels between the 
Amerindians and the peasants and unschooled masses of Spain. Closer to the case-study of this 




civilisation is at play in both the West and the non-West when sovereignty is discussed and 
legitimised. It offers one example of this process and as such rebalances the focus of post-
colonial analyses away from the supposed ‘exceptional’, ‘radical’ and ‘savage’ non-West to 
the day-to-day processes through which the West builds its own (civilised and sovereign) 
identity over its own Other and over the non-Western Others. 
 
Second, and in order to further deconstruct the Eurocentric character of 
sovereignty, this thesis emphasises how difference is forged out of a striking number of 
similarities in terms of institutions and practices between the civilised and savage worlds. A 
focus on the very process of performing civilisation and savagery reveals that the 
distinction between civilised and savage is complex and always in need of reaffirmation. An 
emphasis on the tortuous discourses of civilised sovereignty reveals how ambiguous and 
contradictory the construction of (un)civilised identities can be. This is primarily due to the 
civilised/savage nexus, i.e. the required presence of the savage in order to ‘identify’ the 
civilised. In fact, the very distinction civilised/savage is in constant need of (re-)creation and 
(re-)production both in the West and in its encounter with the non-West. I discuss in details 
how this difference can only be established though the use of inherited and pervasive 
frameworks for the understand of human societies and their evolution. Building upon some 
post-colonial insights about the familiarity of the savage Other (Inayatullah and Blaney, 
2004; Seth, 2001; Nandy, 1983), I explain how civilisational difference ironically relies on 
the identification of familiar (yet degenerated or underdeveloped) similarities between the 
civilised West and the savage non-West. The existence of ‘colonial frontiers’ (or distinctions 
between civilised and savage subjects) is thus not contested but their very construction is 
placed at the centre of the analysis and shown to be central for the task of statecraft. 
Further, my analysis reveals how two colonial frontiers – one ‘internal’ between sovereign 
actors and their Others and one ‘external’ between the civilised and the savage – coexist 
and reinforce each other in the writing of the sovereign state. 
 
Such a re-integration of the domestic ‘colonial encounter’ of the West with its own 
Others is important for our understanding of sovereignty. First, it shows how sovereignty 
must be seen as a political site of struggle irrespective of where (or upon whom) it is 
claimed. As discussed in this thesis, establishing sovereignty is a complex process riddled 
with doubts and ambiguities both in the West and in the non-West. Such a struggle could 
be restricted to simple political or material gains: different actors would thus compete for 
sovereignty in the hope of maximising their power. While I do not deny the importance of  
this motivation, the specific form that this contest for power takes both ‘inside’ and 
‘outside’ the sovereign state reveals the centrality of civilisation to the task of statecraft 
and the inherent ambiguities that result from it. Indeed, and because civilisation is an ever-
reproduced but always de-stabilised construct, both the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ processes 
of claiming sovereignty are riddled with civilisational doubts. The construction of 
sovereignty, however, is bound to these ambiguities due to its reliance on civilisation: 
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actors claiming sovereignty require the presence of a savage that they must also 
differentiate themselves from (or domesticate and render inoffensive).  
 
Second, and interlinked with the above, juxtaposing the ‘internal’ and 
‘international’ processes of statecraft reinforces the critique of the image of the sovereign 
state as unitary and uniform (an image that mainstream IR strives to preserve). In this 
perspective, the (Western) sovereign state represents a coherent unit implicitly or explicitly 
unified by its nationality or culture. Thus, most IR scholars would consider looking at the 
formation of domestic or internal sovereignty is at best futile and at worse an attack on the 
successful model that Western states are supposed to embody. For mainstream IR, the 
savage Others are always and only found outside the sovereign state. Re-integrating the 
‘internal’ dimension of civilised sovereignty enables me to counter that view and to discuss 
how colonial encounters happen inside the protected and advanced Western state. In 
these instances, the savage Other is portrayed as part of the sovereign state in the same 
way as the external Other is portrayed as part of the international system: both are 
relegated to the margins. The presence of the internal Other – which is necessary for claims 
to sovereignty to succeed – thus contradicts the simplistic view of the sovereign state as 
coherent and uniform. 
 
Finally, considering the ‘internal’ side along the ‘external’ one enables the 
identification and comparison of two colonial frontiers: one ‘inside’ the sovereign state and 
one ‘outside’ of it. As will be discussed, these two frontiers function in similar ways and 
have the same purpose: allocating an indisputable sovereignty to the representatives of the 
Western state. Because they separate the civilised from the savage, these frontiers are 
crucial political tools in the legitimation of claims to sovereignty. It is thus through the 
construction and reproduction of these two frontiers that the hyper agency of the West 
(Hobson, 2012) emerges and is maintained. 
 
 
Re-assessing sovereignty in an intercultural world 
 
  This thesis makes several contributions to our understanding of sovereignty and to 
international (or rather intercultural) relations more generally. First, it participates in the 
critique of the Eurocentric assumptions that characterise most IR literature on sovereignty 
by challenging those scholars who still use the concept as a supposedly pluralistic and 
accommodating political principle. This is particularly the case when sovereignty is 
minimally defined as ‘independence from outside interference’ or as ‘final and absolute 
authority’. By attributing this minimalist meaning to ‘sovereignty’ these scholars overlook 
the necessarily Eurocentric definition of this ‘independence’ and ‘authority’. More 
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importantly, they ignore the way international relations are primarily relations among 
cultures (as shown by the way sovereignty is always defined by cultural values). I show how 
the concept of sovereignty always requires a cultural or civilisational framework to acquire 
its full meaning. As such, the traditional, Westphalian definition is revealed to be highly 
misleading insofar as it overlooks the Eurocentric content of sovereignty. This thesis also 
takes issue with scholars who defend the superiority of the successful (Western) sovereign 
state (Keohane, 2002; Fukuyama, 2004). Defending the success of the Western sovereign 
model is the result of a normative judgement made from a particular cultural or 
civilisational viewpoint. As such, the objectivity that these scholars usually claim as the 
basis of their assessment can be legitimately questioned. Additionally, declaring ‘success’ 
and superiority usually obscures the similarities between ‘successful’ and ‘failed’ states that 
are at the centre of this thesis. It thus plays a central role in the glorification of the Western 
model of statehood that is achieved only by erasing the ‘successful’ traits of the supposedly 
‘failed’ states and the ‘failed’ traits of the supposedly successful states. 
 
Third, this thesis criticises scholars who try to establish empirically-produced 
conceptualisations of sovereignty (Thomson, 1995; Krasner, 2010; Berg and Kuusk, 2010). 
These scholars maintain that establishing a scientific definition of sovereignty is possible 
and that thanks to this objectivity their conceptualisations of sovereignty can be applied as 
a universal standard. They thus associate the supposed objectivity of their 
conceptualisation to what they identify as a more acceptable way of defining sovereignty. 
In this thesis these claims to produce empirical conceptualisations of sovereignty are 
problematised by the recognition that the foundations of sovereignty – and in particular 
appeals to civilisation and savagery – result from discursive claims. These foundations are 
not part of an independent and given reality that would be objectively identifiable by 
anyone looking for the right criteria (that these scholars struggle to identify). As such, these 
scholars insisting on producing an empirical definition of sovereignty in effect participate in 
the establishment of the very foundations of what they ‘describe’.  
 
Fourthly, this thesis insists on the centrality of the notions of savagery and 
civilisation in the discursive construction of sovereignty, a point that is omitted by most 
constructivists. Constructivists usually emphasise “shared norms about what it means to be 
a sovereign state” (Wendt, 1992: 413) but they overlook the civilisational origins of these 
norms. More generally, the ways inequalities and hierarchies contribute to the norms of 
international politics (such as sovereignty) are usually elided in the constructivist literature. 
I argue that no account of sovereignty can be complete if the role of the West – and of the 
constructed superiority of its civilisation – is neglected. I also reject the tendency in 
constructivist works to associate civilised sovereignty to a revolved (because imperialist 
and colonial) past. By doing so, these works obscures the way colonial logics still influence 




I thus criticise the varied attempts at making sense of sovereignty that ignore or 
consider as unproblematic the role of culture(s) in international politics. I argue that the 
shortcomings of these approaches all originate from this neglect and argue that a renewed 
emphasis on the cultural aspect of relations between human groups can inform our 
understanding of ‘international relations’. This is why this thesis builds upon post-colonial 
analyses of sovereignty by arguing that the process of statecraft depends on complex and 
ambiguous readings of civilisation. This thesis also takes post-colonial analyses of 
sovereignty one step further by showing how the construction of the unified, sovereign and 
civilised Self is the (temporary and unstable) result of a difficult process of identity-creation 
designed to silence ambiguities and doubts. At the other end of the spectrum, I also engage 
with how the savage and unsovereign identity of the non-West is created out of countless 
potential similarities with the ‘civilised’ West. This thesis thus participates in the 
recognition of the importance of culture (and thus of discriminatory practices based on 
cultural (mis)recognition) in IR (Jahn, 2000)). When Benton (2009: 279) writes that “[w]e 
know sovereignty when we see it – at least we think we do”, she in fact touches upon a 
fundamental aspect: we know what sovereignty is but cannot articulate a satisfying (i.e. 
scientific) definition that would be detached from our own cultural background. If we agree 
that “the exercise of sovereignty is a political fact” (Morgenthau, 1948/1973: 324) our 
attention should be re-focused on the fundamental questions of politics: what makes a 
community political, what makes a group of people a society, and more generally how is 
political (good) life defined? To answer these questions one has to investigate the way 
these elements are culturally identified when sovereignty is claimed or denied. 
 
In addition, my analysis of sovereignty questions the exclusive focus on the non-
West in post-colonial analyses. As argued by Seth (2011: 174): 
 
This world was not born out of the West having an impact upon and ‘awakening’ a 
dormant non-West, but out of both of these being constituted in the course of 
multifarious (unequal, hierarchical and usually coercive) exchanges, such that 
neither was left untouched. 
 
One should thus refuse to isolate the West and its evolution from its encounters with the 
non-West. Nevertheless, exclusively focusing on the non-West creates a risk of separating 
these two entities too firmly and restricting colonial logics of power and domination 
(including the idea of ‘civilisation’) to the colonial world. Anghie (2005: 38), for instance, 
writes that “sovereignty was constituted through colonialism”. One could therefore 
conclude from this statement that an analysis of the encounter between the West and the 
non-West is enough to account for the creation and workings of the concept. In 
contradistinction, this thesis supports the view that if sovereignty is indeed a Eurocentric 
construct, how it is managed inside the West is as important as the way it is denied to the 
non-West. Additionally, such a focus on the non-West creates the expectation that the 
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non-West is necessarily different from the West, an assumption that has been rightly 
criticised by Bilgin (2008). My combination of case-studies in the West and the non-West 
and my exploration of the way difference has to be produced out of similarity enables me 
to question these assumptions further and to support the view that a post-colonial critique 
should also encompass the Western dimension of sovereignty. 
 
 
From sovereignty to international relations: broader 
implications 
 
Given its focus on sovereignty and the centrality of this concept as an organising political 
principle, this thesis has direct implications for the way we understand international 
relations more generally. First, my analysis replaces international relations in the domain of 
the ‘cultural’ by emphasising that core concepts such as sovereignty are culturally 
constructed. International relations are essentially intercultural relations, and as such the 
way cultures perceive each other (as different) is crucial to the functioning of our 
international ‘society’. Nevertheless, and save for a few exceptions, IR has evaded the issue 
of cultural as irrelevant and somehow inconvenient for conceptualising international 
relations. 
 
 In this thesis, I discuss how cultural encounters took place when French sovereignty 
was formed or claimed.12 I point at the specific limits of such an exercise, namely the 
difficulty of perceiving the Other in her own terms. Exploring the creation of sovereignty 
reveals how the Other is read according to the Self’s expectations, which results in the 
creation of a familiar difference. The Other is essentially inscribed into a familiar framework 
where she becomes an antithesis of the Self. Thus, the possibility of a genuine dialogue 
between cultures – or civilisations – is reduced to the encounter between a Self and an 
anti-Self. Because international relations are primarily relations between cultures, the 
question of how cultures interact with each other – how they constitute themselves, 
perceive each other and act with or upon them – should be the central concern for IR 
scholars.  
 
 Looking at sovereignty and at its links with civilisation also highlights the 
importance of colonial frontiers in international relations. These frontiers correspond to 
the differentiation established and constantly reproduced between the civilised and the 
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 Interestingly, these encounters also took place ‘domestically’ or internally. This is due to the fact 
that the Other is always a politicised construction and can also appear or be constructed inside of 
supposedly uniform cultures (such as the French one). 
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savage. Such frontiers are both internal and external to the sovereign state, which means 
that the internal Other is never far from the external one. These civilisational hierarchies 
are not only relevant for sovereignty: they also inform other international practices such as 
war or state-building. Interpreting these practices through the prism of the colonial 
frontiers on which they rely could clarify some of their logics. State-building, for instance, is 
informed by a vision of the failed, non-Western local societies as ‘young’, immature and 
non-organised politically (all ideas that draw upon the imaginary of savagery). 
Acknowledging the presence of these colonial frontiers could thus help deconstruct state-
building practices. In addition, these hierarchies illustrate the preponderance of the 
colonial logic of inclusion-exclusion in our international society: the Others are included 
into the colonial framework – they are assigned a place on the civilisational ladder as 
underdeveloped or degenerate – but at the same time this very characterisation excludes 
them by relegating them to the margins of this order. I believe this type of inclusion-
exclusion dynamic to be central to the way international (or intercultural) relations are 
organised and managed. Studying sovereignty thus raises a number of central questions 
about the way international relations are organised around cultural encounters and about 
how IR as a discipline deals with – or rather avoids dealing with – some of the problematic 
aspect of these encounters. 
 
 
Case-studies and methodology 
 
In order to explore these topics, my work focuses on France in the 16th century. More 
specifically, three aspects are of interest: the way sovereignty was conceptualised in France 
at the time, the way France performed its sovereignty over the non-West, and finally the 
manner in which the French sovereigns ensured their sovereignty internally. For these 
three topics I rely on 16th century French archival sources in order to explore the 
conceptual apparatus deployed in the construction of sovereign claims at the time; i.e. how 
ideas were used and combined in the French conceptualisations of civilised sovereignty. A 
detailed analysis of the archives allows me to thoroughly explore the complex process of 
writing civilised sovereignty and the ways doubts and ambiguities were present and dealt 
with. Readers should be aware that to the exception of one text all of the archives used in 
this thesis have been translated but also adapted into modern English from the French 
language used at the time. This adaptation has been made necessary by the difficulty of 
reading these texts in the original 16th century French. Not only is the syntax different from 
modern French but the vocabulary and spelling also differ greatly from modern standards. 
As a result, the only solution was to adapt these sixteenth-century sources into a language 




Situating this conceptual history in the 16th century is justified for two reasons. 
First, European explorations of America happening at the time represent a major 
civilisational encounter. Like the majority of (post-colonial) scholars who focused on the 
period Todorov (1982: 13) estimates that “the encounter will never reach such an intensity 
again”. That the period of the ‘Discovery’ of America that happened from 1492 and 
throughout the 16th century is now considered as the beginning of modern international 
relations (and of its institutions) is uncontroversial. Anghie (2005: 15), for instance, argued 
that “international law was created out of the unique issues generated by the encounter 
between the Spanish and the Indians”. The ‘Discovery’ of America – and, more importantly, 
of the Amerindians – is thus usually considered as marking the beginning of the (modern) 
European colonial and imperialistic practices (Quijano, 2000; Mignolo, 2002; Maldonado‐
Torres, 2004). This is not to deny that such a statement might be overstated (Pagden, 1986) 
but it remains widely accepted (Bain, 2003: 13). Although less frequently studied than 
Spain, France represents a good case-study in the context of this colonial encounter. In 
particular, the French were involved early on in this process and their attention focused on 
one area (the Eastern part of contemporary Canada) that they sought to control and 
colonise.13 
 
But the 16th century is also characterised by the intensification of the centralisation 
of the sovereign power in the hands of the European monarchs. This process required 
justifications against ‘internal’ competitors as well as ‘external’ opponents, and France is a 
representative example of these struggles. In particular, scholars agree that the end of the 
16th century and the advent of Henry IV to the throne mark the triumph of absolutism in 
France (Weill, 1892). In fact, “[t]he vital influence of [this] period of strife and confusion 
was to prepare the land for absolutism” (Church, 1969: 303). This thesis thus focuses on 
one particular example of crisis: the last period of the Wars of Religion (1584-1598). Some 
historians insist that ‘absolutism’ can only be associated with Louis XIV in the 17th century 
(Jackson et al., 1974: 60) but my interest lies not in comparing the ‘level’ or ‘effectiveness' 
of the French kings’ power nor in establishing how much control they exercised over their 
kingdom but rather in studying how their claims to sovereignty were constructed. The 16th 
century, and in particular the crises that marked the end of this century in France, are a 
fertile ground for such an enquiry. Choosing France in the 16th century is thus not an 
attempt at finding the ‘origin’ of the establishment of sovereignty in the West. Rather, this 
historical episode offers an analytically rich example of a ‘crisis of sovereignty’, i.e. a ‘de-
linking’ of the previous or current holder of sovereignty with the civilisational values that 
underlie the concept. This is particularly useful since “performances of the state are often 
more explicit where changes are desired” (Jeffrey, 2013: 2).14 In other words, this period 
enables me to put the accepted and institutionalised ideas of the modern state ‘at a 
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 A more specific historical context is given in chapter 4. 
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 This period, however, is not exceptional. Far from being a one-time occurrence, crises of 
sovereignty were frequent in the process of centralization of the French state. Moreover, if 




distance’ in order to identify their construction in what is a particularly tumultuous political 
period (Bourdieu et al., 1994; Bourdieu, 2012; Shapiro, 2002: 615).  
 
France in the 16th century thus offers an interesting case both for the external and 
internal construction of civilised sovereignty. Following Kalmo and Skinner’s advice that 
“we are sure to go astray if, in studying the nature of sovereignty, history is not given its 
proper weight” (Kalmo and Skinner, 2010: 7), this thesis contributes to the (supposed) 
return to History in IR. Challenging the common-sense argument that “[a] great deal of IR 
displays little interest in history” (Seth, 2011: 169), Hobson and Lawson (2008) have shown 
that in reality most of the discipline is informed by historical analyses that can take several 
forms. This thesis contributes to what they term ‘historical sociology’, i.e. a form of 
historical analysis that “combine[s] rich historical insights with major theoretical 
statements” (Lawson, 2010: 210). In order to achieve this goal this thesis makes use of an 
extensive range of primary sources spanning the 16th and early 17th centuries. In other 
words, I offer “a focus on the historical details of particular dimensions of international 
relations, but also an emphasis on causal explanations wherever these were located, 
specifying how patterns, configurations and sets of social relations combined in particular 
contexts to determine certain outcomes” (Hobson and Lawson, 2008: 433; see also 
Trachtenberg, 2006).  
 
 In the context of an historical study of state sovereignty archives are particularly 
relevant. Indeed, they are a form of “informational capital” of the state (Bourdieu et al., 
1994: 7). In fact, “there is no state without archives – without its archives” (Mbembe, 2002: 
23). In France, the place of their conservation was called ‘treasure’ during the Middle Ages 
(Delsalle, 2007: 9) which highlights their importance to the state. I have selected a large 
number of texts for the three topics under study (the French conceptualisation of 
sovereignty, the French vision of the Amerindians, and the French political crisis at the end 
of the century) and I have tried to be as exhaustive as possible. My study relies on more 
than 100 archival sources (including manuscripts and published works now held in archival 
collections) as well as on compilations of primary sources. The vast majority of these 
sources were written by or with the ascent of ‘the state’. In other words, they received an 
authorisation to be published or emanated from individuals in positions of authority. As 
such, these sources reflect (sometimes in different ways or with different emphases) an 
official view of the state and of its sovereign character. As will become clear, this does not 
imply that one cannot identity fragilities and ambiguities in them. Nevertheless, one should 
also be conscious that these sources are unlikely to reveal dissenting views. 
 
Although exhaustivity is always difficult to establish with certainty, I am confident 
that my thesis offers a comprehensive analysis of the issues studied. I have also used 
secondary sources for context and in order to identify sources that I might otherwise not 
have discovered. I almost exclusively cite from the originals, however, because I believe 
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that a return to the texts themselves is more fruitful than relying on secondary sources and 
the interpretations of other scholars. In my chapters I do not discriminate between 
widespread and confidential works since the fact that a work could be published at all 
means that it reflects “an element of contemporary opinion” (Dickason, 1997: xv). For the 
topic of the crisis of sovereignty in France, I have relied on the original pamphlets and 
declarations reproduced by Goulart and Goujet and complemented them with manuscript 
sources. Exhaustiveness is more difficult to assert in this case given the sheer amount of 
archives available to the researcher. My criterion for including archives in the analysis has 
been their ‘publicity’: private letters do not perform sovereignty in the same way as public 
declarations or royal edicts. Pamphlets, for instance, are particularly relevant sources. In 
addition, letters and documents relating to the tactics of the political crisis (in particular to 
military strategy) have not been included as they have little relevance when one wishes to 
explore the conceptual apparatus deployed in the construction of sovereignty claims at the 
time. 
 
 In my use of archives, I am sympathetic to several concerns expressed by critical 
scholars. First, the need for context is crucial as it enables an evaluation of “the 
interpretation against the sources” (L'Eplattenier, 2009: 75). I have therefore tried to 
include as much context as possible. I also recognise the uniqueness of certain documents 
and do not present them as ‘one example among many’. Documents for which the 
provenance and authorship were impossible to establish with certainty have been excluded 
from the analysis. I have also deliberately refused to discriminate between important 
authors (or ‘canons’) and minor works. Even if some canonical figures can be identified 
(one can think of Bodin for instance) I have chosen to include what lesser-known actors 
wrote as well. Such a focus also reveals a fuller picture of the intellectual construction of 
civilised sovereignty. This is helpful in generalising the findings and showing how the 
specific construction of a civilised difference uncovered in this thesis was a widespread 
phenomenon (and not the result of a personal or individual intellectual disposition). 
Additionally, restricting the scope of the enquiry to the ‘canons’ runs the risk of focusing on 
authors and actors that are nowadays considered as essential. As this thesis demonstrates 
other authors are equally important and innovative although less-known today.  
 
Despite being sympathetic to this more reflexive use of archives found in recent 
methodological texts, there is one aspect that I have disregarded. Critical scholars working 
with historical material are generally interested in the way archives were produced and 
what documents were preserved or forgotten (Stoler, 2002). Instead of focusing on the 
content of the documents, these scholars study how the very process of archiving (certain) 
documents can reveal interesting dynamics and repressed ‘realities’ (Mbembe, 2002). Such 
an analysis, however, requires uncovering texts and documents that were (by definition) 
excluded or forgotten, or else compare the official records with events as they are 
described by historians. Given my focus on sixteenth-century sources this process appeared 
to be extremely complex. In addition, my interest in the ambiguity of these discourses 
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means that I am able to reveal the alternatives and unrealised potentialities contained in 
these archival documents despite their archiving by and for the dominant groups.15 
 
 My reading of these texts is informed – and in some ways limited – by my use of 
performativity as a theoretical framework. As detailed in chapter 2, I consider that the 
discourses of sovereignty (like the ones offered by the archives analysed here) create the 
very realities of the civilised state that they supposedly describe. This is why I agree with 
Todorov (1989: 14) and his approach to texts: 
 
I do not consider past doctrines as the pure expression of the interests of their 
author: I recognise in them a certain truth dimension. Going through discourses to 
access the world is perhaps a convoluted road, but it is a road that leads to the 
world nevertheless (…) Ideas do not make history on their own: social and 
economic forces also act. But ideas do not have a purely passive effect either. 
 
In other words, considering ideas as mere consequences of (external and pre-existing) 
interests would mean abandoning their study and logically refocusing the analysis on these 
underlying interests.16 In contrast, my approach does not seek to avoid the idea of interests 
and power (and of their importance in framing discourses) but rather to show how 
discursively constructing the world is one of the strategies employed by the powerful (that 
in turn constrains her actions). As Cocks (2014: 49) writes “[t]he insufficiency of force as a 
ground for political authority explains why political power invariably tries to root itself in a 
moral or prudential principle of some sort”.17  
 
 In considering these texts as performative I circumscribe my analysis to what their 
authors perform (or silence) through their writings. I am thus limiting my understanding to 
what some consider to be a ‘textual’ or rhetorical reality. The obvious limit of such an 
approach is the lack of critical comparison with competing, often non-textual, alternative 
realities. Despite this limitation, I believe that such an approach can paradoxically bring us 
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 For a reflection on the intrinsic limits of a focus on dominant discourses see the conclusion of this 
thesis. 
16
 This is what Jennings (1976: 59) proposes. Writing about the English colonial discourses 
surrounding the ‘Discovery’ of America he argues that “[a] basic rule was that any given Englishman 
at any given time formed his views in accordance with his purposes (…) In short, like the most 
modern of architects, the Englishman devised the savage’s form to fit his function”. 
17
 Material gains or power are therefore insufficient to understand our social or cultural reality (and 
in particular the issues of domination and colonialism). Nandy (1983: x) explains that “the drive for 
mastery over men is not merely a by-product of a faulty political economy but also of a world view 
which believes in the absolute superiority of the human over the nonhuman and the subhuman, the 
masculine over the feminine, the adult over the child, the historical over the ahistorical, and the 
modern or progressive over the traditional or the savage”. 
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closer to an historical ‘truth’. For the French exploration of Canada, for instance, I rely on 
the knowledge produced by the travellers, merchants and early ethnographers. However 
‘artificial’ or biased, it is this knowledge (and not the supposedly more complete reality 
living outside these texts) that influenced the political decisions taken at the time. This 
direct influence is acknowledged by the French king himself in 1603: “Having known [these 
lands] for a long time thanks to the accounts of the captains of our ships, pilots, merchants 
and others who have for a long time sojourned, visited and trafficked with the peoples 
there” (B.N.F., Dupuy 318: f. 100) .18 As argued by Dickason (1997: xiii) “[t]he fact that such 
views had little to do with reality did not mitigate their fundamental importance in 
colonization”. While I agree on the importance of these views for the course of action that 
the French took, I refuse to compare and oppose their views to a ‘more real’ reality like 
Dickason does. This is the ‘reality’ to which the French reacted and upon which they acted. 
It is thus far more important to understand it than to describe how the Amerindians were 
supposedly ‘really’ living in the 16th century (which, incidentally, would be the result of 
another discursive process). 
 
 Finally, and as much as is possible in any research project, I took an inductive 
approach and let the archives define the central argument of this thesis. In fact, the long 
period of archival work wielded surprising results that came to contradict some of my 
earlier hypotheses. On three central points, the archives proved themselves to conflict with 
my expectations: first, the Amerindians of Canada were not obviously savage for the 
French. Instead, their descriptions sometimes lead the reader to the conclusion that they 
were as civilised as the French.19 Second, the Amerindians did not figure prominently in the 
French texts of the period. They were neither central in the intellectual discussions on 
sovereignty nor in the struggles that took place during the War of Religions. Thirdly and 
lastly, these struggles revealed that the French were more savage than I had expected. One 
can indeed find countless ‘descriptions’ of French savagery despite France being a 
supposedly civilised place. On these three topics, my (perhaps naïve) expectations proved 
wrong and the whole picture of statecraft emerged as vastly more complex than I had 
anticipated. The analysis of the archives collected forced me to rethink some of my 
assumptions that proved misleading. What the reader will find in this thesis is an attempt 
to make sense of the task of statecraft that I believe to be as accurate as possible given that 
it was guided primarily by my ‘discoveries’ in the archives. Whether my mistaken 
expectations make this thesis less ‘political’ than if I had followed my initial hypotheses is 
dubious; what is clear, however, is that these unexpected results have made this thesis 
different (including in its political claims). 
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 Aurigny (1554: f. 162v-163) also mentions the importance of the compilations (Cosmographie) 
published at the time. For him, these books should be consulted by rulers “so that what they cannot 
see with their eyes they understand in their mind and spirit”. These works present rulers who cannot 
travel themselves with “all the things that are admirable and new in the world” and their description 
makes us think that “we see them with our [own] eyes”. The importance of these discourses is thus 
not overstated. 
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 I am not referring here to the ‘noble savage’ idea but rather to elements of civilisation (such as the 







This thesis starts with the conceptual and theoretical considerations on sovereignty that 
will subsequently guide the analysis in the four main empirical chapters. These four 
empirical chapters are designed to explore the links between sovereignty and (Western) 
civilisation as well as to understand how claims to civilised sovereignty are built and 
maintained.  
 
Chapter 1 reviews the different approaches to sovereignty that have flourished in 
IR in the last 25 years. I argue that conventional analyses have not offered convincing 
conceptualisations due to their search for a universally and culturally neutral concept of 
sovereignty. Moving away from these shortcomings, I explain how post-structuralist 
alternatives have emphasised the intrinsic normativity of sovereignty and how post-
colonial scholars have rightly identified the importance of Western civilisation for the 
construction of sovereignty. The end of this chapter explains how this thesis expands upon 
the insights offered by post-colonial scholars in order to offer a more complete picture of 
the creation of civilised sovereignty. 
 
Chapter 2 outlines the theoretical approach adopted for studying the discourses of 
sovereignty. In this thesis I consider performativity as the best way to understand these 
discourses. Performativity allows one to study how discourses help constitute – or enact – 
reality. It enables me to study how the language of sovereignty is not descriptive but 
“constitutive for what is brought into being” (Hansen, 2006: 15). As such, performativity 
transcends the usual binaries between reality and discourse or between nature and 
culture. This is what makes performativity particularly relevant when it comes to explaining 
how sovereign discourses are founded on a cultural construction of reality masquerading as 
a ‘description’ of a ‘pre-existing nature’. 
 
In chapter 3, I explore how sovereignty was understood and conceptualised by the 
French in the 16th century. This chapter reveals that no conceptualisation of sovereignty 
could be disconnected from cultural elements (unsurprisingly) referring to French 
standards of civilisation. It is thus not only a generic or undefined form of higher political 
authority that French theorists build but a specific form of exercising political power in a 
community. In particular, the notions of ‘progress’ and ‘evolution’ were crucial to help 
them justify why the French king(s) were naturally sovereign. I also discuss how the idea of 
‘absoluteness’ usually associated with sovereignty in fact lies with the civilisational values 
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that support the concept. In the concluding section, I explain that French theorists 
inherited these notions of civilisation and evolution (or progress) from earlier ideological 
constructs (and in particular from Antiquity and the Middle Ages). 
 
Chapter 3 serves as a basis for the following three chapters. Indeed, the standard 
of sovereignty established by these political thinkers and their reliance on pre-existing 
notions of civilisation are then analysed ‘in practice’. Chapter 4 focuses on the blurring of 
identities between the civilised and the savage. Indeed, some perceptions of the 
Amerindians by the French render them as civilised beings living a social and organised life 
akin to a sovereign state. This is all the more surprising as the Amerindians of Canada are 
not part of an ‘advanced’ (i.e. easily comparable to the European standards of the time) 
society like the Aztecs. At the same time as civilisation is ‘discovered’ in America, the 
sovereignty of the French kings is under attack because of their savagery. Opponents 
indeed construct an image of the monarchs diametrically opposed to that defended by the 
theorists. As such, sovereignty is in doubt and (civilised and savage) identities not clearly 
attributed. In the concluding section I reflect more broadly on the consequences of this 
instability. In order to situate these events this chapter also offers an extensive historical 
introduction to the two cases under study. 
 
The following chapter explores how the sovereign is established or re-established. 
Drawing on ideas of civilisation and savagery the task of statecraft is shown to revolve 
around the distancing of the sovereign from the savage Others. In the case of the 
Amerindians, this process takes the well-known form of performing the Amerindians as 
inferior, pre-social Others living in a state of nature. In the French domestic sphere, it is the 
French rebels who are characterised as savage and unworthy of sovereignty. In both cases, 
thus, a similar appeal to civilisation and savagery is used in the task of constructing 
sovereignty. Two colonial frontiers (one ‘internal’ and one ‘external’) thus emerge through 
and are alimented by the discourses of sovereignty. 
 
In Chapter 6, I discuss how the distinction civilised-savage that is central for 
sovereignty is naturalised and as such reinforced. Discourses of sovereignty indeed cement 
the civilisational differentiation on which they rely for their legitimacy. This chapter 
discusses the different strategies used for this purpose. Performed identities thus appear 
‘natural’ and the co-constitution of the sovereign civilised Self and of the savage dependent 
Other reinforces the inevitable aspect of the colonial frontier. Sovereignty can thus 
‘triumph’ without obstacles. 
 
Finally, the conclusion draws together the different chapters. I briefly restate my 
general argument about the centrality of civilisation and savagery in the domestic and 
external processes of constructing sovereignty and then turn to some of the broader (and 
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contemporary) implications of my analysis. I also outline some areas for future research 






Revealing civilised sovereignty: 
achievements and limits of (post-












Since the 1990s, the traditional definition of sovereignty has been challenged a countless 
number of times in an ever growing literature. This widespread dissatisfaction with the 
conceptualisation of sovereignty has come to form a genuine ‘new wave’ of analyses of 
sovereignty: Sørensen (1999: 590) talks about a “renewed interest in sovereignty”, Onuf 
(1991: 425) of “a burst of attention” for the concept of sovereignty, and Weber (1992: 199) 
of a “revival of academic scrutiny concerning sovereign statehood”.20 For Bartelson (2006: 
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 As noticed by Blaney and Inayatullah (2000: 29), it is “[o]nly fairly recently has sovereignty 
appeared to us once again as a puzzle”. For Sørensen (1999: 590), “[o]nly a few years ago, 
sovereignty used to be taken for granted in the study of world politics” whereas it is today “being 
intensely debated among scholars and practitioners of world politics”. And for Prokhovnik (2007: 1) 
sovereignty “is currently open to positive reconceptualisation”. 
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462), “[t]he concept of sovereignty, once relatively uncontested, has recently become a 
major bone of contention within international law and international relations theory”. This 
“explosion” (Biersteker and Weber, 1996a: 1; Prokhovnik, 2007: 41), however, should not 
be overstated. In his history of the discipline, Schmidt has shown that the discourse of 
anarchy that was central to the development of IR is intertwined with a discourse of 
sovereignty, and therefore with debates around the precise meaning and implications of 
the concept of sovereignty. As he observes, “[t]he discipline of political science gained its 
original identity from the study of the state, and it made the topic of sovereignty one of its 
paramount theoretical concerns” (Schmidt, 1998: 41). Moreover, and already in 1990, 
some noticed that “[a] considerable literature [had] accumulated on our inability to 
respond adequately to the questions that are posed by the principle of state sovereignty” 
(Walker and Mendlovitz, 1990: 5).21 But interrogations on sovereignty have nevertheless 
acquired an unprecedented importance since the 1990s, thus confirming that scholars have 
recently (re-)directed their attention toward “the elusive concept of sovereignty” (Schmidt, 
1998: 240). 
 
 Most analyses, however, have proved disappointing for they have neglected the 
real source of the difficulties in conceptualising sovereignty. Indeed, scholars have 
identified different reason(s) for the reappraisal of sovereignty: mainstream scholars 
usually mention the ‘evolution(s)’ of the international system (like the supposed 
intensification of globalisation or the presence of ‘fragile’ and ‘failed’ states) as the main 
cause for the new wave of analyses on sovereignty. Indeed, with the presence of 
globalisation, trans-national actors and decolonised ‘states’, sovereignty seems to be 
eroding, transforming if not disappearing altogether. For others, it is the crisis of modernity 
and of its conceptual tools that is the main reason for the new wave of analyses of 
sovereignty (Onuf, 1991: 425).22 It will be argued in this chapter, however, that this 
explosion is the result of taking the minimalist definition of sovereignty as a starting point. 
In fact, the constant dissatisfaction with the concept lies in the attachment of most 
theorists to a minimally defined and supposedly neutral conceptualisation of sovereignty 
and in their reluctance to question this attachment. Such a conceptualisation finds its 
origins in the problematic – but still dominant – division in the conventional literature 
between the fields of IR and Politics and their respective topics. It is this separation “that 
makes IR theory as a separate body of knowledge possible” (Adler-Nissen, 2013: 180). 
Through this disciplinary divide external sovereignty (the form of sovereignty that matters 
in IR) is seen as detached from internal sovereignty, i.e. how communities organise their 
form of political authority. This is why most IR scholars claim that the traditional or minimal 
definition of sovereignty presented in the introduction is sufficient to understand 
international politics. Such a choice is thus linked to the necessity of preserving their 
disciplinary identity: a concept of sovereignty deprived of what is considered as ‘internal’ or 
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 In 1948 Morgenthau (1948/1973: 315) was already noticing that “despite the brilliant efforts of a 
few outstanding scholars, there is much confusion about the meaning of the term, and about what is 
and what is not compatible with the sovereignty of a particular nation”. 
22
 The association between sovereignty and modernity is also noticed by Jackson (1999: 431). 
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‘domestic’ (culture) enables IR scholars to safeguard their own academic territory. As a 
consequence, the notions of ‘culture’ or ‘civilisation’ are discarded as domestic and internal 
and as having no relevance for international relations (and external sovereignty). 
 
 This refusal to acknowledge the links between external sovereignty and ‘culture’ 
(that is still believed to be restricted to the domestic sphere) means that IR scholars are 
bound to reproduce the fiction of a ‘descriptive gap’ – a supposed ‘gap’ that sparked their 
interest in sovereignty in the first place. Indeed, and as exemplified below in the analyses 
of Jackson and Krasner, most conventional scholars try to ‘solve’ what they identify as a 
‘lack of fit’ or a “growing non-correspondence” (Lipping, 2010: 188) between the classical 
definition of sovereignty – as a final form of authority of a country guaranteeing freedom 
from outside interference – and the reality of imperialism, colonialism and interventions in 
international relations.23 The belief in this traditional and neutral definition of sovereignty 
only serves to re-create the same issues these scholars first faced. Indeed, non-Western 
states always appear as anomalies or deviations from the norm while Western states fulfil 
the conditions of sovereignty without the analyst being able to enunciate why in 
scientific/objective terms (recalling Benton’s claim mentioned in the introduction that we 
recognise sovereignty when we see it but are hardly able to articulate why). As Grovogui 
(2002: 316) argues: “Instead of treating the African condition as evidence that undermines 
the empirical thesis of a uniform international morality, theorists often construe deviations 
from the Western state model as a sign of the inability of African states to live up to the 
requirements of sovereignty”. Due to their attachment to the traditional definition of 
sovereignty conventional analyses are bound to reproduce unsatisfying explanations for 
the descriptive gap that result from this very definition. The recurrent attempts “to 
operationalize [sovereignty] into measurable, if not quantifiable, indicators” (Thomson, 
1995: 214) can only prove disappointing as long as the role of (domestic) culture(s) is not 
recognised. 
 
Both conventional and constructivist scholars thus end up deploring the supposed 
ambiguity of the concept, something that “has itself become a recurring motif in the 
literature on sovereignty” (Kalmo and Skinner, 2010: 1). They are unable to identify how 
the ‘gap’ is in fact the realisation of what sovereignty is (a Western-defined concept). They 
are also unable to recognise the consequences of supporting such a Eurocentric concept 
(for instance in terms of the inherent lack of independence of the non-West and the 
arbitrariness of what counts as valid sovereign institutions and values). Hence, 
“[c]ontinuing to treat the state [or sovereignty] as an unproblematic concept in our 
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 Lipping (2010: 188) argues that “[t]he classical framework appears to be increasingly unable to 
make sense of new phenomena and to serve as a reliable model for novel circumstances”. This 
dissatisfaction with sovereignty thus finds its origin in the presence of new and unexplicable 
phenomena in international relations. Other examples can be found in Cutler (2001) and Peters 
(2009). This gap is described by Walker (2003b: vii) as “the disparity between purely legal 
conceptions and sources of authority and actually existing articulations and locations of political 
authority in the globalizing era”. 
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approaches to international relations (African or otherwise) privileges the dominant 
Western discourse and blinds us to the complexity of reality” (Dunn, 2001: 62). 
 
In this chapter I support the view that post-colonial analyses of sovereignty are the 
most compelling approaches. Post-structuralists have rightly emphasised the intrinsic 
normativity of sovereignty and the resulting need to focus on the discourses of sovereignty 
rather than on a supposedly ‘empirical’ and ‘neutral’ reality. Post-colonial scholars pursued 
a similar agenda but have more specifically linked this normativity of sovereignty to the 
Western civilisational values that inform the concept. Their approach, although requiring a 
break with the usual association between sovereignty and juridical equality, offers a more 
convincing picture of international relations. Indeed, post-colonial scholars have moved 
away from the idea of a ‘descriptive gap’ by accounting for the non-West ‘lack’ of 
sovereignty not as an exception to the rule of a supposedly universal sovereignty but as a 
prime example of the Eurocentrism of sovereignty. Ironically, then, it seems that the 
answer to the puzzle of sovereignty is to be found in an acknowledgement that the concept 
is intrinsically linked to the idea of dependence and juridical inequality (of the non-West). 
This thesis builds upon these post-colonial analyses by insisting on the need to look at both 
the internal and external construction of civilised sovereignty. Only by doing so can we 
reveal the central role played by ‘civilisation’ in constructing the civilised Western self  
against an internal and an external savage (and non-sovereign) Other. 
 
This chapter offers a review of the consequent literature that the discipline of IR 
has accumulated on sovereignty and explains how such an accumulation reveals more the 
shortcomings of most of the discipline rather than an intrinsic difficulty of the concept of 
sovereignty. This chapter argues that by considering international relations as intercultural 
relations the workings of sovereignty can be explained more satisfactorily. This is why I turn 
to post-structuralist and post-colonial scholars in order to inform my research. I conclude 
this chapter by outlining some ways through which these approaches could be 
complemented and reinforced. 
 
 
Re-producing Eurocentric blindness: Conventional 
approaches to sovereignty 
 
Arguably some of the major mainstream contributions to the study of sovereignty have 
been driven by the impression that new realities are emerging that the old-fashioned 
concept of sovereignty – or, to be more specific, sovereignty as it has traditionally been 
understood in the literature – cannot explain. As will become clearer, this so-called gap is in 
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fact inexistent when we abandon the equalitarian, Westphalian/mythological conception of 
sovereignty that has influenced a large majority of IR scholars. Two influential authors will 
be mentioned in this section: Robert Jackson and Stephen Krasner. Although they do not 
share the same theoretical assumptions, once viewed from a post-colonial perspective 
their respective analyses appear surprisingly similar due to their attachment to the 
traditional conceptualisation of sovereignty. This section will discuss how both have to 
resort to Eurocentric (masquerading as universal) ideas in order to define what a real 
sovereign state is. As such, they obscure the role of (Western) culture and civilisation by 
presenting their conceptualisations as a-cultural or culturally-neutral. This is why their work 
is representative of how conventional scholars have dealt with the concept of 
sovereignty.24 
 
Both Jackson’s and Krasner’s most influential analyses of sovereignty start from the 
idea of a ‘descriptive gap’. For Krasner (1999: 51), there is an “empirical inaccuracy of the 
Westphalian model”. In fact, and quite boldly, he argues that sovereignty has always been 
violated in international relations.25 His book develops this argument through different 
themes such as minority rights, human rights and international borrowing. Similarly, 
Jackson’s interest in sovereignty is based on the perceived disconnection between the 
rights and duties that he associates with sovereignty and the deviance of certain states 
from this model. For him, this situation is especially obvious since the end of the classical 
sovereignty game when “[m]any colonial entities were thereby transformed legally into 
states. In reality, of course, they scarcely changed at all” (Jackson, 1990: 40). Some of these 
newly sovereign states do not disclose enough (if any) sovereign attributes or capacities. 
Jackson (1987: 526) indeed affirms that “we immediately notice the extent to which most 
of them depart from current conceptions and expectations of statehood”. This “divorce of 
entitlement and responsibility” (Jackson, 1990: 138) calls for a renewed analysis of 
sovereignty. 
 
Following on from their identification of a ‘descriptive gap’, both scholars resort to 
the same technique: they separate states depending on their possession of an actual 
sovereignty. Jackson differentiates a ‘real’ form of sovereignty from an incomplete one 
while Krasner divides sovereignty into different components that are possessed differently 
by different states. Crucially, though, they both believe in the existence of a ‘complete’ or 
‘real’ sovereignty that would only be possessed by some states. For Jackson, two periods 
can be schematically identified: before 1960, sovereign states were all positively sovereign, 
where positive sovereignty refers to “capabilities which enable governments to be their 
own masters” (Jackson, 1990: 29). After the decolonisations, international relations 
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 Other examples can be found in the works of Helman and Ratner (1992-1993), Thomson (1995), 
Jackson (2003), and Fearon and Laitin (2004). 
25
 In another article, Krasner (2001: 18 and 22) writes that “[e]very major peace treaty since 1648 – 
Westphalia, Utrecht, Vienna, Versailles, Helsinki, and Dayton – has violated the sovereign state 
model in one way or another”, although he also acknowledges that “[a] great deal of what takes 
place is consistent with the sovereign state model”. 
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witnessed the apparition of ‘quasi-states’. These ‘quasi-states’ only possess what Jackson 
(1990: 27) calls a negative sovereignty, i.e. “freedom from outside interference”, but 
without the capacity to actively defend this freedom or to act ‘as’ a sovereign state. 
Negative sovereignty therefore corresponds to immunity, not capacity, and does not 
depend on the actions and resources of the state (Jackson, 1990: 29 and 30). In other 
words, “[u]nder negative sovereignty, there is no requirement of substantive control over a 
territory and its population (i.e. no monopoly of force by the state, no effective control 
over the state territory, no effective bureaucracy)” (Zaum, 2007: 33). Hence, even if both 
positively and negatively sovereign states are usually called ‘sovereign’, Jackson (1990: 3 
and 34) argues for a clear distinction between these two categories. ‘Quasi-states’ are only 
normatively or juridically sovereign, but not empirically sovereign: they have no 
“demonstrable reality” and “[t]hey fail to disclose very much if anything in the way of 
empirical statehood”.26 
 
 In a similar way, Krasner divides sovereignty into four components that are 
possessed unequally by different states.27 These four components (just as Jackson’s two 
forms of sovereignty) are usually conflated into the unitary concept of sovereignty. For 
Krasner (1999: 9, my emphasis) “[t]he term sovereignty has been commonly used in at 
least four different ways: domestic sovereignty, referring to the organization of public 
authority within a state and to the level of effective control exercised by those holding 
authority; interdependence sovereignty, referring to the ability of public authorities to 
control transborder movements; international legal sovereignty, referring to the mutual 
recognition of states or other entities; and Westphalian sovereignty, referring to the 
exclusion of external actors from domestic authority configurations”. Key here is not the 
division of sovereignty itself, but rather the assertion that the “various elements of 
sovereignty have not fit together like some organic whole” (Krasner, 1999: 226).28 
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 Thomson (1995: 220, my emphasis) shares this analysis: “[c]apabilities are central” and “[s]tates 
are recognized as sovereign when they present a fact of sovereignty; that is, states recognize 
another’s sovereignty when the latter has achieved the capability to defend its authority against 
domestic an international challengers”. For Thomson as well as for Jackson “European history largely 
supports this argument but the post-World War II period of decolonization does not”.  
27
 His other argument – that sovereignty is an ‘organized hypocrisy’ – will not be developed here. 
Apart from the internal problem of consistency that this vision of sovereignty introduces (different 
forms of sovereignty seem to be respected/violated differently, thus undermining the argument that 
all norms are organised hypocrisy), this argument does not touch specifically on ‘sovereignty’ as a 
concept and can be equally applied to other norms. 
28
 Some problems emerge with Krasner’s typology, especially on the independence of the four 
components of sovereignty. As acknowledged by Krasner himself, his distinction of four independent 
components is analytically correct but empirically difficult to sustain as the erosion or reinforcement 
of one form of sovereignty usually leads to the erosion or reinforcement of the three others (see 
especially Krasner, 1999: 24, 13 and 14; and for a critique of the separation between the four 
components Zaum, 2007: 32). The independence of the four components ultimately relies on the 
separation between power and authority, a separation that is recognised by Krasner (1999: 10) as 
slippery: “A loss of control over a period of time could lead to a loss of authority”. The terminology 
used by Krasner (and especially his reference to Westphalia) has also been widely criticised (see for 




Although framed in a scientific and objective manner, both (re)-conceptualisations 
are nevertheless deeply Eurocentric. In reality, what both Jackson and Krasner do is to re-
establish in supposedly more neutral terms a division between civilised and sovereign 
countries and the uncivilised political communities that have never achieved (the standard 
of) sovereignty. In effect, and without being mentioned explicitly, their conceptualisations 
recreate a two-tier system in which some ‘naturally’ realise the conditions for a ‘real’ 
sovereignty while others continuously fail to achieve a standard of sovereignty that is 
defined from a Western perspective. 
 
 Jackson’s framework of positive and negative sovereignty, for instance, leads to a 
civilisational judgement on states’ respective value. Although advocated as a neutral 
characterisation (and not linked to an idea of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ sovereigns (Jackson, 1990: 
11)), the negative sovereignty of ‘quasi-states’ is clearly seen as inferior to the positive 
sovereignty of (Western) ‘historical’ states, with the former being incapable of mastering 
the modern political practices that the latter usually exercise (Dunn, 2003: 135). 
Additionally, the discourse on ‘quasi-states’ is reminiscent of past colonial practices. In a 
paternalistic fashion, Jackson (1987: 528) estimates that  
 
Large segments of national populations [in those quasi-states] – probably a big 
majority in most cases – cannot or will not draw the necessary distinction between 
office and incumbent, between the authority and responsibility of officials and their 
personal influence and discretion, upon which the realization of modern statehood 
depends. 
 
The plurality of allegiances and identities inside of those states is compared to “medieval 
Europe”. The thinly veiled association of positive sovereignty with a ‘civilised’ stage 
recreates a classificatory scheme based on Western values. The long list of adjectives that 
Jackson associates with ‘quasi-states’ is particularly revealing of their embodiment of a new 
form of ‘savagery’. For Jackson these ‘states’ are characterised by their bad governance (5, 
47) and their incapacity (28, 29). They are also uncivil (45, 47, 193), illegitimate (47), 
underdeveloped (47, 177), destitute (112), deficient (168), and technologically backward 
(177). Perhaps even more importantly, quasi-states’ leaders lack the will to do good for 
their population (9). As observed by Doty (1996: 155), “the quasi state characterized by 
incompetence and corruption takes up the niche previously occupied by the uncivilized and 
unfit for self-government”. By blaming negatively sovereign states for their under-
achievement of a (Western) civilised standard “Jackson [also] popularized the view that 
negative sovereignty shelters tyrants and disempowers citizenries, particularly the 
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disenfranchised, politically marginal, and those worn down by the present norms of 
politics” (Grovogui, 2009: 263).29  
 
The logical conclusion of his analysis is that intervention and external 
‘management’ of these ‘quasi-states’ is both necessary and beneficial. Although Jackson 
(1998: 12-14) himself seemed to express doubts about this necessity of intervention in a 
later publication, his analysis fails to provide an unbiased conceptualisation of sovereignty 
that does not lead to such conclusions. Not only does he “ignore the structural inequities of 
the present international system in order to conjure up [the non-West] agency after 
decolonization” (Grovogui, 2002: 321) but his definition of what a positive (i.e. ‘real’) 
sovereignty is is based on a normative assessment based on Western civilisation and its 
values. In reality, then, if Jackson himself is not an advocate of imperialism, the 
unacknowledged cultural specificity of his approach to sovereignty cannot but provide a 
justification for such a practice. 
 
 As argued previously, Krasner also fails to conceptualise sovereignty without 
incorporating Western values and expectations. Krasner’s division of sovereignty is 
concordant with Jackson’s two-tier sovereignty, with some states recognised as sovereign 
without any internal substance (or what he calls domestic or Westphalian sovereignty). 
Despite an effort to remain neutral in his definition of domestic and Westphalian 
sovereignty his four components of sovereignty cannot be defined outside of a cultural or 
civilisational framework: they variously refer to the presence, ability or effectiveness of 
political structures or to the ‘mutual recognition’ of these structures by other (already 
sovereign) states. Krasner (2004: 118) for instance associates “domestic sovereignty” with 
“governance structures that exercised competent and ideally constructive control over 
their countries’ populations and territory”. Krasner’s conceptualisation is thus dependent 
on an (unacknowledged) cultural framework inside which some political structures are 
recognised by a club or society of sovereign states. The history of ‘misrecognition’ and 
complete neglect of pre-existing authority and governance structures by Western states (a 
process that will be exemplified with the French and Amerindians in chapter 4) and the 
exclusiveness of the ‘sovereign club’ that lends recognition to states as part of the ‘civilised 
community’ illustrate how normative Krasner’s approach really is. Through his division of 
sovereignty Krasner reintroduces a hierarchy between pre-modern, modern and post-
modern states (Krasner, 2010: 100-101) leading to the logical conclusion that an external 
intervention can violate international legal sovereignty but reinforce domestic sovereignty 
(this view is most clearly expressed in Krasner, 2004; 2005). In other words, Krasner’s 
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 Such an argument (also supported inter alia by Clapham (1998: 147) and Peters (2009: 544)) 
clearly delegitimises the independence associated with the negative sovereignty of quasi-states. As 
Koskenniemi (2010: 239) observes “[s]overeignty, it is sometimes claimed, should not stand in the 
way of producing ‘democracy’, or ‘rule of law’ or ‘human rights’ or ‘security’, if necessary by the 
‘transformative occupation’ by benevolent (Western) occupiers”. 
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framework leads all too easily to the same classificatory scheme that we encounter in 
Jackson’s analysis. 
 
 Hence, Jackson and Krasner insist that sovereignty is different and used differently 
in the West and non-Western world and that it might mean different things in different 
places and for different people. This variability of sovereignty is key as it enables a break 
out of the ‘absolute and universal conception’ straitjacket. Nevertheless, and because of 
their refusal to recognise the civilisational values underpinning sovereignty, these authors 
only touch upon a fundamental idea without revealing its strong normative bias. More 
importantly, they contribute to the mythology of sovereignty as a culturally-neutral, 
objective and consequently universal idea(l) that is equally desirable by all and that could 
be equally exercised by all. Jackson and Krasner participate in the (re)production of yet 
another supposedly objective conceptualisation of sovereignty that, on closer analysis, 
reveals itself to be Eurocentric.30 While they both maintain the fiction of world politics as 
‘international relations’, culture keeps creeping back (and yet is silenced) in their analyses. 
 
 
Constructivist approaches: sovereignty as a 
universalised social construct  
 
At the same time as Jackson and Krasner published their analysis, debates emerged among 
constructivist scholars on the continued relevance of the concept of sovereignty as 
traditionally understood. Once again, the starting point of their analyses has been the idea 
of a ‘descriptive gap’ between a traditional definition of sovereignty stripped of its 
Eurocentric content and a practice of sovereignty that necessarily revealed the strong 
civilisational bias of the concept. Crucially, though, constructivists reproduce the 
problematic idea that a culturally-neutral conceptualisation of sovereignty is possible either 
by disregarding the normative side of the concept or by restricting this normative content 
(and its imperialist consequences) to a revolved past. In other words, constructivist scholars 
either naturalise the major role of Western culture as unproblematic or restrict its 
influence to a period of European international society (thus postulating that our current 
international society is truly accommodating to cultural differences). 
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 This is not to argue that sovereignty could be defined in any other way, i.e. outside of a referent 
civilisation or culture. As explored throughout this thesis the concept of sovereignty is necessarily 
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 Constructivist scholars follow the work of Wendt who in a 1992 article articulated 
the basis of the entire constructivist literature on sovereignty. By arguing that “[i]t is 
collective meanings that constitute the structures which organize our actions” (1992: 397), 
Wendt also touches explicitly on the concept of sovereignty: for him, “[s]overeignty is an 
institution, and so it exists only in virtue of certain intersubjective understandings and 
expectations; there is no sovereignty without an other” (412). Hence, sovereignty norms 
have their origin in practice (413), a premise that an entire generation of scholars working 
on sovereignty will adopt (in contradistinction with the more abstract or ‘transcendental’ 
approach to sovereignty). Accordingly, the focus is on “the ways that the practices of states 
and nonstate agents produce, reform, and redefine sovereignty” (Biersteker and Weber, 
1996a: 11). Sovereignty norms are embedded in society since “they represent shared 
understandings and expectations that are constantly reinforced both through the practices 
of states and the practices of nonstate actors” (Sikkink, 1993: 412). Therefore, 
constructivists consider sovereignty to be  
 
an inherently social concept that exists and has meaning because it encompasses a 
set of intersubjectively shared ideas, on which international agents act. If 
sovereignty is treated as a social concept, its meaning is not exogenously 
determined; rather, it is endogenous to the interaction of international actors 
holding beliefs about sovereignty (Zaum, 2007: 2; see also Fowler and Bunck, 1996: 
387). 
 
If sovereignty is a “socially constructed” (Glanville, 2011: 237) or “an inherently social 
concept” (Biersteker and Weber, 1996a: 1), it means – and this is fundamental for IR – that 
sovereignty does not have an eternal essence defined a priori and eternally but rather that 
it “is constituted by a set of historical practices influenced by tacit understandings of 
legitimate action in particular social contexts” (Adler-Nissen, 2013: 179).  
 
Instead of conceptualising sovereignty in an a-historical fashion, changes, 
transformations and evolutions are accepted as the “constant, ongoing process” 
characterising the social construction of sovereignty (Weber and Biersteker, 1996: 282). 
When sovereignty was considered as eternally fixed and defined, evolutions were seen as 
violations or departure announcing the end, or, more dramatically, the death of 
sovereignty. But from a constructivist perspective, sovereignty is a “necessarily historically 
contingent concept” (Barkin, 1998: 232) that “has evolved over time” (Lake, 2003: 309). In 
other words, “as the prescriptions for sovereign recognition change, so does the meaning 
of sovereignty” (Biersteker and Weber, 1996a: 13). Accordingly, the concept is seen as 
elastic or “pliable” (Barkin and Cronin, 1994: 129), having no particular meaning other than 
a contextual (or historical) one (Chopra and Weiss, 1992). The task of the analyst is 
therefore not to find a timeless definition of sovereignty – an impossible task given that 
“we cannot use definitions to capture the essence of a subject we believe is so deeply 
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contested and undergoing change” (Biersteker and Weber, 1996a: 2) – but rather the 
contrary: “to explore the ways in which sovereignty has been socially constructed and 
reconstructed over time” (Glanville, 2011: 236).31 
 
The sovereignty-versus-human-rights debate provides a good illustration of the 
way sovereignty is being reconceptualised within constructivism. This debate (or deadlock, 
as aptly characterised by Chopra and Weiss (1992))32 is problematic for mainstream 
scholars. For Krasner (1999: 126), “[t]he issue of human rights is but the latest example of a 
long-standing tension between autonomy and international attempts to regulate relations 
between rulers and ruled”. Thompson also recently expressed this idea by arguing that 
“[d]uring the first decade after the Cold War, a series of humanitarian interventions 
appeared to suggest that sovereignty had an increasingly low premium when in conflict 
with the desire to protect human rights” (Thompson, 2006: 252; for a similar view, see also 
Keene, 2004: 120). But for constructivists, sovereignty is not ‘self-sufficient’ or “an 
independent, self-referential value” (Reus-Smit, 1997: 556). Indeed, the concept is 
necessarily affected by the context and “it has always been justified with reference to 
particular conceptions of legitimate statehood and rightful state action” (Reus-Smit, 2001: 
520; see also Sikkink, 1993). For Barkin (1998: 229), “the internationalisation of human 
rights can be seen as an evolution of the constitution of sovereignty, rather than as a 
challenge to it”. In this perspective, sovereignty could (and necessarily does) include the 
prevalent norms about state behaviour of each period. That is why “sovereignty and 
human rights are [now] bound together within a single discourse of legitimate statehood” 
(Reus-Smit, 2001: 538; see also Philpott, 2001a).33 
 
 Hence, constructivists facilitate our understanding of sovereignty by criticising the 
usual insistence on a timeless and contextless definition of sovereignty, and by showing 
how conceptions of sovereignty evolve through time and space. Sovereignty “becomes a 
material fact through historically variable and contingent social institutions and practices of 
recognition” (Donnelly, 2006: 151). But constructivists are still attached to the idea of a 
neutral and thus value-free and universal concept of sovereignty. First, some constructivists 
still defend the possibility of a neutral definition of sovereignty. Peters (2009: 514), for 
instance, argues that the subordination of sovereignty to human rights is a “dynamic 
process in which sovereignty is being complemented, and eventually replaced, by a new 
normative foundation of international law”. For her sovereignty has now been 
“humanized” thanks to the inclusion of the supposedly universal values of international law 
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in the concept.34 In a similar vein, Glanville (2014: 131) explains that the normativity of 
sovereignty – and in particular its link to Western civilisation – needs to be understood as 
restricted to a historical moment, a “problematic but crucial chapter of the history of 
sovereignty”. Glanville situates this ‘chapter’ in the nineteenth century and argues that 
Europeans suddenly realised their civilisational superiority at this moment (101). This 
‘bracketing’ of the Western normativity of sovereignty is contradicted, however, by his 
mention of (European) authors writing about civilised sovereignty well before the 
nineteenth century and by his inability to recognise that the other regimes of sovereignty 
that he mentions (monarchical, national self-determination, minority and individual rights) 
are equally defined inside of a specific civilisational framework. Peters (2009: 519) also 
restricts the existence of a ‘normative’ or civilised sovereignty to a specific period and 
estimates that “[w]ith the extension of the Ius publicum Europaeum around the globe, the 
requirement that states, to become full members of the international legal system, must 
conform to the ‘civilized nation’ standard, had been abandoned”. Generally speaking, the 
reproduction of a supposedly neutral definition of sovereignty in the constructivist 
literature could be explained by their (almost exclusive) focus on the seemingly 
uncontroversial concept of human rights. 
 
Second, constructivists are reluctant to explore the processes of power that 
necessarily play a part in the construction of sovereignty. As argued by Zarakol (2011: 14-15 
and 17), “very few of these [constructivist] works make the power dynamics behind 
socializing relationships their explicit focus”. Consequently the influence of hierarchies and 
status difference in defining international social norms is usually elided in this literature. 
Aalberts and Werner (2011: 2187-2189), for instance, link sovereignty to rights and 
responsibilities originating from ‘community interests’, as if an international consensus 
existed on what these interests are. In their article on the evolutions of sovereignty, Barkin 
and Cronin (1994: 128) similarly conclude that these changes occur “because our 
understanding of sovereign authority is intersubjective, largely based on the principles and 
beliefs that a dominant coalition comes to adopt in the process of constructing an 
international order”. Nevertheless, they do not question further who is part of this 
“dominant coalition” and the effect that this restricted membership can have on the 
definition of sovereignty itself. Even when constructivists are clear that sovereignty is 
“grounded in other, higher-order, values, which sovereign states are thought to realize” 
(Peters, 2009: 518) they do not explore these values or their origins. Controversial 
expressions such as “standards of conduct” (Heller and Sofaer, 2001: 30), “club” of 
sovereign states (Glanville, 2014: 24) or “conscience-shocking” situations that must lead to 
international interventions (Peters, 2009: 535) do not trigger in the constructivist literature 
an interest in the normativity of sovereignty. Very few constructivists are explicit about this 
avoidance: only Glanville (2014: 6) justifies his choice by claiming that he does 
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not seek to pass normative judgement on the historical development of the 
relationship between sovereignty and responsibility. I claim neither that the various 
historical constructions of sovereign responsibilities that I trace ought to be 
celebrated nor that they should be lamented. I simply seek to explore how the 
relationship between sovereignty and responsibility has developed over time. 
 
Constructivists generally strive to ‘describe’ the reality of sovereignty but refuse to discuss 
the origin of the norms that inform sovereignty. Through their analytical choices they avoid 
questioning the deep inequality of the international system and how this reality impacts on 
international law (and thus on sovereignty). In doing so they also attribute a certain 
‘objectivity’ and universality to sovereignty and as such participate in the maintenance of 
the mythology of a neutral conceptualisation of sovereignty. In short, “the recognition [by 
constructivists] that sovereignty is a dynamic social construct and that its interpretation 
varies over time, underrates, indeed subordinates, the power dynamics that characterise 
the international system” (Pourmokhtari, 2013: 1783). 
 
 
Revealing the discursive and normative nature of 
sovereignty 
 
Post-structuralist works move away from the idea of a ‘descriptive gap’ and from the 
attachment to a traditionally-conceptualised sovereignty. Putting emphasis on the inherent 
limitations of mainstream approaches instead of blaming the ambiguity of the concept of 
sovereignty, post-structuralists argue that “the vain attempts of conceptual analysis have 
less to do with the inherent ambiguities of the concept, and more to do with the 
philosophical tools utilized to this purpose” (Bartelson, 1995: 18). In particular, the 
assumption of the neutrality of language for representing reality and the subsequent quest 
for an objective definition hinder any attempt at understanding sovereignty (Bartelson, 
1995: 49). By opposition, post-structuralist works emphasise the discursive nature of 
sovereignty, which is directly related to the intrinsic normativity of the concept. 
 
 First, post-structuralist scholars agree that “the appeal to empirical evidence 
cannot be decisive with regard to political concepts like sovereignty” (Prokhovnik, 2007: 
30). A “descriptive interpretation of sovereignty” insists on finding “corresponding 
realities” (Werner and Wilde, 2001: 285-286) of sovereignty in international politics, 
presupposing that the concept of sovereignty is a mere reflection of these realities. For 
post-structuralist scholars sovereignty is first and foremost a discursive practice. Bartelson 
(1995: 52), for instance, argues that “[t]here is a discursive practice of sovereignty, but 
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sovereignty itself is not amenable to empirical political research”. For Werner and de Wilde 
(2001: 292), sovereignty is a speech act, or more precisely, an institutional fact, meaning 
that it is and remains true and real as long as it is taken for granted inside of a specific 
framework specifying what sovereign norms are. Hence, “a claim to sovereignty attempts 
to establish a relation as an institutional fact (the ‘fact’ of being the supreme or ultimate 
authority and the ‘fact’ of being an independent authority) and a set of rights and 
responsibilities”. Here, the usual ‘logical’ chain is reversed: it is not ‘reality’ that is reflected 
in our ‘thinking’ but rather “[w]hat we think and accept sovereignty to mean” that 
“structures the real world of political and legal practices” (Prokhovnik, 2007: 18). 
Consequently, “[d]ifferent conceptions of sovereignty shape political reality very 
differently” (Prokhovnik, 2007: 21). 
 
 The discursive nature of sovereignty is interlinked with its normativity. Indeed, the 
normativity of sovereignty originates from “the crucial mediation of ‘material facts’ and 
action by ideas and values, all developed within particular histories of meaning” 
(Prokhovnik, 2007: 47). There seems to be no way to ‘construct’ or talk about sovereignty 
outside of a highly subjective perspective: as noticed by Bartelson (1995: 3), “sovereignty 
ultimately is something man-made”. It is so because sovereignty provides an answer to 
questions of political possibilities of a community, an answer that is necessarily specific, 
historically determined, and that offers “a spatial and a temporal resolution to questions 
about what political community can be” (Walker, 1993: 62). These answers are not 
‘naturally’ or logically present but first originate from what is considered as desirable when 
it comes to collective and political organisation. As explored in Chapter 4, these 
conceptions result from political debates and discourses happening ‘within’ (and at the 
same time shaping) a political community. In her own analysis Weber provides examples of 
how the meaning of sovereignty is stabilised during intervention practices. Sovereignty is 
constructed through “disciplinary acts of intervention” (Weber, 1995: 124). This leads her 
to write that “[w]hen state practices do not fit intersubjective understandings of what a 
sovereign state must be, then interference by a sovereign state in the affairs of an 
“aberrant” state is legitimate” (Weber, 1995: 4 (my emphasis); for a similar conclusion, see 
Malmvig, 2006). In a similar vein, Prokhovnik (2007: 58) affirms that “the designation of a 
unit as a state is political rather than automatic and natural”. That is why it is necessary to 
remain sceptical about the possibility of using and studying sovereignty outside of a 
normative framework, i.e. “without imposing an answer onto the question of state 
sovereignty” (Weber, 1995: 9). 
 
 This insistence on the discursive and normative nature of sovereignty means that 
the concept should be analysed not so much in terms of its correspondence with a 
supposedly pre-existing reality, but rather in terms of what it contributes to create or to 
call into being. One way to conceptualise this relationship between discourse and reality of 
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sovereignty is to argue that sovereignty is a performative concept (Weber, 1998).35 This 
‘reorientation’ is crucial since it draws attention to the normative nature of sovereignty: by 
this very act of creation, “‘regular subjects’ and ‘standards of normality’ are discursively co-
constituted to give the effect that both are natural rather than cultural constructs” (Weber, 
1998: 81). Hence, by establishing the (normal) sovereign state as ‘naturally’ pre-existing 
discourses of sovereignty contribute to establish what they claim to describe. It is therefore 
not surprising that a prescriptive or ‘directive’ grammar – must, ought, should, have to – is 
very frequently found in discourses of sovereignty. As noticed by Kalmo and Skinner (2010: 
9), there is a “close association of ‘is’ and ‘ought’ within the sovereignty discourse” which 
means that what is politically desirable is usually expressed in terms of sovereignty. This is 
also identified by Werner and de Wilde (2001: 284) who write that “sovereignty plays an 
important role in normative discourses by – imaginarily – bridging the gap between ‘is’ and 
‘ought’”. As Walker (2003b: viii)  writes 
 
sovereignty, for all its negative associations, continues to offer an organising frame 
for the constitution and regulation of old and new – state and nonstate – political 
communities, and so arguably supplies a necessary precondition for the 
continuation of the virtues associated with political community – in particular the 
ideas of effective, citizen-engaging and representative governance. 
 
Sovereignty therefore participates in the establishment of the standard of the good life or 
of “well-being” (Koskenniemi, 1994: 29) of political communities. As explored in Chapter 3 
the discourse of sovereignty is where the ideal state and society are defined and identified. 
Sovereignty is thus a crucial tool to define “collective life as a project – a set of institutions 
and practices in which the forms of collective life are constantly imagined, debated, 
criticized and reformed, over and again” (Koskenniemi, 2010: 241). Sovereignty allows for 
the identification and if possible the realisation of “cultural, historical or ethical principles” 
(Inayatullah and Blaney, 2012: 125) that lie at the centre of what defines a (sovereign) 
state. The idea that “the function of sovereignty is to participate in the construction of 
normativity” (Weber, 1998: 89) is even acknowledged, although usually less explicitly, by 
mainstream scholars (as seen with the constructivist scholars).  
 
 It is clear, therefore, that if sovereignty is inherently normative and cannot be a 
value-free concept, it is also characterised by its ever-changing aspect. Even more so than 
constructivists, post-structuralist scholars dismiss any attempt at imposing a definition on 
sovereignty: for Bartelson (1995: 53), “[a] history of sovereignty cannot be written from the 
initial assumption of a timeless ontology” or with the idea that one will find a fixed 
referent. Following her argument that intervention practices participate in the creation of 
the meaning of sovereignty, Weber (1995: 10) estimates that “[i]n the face of such 
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practices, it is misguided to retreat to an international legal definition of sovereignty as 
(among other things) a state’s absolute authority over its domestic affairs”. On the 
contrary, fixing a timeless definition will only encourage the analyst to forget the “historical 
and culturally specific character” of sovereignty (Walker, 1993: 166).  
 
The apparent atemporality of sovereignty advocated by conventional in IR theorists 
can thus be understood as “an effect of complex practices working to affirm continuities 
and to shift disruptions and dangers to the margin” (Walker, 1993: 163). The constantly 
evolving conceptualisation of sovereignty reveals that over time – and depending on place 
as well – there will be a definitional change in sovereignty (Bartelson, 1995: 4). This 
evolution is sometimes compared to a “slippage in the notion of sovereignty” (Weber, 
1995: 16):36 due to the number of different conceptualisations of sovereignty that have 
existed and that will arguably exist in the future, the meaning of sovereignty depends on 
how the concept is used (Prokhovnik, 2007: 8). 
 
 Hence, there is a continual process of creation and re-creation of what sovereignty 
means and entails. It would be impossible in these post-structuralist frameworks to follow 
IR’s traditional story of the creation of a concept at Westphalia in 1648,37 a concept only 
now being undermined by globalisation, regional integrations or human rights. For Weber, 
“[t]his is not a one-time occurrence which fixes the meaning of sovereignty and statehood 
for all time in all places; rather, this struggle is repeated in various forms at numerous 
spatial and temporal locales” (Weber, 1995: 3; see also Weber, 1992: 200). Approaching 
sovereignty from this timeless perspective denies its link to specific practices revealed by 
constructivists but also its inherent link to specific forms of collective projects that 
necessarily change across time and space. As Grovogui (2009: 263) argues “sovereignty is 
always grounded in sets of social relationships and attains intelligibility only within a 
particular social or moral order”. That is why “states are constantly maintained, defended, 
attacked, reproduced, undermined, and relegitimised on a daily basis”, and, consequently, 
                                                          
36
 This is particularly problematic for mainstream scholars. Jackson (2005: 76), for instance, suggests 
that “[t]here are of course limits to the renovations that can be made to any institution, including 
sovereignty, beyond which it is changed out of all recognition and it can no longer be said to exist as 
such”. Discussing sovereignty, Keohane (2002: 743) affirms that “[f]rom a scientific standpoint, it is 
troubling that crucial concepts in international relations theory are subject to redefinition and 
reinterpretation as situations change”. Philpott (2001b: 316) also expresses doubts about the extent 
to which sovereignty could be redefined:  
Were sovereignty to mean something other than the traditional definition, were it to lose its 
defining features of internal supremacy and external independence, were it to mean a whole 
assortment of privileges, it would lose all distinctiveness. It would refer to virtually any type 
of authority and thus to no type of authority in particular. Indeed, why not simply jettison 
sovereignty in favor of the broader concept of authority and say that different polities 
practice different forms of authority? 
What these authors emphasise is the need for a ‘core meaning’ of sovereignty to stay identical over 
time. 
37
 This idea has been repeatedly criticised in recent years. See inter alia Osiander (2001) and 
Carvalho, Leira and Hobson (2011). 
39 
 
that “[t]he principle of state sovereignty is less an abstract legal claim than an exceptionally 
dense political practice” (Walker, 1993: 168 and 154). Building upon these post-
structuralist insights, this thesis supports the view that sovereignty is an inherently political 
(and thus normative) concept constructed through discourses. 
 
 
Civilised sovereignty in the construction of unequal 
intercultural relations 
 
Post-colonial scholars have adopted some of the conclusions of post-structuralist analyses 
but have focused more specifically on the Western content of the concept of sovereignty. 
By their rejection of “the apparent innocence of an international legal order based on 
sovereign equality” (Simpson, 2004: xiv), post-colonial authors insist on the “need to go 
one step further by recognising that within international theory [and, consequently, within 
international ‘reality’] sovereignty has been grounded in various Eurocentric 
metanarratives that place the standard of civilization centre-stage” (Hobson, 2012: 334-
335). Post-colonial analyses thus provide a compelling way to reveal and question the 
supposed ‘descriptive gap’ of sovereignty. But instead of reconstructing a supposedly more 
valid (because universally applicable) concept of sovereignty they argue that it is the 
ignorance of the Eurocentric character of sovereignty that led to the ‘descriptive gap’ in the 
first place. In other words, if a gap is identified by conventional scholars its origin lies in the 
refusal to recognise that sovereignty is defined by the West and by Western cultures. As 
such, it is not surprising that the quest for a universally valid and culturally neutral concept 
of sovereignty has failed. 
 
 The first major insight of post-colonial scholars working on sovereignty is the fact 
that state and sovereignty, as other analytical tools, are largely Western categories. For 
post-colonial scholars, the state is a specific form of political organisation forged out of 
European and Western history, and its use as a universal category is thus highly 
problematic (Dunn, 2001). Ayoob (2002: 44-45), for instance, observes that state-making in 
the Third World is “a directed or premeditated” activity insofar as “the trajectory for Third 
World states is clearly mapped out and unforeseen directions are ruled out”. In a similar 
vein, Seth (2000: 221) estimates that:  
 
The nation-state, in short, is not an empty container into which anything can be 
poured; it already has a content. This means that the nation-state cannot serve 
as the vehicle for expressing those aspirations which do not already accord with 
or ‘fit’ the frame of nation, state and modernity; and indeed, it may ill-serve as 
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the vehicle for recovering and expressing what is autochthonous, rather than 
Western and derivative, about a political community and culture. 
 
As a consequence, the acquisition of sovereignty by non-Western states should not be 
interpreted, as in most IR literature, as an empowering and liberating movement, but 
rather as debilitating and excluding Third World states further, usually requiring them to 
surrender “important rights in order to achieve independence” (Anghie, 2005: 6 and 215). 
The dynamic of inclusion and exclusion, of equality and difference (Aalberts, 2014: 774), is 
at the heart of sovereignty when non-Western entities are reintegrated into the picture not 
as anomalies or exceptions but as consequences of the way sovereignty has been defined 
and used by the West. Post-colonial approaches therefore promote a radical departure 
from the traditional vision of sovereignty as a tool for emancipation and freedom, even 
more so because accession to statehood or sovereignty meant suppressing alternatives to 
the states-system (see Doty, 1996: 105; Keene, 2004: 24-25). 
 
 Insofar as the state and sovereignty are categories forged by the West, they 
“became identified with a specific set of cultural practices to the exclusion of others” 
(Anghie, 2005: 37). In other words, sovereignty is defined according to norms and 
standards that originate from the West.  For Anghie (2005: 103), “[s]overeignty was 
therefore aligned with European ideas of social order, political organization, progress and 
development”. This is still the case today: when Berg and Kuusk (2010) try to define 
sovereignty empirically, all they can achieve is a list of attributes reflecting the perceived 
reality of (successful) Western states. Their other characteristics are all dependent on the 
idea of ‘recognition’.38 In other words, it is only the already sovereign states that can make 
these attributes ‘real’ by recognising them in aspirant sovereign entities. It is thus clear that 
the West is essentially sovereign. For Doty (1996: 97), “[t]he United States was the living 
norm of sovereignty (...) The United States (and the West more generally) simply was 
sovereign”. 39  Dunn (2003: 134) also mentions the “American-defined notions of 
sovereignty and the state” in the context of the discourse on development and 
democratisation. Thus, Western states have a ‘natural’ ability to achieve sovereign 
standards that they themselves embody.  
 
Conversely, non-Western states are ‘naturally’ deprived of sovereignty, incapable 
of achieving the ‘objective’ standard of sovereign statehood. For Strange (1996: 25), “non-
Western sovereignty was actively delegitimated” during the period of colonialism, an 
observation shared by Dunn (2003: 40, my emphasis) in the case of the Congo: “Traditional, 
indigenous sociopolitical structures and practices, as well as their autonomy and 
“sovereignty”, were viewed as illegitimate and erased”. Hence, and according to 
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International Law discourses, “non-European states are lacking in sovereignty because they 
are excluded from the family of nations” (Anghie, 2005: 59), i.e. because they are not 
Western enough. Standards of civilisation are thus recognised as crucial in constructing and 
maintaining what sovereignty means: “A chain of equivalences was created between the 
terms civilized, rationality, reason, and sovereign, on the one hand, and uncivilized, 
instinctual, and dependent on the other hand” (Doty, 1996: 46). Western culture is central 
in defining what an acceptable sovereign state is and what all sovereign states should 
aspire to be. Members of the club of sovereign states impose their own requirements 
based on what they consider as non-negotiable values such as their “conceptions of 
community, religion, citizenship and property” (Grovogui, 2002: 327). They establish these 
values as superior and as the only true sovereign values. Ideas of ‘barbarism’ or ‘savagery’ 
are here central in identifying and defining the non-sovereign societies (Inayatullah and 
Blaney, 2004: 88). 
 
As shown by post-colonial scholars, sovereignty should thus be understood as a 
mechanism of exclusion working to separate two worlds, one of ‘civilised’ and ‘developed’ 
countries in the West, and the persistent ‘uncivilised’ or ‘barbarous’ territories in the Rest. 
Anghie (2005: 311 and 313) for instance wrote that “[s]overeignty is formulated in such a 
way as to exclude the non-European” and that sovereignty, along with other basic 
doctrines of international law, was “forged out of the attempt to create a legal system that 
could account for relations between the European and non-European worlds in the colonial 
confrontation”. As a result, the non-European (and later non-Western) is always already 
“discussed outside of the discourse of sovereignty” (Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 88). The 
international order is thus unequally divided by the concept of sovereignty:  in one sphere, 
sovereignty provides “hierarchy and privilege” to the (Western) actors, while in the other it 
gives rise to “subordination and discrimination” (Grovogui, 2002: 323). This ‘two-tier’ game 
of sovereignty has been largely identified by post-colonial authors: Keene talks about a 
“dualistic nature of order in world politics” combining equality and independence in 
Europe/the West with colonialism and imperialism beyond (Keene, 2004: xi and 97). Suzuki 
refers to a “dual mode of interaction” based on the fact that “European International 
Society has of course been characterised by its notion of sovereign equality, but this was 
only within the narrow confines of its ‘civilized’ core” (Suzuki, 2009: 87 and 55). And 
Simpson insists on the idea that sovereign equality coexists with “special prerogatives” and 
“constitutional gradation of states on the basis of cultural and ideological traits” (Simpson, 
2004: 36).  
 
The concept of sovereignty thus seems to “take on a different form when applied 
to the non-European world” (Anghie, 2005: 235).40 At the apex of this argument lies the 
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idea that “the relevant powers applied sovereignty regimes to intra- and inter-European 
affairs that differed fundamentally from those applicable in Africa and other regions” and 
that to the non-West is applied “another political ethos consistent with a different 
international morality than applied in Europe” (Grovogui, 2002: 323 and 325-326). 
 
Thanks to a post-colonial approach of sovereignty one can understand why “the 
European states saw no wrong in violating non-European states’ sovereignty to promote 
the ‘civilized’ way of governance, and even saw fit to resort to force, if necessary” (Suzuki, 
2009: 20). Western interventions in these non-sovereign spheres are portrayed in the 
traditional discourse of sovereignty as necessarily beneficial for the non-West as it will 
supposedly enable it to reach the expected sovereign standards. In the end, and “[b]ecause 
Western states are deemed to be civilized, so they are rewarded with dignity (i.e., 
sovereignty). Conversely, non-Western polities are deemed barbaric or savage and are 
therefore unworthy of dignity (i.e., sovereignty is withdrawn)” (Hobson, 2012: 262). 
 
 
Domestic and international hierarchies, internal and 
external colonial frontiers 
 
Post-colonial scholars have made a strong and convincing case for linking 
sovereignty to civilisation: they have revealed that the ‘anomalies’ usually identified by 
scholars are in reality the consequence of the Eurocentrism of the concept. As such, they 
have rightly emphasised the role of culture in a desperately culture-averse discipline. These 
scholars, however, have focused primarily on the ‘external’ side of the construction of 
civilised sovereignty. Their attention has indeed been directed at the creation of 
sovereignty by Western (civilised) states upon non-Western (and savage) societies. Indeed, 
in their focus on the ‘colonial encounter’ between Western states and savage entities lying 
beyond the sovereign and modern world post-colonial scholars have largely emphasised 
the external side of the colonial encounter, i.e. the denial of sovereignty to non-Western 
populations. In fact, the colonial encounter is now widely considered as crucial for the 
understanding of sovereignty (Glanville, 2014: 130). Aalberts (2014: 779) for instance 
argues that “it is in the colonial encounter that the Europeans are produced as the original 
sovereign powers who command and impose their universal law vis-à-vis the uncivilised”. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
civilised frontier. In both the West and the non-West sovereignty is central for the establishment of 
a hierarchy based on the idea of civilisation. I am thus not denying that the non-West has suffered 
from the use of the concept of sovereignty but rather that the concept has had similar effects inside 
the West. The main difference, therefore, lies in the application in the non-West of a foreign 
standard (something that the West does not experience, even though some segments of its 
population are excluded and repressed through sovereignty claims). 
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Consequently, the way Western ‘sovereign’ states managed to build their own (internal or 
domestic) sovereignty and civilisation is generally left unexplored. In post-colonial analyses, 
then, “Western states are deemed to be civilized” (Hobson, 2012: 262) and thus sovereign. 
The (supposed) “ability of Western states to live up to Westphalian norms” (Grovogui, 
2002: 322) awards them the right to decide and assess the civilised sovereignty of Others. I 
am not implying here that post-colonial scholars purposefully assign an unproblematic and 
natural civilised sovereignty to Western states (especially given their insistence on the 
constructedness of these concepts). Rather, my argument is that the post-colonial 
literature is guilty of neglecting the internal – and, as we will see, surprisingly problematic – 
construction of civilised sovereignty. Very few scholars mention this aspect and none 
explores it in great depth. Inayatullah and Blaney (2004: 70-73), for instance, take the well-
known example of Léry’s use of cannibalism against the Catholics during the religious 
conflicts in France but they do not explore how such attacks are dealt with in order to 
perform a sovereign and civilised French identity. Anghie (2005: 21, 22-23 and 30) 
repeatedly mentions that Spanish civilised identity is “idealised” more than achieved but 
does not question this aspect of the colonial encounter. Finally, Jahn (2000: 63-64) 
observes that the Spanish were far from reaching the civilised standards which they used to 
judge the Amerindians. She explains how such a discrepancy could be maintained by 
stating that the ideals and standards of civilisation simply needed to be recognised and 
realised by a small (upper class) minority in Spain in order to be valid. Her analysis, 
pregnant with possibility, nonetheless does not engage with the construction of this 
Spanish civilised (and thus sovereign) identity.41 
 
 In this thesis, I juxtapose the ‘external’ and ‘internal’ creation of civilised 
sovereignty in order to compare these processes and to provide a more complete picture 
of statecraft. In doing so, what is uncovered is the existence of striking similarities that 
remained unexplored in earlier literatures. Indeed, both the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ 
creation of sovereignty follow the same process of distancing from a savage Other that is 
domestic or external, degenerated or underdeveloped, rebel or child-like, depending on 
whether s/he is ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ the constructed sphere of the sovereign state. The 
                                                          
41
 One can only postulate as to why post-colonial approaches have taken this direction. Apart from 
the already mentioned focus on encounters as a way of ‘de-centring' IR, one plausible reason is that 
exploring the internal construction of civilised sovereignty would reveal the difficulties of the West 
in achieving the very standards used as the basis for the denial of civilised sovereignty to the non-
West. This is why post-colonial scholars tend to remain unclear about the actual achievement of the 
civilised standards of sovereignty by Western states. Dunn (2001: 48 and 56) for instance writes that 
“African political entities were considered illegitimate and inferior because they failed to measure 
up to the standard of the Western nation-state ideal” and that “African states have failed to live up 
to the standards of their older Western ‘brothers’”. We are not told, however, if the ‘ideal’ is 
achieved and if not how it is maintained despite its lack of ‘reality’. Explaining how these standards 
were not achieved even in the societies promoting them thus creates the risk that these norms 
could be seen as ‘artificial’ and instrumentally used by Western states (which in itself would 
reinforce the argument that sovereignty is an ‘organised hypocrisy’). This makes it all the more 
important to explore the internal side of civilised sovereignty. Another (more prosaic) reason is that 
Western states are supposed to be in control of the norms of Western civilisation since they 
establish them and participate in their diffusion. 
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presence of civilised frontiers is a major element that the sovereign voice must deal with 
but that it also benefits from both ‘internally’ and ‘externally’. It serves as a political tool to 
establish domination and to legitimise the sovereign ruler. Indeed, sovereignty is shown to 
be ‘internally’ and ‘externally’ reliant on a distancing from (which is also a creation of) 
savage Others. This is why civilisational difference has to be produced not only during 
colonial encounters but also domestically in the struggles between different Western 
actors. References to civilisation thus transcend the sovereign border and the internal-
external boundary loses part of its significance. As Glanville (2014: 18) notices – but fails to 
convey convincingly – “dominant modes of discourse about legitimate sovereign authority 
domestically and internationally have historically tended to feed into each other”. With 
such an approach, a circular process is uncovered in which internal or domestic standards 
of civilisation serve to grant or deny sovereignty externally while being themselves 
constructed on ideas of civilisation that emerge thanks to (internal and external) 
‘encounters’ with savagery. In sum, the hyper agency of the Western state emerges from 
these combined ‘internal’ and ‘external’ encounters with the Other. 
 
 Analysing both processes together also shed some light on the way sovereignty is a 
complex political discourse riddled with doubts and ambiguities. Indeed, the 
civilised/sovereign and the savage/non-sovereign have an unexpected tendency to appear 
in unexpected places and peoples. Those that are deemed civilised are very often 
portrayed as savage, and vice versa. Thus, the task of statecraft becomes to repeatedly re-
establish the sovereign as civilised in the face of a threatening savagery that could 
destabilise his status. Taken together, the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ dimensions of 
sovereignty bring to light how the task of statecraft – i.e. the construction of civilised and 
sovereign identities – requires to perform as ‘different’ an impressive number of similar 
traits shared by societies supposedly different. Attributing a savage identity to the non-
West – here: the Amerindians – and stabilising the civilised identity of the West (and more 
specifically of France) are complex but essential tasks for the establishment of the 
sovereign state. Such an in-depth exploration reveals that ‘writing’ savagery is as equally 
ambiguous and complex as writing the ‘civilised Self’. 
 
The aim of this thesis is therefore to build upon the insights offered by post-
colonial scholars and to add a missing dimension to their analyses. This is important if one 
hopes to avoid the reproduction of the mythology of the state as a unitary and uniform unit 
or actor. Juxtaposing the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ dimensions breaks this view (that is still 
dominant in mainstream IR) by showing how Others are also present ‘inside’ the sovereign 
sphere. As such, the assumption of an internally unproblematic establishment of 
sovereignty is contradicted. This argument might not find a receptive ear among 
mainstream IR scholars: indeed, IR as a discipline relies on the separation and 
differentiation of ‘external’ and ‘internal’ processes in order to maintain its disciplinary 
identity (and in order to defend its monopoly on knowledge of these ‘external’ events). And 
sovereignty plays in a key role in creating this frontier between internal and external. 
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Postulating this separation as the starting point of the analysis of sovereignty indeed leads 
mainstream scholars to reproduce the traditional/minimal (and misleading) definition of 
sovereignty as a highest authority of a territory and population justifying independence. In 
this approach, culture and civilisation are purely internal standards that have no bearing on 
relations between states. Minimising the significance of this internal-external divide is thus 
essential but it collides with the disciplinary identity (or, more dramatically, the survival) of 
IR as a separate body of knowledge. 
 
Finally, juxtaposing the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ also reveals how cultural 
encounters with the Others can happen ‘in’ the sovereign state. This is particularly 
important for post-colonial analyses which have a tendency to restrict these encounters to 
the ‘distant’ and the ‘exotic’. As shown in this thesis, the savage and alien is equally present 
inside in the form of the degenerate. In fact, the standard of civilisation that sustains the 
denial of sovereignty to the non-West is equally present inside the West. This means that 
Western rulers wanting to claim sovereignty are bound to appeal to the civilisational norms 
that are used to delegitimise non-Western sovereignty. Hence, the civilised-savage divide 
that is widely accepted to exist internationally also exists domestically in the civilised 
sphere. This argument reinforces post-colonial analyses of sovereignty since scholars have 
“frequently postulated without interrogating the Westphalian model or the extent to which 
the model fits the European experience” (Grovogui, 2002: 316). 
 
This argument, however, should not be overstated. It is indeed undeniable that 
Western states have been (considered) sovereign while non-Western states are 
consistently denied sovereignty or ‘enjoy’ at best a conditional or qualified form of 
sovereignty (Hobson, 2012: 335). But this difference is only the consequence of the 
application of the Eurocentric concept of sovereignty, not a difference – or duality – of the 
concept itself. In fact, I am not arguing that (civilised) sovereignty is more universal than 
expected but rather that its provincial character does not prevent it from being applied in 
similar ways everywhere (including in the West). In other words, we are not faced with a 
different set of rules used to award sovereignty to some and to deny it to others but rather 
with one set of discriminatory rules and standards that contribute to the creation of a 
civilised hierarchy upon which claims to sovereignty are based. I thus criticise the view that 
the non-West is a land ‘beyond the law’ and in a constant ‘state of exception’ (Mbembe, 
2003). I concur with Benton (2009: 32) and her analysis of zones of law in the extra-
European territories of European empires when she states that there is a need to 
“challenge the emphasis in many accounts of the legal geography of empire on sharp 
distinctions between European and extra-European spaces” in order to reveal similarities 
and shared patterns. In a similar way as Benton my analysis reveals how these (supposedly) 
radically different spaces are in reality carefully constructed through similar practices and 
hierarchies. Through an exploration of the formation of the idea of French civilisation and 
its application both internally and externally I am able to support the view that civilised 
sovereignty is used coherently across the civilised frontier. I thus advocate not a 
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supplanting but a re-balancing of post-colonial analyses towards intra-European events 
while insisting on the crucial use of the notion of (Western) civilisation. Furthering the post-
colonial research agenda, my analysis also provides an answer to those who have argued 
that such a (post-structuralist) way of conceptualising ‘civilisation’ is not appropriate. As 
Bettiza (2014: 10) writes ““the politics of civilization/s” research tends to overwhelmingly 
focus on Western narratives that construct civilizations as essentialised entities in clash”. 
Providing an informed analysis of how Western civilisation is built and maintained could 
solve the issues associated with such essentialisation while the identification of the 
(discarded) similarities that proliferate among the civilised and the savage sheds a new light 


















Of the different analyses of sovereignty outlined in the previous chapter post-structuralist 
and post-colonial analyses have come the furthest in deconstructing sovereignty and 
revealing the civilised values supporting it. In particular, they have questioned the 
minimalist definition of sovereignty and its supposed neutrality. These approaches have 
sought to interrogate how the reality of sovereign states comes into being. In order to 
contribute to this literature I argue that sovereignty should be considered as a 
performative concept. If all post-structuralist and post-colonial scholars do not make 
(explicit) use of this approach, the philosophical presuppositions and main thrust of their 
arguments all relate to or confirm the assumptions of performativity. As such, the idea of 
performativity is parsimonious enough to enable a synthesis of the existing critical 
scholarship on sovereignty within a single framework. In particular, a lot of these scholars 
would share an understanding of discourse as “a relational totality of signifying sequences 
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that together constitute a more or less coherent framework for what can be said and done” 
(Dunn, 2009: 426).42 
 
This chapter will establish the basis of the theoretical approach that will be used to 
study the discourses of sovereignty in the three next chapters. Like an increasing number of 
scholars in IR I have chosen to use performativity to explore the discourses that build our 
(international) reality.43 Performativity means that “discourses constitute the objects of 
which they speak” (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007: 406). As will be discussed in the following 
sections, such an approach to discourses – and here more specifically to the discourses of 
sovereignty – is crucial in order to de-naturalise their foundations and to reveal the 
constructed nature of these (sovereign) ‘realities’. Indeed, performative discourses of 
sovereignty tend to be presented as “constative utterances” (Derrida, 1986: 11) reflecting a 
pre-existing or pre-cultural reality. Performativity is particularly adapted to question such 
discourses and in particular to study how conflicting identities and dichotomies are 
established as natural and pre-discursive. This will become crucial when turning to the 
civilised/uncivilised divide and in order to understand how ‘difference’ is established as 
natural and pre-existing to its cultural/discursive inscription. Performativity thus sheds a 
new light on this “representational politics”, i.e. reveals how the “recourse to the “natural” 
(…) is always political” (Butler, 1990: 2 and 126). It is particularly adapted to a re-inscription 
of culture in ‘international relations’.  
 
 
Contesting the nature/culture dichotomy to 
denaturalise reality 
 
My ambition in this chapter is not to provide an exhaustive synthesis of performativity in 
the social sciences. Instead, the focus will be on two salient figures (Clifford Geertz and 
Judith Butler) who developed useful arguments for understanding and denaturalising 
civilised sovereignty. By examining how they conceptualise the relationships between what 
is supposedly ‘natural’ and what is supposedly ‘cultural’ – and how they showed that 
‘nature’ is produced in the cultural process of enacting reality – I am aiming at applying 
those principles to sovereignty and at making a broad analogy between these theorists’ 
deconstructions and a deconstruction of civilised sovereignty. 
 
                                                          
42
 As Dunn (2009: 426) adds: “Simply put, a discourse creates a truth-effect — it is a collection of 
representations about X that makes X ‘knowable’”. 
43
 For recent examples see Agius (2013) and Brassett and Vaughan-Williams (2015). 
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A useful starting point for introducing performativity is to go back to Geertz’s 
discussion on the relationship between nature and culture. For Geertz (1973: 49), “there is 
no such thing as a human nature independent of culture”. Indeed, and instead of a 
separation between nature and culture, what the observation of human beings tells us is 
that there has always been an interaction between them, the separation being artificially 
(and misleadingly) made by the analyst. Geertz argues that human beings are physically 
and biologically transformed by the kind of culture or proto-culture they develop, at the 
same time as the kind of culture they develop is influenced by their natural/physical traits. 
Hence, “between the cultural patterns, the body, and the brain, a positive feedback system 
was created” (Geertz, 1973: 47) that allows for the development of finished human beings. 
In this sense, “culture, rather than being added on, so to speak, to a finished or virtually 
finished animal, was ingredient, and central ingredient, in the production of that animal 
itself" (Geertz, 1973: 47). The human physical (or ‘natural’) characteristics are not sufficient 
on their own to explain the development of human beings. For Geertz (1973: 36), “to draw 
such a line [between nature and culture] is to falsify the human situation, or at least to 
misrender it seriously". Indeed, and as revealed by the discussions of chapters 4 and 5, the 
appeal to a supposedly pre-cultural and pre-political nature is itself a political act instead of 
a mere reflection of an untouched and ‘given’ reality. 
 
 This ‘interaction’ nature/culture has been further problematised by Butler in her 
account of sex and gender. Butler starts from the premise that one should not be asked to 
take sides between the prevalence of nature as ‘reality’ or the prevalence of culture 
understood as immaterial (and as such inconsequential) ‘discourse’ since “the options for 
theory are not exhausted by presuming materiality, on the one hand, and negating 
materiality, on the other” (Butler, 1992: 17). Therefore, performativity occupies a middle-
ground that emphasises both the existence of reality and its constructedness. As argued by 
Butler (1993: 8): 
 
[T]here is an “outside” to what is constructed by discourse, but this is not an 
absolute “outside,” an ontological thereness that exceeds or counters the 
boundaries of discourse; as a constitutive “outside,” it is that which can only be 
thought – when it can – in relation to that discourse, at and as its most tenuous 
borders. The debate between constructivism and essentialism thus misses the 
point of deconstruction altogether, for the point has never been that “everything is 
discursively constructed”. 
 
Consequently, arguing that reality exists before our discourses about it, or that our 
discourses do not call into being the reality that they enunciate, is to act arbitrarily to either 
distinguish a pre-discursive realm or to deny the existence of empirical facts altogether. For 
Butler, separating the discursive from the extra-discursive cannot be but a discretionary act 
for the simple reason that “insofar as the extra-discursive is delimited, it is formed by the 
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very discourse from which it seeks to free itself”. Consequently, such a delimitation is 
arbitrary for there are no grounds outside of discourse upon which such a decision can be 
made (Butler, 1993: 11; see also Laclau and Mouffe, 1985/2001: 107-108; Hansen, 2006: 
19). That is why “there is no way of comprehending non-linguistic and extra-discursive 
phenomena except through discursive practices” (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007: 406). Here, one 
should be careful not to associate performativity with a restricted textual approach 
ignorant of the broader social context – or what Callon (2007: 329) criticises as “Butlerian-
style culturalist excesses”. Such a critique is linked to the supposedly ‘disembodied’ focus 
on lifeless texts that performativity engenders. Ringmar (2014), for instance, laments the 
lack of the ‘body’ and of ‘performances’ in most studies using performativity. He argues for 
a focus on ‘performance’ as a way to access meaning in a direct and unmediated way (to 
bypass texts or discourses, so to speak). But if the presence of the ‘body’ is undeniable, its 
meaning is not evident or directly accessible. Arguing that there is a primacy of the material 
(here: the body) means re-establishing supposedly incontestable (because natural and pre-
formed) foundations for reality. As Wilcox (2014: 361) indicates: “Because Butler seeks to 
understand the concept of sex as gendered, she is often accused of neglecting ‘the body’ as 
if physicality and materiality simply had no bearing on the world”.  
 
 In contradistinction what Butler emphasises is the absence of ‘natural’ foundations 
upon which to base a discourse. Indeed, foundations do not appear naturally or logically, 
and a discourse seemingly constructed upon them necessarily calls them into being at the 
same time as it derives from them. Butler considers that foundations are established by the 
discourse itself, a discourse which then claims to only represent (re-present) these 
foundations. With every foundation, a “foundering” can be encountered, but also a 
“contestation”, for the discourse establishing foundations both authorises and excludes 
(Butler, 1992: 16, 17): 
 
[F]oundations function as the unquestioned and the unquestionable within any 
theory. And yet, are these “foundations,” that is, those premises that function as 
authorizing grounds, are they themselves not constituted through exclusions 
which, taken into account, expose the foundational premise as a contingent and 
contestable presumption (Butler, 1992: 7). 
  
This is how a discourse can produce “what it claims merely to represent” (Butler, 1990: 2). 
As a consequence, the empirical is not a “site or surface”, i.e. a passive materiality having a 
meaning on its own. Butler notices that ‘matter’ and ‘matrix’ have a common etymology, 
and that matter therefore has a “power of creation” usually forgotten by empirical 
analyses. She concludes that ‘to matter’ should be understood at the same time as ‘to 
materialise’ and ‘to mean’ (Butler, 1993: 32). Performativity is therefore this “process of 
materialization that stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and 
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surface we call matter” (Butler, 1993: 9).44 This process of materialisation can also be 
understood as a naturalisation, i.e. a presupposition which creates a background 
knowledge taken as ‘true’ (Doty, 1996: 10). 
 
 What does it mean, therefore, when we turn to the notion of subject? Is not the 
subject necessarily pre-existing to the discourse that s/he enunciates? This interrogation is 
particularly relevant in the context of civilised sovereignty: indeed, such discourses 
repeatedly appeal to civilised subjects and entities. But their ‘presence’ is not natural or 
automatic: Butler considers that “subjects do not exist somehow behind or outside 
discourse but are constituted in and through it” (Laffey, 2000: 431). Indeed, the subject is 
not outside the discourse (as if pre-given). Such a conceptualisation of the subject would 
require a “stable ontological subject that prefigures action” (Jeffrey, 2013: 29). Instead, the 
subject should be seen as the result of a political construction made possible through 
necessary exclusions and differentiations. However, “[t]o refuse to assume, that is, to 
require a notion of the subject from the start is not the same as negating or dispensing with 
such notion altogether” but rather to enquire into how this subject has been produced and 
into “the political meaning and consequentiality of taking the subject as a requirement or 
presupposition of theory” (Butler, 1992: 4). As such, no subject pre-exists and “the speech 
act, though clearly issued by a subject, is also one that remakes the subject of that 
enunciation” (Butler, 2010: 155). In his analysis of the performativity of a declaration of 
independence Derrida (1986: 10) for instance argued that the ‘people’ to which the 
declaration refers to 
 
does not exist. They do not exist as an entity, it does not exist, before this 
declaration, not as such. If it gives birth to itself, as free and independent subject, 
as possible signer, this can hold only in the act of signature.  
 
The idea of the immanent ‘subject’ acting on a stable ‘object’ needs to be rejected: a 
performative approach reveals that “[d]iscourse is thus not something that subjects use in 
order to describe objects; it is that which constitutes both subjects and objects” 
(Bialasiewicz et al., 2007: 407). 
 
The idea of a subject, though, does not have to be rejected altogether. It is only its 
priority over (and before) the performative acts that is questioned. For Butler (1992: 12), 
“[t]here is no ontologically intact reflexivity to the subject which is then placed within a 
cultural context” and the analyst should not accept this “foundationalist fiction” that 
                                                          
44
 This effect of boundary is also mentioned by Bourdieu who argues that the act of categorisation 
institutes “a reality by using the power of revelation and construction exercised by objectification in 
discourse” (Bourdieu, 1991: 223 (emphases in the original)). 
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presents the notion of the subject as pre-given to the discourse (Butler, 1990: 3). As 
explained by Laffey (2000: 431) Butler’s aim is to acknowledge the possibility of agency 
(thus to refuse an anti-foundationalist view) while at the same time arguing that the 
subject is necessarily constructed. In other words, subjects are produced – and disciplined – 
by (their own) discourses (Gregson and Rose, 2000: 437). This insistence on the notion of 
the ‘produced subject’ is also what differentiates performativity from performance. Largely 
influenced by Goffman’s key work (Goffman, 1974) the use of the theatrical notion of 
performance to analyse social reality implies “an active, prior, conscious, and performing 
self” as well as “[t]he sense of anterior agents; the separation of performer and 
performance; the sense of performances occupying particular pregiven kinds of spaces; and 
a notion of a (constraining) script” (Gregson and Rose, 2000: 433 and 438). As Jeffrey 
(2013: 27-28) writes the theatrical approach to performance “separates the performer 
from the performance (…) In addition, the notion of performance allows the scholar to 
assume the roles of director and audience, with a privileged knowledge of the scripts, 
costumes and comportment of the ‘actors’ involved”. All of these assumptions contradict 
some of the key claims of performativity: it requires a ‘stage’ that is set and pre-defined 
before the discourse, an ‘actor’ whose identity exists before and outside the act, and a 
possibility of ‘improvisation’ or unconstrained creation that contradicts the iteration and 
repetitions necessary for a discourse to be felicitous.  
 
To illustrate how a performative approach is helpful I now turn to the example that 
made Butler’s performative approach well-known: the deconstruction of the dichotomy 
between sex and gender. Butler’s use of performativity to challenge this well-entrenched 
dichotomy will then be similarly applied to deconstruct other important distinctions (such 
as between the state and sovereignty and between the savage and the civilised). Indeed, 
when two elements are separated one is usually built as natural while the other is placed in 
the realm of the constructed or cultural. As far as the dichotomy between sex and gender is 
concerned Beauvoirian accounts postulate sex as the natural matter upon which the 
cultural construct of gender is imposed so as to give a re-presentation (a meaning) to this 
pre-existing materiality. In these accounts, ““the body” appears as a passive medium on 
which cultural meanings are inscribed” (Butler, 1990: 8). But in fact, this classical separation 
of sex and gender is highly misleading: 
 
Gender ought not to be conceived merely as the cultural inscription of meaning on 
a pregiven sex (a juridical conception), gender must also designate the very 
apparatus of production whereby the sexes themselves are established. As a result, 
gender is not to culture as sex is to nature; gender is also the discursive/cultural 
means by which “sexed nature” or “a natural sex” is produced and established as 
“prediscursive,” prior to culture, a politically neutral surface on which culture acts 




To understand this rather radical argument, it is useful to go back to what Butler argues 
about ‘sex’. According to Butler (1993: 5), “[t]he concept of “sex” is itself troubled terrain, 
formed through a series of contestations over what ought to be a decisive criterion for 
distinguishing between the two sexes”, and in any case cannot be understood as the logical 
consequence of biological evidence (understood both as ‘proof’ and as ‘obvious’). ‘Sex’ 
does not stand out of history as a solid rock on which to inscribe ‘gender’. As a product of 
(political) struggles, ‘sex’ appears thanks to concessions, exclusions, and regulations to 
produce the supposedly ‘natural’ construct that we know as ‘sex’. This naturalness of sex is 
“constituted through discursively constrained performative acts that produce the body 
through and within the categories of sex” (Butler, 1990: viii). For Butler (1993: 10), “there is 
no reference to a pure body which is not at the same time a further formation of that 
body”, and accordingly, “[t]o “concede” the undeniability of “sex” or its “materiality” is 
always to concede some version of “sex,” some formation of “materiality””. ‘Sex’ is thus 
the result of regulatory norms that materialise ‘sex’ “through a forcible reiteration of those 
norms”. The fact that this materialisation has to be reiterated reveals that it “is never quite 
complete, that bodies never quite comply with the norms by which their materialization is 
impelled” (Butler, 1993: 2). As Butler later argued “performativity never fully achieves its 
effect, and so in this sense ‘fails’ all the time; its failure is what necessitates its reiterative 
temporality, and we cannot think iterability without failure” (Butler, 2010: 153). 
 
 This conclusion is identical to what Geertz argues about the dichotomy 
nature/culture: here, sex and gender cannot be separated as sex (or the body) “come[s] 
into being in and through the mark(s) of gender” (Butler, 1990: 8). Thus, “[i]f the immutable 
character of sex is contested, perhaps this construct called “sex” is as culturally constructed 
as gender” (Butler, 1990: 7). For Butler (1990: 8), “sex, by definition, will be shown to have 
been gender all along”. Sex or the body is not outside the social or cultural but rather a 
product of it. Performativity therefore implies a complete reversal of empiricism: ““sex” 
becomes something like a fiction, perhaps a fantasy, retroactively installed at a prelinguistic 
site to which there is no direct access” (Butler, 1993: 5).  
 
 Hence, and following Butler’s and Geertz’s arguments, it becomes impossible “to 
stabilise claims to identity through recourse to some biological foundation because the 
division between the natural and the cultural is forever contested” (Weber, 1998: 79). But 
at the same time, performativity should not be caricatured. Some scholars indeed argue 
that “discursive approaches deny the “reality” of the subject being discussed”. In fact, 
reality has not disappeared but has acquired a completely different ontological quality: 
reality is formed through a process of materialisation and interpretation that is distinctively 
discursive. In other words, “[s]ubjects are “real” only through [and thanks to, one can add] 
discourse” (Dunn, 2003: 11). To say that “the gendered body is performative” means that 
“it has no ontological status apart from the various acts which constitute its reality” (Butler, 
1990: 136). As such, performativity is not a way of saying that “there is nothing outside of 
discourse; it is not that [the empirical does] not ‘really’ exist, but that we have no access to 
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[it] outside of cultural interpretations” (Wilcox, 2014: 361). Ontology becomes seen as 
political and always already politicised (Mol, 1999). This will be illustrated by the discourses 
of sovereignty of chapters 4 and 5 where claims to sovereignty are in fact claims supported 
by an appeal to a supposedly pre-existing reality. 
 
If performativity is frequently presented as a radical deconstruction of reality, one 
explanation could be that the empirical sometimes appears self-evident and meaningful in 
itself. But through a performative reading one understands that this ‘meaningful empirical 
reality’ only seems to be meaningful in and of itself because discourses are so well-
accepted that they make reality appear as natural. Performativity is therefore not a way of 
saying that reality does not exist, but rather that it exists differently, and hence with 
different implications. As such, performativity “does not make the state, or the other 
subjects, any less “real.” What it does is radically problematize what is meant by real, and 
indicates that the “real” is a mode of appearance, a constative/performative production” 
(Dillon and Everard, 1992: 300). As Ashley (1987: 52-53) argued, performativity allows us to 
explain “a structuring whose persistence is itself puzzling and in need of explanation by 
reference to social practices”.45 
 
 
Applying performativity to sovereignty: de-
naturalising sovereign foundations  
 
The conceptual evolution of sovereignty in IR can be profitably compared to the evolution 
of gender in feminist theory and to its performative ‘deconstruction’. At first attached 
directly to sex as its ‘logical’ meaning and ‘natural’ signification, gender could not be 
separated from sex, with everything originating from this ‘empirical’ and ‘objective’ basis. 
What will later be called the ‘cultural’ genderised characteristics of men and women 
therefore resulted from their ‘natural’ constitution. With the Beauvoirian critique, gender 
became the social/cultural meaning added upon a natural/physical sex. In this version, “the 
social unilaterally acts on the natural and invests it with its parameters and its meanings” 
(Butler, 1993: 4). This first evolution allowed for a critical move: by showing how the 
‘cultural’ acted upon the ‘natural’, how gender could evolve and was an arbitrary 
construction long-thought as ‘natural’, this first move was essential for contesting the 
naturalisation of gender. That is why Butler (1990: 6) considers this critique as “intended to 
dispute the biology-is-destiny formulation”. But at the same time, this critique naturalised 
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 Mitchell (1999: 89-90) developed a similar argument about the state: “We must analyse the state 
as such a structural effect. That is to say, we should examine it not as an actual structure, but as the 
powerful, apparently metaphysical effect of practices that make such structures appear to exist. In 
fact, the nation state is arguably the paramount structural effect of the modern technical era”. 
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the dichotomy nature/culture or sex/gender, instituting ‘sex’ as the uncontestable 
foundation of gender. She argues that, after a first critical uncovering of the dichotomy 
between sex and gender, there is now a need for a deconstruction of what forms the basis 
of the dichotomy, namely the separation between foundations and discourses (without at 
the same time returning to the first state of affairs where foundations determined 
discourses). This deconstruction of the dichotomy could not only show the arbitrariness of 
the discourse – gender – but also the arbitrariness of the foundations themselves – the 
‘natural’ sex – with both elements being conceived as part of the same (discursive) realm. 
 
 When turning to sovereignty and the state, three similar possibilities can be 
identified. First, sovereignty can be seen as the logical implication of the presence of the 
state. This pre-sence (or pre-given materiality) naturally gives rise to sovereignty, the two 
concepts being usually employed together because they cannot be separated: a state is 
sovereign and sovereignty is of a state. For Thomson (1995: 215), “state-centric theories, 
which have dominated International Relations, are built on the assumption that states are, 
by definition, sovereign”. In this ‘classical view’ (Lake, 2003: 305-306) sovereignty logically 
follows the ‘pre-sence’ of a state, or, to put it differently, the ‘presence’ of the empirical 
state inevitably gives rise to sovereignty.46 The predominance of “[e]xpressions such as 
sovereign state or state sovereignty clearly indicate that historically, as well as 
conceptually, these two terms – sovereignty and the state – have run their course more or 
less hand-in-hand” (Lipping, 2010: 186). Jackson (1990: 34 and 40) for instance argued that 
before decolonisation “[s]tates historically were empirical realities before they were legal 
personalities” and that, as such, “sovereignty and empirical statehood were still roughly 
aligned in most cases”. In a similar vein Hinsley (1986: 17) explained that “when a society is 
ruled by means of the state the concept of sovereignty is sooner or later unavoidable”. In 
these approaches, the empirical state seems to ‘speak for itself’ in giving rise to 
sovereignty.  
 
Identical to the Beauvoirian critique, the constructivist turn in IR encouraged 
theorists to question the prevalence of the ‘empirical state’. With this evolution, the state 
was placed “in the realm of the physical/natural” while sovereignty was transposed “in the 
realm of the cultural” (Weber, 1998: 83). The idea that the state was indeed ‘natural’ and 
given, but that sovereignty was a social or cultural construct that came after, so to speak, 
as a characterisation of those state elements or capacities represented a strong critique of 
the empirically deterministic approaches to state sovereignty. As with sex and gender, this 
first move was crucial for a first contestation of sovereignty to emerge: sovereignty was 
now conceptualised as a social construct, an arbitrary artefact evolving through time and 
space in line with the culture from which it proceeds (Barkin, 1998; Biersteker and Weber, 
1996b; Glanville, 2011; Weber, 1995; Zaum, 2007). To paraphrase Butler, the separation 
between state and sovereignty was intended to critique the empirical inevitability of most 
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analyses: state ‘realities’ alone can no longer give rise to sovereignty and thus to a 
sovereign state. What is now needed is the good type of state (i.e. this state that can be 
culturally characterised as legitimate and sovereign). 
 
But this first critique of sovereignty is insufficient. Indeed, such a critique both 
denounces and naturalises a (normative) discourse in which some states are considered 
sovereign thanks to certain capacities while others are considered non-sovereign due to 
the ‘lack’ of those capacities. This claim also implies that every state, with the right amount 
of capacities (for ‘good governance’) would be able to attain sovereignty; as such, ‘quasi-’, 
‘fragile’, or ‘failed’ states are still not sovereign because they have not complied with a 
Western script of sovereignty, and they could attain sovereignty with the right level of 
capacities (Helman and Ratner, 1992-1993; Fukuyama, 2004: 129-130), if only they were to 
make more efforts to develop them. The ‘Western state’ model is left untouched as an 
obvious reality justifying the bestowal of sovereignty to the West and its denial to the Rest. 
Therefore, by separating ‘state’ from ‘sovereignty’, this first critique institutes the state as 
the naturalised foundation of the discourse of sovereignty, as the essentialised pre-social 
(Epstein, 2010: 331) or pre-cultural, making it difficult to question this ‘reality’ without 
rejecting representation at the same time. 
 
 A performative critique goes further and de-naturalises the supposed pre-existence 
of the sovereign state ‘realities’ (and lack of these same ‘realities’ in non-sovereign states). 
As argued by Weber (1998: 92), “the traditional IR definition of sovereignty – absolute 
authority over a territory occupied by a relatively fixed population and recognised as 
sovereign by other sovereign states – renders the state prediscursive” because the four 
components are taken as pre-existing to the definition itself. What the discourse of 
sovereignty does is to naturalise these discursive elements that serve as ‘foundations’ for 
the representation. As Bourdieu, Wacquant and Farage (1994: 16) indicate the (sovereign) 
state is instituted through the production of “the performative discourse on the state 
which, under the guise of saying what the state is, caused the state to come into being by 
stating what it should be”. Thus, and as for sex and gender, states and sovereignty are 
never in the realm of nature and are always constructed (Weber, 1998: 90). Performativity 
suggests that no state is ‘naturally’ there outside the discourses that create it; contrary to 
“much of the conventional literature on the nation and the state [that] implies that the 
essence of the former precedes the reality of the latter”, a performative approach argues 
that “no state possesses a prediscursive, stable identity”, i.e. stable foundations on which 
to ground a discourse (Campbell, 1992: 11 and 105). 
 
 The first action of the performative discourse of sovereignty is to create the 
foundations it subsequently claims to only represent, which is what Campbell (1997: 168) 
calls “performative enunciations marked as constative acts”. To understand how, one has 
to refer to those elements mentioned by Weber (1998: 92) as constituting the traditional IR 
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definition of sovereignty – “absolute authority over a territory occupied by a relatively fixed 
population and recognised as sovereign by other sovereign states” – and to interrogate 
their ‘naturalness’. It is thus the state itself that needs to be questioned. And for scholars 
using performativity, the state is clearly not a natural object that can be studied pre-
discursively. Indeed, a performative analysis of the state concludes that states have “no 
ontological status apart from the many and varied practices that constitute their reality” 
(Campbell, 1992: 11). The complexity of the world, the ambiguities and contingencies 
encountered in international relations are normalised and domesticated through a 
discourse on statehood that serves as a foundation for sovereignty. A state has to 
“establish its condition of possibility” (Campbell, 1997: 167) through discursive means, that 
is to say to render coherent and foundational a set of elements that the discourse itself 
brings to light. One of the ways of doing it is through ‘foreign’ policy discourses, “a specific 
sort of boundary-producing political performance” (Ashley, 1987: 51). 
 
 Hence, and as argued by Campbell (1997: 164-165), “[a]lthough the multifarious 
discourses surrounding the state that invoke its name and declare its purpose give the 
appearance of simply reflecting a reality awaiting apprehension, such discourses in 
actuality constitute that reality for, when pursued, the sources of authority on which those 
discourses rest can be considered “mystical”” (see also Derrida, 1994: 34). Those ‘strong’ 
states – those ‘positively’ sovereign states – are therefore states whose reality has been 
accepted as natural and empirically evident. This analysis, however, is not another way of 
saying that the materiality of the state does not exist: it would indeed be difficult to deny 
the existence of some material elements. But those elements do not speak for themselves, 
and “the ways we understand this materiality of people, territory, government, etc – does 
not pre-exist performative expression of the state, including sovereignty” (Weber, 1998: 
92). With a performative analysis it also becomes possible to show how certain foundations 
called into being by discourses can be contested by alternative discourses – thus showing 
their arbitrariness. The discourse of sovereignty, by constituting a particular society or 
political community “always necessarily excludes as well as includes” (Walker, 2003a: 22). 
Certain foundations are ‘erased’ through discourses despite their discursive affirmation by 
competing actors. Those material elements can remain outside of discourse (or be erased 
through discourse) and consequently will not be part of ‘reality’. 
 
As such, scholars using performativity are interested in the social practices that 
sustain the idea of ‘state’ (through supposedly stable identities and labels) and the claims 
to sovereignty (Jeffrey, 2013: 42). The consequence of using performativity is thus the 
‘processisation’ of the state, since “the identity of the state is performatively constituted by 
the very expressions that are said to be its result” (Weber, 1998: 90). In the case of civilised 
sovereignty these practices are the countless discourses establishing or denying civilisation 





Establishing reality: reiterative discourses and the 
‘reality effect’ of sovereignty 
 
An approach using performativity begs important questions for the state and sovereignty. 
Crucial among them is how we understand the force of performative discourses – i.e. their 
ability to create and naturalise the ‘foundations’ of sovereign and non-sovereign states. As 
noticed by Dunn (2009: 426): “Some representations become accepted as ‘true’ and others 
simply do not. Particular meanings and identities of objects become widely accepted as 
fixed and true; not because of the inherent ‘truth’ of those representations, but because of 
the strength of that specific representational power”. Here, two questions are essential: 
first, how to understand the interaction between discourses and their sedimentation, i.e. 
their becoming seemingly materially self-evident? And secondly, how to explain the 
relative force (or power) of certain discourses over others? 
 
 The first question concerns the effects of performative discourses on ‘reality’. Most 
authors working on performativity estimate that performative discourses have a 
sedimented or accumulated effect on reality, so that they materialise and exercise a 
constraint on subsequent discourses. The discourse of sovereignty, as other performative 
discourses, acquires a “naturalized effect” due to its reiterative nature (Butler, 1993: 10). 
For Laffey (2000: 411), “History – the reiteration of gender norms [or, for that matter, of 
sovereign norms] – acquires ontological weight through materializations and 
sedimentations”. Butler (1993: 94) also argues that: 
 
A construction is, after all, not the same as an artifice (...) There is a tendency to think 
that sexuality is either constructed or determined; to think that if it is constructed, it 
is in some sense free, and if it is determined, it is in some sense fixed. These 
oppositions do not describe the complexity of what is at stake. 
 
In other words, the naturalisation or materialisation of sovereign realities can exercise a 
strong effect of closure and blindness. As Boli (2001: 54) explains “[t]he assumption that 
the national polity is real is now reflected in so much structure, accounting, and 
interpretation that we can hardly imagine a world constructed in any other way”. The 
naturalisation of the sovereign state means that “[t]he state comes to seem an 
autonomous starting point” (Mitchell, 1999: 84) and we forget that this ‘instituted 
institution’ (despite appearing to us as natural) “issues out of a long series of acts of 
institution (in the active sense)” (Bourdieu et al., 1994: 4). Hence, the fact that we so often 
take nature/foundations as meaningful in themselves is a consequence of the fact that our 
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discourses (of gender or of sovereignty) are so well-accepted that they conceal how these 
‘natural foundations’ could mean something else, hence that they do not mean anything 
outside of our discourses about ‘them’. Consequently, what the persistent materialisations 
reveal is the stability of our cultural constructions of the world and the limited space 
available for alternatives. This is particularly true for the discourses of sovereignty: their 
‘reality effect’ seems to foreclose any alternative. Through its ‘foundational’ violence 
(Cocks, 2014) sovereignty prevents the establishment and development of alternatives. The 
reiterative effect of performative discourses sediments and positions the sovereign 
subjects over time in seemingly static and definitive categories (Butler, 1997: 33-34; see 
also Lee, 2012: 59), with performative utterances therefore exercising their creating power 
in the context of the legacy of a certain past. 
 
 It should not be concluded, however, that this ‘past’ is a given and exists outside of 
the realm of discourses. In their analysis of Australia, Dillon and Everard (1992: 292) argued 
that “[r]epetition (…) masquerades as a recollection of the same” and add that repetition 
 
claims to be a backward look to something stable and fixed, preceding the present 
act, which is merely to be retrieved or recovered, and repeated. But it is not. It is a 
creative process, although of a particular sort. It thus produces what it claims to 
repeat, because repetition is never the same, but it does so through, and in the 
distinctive idiom of, the dynamics of a nostalgia for a past presence. It is, then, a 
record of constant variation and alteration that contains its own distinctive modes 
of production, exclusion, and violence, for it is a movement in which movement is 
something to be overcome. 
 
Repetition is thus also production, for its very claim to recall the past acts as a 
reinterpretation – a re-enactment – of it. Performative discourses “invoke earlier 
articulations, even as their reiteration changes them” (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007: 417). As 
such, performativity is also connected to the idea of ‘change’. Generally speaking Butler 
does not provide a compelling analysis of change. Indeed, change sits uneasily with the 
idea of norms and iteration that stands at the centre of performativity. As Butler (2009: xii) 
writes even “though we can radically rework our genders or even try to rework our 
sexualities (though often failing), we are in the grip of norms even as we struggle against 
them”. The capacity for reality to change and transform is in fact difficult to include in what 
is, essentially, a static approach that strives to uncover how a constant reality is produced 
through discourses. One way that ‘change’ can be accounted for is when ‘reality’ exceeds 
the norms. As Wilcox (2014: 361) indicates the “realm of bodily excess cannot be accessed 
outside of discourse, but it is this excessive realm of the body that creates the possibilities 
for agency, resistance and political change”. It is thus through the failures of discourses to 
materialise as intended that alternatives are revealed and change can materialise. Butler 
writes about “discontinuities” between the intended reality and the actual reality that 
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emerges.47 Hence, the continuity and seemingly constant reproduction of the same “is 
called into question by the cultural emergence of those “incoherent” or “discontinuous” 
gendered beings who appear to be persons but who fail to conform to the gendered norms 
of cultural intelligibility by which persons are defined” (Butler, 1990: 17). This occurs in a 
similar way for sovereign states: when their ‘reality’ (and in particular their civilised 
‘reality’) clashes with previous or competing discourses their very existence is threatened 
or can be transformed. Additionally, reproduction can deviate in unexpected ways: 
performative discourses are more unpredictable than the insistence on the idea of 
‘citationality’ would suggest (Gregson and Rose, 2000: 446). For Butler (2009: iii and i) 
“every act of reproduction risks going awry or adrift, or producing effects that are not fully 
foreseen” thus transforming norms in unexpected ways. 
 
 This remark leads us to the crucial question of the force of the performative 
discourses: “[t]o what extent does discourse gain the authority to bring about what it 
names through citing the linguistic conventions of authority, conventions that are 
themselves legacies of citation?” (Butler, 1997: 51). Performative discourses are not 
removed from society and materiality: rather, they should be understood as “power 
processes” (Carver, 2008: 118) which “shift across time and space, largely through political 
struggle and the distribution of power” (Dunn, 2003: 10). At the most basic level, this 
power exercised by performative discourses is dependent on the author of the discourse, 
i.e. on his/her authority. Here, having power means being able to “freeze meaning” and 
naturalise specific representations to the point that they appear “doxic” (Neumann, 2007: 
190). As such, “[t]he effectiveness of the performative discourse which claims to bring 
about what it asserts in the very act of asserting it is directly proportional to the authority 
of the person doing the asserting” (Bourdieu, 1991: 223). To be able to ‘state things 
authoritatively’ – “that is, in front of and in the name of everyone, publicly and officially” 
(Bourdieu, 1991: 222) – is the first condition for a successful performative action of the 
discourse. 
 
 But more precisely, how is this authority constructed? The first condition is to 
respect (or to re-enact) socially defined practices or conditions accepted as authoritative. If 
a performative act is successful, it is because 
 
that action echoes prior actions, and accumulates the force of authority through 
the repetition or citation of a prior and authoritative set of practices (…) What this 
means, then, is that a performative “works” to the extent that it draws on and 
covers over the constitutive conventions by which it is mobilized. In this sense, no 
term or statement can function performatively without the accumulating and 
dissimulating historicity of force (Butler, 1997: 51). 
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In other words, the authority of a performative discourse owes much to “the social 
conditions of its production” (Bourdieu, 1991: 38) which renders it natural because 
inscribed in (and therefore hidden behind) a tradition of previously used authoritative 
practices. In the same action, the performative author reproduces social standards 
associated with authority while hiding this ‘reproduction’ behind the naturalness of the 
authoritative acts reproduced. This is clearly the case when those authorised to speak in 
the name of the sovereign state resort to established practices such as official declarations 
or accreditation of foreign ambassadors (things that a sovereign state does). Performative 
discourses can thus be significant and impactful only if they “elicit recognition as a 
warranted, valid, and indeed naturally appropriate way of seeing, saying, and making the 
world” (Ashley, 1987: 53). They “draw upon socially available cognitive resources – 
recognized precedents and shared symbolic materials – in order to impose interpretations 
upon events, silence alternative interpretations, structure practices, and orchestrate the 
collective making of history” (Ashley, 1987: 53).  
 
But this authority should not be considered as a personal attribute of a single 
individual; rather, it is diffused throughout society in the “symbolic economy within which 
performances take place” (Jeffrey, 2013: 31). In this light performativity can easily integrate 
constructivist arguments about different dominant conceptions of sovereignty and its 
meaning. The second condition that makes a performative discourse successful is thus the 
‘objectified’ conditions conditioning the acceptability, authority, and therefore potential 
success, of a performative discourse. Indeed, in the example of regional(ist) groups and 
identity taken by Bourdieu (1991: 223-224), “the cognition effect brought about by the fact 
of objectification in discourse does not depend only on the recognition granted to the 
person who utters that discourse”. Crucially, it also depends on “the economic or cultural 
properties they share in common”. The authority of the author cannot be assessed on its 
own but depends on the social conditions of its production: it has to be analysed in relation 
to the group(s) recognising the author as a source of authority (or as lacking authority). As 
such, discourses of sovereignty ignoring established conditions of felicity and overlooking 
the correspondence between the author and the intended audience will not exercise a 
performative effect (or rather: they will fail). In other words, “an accounting of felicity’s 
conditions must attend to the cultural structures that render a performative intelligible, 
meaningful, and capable of being interpreted as felicitous or infelicitous, in addition to the 
mode and context in which the performative is enacted” (Alexander and Mast, 2006: 4). 
Performative discourses thus occupy an ambiguous position: they are reliant on a context 
that they contribute to enact.48 This is particularly true for the discourse of civilised 
sovereignty (and the civilisation enacted in support of sovereignty claims). 
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Uncovering this sedimented effect of the performative discourse of sovereignty as 
well as its social conditions of felicity is crucial when considering the implications of a 
performative analysis of the concept. The critique of the normativity of sovereignty gains 
strength when the ‘reality’ of sovereignty is interpreted through performativity. Indeed, 
and as an answer to such a critique of the normativity of sovereignty, most mainstream 
scholars argue that if sovereignty is indeed normative, its use is justified by its ability to 
create strong states. By introducing a specific understanding of the ontology of these 
‘strong’ states, an approach using performativity reveals that this strength is not linked to a 
particular version of sovereignty – such as civilised sovereignty – but that it is linked to the 
force of the discursive practices themselves that act to (re-)create and (re-)inforce the 
reality (or strength) of the state in question. This is because “certain understandings of 
sovereignty (…) are imbued with value” (Jeffrey, 2013: 7). Conversely, these discourses can 
also (re-)create the weakness or fragility of other states. Taking them at face-value means 
taking for granted the superiority of the ‘civilised sovereign state’ model and, ultimately, of 
the civilisation that supports it. But when this ‘effectiveness’ is proven to be part of the 
discourse of sovereignty itself there is no more ground on which to establish this 
superiority. As such, performativity brings the critique of dominant discourses of 





In this chapter performativity has been shown to be particularly relevant for the analysis of 
sovereignty. More specifically performativity provides an answer to the “foundational 
problem” (Shinko, 2010) that sovereignty presents to the analyst:49 
 
The problem of sovereignty is profoundly paradoxical. Accenting the root, we may 
say that it is profound in the sense that it is preoccupied with the problem of 
foundation: a fundamental principle, a supporting structure, a base on which 
society rests, a fund of authority capable of endowing possibilities, accrediting 
action, and fixing limitations. Accenting the prefix, we may say that it is profound in 
the sense that that it proceeds from a situation ahead of all foundation, in favor or 
support of foundation, to produce or bring forth foundation, that will count as or 
substitute for the foundation now lacking (Ashley and Walker, 1990: 382). 
 
This productive nature of the discourse of sovereignty is crucial when one accepts that 
there is no position outside of culture – and thus outside of interpretation. As Butler (1990: 
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78) argues “[m]obilizing the distinction between what is “before” and what is “during” 
culture is one way to foreclose cultural possibilities from the start”. There is no point 
outside of culture from which to decide on the presence of a ‘natural’ sovereign. Instead, 
and to paraphrase Butler (1990: 37), this natural sovereign is the result of a discursive 
production of nature and of a naturally and empirically civilised sovereign that is postulated 
as the unquestioned foundation of culture. This questioning of the binary nature/culture 
thus resonates with the discursive construction of civilised and sovereign identities 
analysed in this thesis. But it also enables scholars to approach the idea of ‘state of nature’ 
differently. As will be discussed in the following chapters this concept is central for the 
establishment or denial of civilised sovereignty. Deciding on what nature is is indeed at the 
centre of the process of creation of civilised sovereignty. But a rejection of the notion of an 
‘untouched’ nature – in other words: a rejection of the possibility of deciding what nature 
is before or outside culture – clearly contradicts the assumption that such a state of nature 
could exist and thus contributes to unsettle the civilised-cultural/savage binary. 
 
 Hence, and following on from the discussion of sovereignty as a profoundly 
Eurocentric concept influenced by the values and principles of a parochial culture, 
performativity enables me to question some of the central assumptions of the discourse of 
sovereignty. In particular, I am now able to pose as a question the foundations of this 
discourse, i.e. the civilisational elements invoked to support claims to sovereignty. If the 
idea of performativity “presupposes that norms are acting on us before we have a chance 
to act at all” (Butler, 2009: xi), how is this normative (and productive) action taking place in 
the discourse of civilised sovereignty? In other words, how are the identities of civilised and 
savage established in the very discourse that is supposedly built upon these foundational 
elements?50 These questions will be tackled in the next three chapters. As a precaution, 
however, it should now be clear that if these civilised and sovereign identities are 
considered arbitrary and artificial – in the sense that they could have been different – this 
should not be taken to mean that they are inconsequential. As such, deconstructing these 
civilised and savage identities is not synonymous with a “deconstruction of politics” and a 
refusal of the very idea of ‘identity’. Rather, such an approach “establishes as political the 
very terms through which identity is articulated” (Butler, 1990: 148). 
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The writing of the ideal French 











In this thesis, the articulation of identity that I focus on is that of the French civilised and 
sovereign state. As a first step in this analysis this chapter explores French 
conceptualisations of sovereignty in the 16th century with a focus on the principles 
informing these discussions. My interest lies primarily in identifying shared ideas 
repeatedly used to construct (an ideal of) sovereignty. This chapter thus represents an 
attempt at studying the conceptual construction of sovereignty at the time, i.e. how claims 
to (absolute) political authority are justified and maintained. More specifically, this chapter 
will reveal how these discourses of sovereignty are necessarily built upon references to 
civilisation and savagery. In fact, one will be hard-pressed to find a ‘pure’ conceptualisation 
of sovereignty among French theorists (i.e. a conceptualisation that does not refer or is not 
built upon cultural notions of progress, evolution and civilisation). As will be shown through 
an exploration of French political thought sovereignty can only be defined in relation to 
civilisation. The ‘absoluteness’ of the concept in fact originates from the superior and 
inviolable principles that are expressed by the French through their concept of sovereignty. 
As such, this chapter concurs with post-colonial analyses which conclude at the 




The civilisation that these French conceptualisations of sovereignty rest upon is 
necessarily constructed against uncivilised (and unsovereign) countries or peoples. 
Sovereignty – and in particular French sovereignty – is described as a superior form of 
political authority and as the best possible form of government but its role as model can 
only be established by denigrating or denying the existence of other forms of proper 
political authority. France thus becomes, in essence, the perfect form of a sovereign state. 
This need to situate France above inferior forms of political organisation is what explains 
the repeated references to evolutionary theories of humankind.51  The French texts 
analysed here make repeated use of internal and external references to ‘progress’ (i.e. 
references to France itself as having achieved civilisation or references to other societies as 
less advanced). These notions of ‘progress’ (towards French civilisation) form the core of 
the discourses of sovereignty and help define what a ‘true’ sovereign is for sixteenth-
century French thinkers. Revealing these aspects will be particularly useful when turning to 
how Amerindians and French achieve this standard of civilised sovereignty or failed to 
conform to it. The different elements explored here as forming this standard – i.e. the 
elements that correspond to what a real sovereign (and civilised) society must be – are 
especially important as they will be at the centre of discussions in the following three 
chapters (both with regards to the Amerindian’s lack of sovereignty and to the French 
troubled achievement of civilisation). 
 
In order to discuss these issues the crucial period of the 16th century will be 
analysed in this chapter. According to Church (1969: 3), this century “was one of the most 
important in the evolution of [essential political concepts such as sovereignty] since at that 
time there occurred the significant change from essentially medieval constitutional 
theories” to what came to be known as ‘modern’ political ideas. The 16th century 
represents a major transitional period between medieval political thought and modern 
political thinking, a moment particularly characterised by the progress of the king’s power 
(Guenée, 1971: 78-79). For Church (1969: 335), “[t]he metamorphosis of the realm from 
feudal community to national state was complete” at the end of the 16th century. What is 
established at this time will dominate French political thinking until the Enlightenment. 
Indeed, the triumph of absolutism is clear in all the political treatises published after 1594 
(Weill, 1892: 267 and 271) and the next major political crisis – the Fronde starting in 1648 – 
will mainly repeat the same political conceptions (Lemaire, 1907: 169-170). Additionally, 
questions relating to royal power (and thus to sovereignty and its justification) have 
sparked off an abundant literature during this “agitated century” (Lemaire, 1907: 71).52 This 
is not to argue, however, that the political ideas discussed here were invented (in a sort of 
heroic movement) by French thinkers: these ideas have a history and most of them find 
their origin in the readings of Ancient philosophers and in Christian doctrine. Instead of an 
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 What Pagden (1982: 4) calls ‘comparative ethnology’, i.e. “an ethnology which argued that cultural 
difference could be explained neither as the consequence of differing psychological dispositions nor 
as the merely contingent arrangements of different social groups, but as the indication of the 
positions which the various human societies had reached on an historical time-scale”. 
52
 Le Jay (1589: f. 9v-10) recognises this ‘agitation’ when stating that “there has never been a century 
so full of sedition, disregard and contemptuousness for the Kings than the one we live in”.  
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in-depth exploration of these antecedents, however, what this chapter provides is a 
snapshot of these ideas and of their use in the conceptualisation of sovereignty. 
 
I discuss French conceptions of sovereignty as they appear from 1519 (and the 
publication of Seyssel’s important treatise) to the first decade of the 17th century (i.e. the 
aftermath of the religious and political conflicts of the 16th century). This chapter aims at 
being as exhaustive as possible and to introduce an extensive range of works published 
during the period, from the well-known work of Bodin to more confidential political 
treatises. The objective here is not to establish a hierarchy between the most and the least 
influential works nor to discuss differences between them53 but rather to identify the 
common ‘grammar’ used by political thinkers. One should remember that these works 
were all published with the approval of the king.54 This reveals two aspects: first, that these 
treatises had a certain influence and/or were reflecting ideas and issues generally 
considered as valid for the period under study. Second, the very fact that they could be 
published reveals the proximity of their views to the ‘official’ royal discourse. Keohane 
(1980: 83-84) characterises it as a “conjunction of study and political involvement” and 
adds that: 
 
French scholars of jurisprudence, men of classical education and humanist outlook, 
often held minor government posts. Such men tended to be strongly monarchical 
in their political beliefs, and dedicated to advancing the glory of France. 
 
Their proximity to royal power and their vested interest in the maintenance of the 
sovereignty of the king should not, however, disqualify the views of these scholars as 
manipulated, insincere, and somehow ‘untrue’. The distinction between their ‘real’ or 
personal opinions and their published and public expressions can only be arbitrarily 
established, when it can be at all. Although these scholars could have potentially been 
more progressive or offered dissident views in a different, less constrained, context, this 
potentiality has only a limited interest given the objective of this chapter (which is to 
identify dominant conceptualisations of sovereignty). 
 
Hence, most authors used in this chapter shared a similar background, education 
and position. They generally studied Law (like Budé) and their professional position was 
that of ‘jurisconsults’ (such is the case for Loyseau, Coquille and Moulin). Inside this 
category of ‘jurisconsults’ or ‘legists’ (Church, 1969: 6) most of them were lawyers in one of 
the major institutions of sixteenth-century France (in general but not always the Parliament 
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 For in-depth explorations (including discussions of the differences between scholars) see Weill 
(1892), Lemaire (1907) and Church (1969). 
54
 Authors and publishers were in fact delivered a ‘privilège’ to publish their works. 
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of Paris): Bignon, Aurigny, du Vair, Gentillet, d’Albon, Poisson and Marion fit that 
description. If not working at the highest levels of the judiciary or as councillors or 
members of the Parliament they exercised a public office such as diplomat (Postel and 
D’espence) or held positions close to the king (such as Seyssel or L’Hospital). A final group 
dedicated itself to scholarly activities (in the fields of history for Haillan and Du Chesne and 
of political economy for Montchrestien) or artistic matters (like Caron and Pasquier). In 
short, most of these authors can be classified as lawyers, scholars and/or public servants.  
 
The similarity of their social position should not, however, be taken in a 
deterministic way as implying an absolute similarity in their views.55 As such, and while I do 
not deny differences between the numerous authors cited, these differences are marginal 
from the perspective of this chapter. Indeed, and even if some ideas can be used for 
radically different political goals or the intensity of the arguments used can vary widely (for 
instance in the attribution of an absolute power to the king), these differences are 
irrelevant for my discussion insofar as the same principles and concepts are used despite 
the different political goals of their author. Similarly, I am not denying the importance of 
the religious divide experienced in the 16th century. But interestingly, both sides used 
similar ideas and arguments, if not at the same time or with the same intensity. As 
explained by Weill (1892: 205), arguments relating to the obedience due to the king shifted 
camp when a Protestant became heir to the throne; suddenly, it was no longer used by 
Catholics to criticise the Protestant’s rebellion but by the Protestants themselves against 
the Catholic League. Therefore, what one finds in this vast literature (that could be 
qualified as ‘political theory’) is a common view on the state and its ideal organisation. As 
will be discussed, French authors usually build their argument in the same way and often 
plagiarise each other (sometimes word for word). Their common heritage and education is 
also revealed by the references they use and the examples they provide. This is why a 
presentation of these works by authors – or insisting on the ‘personal’ arguments 
developed by each author – would not only be repetitive but would also obscure the 
commonalities and shared truths defended by all sixteenth-century French theorists. 
Building this chapter around the common themes and topics encountered in these works 
thus enables me to highlight the common culture of these authors (instead of the few and 
marginal differences that exist between them). And it is this common culture that plays a 
critical role in the conceptualisation of sovereignty.  
 
 This chapter is structured in the following way: I first explain how sovereignty was 
conceptualised as a superior and final form of authority and strongly linked to monarchy 
and the king (in particular through the ‘body analogy’). The second section shows how this 
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 Other factors could influence their writings. Those living and working in the provinces, for 
instance, could take a stronger position in defence of local customs and particularism (and argue 
that the king has no power over them). Similarly, the epoch had an influence on the ideas produced. 
The strong reigns of François I and Henry II led authors to glorify absolutism and the monarchy. 
Overall, however, these differences impacted only marginally on the core of the political beliefs 
about sovereignty analysed in this chapter. 
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superior authority was justified with reference to higher principles of French civilisation 
and how these principles represent the ‘absolute’ usually associated with sovereignty. I 
therefore demonstrate how sovereignty is constructed by French political theorists as a 
final form of authority inscribed in and defined by these higher principles (and in particular 
Christianity and justice). This leads to the necessary portrayal of the king as a father 
protecting his children/subjects and acting for the public good. This representation of the 
king is essential since sovereignty is a performative concept prescribing and describing 
‘perfection’ as understood in the French sixteenth-century context. Finally, I show how 
scholars associated this perfect civilised sovereignty with France and its historical 
development. In so doing, they reveal how their construction of (civilised) sovereignty rests 
on a civilisational process starting in the ‘state of nature’ and ending in the ‘most Christian’ 
and civilised European states of all: France. I discuss this evolutionary vision of humankind 
further in the conclusion. 
 
 
The meaning of sovereignty and its monarchical 
‘nature’ 
 
The meaning of sovereignty 
 
The discussion starts with the very definition these authors gave to sovereignty. It could 
appear as surprising that explicit definitions of sovereignty are rare in French sixteenth-
century political thought. Bodin indeed lamented this fact in 1576 when his major work on 
the topic was published. One (if not the main) reason for this lack of definition of 
sovereignty is linked to the inherent civilisational character of the concept. As Loyseau 
(1608: 34) writes “every inhabited and civilised country is under some sovereignty, because 
otherwise it would be in Anarchy and without a form of government”. Importantly here, 
only some states are sovereign, and these states are the ones inhabited by civilised 
peoples. Because of this inherent link to civilisation, culturally-neutral definitions of 
sovereignty are rare. As I will also explain below, it is also insufficient when one wishes to 
give a full account of sovereignty. Finding a pure or technical definition of sovereignty (like 
IR scholars struggle to do when they stick to the traditional or minimalist conceptualisation 
of sovereignty) is thus not easy and, more importantly, is only a temporary step. The 
minimalist definition of sovereignty is always rapidly reinscribed into a specific civilisational 




 This near absence of a minimalist – i.e. non-culturally specific – definition of 
sovereignty has led many to argue that Bodin was the first one to provide such a 
definition.56 For Bodin (1576: 125), “sovereignty is the absolute and perpetual power of a 
Republic (…) that is the greatest power to command”.57 Sovereignty is primarily defined by 
its superiority over other forms of authority and thus its apparent absoluteness: the 
sovereign can give some authority to others but “always retain more” with him; and 
“sovereignty is not limited in power, neither in office nor in time” (Bodin, 1576: 125-126). 
The idea of superiority and absoluteness were also clearly mentioned by Budé (1547: 42) 
and by Loyseau (1608: 25-26): 
 
[Sovereignty] consists in absolute power, that is to say perfect and entire in all 
respects (…) and consequently with no superior degree. Because if one has a 
superior he cannot be supreme and sovereign. 
 
As clearly articulated here, this superiority implies a lack of limitation since the idea of 
‘limit’ necessitates a higher authority and, by definition, the sovereign does not recognise 
any superior authority (Poisson, 1597: f. 7v). Re-iterating this conception of absolute 
monarchy Bignon (1610: 309) estimates that the sovereign in France possesses a pure and 
absolute power and authority, without restriction or being responsible for his actions.58 
Sovereignty is thus what characterised the political community called ‘the state’ “from 
which if it is removed, it would not be a state any longer” (Loyseau, 1608: 25). With this 
insistence on supremacy and absoluteness it is not surprising that “the doctrine of 
sovereignty offered the national king the most convenient theoretical weapon with which 
to combat the claims of rival feudal or ecclesiastical authorities, refractory estates or 
competing systems of law” (Shepard, 1930: 582).  
 
 
Sovereignty as necessarily monarchical 
 
However, not all states – and by extension not all political communities – are sovereign. In 
fact, this sovereign community necessarily takes the form of a monarchy. For Seyssel 
(1557a: preface) all the greatest empires in the world have been monarchies and governed 
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 This is also how “[t]he words "Bodin" and "sovereignty" have become almost as inseparably linked 
as synonyms” (Shepard, 1930: 585). 
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 Bodin, like most political thinkers, was using the word ‘puissance’ when writing in French. This 
could lead to some ambiguity since ‘puissance’ can be translated as ‘power’ or ‘authority’ (the 
‘capacity’ to do something or the ‘right’ to do it). ‘Puissance’ will be variously translated as ‘power’ 
or ‘authority’ depending on the context. 
58
 I am purposefully using the masculine (‘he’ and ‘his’) when talking about the sovereign. See the 
relationship between conceptions of masculinity and sovereignty in the third section of this chapter. 
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by one king only, which reveals the superiority of monarchy when compared to other forms 
of political rule. Similarly for Aurigny (1554: f. 245v) “the super-stewardship and authority 
of the king is the most excellent of all”. Simon Marion also argued in 1572 that “sovereignty 
was the true mark of royalty and must reside perpetually in the prince who was unable to 
separate it from himself or communicate any portion of it to another individual” (Church, 
1969: 121). More generally, political theorists of the 16th century are strongly attached to 
monarchy as the form of sovereign government and the “praise of ‘monarchy’ becomes 
one of the tropes of the political essays” of the time (Weill, 1892: 280).  
 
But why is monarchy the best (and in fact the only true) form of sovereign regime? 
Two main justifications are used by French authors. The first relates to the natural 
perfection and natural inevitability of the establishment of a monarchy. Put differently, 
‘nature’ itself dictates the establishment of a monarchy. For Bignon (1610: 287-288), since 
the dawn of the world “the first family fathers have commanded in their house” and from 
this fact can be concluded that all peoples have similarly submitted themselves to a king in 
what is essentially an assemblage of several families.59 Political treatises of the time 
repeatedly compare the ‘republic’ or political community to the family unit (see an 
example in Coquille (1607: 1)). The well-conducted family, argues Bodin (1576: 8), is the 
“real image of the Republic”. Hence, what is good at the family level is seen as good at the 
level of the kingdom (L'Hospital, 1824-1825: 384). This belief is inscribed in an evolutionary 
view of humankind detailed by Madeleine (1575: f. 1v-2): 
 
And in fact we read that soon after the creation of Man and after humankind had 
grown to some degree, men were vagabond and wandering in the woods and 
forests without any hideaway, living like Plutarch said of acorn and honey, and 
being close to the natural of brute beasts (…) [but] as the families were growing 
and multiplying, and they entered into some confusion and disorder, it became 
necessary to establish a form of Republic (…) And therefore, following what nature 
almost dictated them, they chose and erected a King to whom they attributed 
superiority and domination. 
 
With the growth in population and the division of society into families, a king is necessary 
to maintain order (Madeleine, 1575: f. 1v).60  
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 Pagden (1982) explains how the origins of civil society are usually identified with the family, and Le 
Jay (1589: f. 79) wrote that “[a]ll the republics are regulated and arranged in the same way as the 
particular households of which they are made and composed”. 
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 The introduction of the ‘state’ as a solution to an ever-growing population and potential scarcity 




But this ‘natural’ origin of monarchy is not only linked to the model of the family 
and to population growth: it is also a model shown and applied everywhere by ‘nature’ 
itself. Sixteenth-century authors see monarchy – the rule of one – mirrored in Nature’s 
every aspect: monarchy is the safest government as shown “by the comparison and 
example of the superior bodies, among which the Sun commanding to all the others” 
(Coquille, 1607: 1; see also Madeleine, 1575: f. 3; d'Albon, 1575: f. 6 and 8; Jay, 1589: f. 
34v; Poisson, 1597: f. 7). Animals also display forms of monarchy. The example of the bees 
is one of the tropes of Greek political thinking repeated by French theorists of the time: just 
as bees have one king humans should be governed by a single individual (Aurigny, 1554: f. 
1v; Jay, 1589: f. 267v; Madeleine, 1575: f. 3v; Perrière, 1567: f. 23v; Coquille, 1607: 1). 
Monarchy is thus the most natural form of police (i.e. political organisation) and “nature 
obviously declares it, wishing that in every multitudinous assembly (…) one presides over 
the others” (Roy, 1575a: f. 4v; see also f. 5-6; on the 'naturalness' of the existence of one 
leader see Postel 1552: Chapter 4)). For Madeleine (1575: f. 2-2v) “the royal dignity or 
domination of one is the most ancient form of Republic, the most natural and pleasant” 
and “consistent with human reason”. Any other regime thus becomes considered as ‘un-
natural’, uncivilised and less than sovereign. 
 
 Nature, however, is only a reflection of divine will, which leads to the association of 
monarchy to God’s own ‘government’. For Roy (1575a: f. 2) the royal government is the 
closest on earth to the divine government of the universe. As such, monarchy is “consistent 
with and symbolises the divine and ineffable principality of God (who presides alone over 
all things)” (Perrière, 1567: f. 6). For these authors monarchy was instituted or created by 
God (which confirms its perfectness) and should therefore be followed by men who are 
only imperfect creatures (Madeleine, 1575: f. 5). A combination of the natural and divine 
arguments is used by Seyssel (1557b: f. 6v) to maintain that the monarchical state is 
superior and it “is shown by divine, human, natural and political reasoning that we have to 
come back to one leader in all things and that plurality of leaders and princes is pernicious” 
(see also Hexter (1968: 407)). Roy (1575a: f. 14) concludes that “there is no doubt 
monarchy is the best police of all, being ordered by God, instituted by nature, received in 




Sovereignty and the existence of a civil state 
 
Monarchy thus becomes intimately linked to sovereignty and, crucially, to the creation of a 
civil state. For Madeleine (1575: f. 1) the king’s duty is to maintain his subjects in “society 
and concord”. In a similar vein, Budé (1547: 31) considers that without monarchy and its 
sovereign perfection “our human life (which in and of itself is very variable, dangerous and 
73 
 
full of impediments) would be even more tenebrous and entirely devoid of light”. This 
traditional association between civilisation, the existence of a society, and a reasonable 
(‘enlightened’) way of life, reveals how monarchical sovereignty is the path towards a 
civilised state. Monarchy ensures the maintenance of the ‘natural’ hierarchy upon which 
society is (or ought to be) founded.61 As such, it conforms to “human reason” (Madeleine, 
1575: f. 2) because a ‘body’ needs to have one head only: “The Republic only has one body, 
which has to be governed by the authority of the head62 ordained by God, and if others 
exercised an authority not flowing from him there would be a plurality of kings leading to 
confusion” (Du Tillet cited in Weill, 1892: 39).  
 
 The superiority of the rule of one (‘monarchy’) is thus supported with reference to 
the classic ‘body analogy’:63 the political body that the kingdom represents should be 
governed by its ‘head’, i.e. the king. This analogy starts with the ‘description’ of the 
kingdom as composed of ‘members’ or body parts. Caron (1556: f. 6-6v) writes that 
 
if we look at the composition of our [political] body we will find an order and 
organisation between its parts, just like in every man we see a form of a true 
Republic. Reason governs, the body obeys, the parts depend on the senses and 
recognise reason as their sovereign princess. 
 
This (implicitly) diverse and divided body is thus unified by the ‘head’ of the state/body into 
one (Bodin, 1576: 9; Jay, 1589: f. 187v-188; L'Alouëte, 1597: 1). As Church (1969: 32) 
explains, “[a] favourite figure used by the writers of the period was the comparison of this 
social organism with the human body composed of many individuals but mutually 
dependent members and guided by a single head”. Without the head/king, no healthy body 
can be formed. In the ‘head’ of the political body are situated reason and intelligence that 
are essential to the activity of the body (Budé, 1547: 137). As Aurigny (1554: f. 256) puts it, 
“all the body parts are not equal nor equally valuable, but some commands and the others 
obey (…) Thus the prince, who is the sovereign part of the Republic, must be highly 
knowledgeable”. In a similar fashion L’Alouëte (1597: 47) considers that “in the head, 
which is the seat of the soul, is found and reside the excellent faculties of intelligence, the 
rich treasures of memory, the fertile skills of invention, and the sagacious discourses of 
reason”. Some go further and match the entire political body to the human body: the 
hands become associated with the king’s powers to ensure order and justice (Loyseau, 
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 See for instance Bodin (1576: preface) and Le Jay (1589: f. 34). 
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 In French, ‘chef’ meant both ‘head of the body’ and ‘leader’. This later meaning is now the most 
common one. 
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 As explained by Archambault (1967: 21): “The political treatises of the late mediaeval and 
Renaissance periods in England, France, and Italy make wide use of the analogy of the human body. 
This analogy is habitually meant to illustrate the author's conception of the society he is describing, 
and more specifically – since the works in question deal without exception with the government of 
princes – to show what the relation of the Prince to his subjects is, or should be, in that society”. 
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1608: 10) and Perrière (1567: f. 8) writes that authority flows from the king just like the 
nerves originates from the brain. 
 
By presenting the king as the ‘head’ of the republic or political body French political 
thinkers participate in what Kantorowicz (1957: 208) called the transcendentalising of the 
state behind its purely physical existence.64 To do so they draw their inspiration from a 
wider political tradition that considered “political happiness as inconceivable without 
hierarchy. Nature had intended it that way: the head does not serve the same purpose as 
the feet” (Archambault, 1967: 49). This insistence on the body analogy – and the associated 
comparison of the king with the physician of the body politic65 – reveals the centrality of 
hierarchy in the political thought of the period (Lemaire, 1907: 51). 
 
 
Justifying the authority of the king: God and justice 
through the sovereign monarch 
 
 
Where does absoluteness lies? 
 
This natural and divine argument associating sovereignty with the rule of one is 
nevertheless not enough. The sovereignty of the monarch does not and cannot rest on 
such an explanation. We touch here upon one of the difficulties of conceptualising 
sovereignty, a difficulty that we will explore through Bodin. Bodin is mostly famous for his 
(supposedly) absolute conception of the sovereign authority of the monarch as expressed 
for instance in these rhetorical questions: “How would one be sovereign if he recognised 
the principle of justice of a higher authority? Of one who quashes his judgements, corrects 
his laws, and punishes him if he abuses of his authority?” (Bodin, 1576: 191). Here Bodin 
suggests very explicitly that the king’s authority is absolute, i.e. that it does not depend on 
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 My use of the ‘King’s Two Bodies’ theory is only tentative in the context of France since 
Kantorowicz (1957: 20 and 446) himself estimates that his theory is only applicable to England. 
Instead of arguing that the exact same model can be applied to France, I want to suggest that 
similarities can be found between the two countries in their conceptualisation of the king’s authority. 
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 As written by Archambault (1967: 29) “[t]he comparison of the Prince to a physician is an 
important variant of the analogy of the human body”. See, for instance, Aurigny (1554: f. 255v), 
Caron (1556: f. 22v), Haillan (1611), and L’Hospital (1824-1825: 387; 1825: 17-18). Henry of Navarre 
will make use of the same analogy in 1588 (B.N.F., N.A.F. 17874: f. 15). Du Vair is somewhat more 
original and adapts the ‘body analogy’ into a ‘tree analogy’ with the king standing as the trunk 
unifying all the branches/parts of the kingdom (Vair, 1680: 5). 
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any superior or external element or foundation. He is nevertheless constantly framing 
‘sovereignty’ as inscribed into a wider framework of divine and natural law. As he says: “as 
far as the divine and natural laws are concerned, all the Princes of the earth are subjected 
to them, and it is not in their power to contravene them”. In a contradictory statement he 
even affirms that “the absolute power of Princes and sovereign lordships does not extend 
to the laws of God and nature” (Bodin, 1576: 133; see also 129 and 145). Sovereignty thus 
clearly depends on two higher principles: God’s law (or the divine will) and natural law, a 
set of principles open to interpretation and rarely defined exhaustively but usually 
associated with a ‘reasonable’ and ‘just’ way of life. These ‘limits’ reveal how sovereignty is 
justified by some higher principles that can only be identified inside of a cultural – or 
civilisational – framework. 
 
 Before discussing what these ‘civilisational principles’ attached to sovereignty are 
in the case of sixteenth-century France it is useful to quickly elaborate on the relationship 
between these values and sovereignty. As shown through the example of Bodin (and as will 
become clearer with the discussion below) sovereignty is not absolute in the sense of an 
unqualified and potentially infinite form of power. Rather, the ‘absolute’ which sovereignty 
is regularly associated with refers to the principles upon which it depends; principles that 
can be broadly termed ‘civilisational principles’. These principles – and these principles only 
– are absolute and cannot be negotiated.66 As will be revealed in the next chapters (and 
particularly with the French internal discourses) these principles are accepted by all the 
French actors (including adversaries to the king). Sovereignty thus becomes the final and 
highest authority of a political community, an authority that is defined and built upon 
civilisational values held as absolute inside of this community.67 In this sense, sovereignty is 
necessarily defined by and inside these civilisational values and ideals. Strictly speaking, it is 
not limited by them insofar as it can only exist inside of this framework and becomes 
illegitimate, non-existent, and unreal – these three terms meaning the same thing in this 
context – as soon as it is detached from these principles. We now turn to an exploration of 
these values before exploring further the misleading idea of ‘limits’ to sovereignty at the 
end of this section. 
 
 
Sovereignty and religion 
 
The king’s authority and his ‘perfect’ and ‘natural’ sovereignty had thus to be justified by an 
appeal to higher principles, the most important of which being the articulation between 
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always points to and receives its power from some further notion or structure which, in that sense, 
is even more ‘absolute and [seemingly] perpetual’ than it”. 
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the sovereignty of the king and his appointment by, imitation of or achievement of God’s 
commandments. Religion was central in sixteenth-century French political theory (Church, 
1969: 7-8) and it was not uncommon to find treatises or discourses claiming that the king’s 
first obligation is to maintain religion (see for instance the discourse contained in B.N.F., 
Français 12125, f. 35v). As Madeleine (1575: 10) indicates, “in all the kingdoms and empires, 
and in all the other forms of Republics, there is first and foremost the need to establish and 
recognise a true and perfect state of religion” without which “everything would be in 
confusion and disorder”. Sixteenth-century political theorists thus prescribe the 
maintenance of “the true, the Christian civil life” (Padgen, 1982: 193). In this task, they 
were helped by a long tradition establishing the French king as ‘Most Christian King’. 
Consequently French people “could avoid, to a very large degree, any feeling of 
contradiction between their duties to the Church and their duties to the state” (Strayer, 
1969: 9 and 16). 
 
For most political thinkers, the king is appointed directly by God and recognises 
divine authority as the only one superior to his own. Seyssel (1557b: f. 29) explains how the 
authority of the king comes from God and in a public discourse to the Estates General in 
1560 L’Hospital (1824-1825: f. 10) declares that the “king holds his crown not from us but 
from God”. As argued by Pasquier (1621: 145) in a book first published in 1560 “all 
terrestrial authority [puissance] must be established by God”. The authority that the king 
enjoys is thus a “gift from God” (Caron, 1556: f. 10)  and the king is often described as being 
chosen or elected by God in a direct and intentional way (Chesne, 1609: 2; L'Alouëte, 1597: 
45; Bodin, 1576: 190). Marion estimates that this election makes kings “sacred” (B.N.F., 
Français 18888: f. 66) and the advocate-general Jacques Cappel argues in 1539 that the 
French kings “are constituted by God upon his people” and “hold their kingdom from God 
alone” (B.N.F., Français 18888: f. 24v). It is clear, therefore, that  
 
[t]he theory of the divine authorization of kingship was a vital force in the political 
thought of the sixteenth century. The conception was believed to provide the most 
satisfactory basis upon which to establish the legitimate character of the political 
power (Church, 1969: 246). 
 
One consequence is the superiority attributed to God over the monarch: for Gentillet 
(1576: 47) “the Prince has no authority [puissance] above God”. In a similar vein, Bodin 
(1576: 127) argues that “he who is absolutely sovereign does not recognise anything higher 
than himself apart from God” and that the sovereign prince only has to justify himself in 
front of God.68 
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 Similar expressions can be found in Budé (1547: 42) and Tillet (1578: 132). 
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Additionally, the divine origin of the French king’s authority entails that his earthly 
government is inspired by God and reproduces on earth God’s government of the universe. 
The king naturally respects divine law (as will be further explained below in relation to 
‘justice’) and must fear God (Seyssel, 1557b: f. 11). In the Traité de Reformation de la 
Justice attributed to L’Hospital and pronounced in the 1560s the author argues that kings 
have to obey and humiliate themselves under the “sweet and loveable yoke of God’s law” 
(L'Hospital, 1825: 66). Other authors imply a direct connection or communication between 
God and the French kings. For Budé (1547: 82) God “conducts [the kings’] free will and 
guide them through divine inspiration to the right path of reason (which is unknowable to 
other men)”. Caron (1556: f. 3v) makes a similar observation when he writes that the kings’ 
laws are so perfect that “people are astonished by their admirable prudence and believe 
[the kings] to have previously conversed and communicated with God about them”. This 
“divine counsel” is also mentioned by Perrière (1567: f. 54), thus confirming the belief in a 
king “inspired directly by God” (Keohane, 1980: 56). ‘Dignity’ or ‘honour’ – and in particular 
“terrestrial dignity’’ – is one of the elements communicated by God to the French kings 
(Loyseau, 1608: 64). For these thinkers “the king was God’s representative on earth” 
(Church, 1969: 104) and his authority clearly established on the basis of this divine 
connection.69 Kings are thus seen as the ‘lieutenants’ of God on earth (Jay, 1589: f. 11v; 
Poisson, 1597: f. 11), as “ministers of God” (Moulin, 1561: 67) or as mediators between 
God and men and as the only ones able to interpret and understand the divine will in 
temporal affairs. L’Alouëte (1597: 152) implies nothing else when he writes that kings are 
“internally moved and instructed by the High Spirit”.  
 
This idea is pushed further by some sixteenth-century political thinkers as they 
explain how the king is not only a ‘representative’ but the ‘image’ of God on earth. For 
Caron (1556: f. 10v) and d’Albon (1575: f. 5v) the king is “the semblance of God among 
men” and for L’Hospital (1825: 189) he imitates God. This expression is used explicitly by 
Marion (“the King represents on earth the image of God” (B.N.F., Français 18888: f. 68)) 
and by d’Espence (“The Prince is the image of God”), the latter adding that the king “makes 
himself alike to God thanks to his virtue” (d'Espence, 1575: f. 43). L’Alouëte (1597: 94) 
compares the king to an earthly Sun, a metaphor also used by du Chesne (1609: 124) when 
he mentions how the king represents God on earth. He then adds: 
 
Kings are the living image of God (…) as Kings they are public persona, and as 
earthly Divinities they oblige the other [men] by the beauty of their acts of power 
and virtue, their only goal being the good of the people they are in charge of, thus 
imitating the sovereign Majesty of God the King of Kings (Chesne, 1609: 5). 
 
                                                          
69
 This idea dates back to the High Middle Ages: as mentioned by Lemaire (1907: 2) some thinkers 
under Charlemagne already considered the king as a representative of God on earth.  
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The idea of the ‘representation’ of God by the king is carried out to its extreme by some of 
the late sixteenth-century thinkers: the king does not only represent God but is himself God 
on earth. The king is thus explicitly placed on a similar level as God, in particular by 
Grassaille who talks about the familiarity of the king with God (Church, 1969: 47). For du 
Chesne (1609: 330), “all the French kings are a divine dough mixed with a little bit of 
humanity that Nature shapes in the form of men in order to govern this flourishing 
Monarchy”. For d’Albon (1575: f. 6v) the king “is more than human” and maybe divine. We 
touch here upon the extreme extent of the link between god and monarch that becomes 
familiar at the end of the century. Constant, for instance, estimates that opposing the king 
is like opposing God, while Du Rivault “represented the ruler as literally a minor god on 
earth, admonishing him always to bear in mind his capacity as a lesser divinity and creature 
of the Deity” (Church, 1969: 308-309). 
 
 
Sovereignty and justice 
 
The sovereign authority of the king is also justified with regard to another important – but 
connected – idea: natural law. 70  Shepard (1930: 591) explains that natural law 
encompasses the notions of “(1) the inviolability of private property; (2) the inalienability of 
subjects or families, and the illegality of arbitrary murder of citizens at the command of the 
sovereign; and (3) the obligatory force of contracts”. Most thinkers remain vague about the 
exact definition of natural law: Le Jay (1589: f. 33), for instance, only mentions the 
obligation to be “just and reasonable”. Gentillet (1576: 60) also argues that “a Prince can 
give law to his subjects if it is not contrary to nature and to natural reason”. As such, the 
power of the king is “limited by the boundaries of reason, law [i.e. established law] and 
equity”. Because it is connected to the idea of ‘civilisation’ natural law is notoriously 
difficult to describe. I will focus in this section on one of the most (if not the most) 
important notions contained in natural law: justice. Justice represents a central 
civilisational principle on which sovereignty depends. Bodin for instance writes that “the 
first mark of the sovereign prince is the power [puissance] to give law to everyone in 
general and to each one in particular” (Bodin, 1576: 197). From this first essential right flow 
all the other “rights and marks of sovereignty, so that properly speaking we can say that 
there is only this mark of sovereignty since all the other rights are included in this one” 
(Bodin, 1576: 199) .  
 
In a nutshell, the king’s sovereignty is acceptable since it is linked directly to the 
achievement of justice in the kingdom. There is no – and can be no – contradiction 
between the divine foundation of sovereignty and its justification through ‘justice’ since 
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 These two ideas are connected since the king ensuring the respect for natural law acts as God 
rendering justice. See d’Albon (1575: f. 5v). 
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justice is a gift of God (L'Hospital, 1825: 68). In other words, the “law is divine reason given 
to the wise man” (Caron, 1556: f. 18v), a “donation from God that flowed into the Prince’s 
mind” (L'Alouëte, 1597: 9). The second main foundation of the sovereign royal authority is 
thus justice. For sixteenth-century political thinkers justice is necessary to justify the king’s 
authority; as stated by L’Hospital (1825: 116) “justice attributes them the right to 
command”. It is the source of the royal authority and majesty for Budé (1547: 21) and 
Madeleine (1575: f. 24v) insists that justice “confirms, increases and maintains the 
successive kings and monarchs in their authority”. 
 
More precisely, it is through the king that justice is realised. First, men came to 
submit to the sovereignty of one precisely to “enjoy justice” (Roy, 1575a: f. 8). It is indeed 
always better to have one’s king as judge than a multitude of judges (Aurigny, 1554: f. 226). 
Second, when talking about the links between the sovereign king and justice, theorists 
generally argue that only the king knows what is just. For Roy (1575a: f. 39), people under a 
royal government “ignore by themselves the public good and public bad” and therefore 
need to rely on the king to help them. In a similar vein, Coquille (1607: 4) estimates that 
people need justice because they are imperfect. In contradistinction, the king is 
characterised by its virtues and perfections – in particular in relation to justice (Aurigny, 
1554: f. 241v; Madeleine, 1575: f. 23v; Chesne, 1609: 3). Third, the king represents the 
living ideal of justice: as eloquently written by L’Alouëte (1597: 65) “in the person of the 
Prince, like in the eminent frontispiece of the State, must be the model and mirror of true 
Justice”. Madeleine (1575: f. 27) confirms this representation of the king as the true source 
of justice in the kingdom: “the King (who is the legislator and governor of his subjects) must 
be the true light of justice, representing for this issue the authority and majesty of God on 
earth”. As a consequence, the king and justice become indivisible. “Justice and the good 
prince are relative and inseparable”, writes L’Hospital (1825: 28-29; see also the same 
expression in Loyseau, 1608: 51)), adding that justice is the principal office of the kings 
(who in fact do not deserve this title if they do not guarantee its achievement).  
 
 To accentuate their argument, political theorists contrast the ‘fair and just king’ to 
the ‘unfair and tyrannical despot’. L’Hospital (1825: 77 and 244) opposes the “tyrannical 
principalities” to the “royal and legitimate monarchies”, adding that “we cannot desire a 
happier condition in this world than being under a monarchical and royal state, royally 
governed: under this name, justice (which is the true royal virtue) is included, like injustice 
is proper to tyrants and the oppressors of humankind”. On the contrary, the lack of 
“observation of the law and of precepts of justice” (Perrière, 1567: f. 17v) is characteristic 
of tyrannies and the antithesis of a (sovereign) monarchy. The French theorists express 
their disapproval of Macchiavelli’s advice to rule arbitrarily (Bodin, 1576: preface), arguing 
that such a choice prompts a monarchy to “degenerate into a Tyranny, [in which kings] 
exercise with discretion violence, thefts and injustices [until] their state falls into total ruin 
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and confusion” (Gentillet, 1576: 36). A ‘logical’ association is thus formed between tyranny, 
chaos, barbarity and a lack of sovereign authority.71 
 
 The king’s authority is thus directly linked to a just political order that allows 
subjects to live peaceful in a (civilised) society. As summarised by d’Espence (1575: f. 43): 
 
of all these great goods and graces that God gives, we cannot use them well or 
enjoy them if there is no law, no justice and no prince. Justice is the purpose of law. 
Law is of the prince’s making. The Prince is the image of God. 
 
Just like religion, justice serves as another element necessary in a ‘properly’ sovereign and 
civilised state. Recurrent expressions reveal how ‘justice’ is central to the existence of the 
civilised community. L’Hospital (1825: 21-22) writes that 
 
the order or disorder in the monarchies, cities and republics, emanate from and 
proceed necessarily from justice (under which name I include piety from which it is 
inseparable), or from injustice (…) This is certainly a brief explanation, but it is the 
rule nevertheless, not only of the Christian but of every man living under the light 
of the simple natural law and who possesses some reason. 
 
The oppositions and linkages between ‘justice/injustice’ and ‘civilisation/barbarism’ are 
explicitly mentioned by most authors discussing political ideas in the 16th century. Caron 
(1556: f. 18v), for instance, argues that “without law our disordered life would be very 
similar to that of beasts”. Madeleine (1575: f. 26 and 30) develops a similar discourse, 
emphasising that law prescribes “a certain political order”: 
 
With justice men are contained in a society and concord, kingdoms and 
principalities are kept in peace and union: conversely with injustice all things are 
wasted and perverted. So much that where injustice reigns, there is no superiority 
or domination and we cannot distinguish what is our own. The meanest, strongest, 
the subtlest and most insidious dominate. It is no longer a Kingdom, but a den of 
thieves. It is no longer a human society but an assembly of beasts. 
 
                                                          
71
 L’Hospital (1825: 26) lists the consequences of such a state as follows: “troubles, divisions, 
massacres, robbery, intestine wars, vandalising, upheavals, revolts, ruin and desolation”. 
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The association between the lack of justice and a brutal way of life is common throughout 
the period (see another example in L'Alouëte (1597: 9)). L’Hospital (1825: 79), for instance, 
writes that “force and violence are more characteristic of beasts than men. Law comes 
from the most divine part that is inside us, which is reason”. Justice is thus crucial to the 
existence and maintenance of a civilised and sovereign society (Perrière, 1567: f. 11v). 
Respecting the law and justice is essential “to us who have political and moral intelligence” 
while disregarding justice is only valid among “Barbaric Nations” (Budé, 1547: 136-137), i.e. 
where “everything is upside down” and “the country in confusion and peril” (Gentillet, 
1576: 396). Using a comparison between rural and urban inhabitants, Aurigny (1554: f. 4v) 
arrives at a similar conclusion: “The greatest good that is in a city is good justice, which 
guarantees the foundations of human society; and without it no civil congregation can be”.  
 
 
From defining to performing sovereignty 
 
What do we learn about sovereignty from this discussion? First, that two main civilisational 
principles – Christianity and justice – were held to be the foundations of the legitimate and 
final authority that sovereignty represents. Second, that the absoluteness usually 
misplaced in sovereignty in fact lies in these principles. As a consequence, the king loses his 
sovereignty as soon as he acts against the precepts that came to define the concept. 
Hence, sovereignty itself can never be abused or misused since any misconduct disqualifies 
the one misbehaving as a legitimate holder of sovereignty. What is real – a ‘real’ 
sovereignty – is that which lives up to the ideal defined inside this specific civilisational 
framework. And this framework is better understood as ‘conditions of achievement’ or 
‘conditions of acceptability’ of the sovereign authority rather than as ‘limits’ to a sovereign 
power that is naturally unlimited and absolute. The idea of limits is thus misleading insofar 
as it implies the possibility of an unchecked sovereign power. This is perfectly summarised 
by Seyssel: although he mentions ‘limits’ to the freedom of the sovereign prince (Seyssel, 
1557a: preface) these ‘limits’ are not limiting insofar as the power of the king is not 
diminished but rather increased when the rules of sovereignty are respected. He adds that 
if sovereignty “were looser and more absolute it would be worse and more imperfect” 
(Seyssel, 1557b: f. 13), a judgement that makes sense only if sovereignty is not taken to 
mean unlimited or unchecked political authority.  
 
 More specifically, and as stated by Loyseau (1608: 26), the limits that are discussed 
by most political thinkers only affect the power of the king, not the (absolute) principles 
that sustain claims to sovereignty. In other words, the absolute precepts of sovereignty are 
to be found in the civilisational principles supporting the concept. As Moulin (1561: 87 (my 
emphasis)) writes: “the prince (although sovereign) cannot proceed unless he follows 
[divine] truth: if he does not then all he undertakes is entirely null”. Hence, we arrive at a 
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new understanding of the term ‘absolute’: “whatever full authority [puissance] [the kings] 
have, it must be exercised with equity and justice, and if their absolute power is not 
regulated it becomes dissolute” (Tillet, 1578: 134). Characterising sovereignty as defined 
inside or by some higher principles is not a way to reduce the authority associated with it 
but rather to specify its conditions of possibility (Gentillet, 1576: 58). Political theorists 
usually resort to the example of ‘law’ in order to explain how this intellectual construct 
functions: for Aurigny (1554: f. 245v), “it is no law if it is not just, equitable and beneficial to 
the common good (…) It is not law because it pleases the prince but because it pleases the 
good and wise prince, to whom nothing pleases except what is honest and conducive to the 
Republic”.72  
 
 In this approach, the perfect authority of the sovereign king is necessarily identified 
with the respect of reasonable and civilised principles (Roy, 1575a: f. 20). The sovereign 
monarchs will necessarily be perfect and achieve the ideal of sovereignty without the need 
for rules and sanctions (Budé, 1547: 20). In a discourse pronounced at the end of the 
century du Plessis Mornay estimates that “[e]very man with commonsense will always 
presume without proof that the King in his quality of King (and without considering the 
insanity or kindness that are specific and natural to him) would have done what he could 
and had to in order to pacify his state” and more generally to comply with the demands of 
civilised sovereignty (A.E., M.D. France 373: f. 77 (my emphasis)). Accordingly, ‘crossing’ the 
line or not respecting the ‘boundaries’ of sovereignty is not possible for the king as king; he 
immediately becomes a “tyrant” and loses his sovereignty (Shepard, 1930: 586-587). In this 
context, the king’s acts are ispo facto just (Church, 1969: 333) without sovereignty being an 
unrestrained licence given to the king: “The will of the king was law, but it was of necessity 
his just will and not merely his unrestrained pleasure” (Church, 1969: 269). Sometimes 
ridiculed as a mere ‘moralism’ (Hexter, 1968: 404) on the part of these political thinkers 
this way of defining sovereignty is in fact the only possible and realistic one. It is both 
descriptive and prescriptive: sovereignty and the values or foundations that define it 
necessarily coincide, which does not mean that monarchs and subjects cannot fall short of 
achieving this ideal(ised), civilised and sovereign reality (as will be discussed in more detail 
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 Caron (1556: f. 19v) adopts a similar line of argument when stating that “no constitution can ever 
be called lawful if it is not just (…) the sinful ordinances of men should not receive the excellent 
name of ‘laws’ since they are contrary to Justice, the soul of the Republic”. 
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The sovereign king as a father 
 
This combination of description and prescription – characteristic of performative acts 
(Derrida, 1986) – is attached to an ideal image of the monarch (Weill, 1892: 162). If the 
‘really’ sovereign monarch is the one following all the civilised principles outlined above, 
then the portrait of the king is bound to be an image of perfection. The king is thus 
performed as possessing a final set of characteristics: he is a father – and therefore defined 
against a ‘feminine’ other – who protects the ‘public good’ and the interest of his subjects. 
As such, the sovereign represents the ‘enlightened’ and civilised ruler, justifying his final 
authority by his action in the service of his subjects.  
 
First, and since the political community is portrayed as similar to the family unit, 
the fate of the republic depends on the king in the same way that “the good or bad of the 
household depends on the family father” (Perrière, 1567: f. 2). The king thus becomes 
associated with a paternal figure ruling upon his subjects/children (d'Albon, 1575: f. 7; Jay, 
1589: f. 18v and 83): “the King is the common father of all his subjects”, states Caron (1556: 
f. 24v), while Madeleine (1575: epistle) compares the “good kings” to the “real fathers of 
their people”. The image of the ‘shepherd’ also emerges with a similar meaning (L'Alouëte, 
1597: 90; Chesne, 1609: 6). 
 
 This paternal position is closely associated with the type of behaviour that a real, 
sovereign king is supposed to follow (if he wants to be recognised as sovereign). Indeed, 
“the king is in his Kingdom or city like the family father [and] must dominate his citizens 
and vassals with goodwill” (Perrière, 1567: f. 3). The ‘love’ that the king owes to his 
subjects is a recurrent element: “The good prince can accept to be feared, but as the father 
of his children, which is to say feared and loved at the same time” (L'Hospital, 1825: 78; see 
also Budé, 1547: 202). Aurigny (1554: f. 245) also mentions how the good king must love 
his subjects like a good father would love the members of his household. This is particularly 
important in order to ensure the obedience of the subjects/children: 
 
And just like children easily and naturally submit themselves to the power and 
authority of their father (…) For the same reason people easily submit themself in 
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obedience to the one they estimated had more love and zeal for the public good 
(Madeleine, 1575: f. 6-6v). 
 
Obedience is thus not undeserved: the king administers his subjects in a “pleasant” way 
and like his “wards” (Budé, 1547: 82 and 154). The role that he fulfils – that of a good tutor 
(Perrière, 1567: f. 18v; L'Alouëte, 1597: 50-51) – is based on the ‘virtues’ that he possesses. 
Virtues are indeed one of the main “ornaments” of a sovereign king and are considered 
necessary for him to reign (Caron, 1556: f. 12v-13). His virtues must in fact exceed “the 
average condition of his subjects” (Budé, 1547: 126). Budé (1547: 125) gives us an 
exhaustive list of the necessary virtues of the king: “they need to know all the sciences that 
are like virtues to command in great, high and belliquous enterprises ; they need to be 
prudent in order to police and reign over their subjects, and to be wise, to command what 
is useful in all situations; [to have] industry, and perpetual vigilance over the public good; a 
controlled liberality that is far from cupidity and prodigality; and dignity and Majesty in 
their works, with perpetual truth”. 
 
 
Sovereignty as ‘masculinity’ 
 
Throughout the 16th century, therefore, political thought “was completely infused with an 
ideal of strong paternal rule as the best possible form of government” (Church, 1969: 95). 
This ‘rule of the father’ is explicitly constructed against the ‘feminine’ other. As Aurigny 
(1554: f. 137) argues “[a] king and prince in his early days must be taught that he is sent to 
the world and must be prepared to magnanimity and physical power, not to delights, 
frivolous pleasures and delectations through which the mind is effeminate and becomes 
weak and the body languishes”. We see here the direct opposition between the “royal 
virility”, as Perrière (1567: f. 27) puts it, and ‘femininity’ characterised by weakness and 
frivolity. Caron (1556: f. 11) adds that the king must not be weak and should control his 
“affections”. The sovereignty of the king is thus directly associated with his masculinity and 
the real sovereign king “should not become effeminate nor weak and be attracted to 
delights and delectations or other vices and passions that are the most cruel and powerful 
enemies” (L'Alouëte, 1597: 81; see also Poisson, 1597: f. 33v). 
 
The opposition between sovereignty and the ‘feminine’ involves comparisons with 
foreign kings or former French monarchs. L’Hospital (1825: 35), for instance, writes that the 
French kings are not elevated by God to this responsibility “to languish among delights, to 
comb their hair, wear blush and clothes like women do, and as did also the ancient Persian 
kings and some of our ancient kings”. A double opposition is forged: on one side lie the 
French ‘masculine’ and sovereign kings, and on the other some of the ancient French kings 
85 
 
and the barbaric foreign rulers, all characterised by their ‘femininity’. Haillan (1611) is one 
of the most explicit in his link between the ‘bad’ ancient kings of France and their supposed 
feminine traits.73 Gentillet (1576: 298) for his part links civilisation and citizenship to 
‘masculinity’, criticising the Roman citizens sent abroad for becoming “soft, feminine and 
weak, just like those of the country they were sent to”. In contradistinction, the French 
gentilhommes achieve a perfect balance between softness and strength that is described as 
follows by Bignon (1610: 89): “the French gentlemen, although raised and fed with 
delicacy, never lack of generous courage”. Their kings logically follow the same model, 
being at the same time ‘strong enough’ not to be ‘feminine’ but civilised enough not to be 
considered ‘brutal’ and ‘barbaric’. The sovereign king also displays qualities that are 
explicitly associated with the ‘masculine’. Most important among them is ‘rationality’: the 
king “is the King of his own emotions, and is always victorious over his passions”, thus 
being “the real Prince of his State” (L'Alouëte, 1597: 81-82). The ‘masculine’ is here 
associated with the rational ruler while the ‘feminine’ must necessarily obey: “the prince, 
who is the sovereign part of the Republic, has to be greatly knowledgeable, and must 
alienate all [his] frivolous and vulgar passions, all [his] sensual and immoral desires” 
(Aurigny, 1554: f. 256). As clearly expressed by Postel (1552: Chapter 16): “[t]he masculine 
is a fountain of authority, the feminine of reason. And authority must therefore command 
and reason must execute”. But the use of ‘reason’ by Postel can be misleading: far from 
implying an association between ‘reason’ and the ‘feminine’, Postel understands ‘reason’ 
as ‘reasonableness’ (i.e. as a natural inclination to accept and obey). In all these discussions 
of sovereignty one is therefore clearly able to see how a ‘gendered imagery’ supports and 
maintains the distinction between the sovereign and non-sovereign (Shinko, 2010). 
 
 
Sovereignty as achievement of the common good 
 
The consequence of portraying the sovereign king as a good and ‘masculine’ paternal 
monarch is that his rule is necessarily oriented towards the common or public good of the 
kingdom and the subjects.74 The expression ‘public good’ is repeatedly used by sixteenth-
century thinkers in order to associate sovereignty with the good management – or ‘good 
governance’ – of the kingdom. The main concern of the prince, writes Aurigny (1554: f. 
255v), must be the services he can provide to the republic, something that Perrière (1567: 
f. 2v) calls “the public utility of the city and the good of all the civil society”. Hence, when 
the tyrant is characterised by his disregard for the common good (Caron, 1556: f. 46) the 
sovereign king shows zeal towards it (Madeleine, 1575: f. 21v). As Cappel expresses in 
1539, this concern is a consequence of the “political marriage” between the king and the 
public affairs of his kingdom (B.N.F., Français 18888: f. 39-39v). The role of the sovereign 
king is thus equated to working in favour of the public good (Seyssel, 1557a: preface; 
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 His book was first published in 1580. 
74
 Something that Skinner (2008) also uncovers in his genealogy of the (sovereign) state. 
86 
 
d'Albon, 1575: f. 7; Gentillet, 1576: 23). The kings themselves are keen to present their 
action as designed to improve the common good (as can be seen in the different treatises 
contained in A.E., M.D. France 360).  
 
 This “traditional notion of the prince as embodiment of and spokesman for the 
common good” (Keohane, 1980: 61) is thus central in the construction, justification and 
maintenance of sovereignty. Nevertheless, this notion never acquires a precise meaning. 
Three ideas are usually mentioned by the theorists: order, peace, and the ‘public’ interest 
of the subjects and kingdom. First, order is mentioned as part of the role of the king and 
defined as the “right disposition of affairs” (Perrière, 1567: f. 23). The idea of order remains 
vague but associated with the “right rule and government over the subjects” (Madeleine, 
1575: f. 7). Second, peace is the objective the king should achieve through his rule: 
“tranquillity” and “rest” are mentioned by several authors (Madeleine, 1575: f. 7; 
L'Alouëte, 1597: 7). Caron (1556: f. 21) adds that the “purpose of a real Prince is to make 
his kingdom better and to maintain it by his example in a blissful tranquillity”. The related 
idea of protection of the people is used in other treatises (Chesne, 1609: 232; 
Montchrestien, 1615/1889: 120). Both ‘order’ and ‘peace’ (just as ‘justice’) are attached to 
a well-administered and thus civilised sovereign state. 
 
Third, but certainly most importantly, the idea of ‘public good’ is explained with 
reference to the interests of the subjects and the kingdom and is thus opposed to the 
private interests of the king. L’Alouëte (1597: 67) explicitly states that the king “does not 
rule for himself but for the public good” of the kingdom. For Caron (1556: f. 45v-46) the 
king should “forget his attachment to his private profit as something unworthy of him since 
he will easily judge inappropriate to the one in charge of the public duty to dedicate 
himself to some private desire”. The sovereign king should “postpone his particular profit 
or pleasure” (Madeleine, 1575: f. 21v) and “directs his will towards the public utility, always 
preferring the public good to his own private and particular interest” (Perrière, 1567: f. 2v). 
L’Hospital (1824-1825: 407) takes the example of the answer of the king to the 
remonstrances and grievances of the subjects which shows their consideration for the 
profit and advantage of their subjects (something characteristic of a “good king”). The real 
Christian king must value nothing more than “the happiness and felicity of his people” 
(Aurigny, 1554: f. 258v). Hence, the king stands out as an ‘uncommon’ individual: “[t]he 
King is dissimilar to the private man because from his good [action] follows the public 
good” (Caron, 1556: f. 11v). Caron becomes more explicit when he insists on the purpose of 
having a king who is established to protect the public good and reiterates his association of 
the king’s interest with the subjects’ interest “up to a point where his contentment 
becomes their contentment” (Caron, 1556: f. 45v). There is therefore no difference 
between the public good and the interests of a (good and sovereign) king: the two are 
necessarily identical and the frontier between private and public interests disappear as far 
as the king is concerned. This ideal reality is contrasted to the tyrannical (and less than 
sovereign) king who “takes everything for himself and dispossesses his subjects [thus] 
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converting his particular interest in the interest of everyone” (Gentillet, 1576: 406; see also 
Bodin, 1576: 245). 
 
 




So far in this chapter we have explored how French political theorists thought about 
sovereignty in the 16th century. Sovereignty is first and foremost described as a superior or 
final form of authority, but most of the discussion is in fact centred on the conditions inside 
of which sovereignty comes to be real. In other words, a final authority can exist in 
(potentially) any context but will only be recognised as sovereign (and thus as deserving 
respect) if it matches the conditions put forward by these thinkers. To briefly summarise, 
these conditions of possibility of sovereignty are: 
 
 - the existence of a monarchy (any other form of political organisation being less 
than sovereign); 
 - the recognition and respect for divine and natural law as defined in the French 
cultural context, and in particular for Christianity and justice; 
 - and as a consequence the realisation of these ideals by a paternal figure – the 
king – in the interest of the common good of the subjects. 
 
This list is striking for its level of cultural – or civilisational – specificity. In other words, a 
‘true’ sovereign is identified and defined by elements that either explicitly pertain to a 
specific cultural framework – like Christianity or Western European monarchy – or are 
dependent upon it to become tangible and recognised – like natural law, justice, and the 
common good. As such, sovereignty is linked to civilisational elements that have their origin 
in one particular culture: that of France in the 16th century. But French theorists seem 
oblivious to this fact or rather accept it as unproblematic. Hence, they ‘naturally’ and 
‘logically’ describe France and the French kings as perfectly sovereign without questioning 
their own assumptions.75 The rest of this chapter will be dedicated to explaining how this 
was done in order to inform the next two chapters (when this framework will be applied to 
the Amerindians and to the French themselves during the League). 
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 As such, one could argue that these authors were either blind to their own ‘French-centrism’ 
and/or entirely convinced of their superiority. The only exceptions to this rule occur when they try to 
distantiate themselves from the king in order to escape the accusation of ‘idolatry’ and maintain 




French civilisation and sovereignty 
 
This discussion of the perfection of French sovereignty can be analytically divided into two 
main sections: how France realises the model of sovereignty described above and how it 
has ‘historically’ always realised it (or came to realise it before the others). First, France is 
performed as having already achieved this state of civilised sovereignty. It is a kingdom 
characterised by its maintenance of justice, “greater and more praiseworthy in France than 
in any other country” (Seyssel, 1557b: f. 12v). The French kings are esteemed for their 
devotion to justice (Bignon, 1610: 422). In addition, France possesses the “most beautiful 
laws, the most holy ordinances of the world, admired by all the foreigners” (Montchrestien, 
1615/1889: 257-258 and for a similar expression in Marion’s discourse see B.N.F., Français 
18888: f. 78). In fact, foreigners are so impressed by the perfection of French justice that 
they regularly appeal to France to solve their dispute (as mentioned by most of the authors 
cited in this chapter). Du Chesne (1609: 232, 240-241 and 274) uses a comparison with 
unjust/unsovereign societies to perform the superiority of the French kings when it comes 
to justice: 
 
Consider the force that had the Justice of our Princes, including in the heart of the 
barbarians who are in the first infancy of their Monarchy, they desire it [Justice] for 
what it alone makes it worth to be desired, i.e. a good and just King, a rare and 
precious thing not often found outside the limits of France. 
 
France also embodies the religious perfection associated with sovereignty. This is especially 
clear in d’Espence’s work but is present implicitly in all the political treatises of the time. 
D’Espence (1575: f. 32-32v) argues that the French kings have deserved their title of “Most 
Christian Kings” since they have always defended Christianity against the attacks of the 
infidels and barbarians. Le Jay (1589: f. 180) adds that “over all the other nations Gaul has 
been constant, fervent and zealous with its religion”. 
 
 In a more general sense, the French kingdom is performed as the embodiment of a 
perfect sovereignty. For Haillan (1611: f. 171) “there is no doubt that [the Kingdom] is 
absolutely Royal, Monarchical and Sovereign, accompanied by all the marks of absolute 
power [puissance] and sovereignty that one can desire in a Monarchy”. He adds that the 
great “Spirit” of France accompanied her inside as well as outside the kingdom in all her 
enterprises and discoveries “including to the newly discovered lands” of America (Haillan, 
1611: f. 7). The French monarchy is also “governed by a better order than any other one” 
(Seyssel, 1557b: f. 7v) and is “the most established Monarchy that exists and has ever 
existed in the world” (Loyseau, 1608: 43). Because the French “have been more civilised” 
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than any other they have happily combined the arts of war with the arts necessary for a 
civil life such as “ploughing and cultivating the land” and “studying the arts and religion” 
(Bignon, 1610: 141). This perfection in her “absolute power” [puissance] allowed France to 
conquer other countries peacefully through “her word” (i.e. the attraction she exercises) 
and example (Pasquier, 1621: 145). 
 
 Even more important for a discussion of the conceptualisation of civilised 
sovereignty are the recurrent ‘descriptions’ of France as a flourishing kingdom. As 
expressed by different authors France is “the most flourishing Kingdom that has ever 
existed” (Bignon, 1610: 522), characterised by its wealth and abundance of all things 
(Chesne, 1609: 306-307; Seyssel, 1557b: f. 29). This ‘flourishing’ reality is seen by some as 
the direct result of the action of the sovereign kings (Haillan, 1611: f. 6; Madeleine, 1575: f. 
12v). As eloquently written by d’Espence (1575: f. 34): 
 
What scared those who want to invade the kingdom of France the most if not the 
fact that it is the most flourishing of all? None extends its limits farther. None 
possesses a Senate so august, so sacred, and so frequently assembled. In none exist 
so renowned academies and universities. None is more populous, none possesses 
such a concord and such an authority [puissance]. In no other country justice 
flourishes like in France. In no other places is faith as honest and religion less 
corrupted.  
 
Hence, the sovereignty of France is directly linked to – as well as gives rise to – the idea of a 
‘flourishing kingdom’ highly familiar in discussions of civilisation and civilisational 
superiority. Indeed, the civilised and sovereign reality of France ‘produces’, ‘generates’ and 
‘gives rise to’ a perfect society. This ‘social efficiency’ is crucial in the construction of the 
civilised identity of France (and will be used against the Amerindians’ sovereignty and 
destabilised during the French League).  
 
 
A ‘history’ of (eternal or acquired) perfection 
 
The perfection of the French state, its superior civilisation and its subsequent sovereignty 
are usually justified among French scholars by references to a mythical and eternal 
perfectness of the French state or by an evolutionary perspective (with a progressive 
attainment of perfection). In both cases, and although the explanations differ, the result is 
the same: France represents the perfection necessary to uphold claims to sovereignty. 
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Recurring to ‘history’,76 therefore, appeared as a crucial tool to ‘discover’ the reason for the 
existence in France of a perfect form of governance and sovereignty. Among political 
thinkers ‘history’ thus acquired a specific status and most of these scholars resorted – to 
varying degrees – to ‘historical’ arguments (Jouanna, 1989: 317-319).77 
 
 One group of scholars adopted the view that the perfection of the French kingdom 
is the result of a long evolution. In such discourses, the current state of (civilised) France is 
compared to its ‘barbaric’ origins and the two ‘realities’ are linked together by an 
evolutionary account. Caron is probably the most explicit about this evolutionary view of 
humankind invariably leading (if successful) to a civilised and sovereign society similar to 
that of France. Written like a dialogue his book includes a number of tropes about the 
evolution of human society (and therefore the possibility of evaluating and classifying their 
achievements): 
 
When men were spread and dispersed in woods and mountains, living without laws 
like brutal beasts and knowing no society; they followed the company and 
assembly of each other, having no cities, houses nor huts but only hiding places to 
which they retreated for the safety and defence of their body. It seems therefore 
that it was very difficult to attract them to the social life necessary for men to reach 
harmony. [Making a reference to the contemporary Amerindians] Do you 
remember the writings about these Barbarians and savages that still do not belong 
today to any police? (Caron, 1556: f. 6v-7). 
 
Based on both mythological and actual references to the ‘state of nature’ idea, Caron builds 
an evolutionary view of human societies.78 For him, (rational or prudent) men progressively 
organise themselves until the establishment of the “sovereign happiness”, i.e. “the 
constitution of a town or city well-ordered and policed with laws and mores appropriate to 
reason” (f. 7). Caron makes use of the classical association between civilisation and city and 
of civilised man “as a uniquely city-building, city-dwelling animal” (Padgen, 1982: 15). 
Humankind thus enters into this “political humanity” representing the highest possible 
                                                          
76
 ‘History’ is used in inverted commas to denote the instrumental use made of ‘historical’ 
knowledge. This section is not interested in establishing – as if it were possible – a true historical 
account of France’s past or in comparing this instrumental ‘history’ to a supposedly ‘real’ History. 
The instrumental use of ‘history’ in order to perform the state means that “writing history [is] an 
exercise in the construction of meaning” (Jeffrey, 2013: 43) rather than the retrieving of a lost past.  
77
 Although it was not the first treatise to resort to history it is undeniable that Hotman’s Franco-
Gallia (Hotman, 1711) had a strong influence on subsequent authors (Lemaire, 1907: 101; Weill, 
1892: 99). This book is not mentioned in this chapter since it introduced ideas that differed from the 
‘mainstream’ of contemporary political theory (and that were thus harshly criticised by most 
scholars). 
78
 Le Jay (1589: f. 19-19v) also develops a similar evolutionary view where men evolve from “brutal 
beasts” living in a state of nature (characterised by an absence of civil law and the domination of the 
strongest) to the civil and reasonable life. 
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form of political order – an order that is unknown to those “living without any civility” but 
perfectly realised in France (Caron, 1556: f. 7 and 44v).  
 
For this first group of scholars ancient France entirely matches the description of 
the ‘state of nature’ that will be later applied to the Amerindians. Ancient French are 
described as nomads regularly changing their habitation (Tillet, 1578: 5) and living in a 
general state of ‘Barbarism’ that characterised Europe at the time (d'Espence, 1575: f. 13-
13v). The ancient French are performed as warriors entirely occupied in warfare (Roy, 
1575a: f. 26v). For these authors the French people was therefore not perfect from its 
inception: “just like those who are newly born have neither reason nor knowledge (just like 
beasts) even though they have the physical appearance and name of ‘men’” (Haillan, 1611: 
f. 2-2v) the ancient French were characterised by their barbarism.  
 
The evolutionary scheme developed by the French theorists is thus relatively 
simple: out of this first or primitive state of barbarism the French have developed into the 
most civilised and flourishing kingdom on earth. The link is provided by the French kings 
who act as ‘agents of change’. Haillan (1611: f. 12) mentions the mythical king Pharamond: 
“Pharamond having established them in a safe place decided to join in one body this 
barbaric people thanks to good laws and constitutions”. Here can be identified several 
classic associations: between barbarity and nomadism, between the civilised people and 
their association in a unified ‘body’, and the passage from barbarism to civilisation thanks 
to law and justice. Other scholars mention Charlemagne as the source of the French 
process of civilisation (d'Espence, 1575: f. 13v). A final group of authors considers that the 
naissance of a real sovereignty and civilised state in France dates back to the king Clovis: 
this king “embellished the Kingdom of the Christian Faith, of a secured administration and 
justice, of laws and ordinances” (Haillan, 1611: f. 2-2v). For them it is clear that France has 
never lost its sovereignty and civilisation ever since (Chesne, 1609: 132 see also Cappel in 
B.N.F., Français 18888: f. 26). 
 
 Whatever the disagreements as to the exact timing of this transformation all agree 
that France is now civilised enough to be considered a perfectly sovereign state. If the 
Gaulois were called ‘barbarians’, writes Bodin (1576: 443), we now see that the French are 
“the most courteous and accommodating people of Europe”. The virtue(s) associated with 
the French kings and people enabled the kingdom to reach this stage (Roy, 1575b) and to 
now be “redoubtable to Europe, Asia and Africa [despite] having long languished in a weak 
and fragile childhood, without laws, without any form of justice or a good and solid 
government” (Haillan, 1611: f. 2). 
 
 The second group of scholars depicts and performs France as ‘eternally’ civilised 
and sovereign, having been born or created in that perfect form. For them, “the form and 
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way of reigning” introduced by the previous French kings is particularly “reasonable and 
political” which can explain the maintenance of a good political order in France (Seyssel, 
1557a: preface). More specifically, most theorists link this political order to the fact that 
France has always been a monarchy: “this [French] kingdom has already lasted longer than 
any other that has existed” (Loyseau, 1608: 43). In fact, it is “the oldest Kingdom that exists 
today” (Chesne, 1609: 302; see also Budé, 1547: 41; Moulin, 1561: 27-30; Roy, 1575a: f. 20 
and 22; Jay, 1589: f. 213). Because France has always kept its “Royal state and government” 
(Bignon, 1610: 253-254), ‘monarchy’ and France become inextricably associated (Coquille, 
1607: 1; Tillet, 1607: 10). Monarchy in France is thus the oldest in the world and has been 
continuously passed down among French people.  
 
 Different elements also characterised this long-lasting civilised sovereignty. The 
ancient French are performed by L’Hospital (1825: 231) as the highest achievers of justice 
and administration. Pasquier (1621: 9) also repeatedly mentions the political organisation 
that characterised even the old Gaulois: “there has never been a lack of police among our 
old Gaulois”. More precisely, adds Pasquier, “the French were not savage people like other 
barbaric nations, but civilised and polite”. For him, all of these historical proofs come as 
evidence that France never displayed signs of savagery. Which is why “the French 
monarchy is the best established to last long and to greatly prosper over any other state or 
empire” (Seyssel, 1557b: f. 18v). France is also performed as having always been 
particularly Christian – the French king being the first to receive the Christian faith (Chesne, 
1609: 302) – and the old Gaulois are sometimes considered as particularly devoted to 
Christianity (Postel, 1551: 26). French civilisation and its ‘eternal’ existence also entail the 
awareness and practice of the ‘arts’ and intellectual work. Even in their ‘barbaric’ childhood 
French people have always studied eloquence and literature, from which follows that “our 
old Gaulois (…) had the use of arts and letters before and more anciently than Greece and 
Asia” (d'Espence, 1575: f. 25-25v; also mentioned in Pasquier 1621: 791). Hence, France has 
been a civilised and sovereign kingdom at least since the time of Charlemagne:  
 
Since that time this kingdom has been better established than any other in 
Christendom. Our ancestors have always been like an iron or cast iron wall, 
opposed to all the barbaric nations, but opposed to them not because of a 
disordered cupidity or because of a barbaric ambition to amplify the limits [of their 
kingdom] but rather with a holy heart and a great and religious courage to give a 









An exploration of French political thinking in the 16th century thus reveals how sovereignty 
was constructed upon, and maintained by, a civilisational discourse performing the French 
state as the summit of civilised sovereignty. Although qualified by some as an ‘absolute’ 
principle (by which they mean an unlimited and unchecked form of political authority) 
sovereignty is in reality always defined as the superior and final form of authority in a 
political community. The ‘absolute’ aspect of the concept lies somewhere else, in what I 
have loosely termed ‘civilisational principles’. These principles or values are held as 
absolute – they cannot be negotiated or transgressed – and can only be defined and 
identified inside of a specific cultural framework: that of France in the 16th century.79 
Christianity and the respect for natural law (and in particular for ‘justice’) form the core of 
these principles from which derive secondary ideas: the king is performed as a father ruling 
over his subjects/children with benevolence, with reason (he is not victim of his own 
passions and therefore not ‘feminine’) and for the common good of the kingdom. This 
dependence of sovereignty upon civilisational principles is particularly visible in the use of 
‘evolutionary’ theories of humankind. As shown in this chapter, discussions on sovereignty 
in sixteenth-century France regularly included an explanation of how men developed from 
a state of nature to a civilised and sovereign (French) monarchy representing the highest 
stage achievable. In these ‘theories of progress’ or ‘modernisation’ the idea of an initial 
state of nature played a crucial role. It represents the ‘starting point’ of human societies 
while civilised sovereignty is conceptualised as their most desirable end point. 
 
These evolutionary theories of humankind (that serve to place the French 
sovereign state at the apex of civilisation and as a perfect example of sovereignty) should 
not be taken as a complete innovation of sixteenth-century French thinkers. They mostly 
reflect and build upon previous conceptualisations of ‘progress’ that were forged in 
Antiquity, were transmitted throughout the Middle Ages and for which a clear genealogy 
can be established. The crucial concepts of savagery, barbarism and thus state of nature 
indeed largely pre-date the sixteenth century. The early anthropology of the Renaissance is 
linked to “the well-known Renaissance folkloric figure of the Wild Man; early Christian 
perceptions of monkeys, apes, and baboons; and the classical Greek and Roman tradition 
of the noble savage” (Dickason, 1997: 63). These ideas are all related to Greek and Roman 
conceptions of the ‘savage’ living a simple life devoid of complex social institutions and 
without government (Boas, 1978).  
 
                                                          
79
 This is why Glanville’s analysis of early modern theories of sovereignty is compelling but 
incomplete: Glanville (2014: 32-36) rightly identifies that “theorists of absolute sovereignty did not 
claim that [sovereignty] was unlimited” but rather that it entailed rights and responsibilities. He fails, 
however, to connect these responsibilities to a specific cultural or civilisational model – something 
that this chapter has tried to correct. 
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French theories of sovereignty in the sixteenth century are particularly informed by 
two traditions. First, the concepts of savagery and state of nature used by French scholars 
can be traced back to the idea of monstrous races developed during Antiquity (Friedman, 
1981: 207). According to this anthropological thinking, monstrous men live “outside the 
cultural setting of a city”. As a consequence, “their lives were guided by no law” (Friedman, 
1981: 30). The monstrous races are thus an early example of the idea of savagery that is so 
central in identifying and defining sovereignty. Only the ‘normal’ races can develop a 
rational, organised and political order leading to sovereignty. The second tradition develops 
out of the figure of the Wild Man who lives among nature (or in the woods), is brutish, 
strong physically but lacking social abilities, agriculture, speech and manners. As Jahoda 
(1999: 5) explains, this Wild Man of the Woods lives “a solitary life apart from the company 
of beasts and devils”. What is particularly highlighted in these ‘descriptions’ is the lack of 
social life that characterises the Wild Man (Bernheimer, 1970: 20), a lack that is explained 
by his inherent irrationality (Husband, 1980: 4). 
 
Just as the monstrous races, the medieval Wild Man became widely used as a 
convenient Other devoid of the qualities of the civilised Self. The Wild Man is “uncanny, 
unruly, raw, unpredictable, foreign, uncultured, and uncultivated” (Bernheimer, 1970: 20). 
In fact, and as explained by Husband (1980: 5), the Wild Man was used  
 
to counterpoise the accepted standards of conduct of society in general. If the 
average man could not articulate what he meant by “civilized” in positive terms, he 
could readily do so in negative terms by pointing to the wild man (…) As medieval 
man became progressively obsessed with a highly ordered social structure, a 
rational disposition to direct it, and a committed faith in God to sustain it, the wild 
man came to represent the opposite. Sublimated in the wild man were the 
preeminent phobias of medieval society – chaos, insanity, and ungodliness. 
 
Most of the ideas so central to the discussion of the civilised sovereign order are 
thus present in the texts on the monstrous races and the Wild Man.80 The ‘sources’ of this 
primitivism can be traced back to Antiquity in what amounts to an “unbroken tradition” 
(Boas, 1978: 153) from Antiquity to the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. These seminal 
ideas of savagery were part of the anthropological legacy of the previous centuries: “in a 
virtually uninterrupted continuum, the notion of these monstrous races [described by the 
Greek literature] was perpetuated from classical times through the Middle Ages” (Husband, 
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 I do not develop further these pre-modern conceptualisations of savagery as they do not differ 
from the ideas mentioned in this chapter and in the following. In other words, one will be able to 
find longer explorations of these conceptualisations in the works of the scholars mentioned here but 




1980: 6).81 That is how they came to inform scholars in France who were trying to explain 
what a sovereign and political order referred to. By using savagery as a counterexample or 
an ‘unnatural’ evolution, French theorists came to define the civilised French order as the 
achievement of a perfect – hence sovereign – social order inscribed in the ‘natural/normal’ 
evolution of human societies. 
 
The conceptual construction of sovereignty in the 16th century therefore relied on 
notions of civilisation and savagery that pre-date the Discovery of America. In fact, one can 
question the actual impact America had on the construction of a specific European 
vocabulary (what Pagden (1986) calls the impact of the New World on the Old). Indeed, it 
seems that French theorists were using the ideas of ‘progress’ or ‘evolution’ without the 
Amerindians being key references. In addition, their conceptualisation of civilisation draws 
heavily on medieval notions of human progress. It thus seems exaggerated to argue that 
the ‘Discovery’ of America “disrupted all the political and social notions in Europe” 
(Chinard, 1911: 245). This is not to deny that the Amerindians played a role in the 
construction of the concepts that later justified claims to civilised sovereignty in and 
outside Europe. In fact, several authors in this chapter use them in their conceptualisations. 
Rather, my argument is that other authors (and in fact the majority in the case of French 
sixteenth-century thinkers) made use of similar concepts of savagery and ‘evolutionary 
theories’ of humankind with reference to other (more or less mythical) peoples. Post-
colonial scholars must therefore be careful not to over-emphasise the importance of the 
Amerindians in the construction of sovereignty and its twin concept of anarchy. I concur 
with the post-colonial theorist Barry Hindess (2007: 332) in defending a more nuanced view 
of the ‘impact’ of the ‘Discovery’ of America:  
 
In emphasizing the interpretative resources provided by the classical tradition in 
Europe, my point is not to suggest that the Americas had little real impact of their 
own on European perceptions of the world around them. Rather, it is that the 
influence of the encounter with the Americas on European thought in this period 
can hardly be disentangled from that of ideas received from classical antiquity. 
 
Hence, the main influence exercised by the Amerindians is that they came to provide a new 
and (more importantly) a contemporary example – a “living illustration” (Ashcraft, 1971: 
1097) – of the ‘state of nature’, an idea that was already widespread at the time. 
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 Campbell (1988: 15) also notices that theories of Otherness regarding Asia travelled from 
Antiquity to the Renaissance, “[f]rom Herodotus to Pliny to Solinus to Isodore of Seville to Vincent of 
Beauvais to Sebastian Münster: each link of the chain binding the oriental lore of antiquity with that 









Sovereign doubts: civilisation and 







As shown in the previous chapter French theorists establish a strong image of France as 
civilised and thus sovereign. When turning to events during which the discourses of 
sovereignty played a key role, one can thus expect a relatively stable division: on one side, 
the French state is necessarily civilised and its sovereignty never destabilised. Indeed, how 
could the French not be civilised since they establish what civilisation is? On the other side, 
the non-Western actors should be easily denied civilisation and thus sovereignty. If 
civilisation is always constructed against a savage other, this other is usually perceived as 
living outside the West. In theory, then, the sovereign state would only need one colonial 
frontier and this frontier should be clearly established and demarcated. 
 
This would be to forget, however, that the theories of sovereignty analysed in the 
previous chapter are deeply performative. These writings prescribe a model while 
pretending to describe an existing reality. As such, they act to create a reality supposedly 
exterior to themselves. This performative effect can not only be unsuccessful – or 
infelicitous – but it is also always established against alternatives and competing 
discourses. This is precisely what is revealed by an analysis of the deployment of the 
discourse of sovereignty in the West and over the non-West. Two crucial events involving 
this discourse will be analysed in the rest of this thesis. These examples reveal how the 
discourse of sovereignty establishes (civilised and savage) identities amidst confusion and 
doubt. Indeed, civilisation and savagery seem to exist on the ‘wrong’ sides of the Atlantic: 
French ‘internal’ discourses of sovereignty reveal an unexpected savagery inside of 
‘civilised’ France while the colonial encounter is replete with references to elements of 
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civilisation among the supposedly savage. What is uncovered in these two instances – and 
thus on both sides of the demarcation between civilised and savage – is the crucial and 
difficult process of writing a civilisational difference that sovereignty depends upon. 
Savagery and civilisation never seem to be where one (due to the strong influence of the 
colonial discourses themselves) expects them to be. The discourses of sovereignty will thus 
become key in re-establishing the colonial ‘truth’: civilisation belongs to the sovereign West 
(and more specifically to one civilised group in the West) while the Rest is ‘naturally’ 
uncivilised. 
 
 Building upon some key post-colonial insights I reveal in the three following 
chapters that notions of savagery and civilisation are widely encountered in unexpected 
places: during their encounter with the Amerindians but also in their ‘domestic’ sphere the 
French texts perform civilisation in the savage world and savagery in the civilised one. This 
unexpected picture explains why sovereignty relies on the the re-establishment of the 
colonial ‘truth’. Indeed, the discourses of statecraft will be performed so that civilisation 
belongs to the sovereign West while the non-West is ‘naturally’ uncivilised and 
unsovereign. Analysing together the empirical construction of sovereignty in two different 
settings thus reinforces the main arguments of this thesis: (i) that discourses of 
civilisation/savagery are central for sovereignty both in the West and over the non-West; 
and (ii) that sovereignty depends on what can be called ‘civilisational differentiation’ inside 
as well as outside the West. Ultimately, then, it is a full picture of civilised sovereignty that 
emerges, one in which sovereignty is shown to rely on the same discursive constructions of 
difference wherever it is claimed or denied. In order to explore this process, the present 
chapter focuses on the numerous crossings of the colonial frontiers that one encounters 
through an exploration of statecraft. Indeed, and because sovereignty is constructed 
against an ‘internal’ as well as against an ‘external’ Other, two colonial frontiers coexist and 
reinforce the legitimacy of the sovereignty ruler. In this chapter, however, the archives 
reveal how these frontiers are unstable and regularly crossed, thus associating sovereignty 
to the now civilised savage and denying it to the savage civilised. 
 
 
French encounters with the Amerindians 
 
 
This discussion is informed by an in-depth exploration of archival material related 
to two crucial episodes for French sovereignty: the ‘discovery’ and later claims to 
sovereignty over the Amerindians of present-day Canada and the struggles of French kings 
to establish and maintain their sovereignty ‘internally’ during the last phase of the Wars of 
Religion. As far as the first case is concerned, the French were not the first ones to explore 
the coast of Canada. Portuguese and English sailors had touched upon this part of the ‘New 
World’ in the last decade of the 15th century. But the French were not long to follow. The 
first to arrive were the Normand and Breton fishermen who started navigating to Canada 
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as soon as 1504 (Champlain, 1993: 13). This is well-remembered in several accounts of the 
period: indeed, the French fishermen are regularly cited as “the first among the Christians” 
(B.N.F., Rothschild 1967: tome 1: 9 (emphasis added)) to discover and navigate to this 
‘Newfoundland’. To fishing will be quickly added fur trading (especially in the second part 
of the 16th century). These two activities explain the presence of private Frenchmen and 
the interests of merchants in these lands. Political interest in claiming and controlling the 
land of Canada quickly followed. 
 
The first official expedition is launched in 1524 and conducted by Verrazano. The 
stated objective was to find a direct route to the Orient (Boucher, 2004: 17), the French still 
considering ‘Canada’ to be an ideal place to search for a passage to China and its wealth. 
The novelty of the land discovered was clearly perceived by Verrazano himself: touching 
upon the coast of Canada, he declares: “And then appeared a land that no one, neither in 
the old days nor nowadays, had ever seen” (Julien et al., 1946: 54).82 It is at that time that 
the first mention of ‘Nova Gallia’ appeared on a map published a year after Verrazano’s trip 
(Trudel, 1973: 1). This expedition and the following voyages are usually considered as 
“matters of state” since they were officially sanctioned and authorised by the king 
(Champlain, 1993: 32). This early period is one of “desultory voyages of discovery, inspired 
by the hope of a short passage to the East, and associated with the fishing off the 
Newfoundland banks” (Jackson et al., 1974: 78). Following in the steps of Verrazano is 
Jacques Cartier, who led or participated in three different trips between 1534 and 1541, 
first in an attempt to find the same passage leading to China, later to discover and take 
possession of the resources of this ‘New France’. The French king explains the purpose of 
the first of these trips as the “discovery of certain islands and lands where it is said that he 
[Cartier] will find a great quantity of gold and other rich things” (B.N.F., Français 15628: f. 
213v). The last of Cartier’s trips was headed by Roberval who received the first royal 
commission explicitly stating conquest and colonisation as the goals of the voyage, making 
it “the earliest official expression known of the French crown’s intention to acquire 
American territories” (Slattery, 1978: 159). 
 
 These early discovery voyages were criticised by the other European powers: the 
Spanish ambassador, for instance, indicates that he officially complained about one of 
Cartier’s trips in 1540 (A.N., K1485: doc 21). But these diplomatic incidents had little 
consequence. More important were the external and internal political problems 
encountered by the French kings, which resulted in the lack of any meaningful French 
settlement in Canada during the 16th century. France’s colonial policy was constantly 
stopped and weakened by the Wars of Religion and conflicts with its European neighbours 
(Davenport, 1917: 3; Roberts, 1942: 19; Julien et al., 1946: 76; Jackson et al., 1974: 79). 
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 Notice here the discursive silencing of the presence of non-Christian, non-civilised, peoples in this 
dramatic sentence. Here, this silencing results from the awarding to Europeans of a capacity to ‘see’ 
that the Amerindians do not possess. This observation is a prime example of the ‘epistemic 
deficiency’ attributed to the Amerindians (see page 132-133). 
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They led to long periods of inaction on the part of the political authorities. Additionally, 
French political interest in the New World should not be overstated: Verrazano’s voyage, 
for instance, was financed by merchants. In a letter written shortly after Verrazano’s 
return, a trader from Lyon indicates the strong interest of the merchant community in the 
potentiality for trade offered by Canada (B.N.F., N.A.F. 9384: f. 75). In fact, the interests of 
the French were directed primarily at the Mediterranean rather than the Atlantic (Trudel, 
1973).83 Taken together, these factors could explain why only “a derisory level of resources 
was allocated to these undertakings” (Ladurie, 1994: 127). 
 
In this context of shifting political interest in the New World, commercial activities 
were the only ones ensuring the presence of the French in Canada. These activities, 
however, did not necessitate any permanent settlements. It was in fact unnecessary to 
maintain settlements during winter when fishing and fur trading were more difficult 
(Dickason, 1997: 140). Thus, only the political goal of occupying the land could guarantee 
the presence of the French, and this goal was fluctuating. The very limited number of 
French living in Canada was identified as a problem early on (see for instance the report of 
1627 contained in B.N.F., N.A.F. 9269: f. 223). Schnapper (1954: 325) also indicates that 
peopling was mainly passed down to the missionaries and nobles, resulting in a very limited 
number of settlers, “two or three hundreds in 1641”. So when Champlain (sent by the 
French king) arrived in Canada in 1603, the only place where the French had a temporary 
‘colony’ was Tadoussac (Champlain, 1993). 
 
This chapter specifically focuses on the early period of encounters as the crucial 
period of the formation of the French vision of the Amerindians. It starts from Verrazano’s 
voyage in 1524 as the first time the expression ‘New France’ and the possibility of French 
establishment are mentioned (Chinard, 1911: 32). This period finishes with the creation of 
the first commercial company open to investors in 1627 – the act of creation can be found 
in A.E., M.D. France 782, f. 97 – as the beginnings of the classic colonisation attempts by 
the French in Canada.84 By the first decades of the seventeenth century, the main 
characterisations of the Amerindians are established. Despite the modesty of the French 
achievements in Canada,85 this episode represents a major encounter between a European 
state and populations living in the ‘New World’. It resulted in a vast number of documents 
and testimonies, ranging from explorers’ accounts of their journey to ‘scientific’ 
publications (usually under the guise of a Cosmographie), missionaries’ accounts, official 
                                                          
83 Addressing this issue in a more general way, Hodgen (1964: 147) notices that “in the world as 
known to Europeans in the sixteenth century, the fear of the Mongol hordes and the peril of the 
Turk still overshadowed almost all other claims on attention, even including that made by the more 
exotic inhabitants of the New World”. 
84
 For a more detailed account of the early explorations and colonisation of Canada by the French 
see Trudel (1973) and Bitterli (1986: Chapter 4). 
85
 Du Chesne (1609: 304) states in 1609 when talking about France’s power that “she also has in the 
new Indies some lands, but because they are uncertain and of little importance they should not be 
valued more than for their role in maintaining navigation [to this part of the world]”. 
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declarations and letters. ‘Canada’ and its inhabitants were also present in theatre plays like 
Acoubar (Hamel, 1586/1611) and in novels and short stories like the Heptaméron of 
Marguerite de Valois (B.N.F., Français 1520) and Les amours de Pistion et de Fortunie 
(Périer, 1601/1973).86 The ‘savages’ of America were even physically present in several 
ceremonial Entrées of the king in French cities (in Rouen in 1550, Troie in 1564 and 
Bordeaux in 1565).87  
 
In the main Boucher (2004: 27) estimates that “between 1565 and 1610, one can 
find more than a hundred French works mentioning the Americas”. Interestingly, the 
Canadian Amerindians are not among the more frequently mentioned ‘New World’ 
peoples: “Brazil was without a doubt the most well-known part of America in sixteenth-
century France” (Boucher, 2004: 18). In order to analyse French sovereignty, though, 
Canada offers a much richer example since official state interest in Brazil was limited. The 
archives concerned with Canada constitute a rich corpus that helps us understand how the 
French performed the Amerindians and consequently how they could deny them 
sovereignty. My set of archives includes the major French sources written or published 
about Canada in these early years of exploration and colonisation. Among them dominate 
three (sometimes overlapping) groups: the explorers such as Verrazano, Cartier, 
Champlain, Lescarbot and Alfonse; the missionaries such as Biard and Sagard; and the 
‘scholars’ like Thévet and Montchrestien. Looking at such a range of actors is crucial in the 
absence of a French canonical figure on the Amerindians (like Vitoria was in the Spanish 
context). Such a classification, however, should not be seen as strict:88 indeed, I do not wish 
to argue that missionaries, explorers and scholars necessarily produced different visions of 
Canada. Indeed, their focus is sometimes different and their ‘descriptions’ take several 
forms: that of journals of exploration for Verrazano or Cartier, of encyclopaedia for the 
scholars, with an overwhelming focus on religion for the missionaries. But my selection of 
texts is oriented more by the specific claims of the authors to ‘describe’ the Canadian 
Amerindians than by their position in French society, the ‘reality’ of their perception or 
even of their travels to Canada. Indeed, it is my contention that the writers mentioned in 
this study are more influenced by the cultural background in which they grew and wrote 
than by their (sometimes fictional) individual experience of ‘Canada’. The diversity of their 
views is thus proportional to what their culture allowed them to see. I therefore do not 
wish to question the veracity of their claims or their correspondence with an ‘external’ 
Canada but rather seek to treat their texts as establishing a ‘truth’89 about their object. As 
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 These works do not offer specific insights about the image of the Amerindians in sixteenth-century 
France and they will therefore not be mentioned in this chapter. Rabelais is another famous example 
of the use of ‘America’ in sixteenth-century French literature; his work will not be used in this 
chapter because he does not specifically talk about Canada (for more details on Rabelais see Chinard 
(1911)). 
87
 On these Entrées, see Wintroub (1998; 2001) , Dickason (1997: 212-213) and Chinard (1911: 105-
106). 
88
 In his study Sayre (1997: 24) also rejects the usual classification of sources on the Amerindians 
according to the ‘occupation’ of their authors. 
89
 The French writers and explorers show a surprising degree of self-confidence in their ‘descriptions’ 
of the Amerindians, thus justifying the use of ‘truth’ to qualify their writings. In particular, they show 
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argued by Todorov (1982: 71-72), these discourses should be considered as ‘acts’ instead of 
‘(descriptive) texts’. Consequently, the notion of ‘truth’ as correspondence to a pre-existing 
reality is both illogical and misleading: it is illogical because these discourses contributed to 
the reality they supposedly only described, and it is misleading because what becomes 
important is what was accepted as ‘true’ in any given time and context, not what was 
supposedly ‘really true’. 
 
In this process, the French construction of the Amerindians was not isolated from 
the larger European movement of exploration and the ‘scientific’ and political knowledge 
produced as a result. Spain and Spanish authors in particular exercised a strong influence 
over the rest of Europe. This chapter does not mention these reciprocal influences but 
acknowledges their existence. Finally, I will follow the French writers in this chapter in 
treating the Amerindians of Canada as a whole and unified object; generally speaking, only 
some explorers differentiated between the various Amerindian groups while most of the 
others – in particular the cosmographers – performed them as a coherent whole. 
Verrazano for instance writes: “we believe that all of the natives of the lands we visited 
have identical mores and habits” (Julien et al., 1946: 61). This is particularly unsurprising: 
the Amerindians are alike since they are performed as ‘blank pages’ deprived of culture 
(Todorov, 1982: 50). Hence, the “underlying similarities” of their way of life is “frequently 
noted during this period” (Dickason, 1997: 91). 
 
 
Civilisation in America: perceptions of the Amerindian 
social order 
 
In the texts of this period, the Amerindians cannot be said to have been 
‘automatically’ (i.e. naturally and effortlessly) assigned their place at the bottom of the 
evolutionary ladder of humankind. Arguing so would deny the existence of the crucial and 
difficult process of ‘writing difference’ that took place at the time of the first encounters. 
Thus, presenting the encounter as a ‘natural’ clash overlooks the fact that countless 
similarities had to be dealt with in the process. I concur with Shoemaker (2004: 143) in that 
it is misleading to claim that Indian and European “values and practices” are at odds and 
“vastly different”. For this view overlooks the critical point that this difference had to be 
enacted or forged out of a series of striking similarities. Indeed, the French discourses 
performed several aspects of what could be understood (and is usually today characterised 
                                                                                                                                                                    
no sign of doubt or hesitation and it is rare in this literature to find an acknowledgement of the 
difficulty to properly understand the Amerindians. Léry (1585: 120) who wrote on Brazil and not on 
Canada provides an exception to this rule: “because of their gestures and attitudes that are entirely 
dissimilar to ours, I admit that it is difficult to represent them well, neither in writing nor even in 
painting”. As Greenblatt (1991: 89-90, my emphasis) wrote about Columbus: “his discourse 
(anticipating much colonial discourse to follow) is a fantasmatic representation of authoritative 
certainty in the face of spectacular ignorance”. 
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as) the civilisation of the Amerindians. This has also been identified more broadly in the 
post-colonial literature: Pagden (1982: 79) observes that given the wide range of 
‘potentially’ civilised attributes attributed to the Amerindians “Vitoria’s audience might be 
justified in assuming that the Indians lived in a society which fulfilled all the basic 
requirements for a civil way of life”.90 Sayre (1997: 145) also argues that “[o]ften a 
dissonance arose between claims that the Indians did not have clothing, agriculture, or 
writing, and observations that they in fact did have these markers of civilization”. This 
general dissonance sometimes results in apparent contradictions and a “quandary” 
(Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 61). There was, therefore, a ‘strange likeness’ (Shoemaker, 
2004) between Amerindians and Europeans.91 This is all the more striking as Canadian 
Amerindians did not live in what are sometimes called ‘advanced’ (because easily 
comparable to European standards) society like other Central and South American peoples. 
Nevertheless, the French impressions of them clearly reveal the potentiality for civilisation 
in these remote and unknown lands.  
 
What are the signs of civilisation identified by the French? First, the French identify 
some signs of what we could call today the ‘religious’ practice of the Amerindians. Alfonse 
(1559: f. 29v), for instance, refers to priests and churches. ‘Shamans’ are also mentioned by 
Cartier and Champlain. Sagard (1632: 88-89) also recognises that the Amerindians seem to 
possess and share a number of (religious?) beliefs. More generally, any prolonged contact 
with the Amerindians led the French to ‘describe’ rituals and beliefs. A reasonable 
conclusion from these occurrences in French texts is that the explorers perceived these 
practices as related to a religious system. This is why they are mentioned in the first place: 
indeed, describing other peoples implied for Renaissance travellers an emphasis on several 
aspects of daily life (like food or marriage customs) among which religion was prominent. 
But encountering these signs in the French texts of the period remains surprising: given the 
now well-established conclusion that the Amerindians were portrayed as savages living in a 
state of nature, these occurrences are bewildering. 
 
In a similar way, agriculture is not absent from these newly found lands. While the 
idea(l) of savagery is associated with a clear lack of knowledge of agriculture the 
Amerindians encountered by the French are performed as practicing it. Cartier, for 
instance, is impressed by the fields of some of the groups near Montreal (Julien et al., 
1946). Lescarbot (1617: 865-866; 925-927) also writes about the Amerindians’ agriculture 
several times: he mentions two different peoples and their agricultural practices 
(particularly for those peoples who are not in frequent contacts with Europeans). Their 
cultivation of corn is compared to the way broad beans are grown in France and the 
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 Another Spanish example is Cortes who writes about the Mexican Amerindians that “[t]heir 
customs in general are very similar to those of Spain” (cited in Dickason (1997: 37)). 
91
 In the past few decades a number of contemporary scholars have discussed how the political, 
social and economic life of the Amerindians was not savage and could even be considered as close to 
European standards of civilisation (Jennings, 1976). Given my emphasis on performativity, however, 
only the contemporary recognition of these similarities by Europeans themselves matters. 
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Amerindian success admired.92 As such, the Amerindians seem to conform to the French 
standard of civilised agriculture and thus to a key element of civilisation: the idea of ‘social 
efficiency’. They make use of their land and  their practices are not unfamiliar to the French 
explorers and writers. 
 
Finally, and perhaps most strikingly, the Amerindians seem to possess a form of 
government. Once could have expected the French to perform the Amerindians as living 
outside of any form of political institutions. This is, after all, the definition of the state of 
nature. But in reality, and as observed by numerous French writers, a political order and 
some institutions exist (thus leading once again to the potentiality of Amerindian 
civilisation). On his third trip, Cartier is able to see the one individual that he describes as 
having “the command and the government of the country of Canada” (Julien et al., 1946: 
189). Similarly, Roberval writes that “they have a king in each [part of the] country that 
they are wonderfully subjected to and that they honour in their fashion” (Julien et al., 
1946: 206). References to kings and leaders are frequent (Alfonse, 1559: f. 28v; Sagard, 
1632: 127), and some order during wars is mentioned by Thévet under the form of banners 
(Thévet, 1575: f. 1012v). Sagard also describes the councils that they hold in the event of a 
judiciary problem or for decision-making (Sagard, 1632: 198-199, 221-224). Biard (1616: 53) 
certainly provides the most comprehensive account; after explaining how the Amerindians 
are organised around local chiefs (the Sagamos), he adds that  
 
it is mainly during the summer that they visit [their land], and hold their state; by 
what I mean that several Sagamos gather together, and deal with issues of peace 
and war, friendship treaties, and of the common good. 
 
As one easily notices, this description of the ‘politics’ of the Amerindians is particularly 
close to the idea(l) of sovereignty held by French theorists at the time. The mention of the 
‘common good’ is particularly striking as it represents a key element of the political 
vocabulary of the time (as explored in the previous chapter). Lescarbot (1617: 865-866; 
925-927; 942) even provides a ‘description’ of the democratic process through which the 
Amerindians decide to go to war, a process that is surprisingly rational and reasonable: the 
Sagamos explains his reasons to start a conflict and listen to objections before reaching a 
decision. 
 
 These characterisations open the way to paint a particularly positive image of the 
Amerindians. Attached to the temporal mythology of the ‘Golden Age’ of humanity, the 
Amerindians seem to prove equal and sometimes superior to the French. There is no 
denying the fact that the Amerindians were painted as noble savages (as we will explore in 
the next chapter). As such, their positive traits are always attached to their inferior 
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(because savage) condition. 93 Nevertheless, the encounter with the Amerindians produced 
some surprising observations from the part of the supposedly civilised and sovereign 
explorers. For Roberval, the Amerindians live a life of abundance, and have no worries 
(Julien et al., 1946: 206). For Alfonse (1545/1904: 494), the Amerindians are “gentle 
peoples, and they do not hurt anybody if nobody hurts them”. This Golden Age is thus one 
of concord and peace, untouched by sin, ambition or the complexities accompanying social 
life (Lescarbot, 1617: 859). Lescarbot (1617: 882) similarly writes that “our savages, 
although they go naked, possess the virtues that can be found in civilised men”. Among 
them is generosity and courage. Sagard (1632: 65, 85 and 185) also repeatedly emphasises 
the ‘human’ aspect of the savages (who do not stop to be labelled as ‘savages’ for this 
reason): “all the savages, generally speaking, have some spirit and a rather good 
understanding, and they are not as rough and slow-witted as we imagine in France”. The 
savages indeed exceed his expectations, and their harshness and rusticity are exaggerated. 
 
 
 Additionally, the Amerindians provide an opportunity for the French to criticise 
their own society: for Montchrestien, “if it were possible to remove from them all of their 
bad traits, and to replace them with our good traits, which is to say to give them our virtues 
without giving them our vices, then they would be honest men” (Montchrestien, 
1615/1889: 322). The appetites, desires and speed characteristic of French life are also 
something that the Amerindians are free of, thus experiencing a relatively relaxed life 
(Biard, 1616: 49). Hence, the “savages are rather human (…) and maybe even more than 
peoples considered as more polished and less savage” (Sagard, 1632: 64). 
 
 
It appears clearly, then, that the Amerindians proved civilised (i.e. were performed 
as such by the French) at least to a certain extent. For some key criteria of civilisation, 
influential observers contradict the ideal of savagery that would be expected in the ‘New 
World’. The picture of the naked, asocial and skill-less Amerindian is here contradicted by 
the assessment given by the French. Although this image of civilisation in America will not 
be the dominant one (as explained in the next chapter) it is an important and undeniable 
element of the French encounter with the Amerindians. 
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 As Dickason (1997: 273) concludes: “It mattered little whether these savage New World men were 
perceived as living in a Golden Age or as wallowing in unrelieved bestiality”: they kept representing 
man in the state of nature and “before the acquisition of culture”. Shoemaker (2004: 143) arrives at 
a similar conclusion: “for Indians, accepting or furthering the noble savage ideal offers no escape 
from colonialism because it is a notion linked to a dead past”. Crucially, thus, the ‘noble’ savage is 
still a savage and the qualifying ‘noble’ does not elevate the savage above the civilised. On how the 
two faces developed see White (1972: especially 28). 
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Savagery in Europe: France in the state of nature 
 
At the same time, and on the other side of the Atlantic, the French civilised identity was not 
built easily or automatically. Rather, the French were performed as strikingly close to the 
seminal image of savagery inherited from Antiquity and the Middle Ages. In order to 
illustrate how France was performed as an uncivil state of nature I focus on the 
reinforcement of the League against Henry III and its progressive demise under Henry IV 
(1584-1598). This period witnessed one of the major crises of the French monarchy. As 
Church (1969: 260) wrote: “Roughly between 1585 and 1593, the royal authority faced its 
most severe challenge during centuries of existence, and that was because the heir to the 
throne was an heretic incapable of fulfilling the capacities of the Most Christian King”. 
Despite its intensity this crisis is not exceptional or isolated: crises of sovereignty were 
frequent in the process of centralisation of the French state. Other major crises include the 
Guerre du Bien Public in 1464-1465 or the Fronde between 1648 and 1653. Moreover, 
these crises are only momentary and explicit examples of a deeper iterative need to 
perform and re-perform sovereignty on a daily basis. Even once centralisation is achieved 
sovereignty still needs to be produced and reproduced constantly in order to be 
maintained. 
 
The crisis that interests us started in 1584 and 1585 under the rule of Henry III. 
According to most historians “the decisive event was the death of François d’Anjou”, the 
king’s brother. From this moment on, and in the absence of royal children, the “legitimate 
heir became a protestant prince, Henry of Navarre” (Jouanna, 1989: 185), the future Henry 
IV. For Knetch (2000: 218), “[t]he death of Anjou was a momentous event as it raised 
acutely the problem of the succession to the French throne. For Henry III had no son and 
seemed unlikely ever to have one”. What could have been a simple (although unusual) 
succession therefore sparked a crisis primarily because Henry of Navarre was Protestant. In 
reaction “the French Catholics served notice that they were not willing to accept a heretic 
on the throne” (Baumgartner, 1995: 222). It is therefore conventionally accepted that 
“[t]he prospect of a Huguenot becoming the next king of France plunged France into a 
political crisis” (Knecht, 2000: 218). 
 
 The unfolding of events is well-known but involves different alliance shifts and re-
configurations. A Catholic League is formed – and simply designated under the name ‘the 
League’ – against the king and his potential successor Henry of Navarre. Hence, “[f]rom 
1585 the union thus formed led to seizure of power and to civil war” (Ladurie, 1994: 215). 
Some have called this crisis the War of the Three Henrys (the first name of the king, of 
Navarre and of the League’s leader Guise). The League tried to impose the Cardinal of 
Bourbon as the new heir to the throne and gathered support not only by mentioning 
religious arguments but also by using the widespread discontent of the population against 
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the king’s rule (Jouanna, 1989: 189).94 Henry III, despite his position as king, was not the 
most powerful actor in the kingdom. He had to sign several agreements with the League 
(sometimes against his will) in the first few years of the war in order to weaken Henry of 
Navarre. The king also had to leave Paris under the pressure of the League’s leader Henry 
de Guise. In 1588, popular discontent spread to the cities – especially Paris – with a call to 
form a popular League; 300 cities responded favourably to it (Baumgartner, 1995: 225).95 In 
December 1588 Henry III decides to assassinate the League leaders (in particular the 
members of the Guise family). The next year, and due to his continued weakness against 
his adversaries the king is forced to negotiate with Navarre in order to join their force 
against the League.  
 
 Henry III is assassinated in 1589 but his death did not result in the ending of the 
conflict: a majority of Catholics refused to recognise Henry of Navarre as their king. In 
particular, the role of the Duke of Mayenne as one of the leaders of the League is crucial in 
the continuation of the conflict. Finally, in 1593, Henry of Navarre “decided the fate of 
France by formally adopting the Catholic faith, and in the following year, supported by the 
moderate Catholics, he was able to enter Paris in triumph” (Jackson et al., 1974: 53 ; for 
documents relating to his conversion: A.E., M.D. France 242: f. 74 and following). Henry of 
Navarre is sacred king (and becomes Henry IV) in February 1594. He is recognised the same 
year by the Sorbonne – a stronghold of Catholicism in the kingdom – as the “legitimate and 
real king most Christian, natural lord and heir to the kingdoms of France and Navarre” 
(Weill, 1892: 267) and absolved by the Pope in September 1595. At this point most of the 
Leaguers rallied behind the new king (a move helped by the important sums of money 
given by Henry IV to his new allies). 1595 marked the end of the internal conflict which 
then turned into a war against Spain (declared in January 1595) that would end only in 
1598 with the signing of the Peace of Vervins. Indeed, and throughout the conflict, Spain 
had been very active in support of the League in an attempt to weaken the French king. 
After the king’s coronation the nationalist spirit against Spain awakened in France (Weill, 
1892: 263). The Peace of Vervins marks the end of the Religious Wars that had affected 
France in the 16th century (Lesaffer, 1999: 131). 
 
The study of French sovereignty throughout this crisis will be done through an 
exploration of the political discourses, edicts, official declarations and pamphlets that were 
published at the time. A number of them can be found in Goulart and Goujet’s 
compilations Mémoires de la Ligue. Others were accessed at the Bibliothèque Nationale de 
France, at the Archives Nationales and at the archives of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. 
Official declarations will be complemented by an analysis of pamphlets which had a strong 
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 More specifically, the king’s advisors were seen as exercising too much influence on the king (to 
the detriment of the old nobility broadly represented by the League) and as pushing for an alliance 
with the ‘heretics’. More generally, historians agree that the religious issues were not separated 
from political and class struggles (Jackson et al., 1974: 53). 
95
 Paris became for a few years the centre of the League. It was divided into sixteen neighbourhoods 
and administered by a council (Conseil des Seize).    
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popular appeal. Indeed, pamphlets played the role of newspaper and encountered a wide 
distribution (Weill, 1892: 204). A lot of them were anonymous or published under 
pseudonyms. ‘Private’ and ‘strategic’ documents are not used in this chapter. Indeed, the 
objective is not to try to re-establish the course of events in its minute details but rather to 
explore the ideas used (generally publicly) by the main actors. Among them different 
groups can be identified: the two successive kings and their supporters on one side,96 and 
the League on the other (with the dominant figures of the Duke of Guise, the Duke of 
Mayenne and the Cardinal of Bourbon). This crisis indeed sparked a growth in politically-
engaged documents defending one side or the other. It is this very polarisation of the 
debate that makes this moment a crisis of sovereignty: different actors fought to establish 
their interpretation as true and legitimate. This does not mean, however, that these texts 
reflect all the opinions of those affected by these events. In fact, they still represent the 
interests of a minority close to the powerful actors of the crisis – and a minority that had 
the capacity to have its voice heard. Since sovereignty depends on the ability to perform 
the required realities and to impose this interpretation this section will focus on the 
discourses of the powerful (in the same way as this thesis does). It is these discourses that 
were publicised and repeated. 
 
Performing the troubles of the kingdom 
 
The analysis of the ‘state of the kingdom’ during these events reveals several important 
aspects of the process of performing sovereignty. The texts of the period are far from the 
ideal of the French civilised sovereign state ‘described’ by theorists in the previous chapter. 
In fact, they establish a solid and repeated image of the kingdom as living in a state of 
nature (drawing, again, on tropes about savagery received from Antiquity and the Middle 
Ages). During the League the image of the kings as guarantors of civilisation and 
sovereignty is indeed repeatedly destabilised by their adversaries, thus contributing to a 
‘crisis of sovereignty’ (a ‘de-linking’ of the current holder of sovereignty with the 
civilisational values that support the concept). Unsurprisingly, the most ardent proponents 
of this ‘de-linking’ are found among the League advocates and those opposing Henry III. 
Charles of Bourbon talks in 1585 of “calamities” and “oppressions” in his famous Péronne 
declaration (B.N.F., Dupuy 87: f. 210 and 211v). Charles of Lorraine (a member of the Guise 
family) ‘describes’ in 1589 a “state strongly weakened by the continuous miseries and ruins 
that it has suffered” under the rule of Henry III (B.N.F., Dupuy 121: f. 100v). In a discourse 
to the Duke of Guise on the topic of peace and war one League author estimates that “our 
police is so corrupted that it would be better calling our dispute a seditious tumult rather 
than a true war” (B.N.F., Cinq Cents de Colbert 30: f. 11v). Repeated references are made 
to the ‘inhumanity’ and ‘barbarism’ of the Protestants (Goulart and Goujet, 1758b: 102) but 
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 This is a simplification for the sake of our analysis: in the first few years of the conflict Henry III and 
Henry of Navarre were indeed adversaries. This simplification is made necessary by the non-linear, 
thematic approach adopted in this chapter. 
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also of the king himself – particularly after the murders of 1589 (Goulart and Goujet, 1758c: 
141). 
 
The deputies of Paris also express their concerns in 1588 in a remonstrance to the 
king. Using the ‘body analogy’ and some of the ideas explored in Chapter 3 they write that 
the French state is “so full of ulcers that all members of the body are rotten and infected”.  
They enumerate the “oppressions”, “trouble, ruin and confusion” of the kingdom, its 
“disorders, miseries and desolations”, reminding the king of his responsibility before God 
for the good administration of the kingdom (all quotes are from B.N.F., Dupuy 844: f. 561-
561v). Some go further and openly question the idea of ‘order’ attached to sovereignty by 
mentioning the existence of a ‘civil war’ in the kingdom. The Duke of Mayenne, for 
instance, frequently highlights the disorganisation of the kingdom and describes the 
conflict as a “civil war” (see for instance A.E., M.D. Espagne, 331: f. 61). This state of civil 
war is also associated with “sedition” among the subjects by Bourbon (A.E., M.D. France 
761: f. 118), thus further highlighting the distance between the king’s rule and the natural 
obedience encountered among the subjects of a civilised and sovereign state. 
 
This state of disorganisation is confirmed by other sources less obviously linked to 
the League. In a remonstrance to the king during the Estates General gathered in 1588, 
justice is considered to be “not only half-perverted, but completely ruined and lost” 
(Goulart and Goujet, 1758b: 102). In the same document is lamented the “civil war, 
poverty, miserable servitude and infinite evils” that the French people are experiencing 
(Goulart and Goujet, 1758b: 110). In another discourse the author estimates that “we can 
actually call France the Mother of Laws, but a poor protector of them” (Goulart and Goujet, 
1758b: 99). Similar expressions can be found in a report circulated during the same Estates 
General: “poor France is dismembered, disordered, full of distrust, factions, and of evil 
enterprises”. It is a kingdom where “religion is in double, the Princes are despised, military 
discipline is lost, Justice is corrupted, the King’s finance all spent, and discord is 
everywhere”. The king is directly criticised for letting himself be subject to his passions and 
humours, thus distancing himself from the rational image of the ‘masculine’ sovereign king. 
His ability to maintain unity and concord is also doubted when France is performed as “[a] 
body from which the members and parts are discordant quickly and necessarily falls apart” 
(all quotes are from A.E., M.D. France 761: f. 250-251). 
 
 Finally, ‘scholars’, ‘intellectuals’ but also some Protestants (especially in the early 
years of the conflict) express similar judgements on the state of France. Writing at the end 
of the 1580s Du Vair estimates that “we will soon be reduced to the most miserable and 
calamitous state that any kingdom has ever experienced” (B.N.F., Français 10270: f. 49v). 
The Duke of Nevers – a strong defender of Catholicism and critic of Henry III – uses the 
classic ‘body analogy’. He explains how divisions inside the kingdom are dangerous since 
these factions will not be able to come together anymore “just like it is impossible to join 
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the arms and legs of a body once they have been separated” (B.N.F., Dupuy 579: f. 188). 
Finally, Protestant writers and supporters of Henry of Navarre also share this pessimistic 
view of the kingdom, to wit: Philippe Duplessis-Mornay writes that the kingdom is on fire 
(B.N.F., N.A.F. 17874: f. 13v) while Henry of Navarre himself mentions the calamities it is 
experiencing (B.N.F., Français 10270: f. 137v). Hurault insists on the “disorders of the 
Kingdom of France” (Hurault, 1588: 120) and in a Protestant pamphlet against the League 
the ruin and tremor of the kingdom are mentioned (B.N.F., Français 15534: f. 394). All 
these expressions come in sharp contrast to the model of civilised sovereignty mentioned 
by French political theorists at a similar period. France indeed comes to represent a 
counter-example of the civilised order so praised by the French. 
 
 This ‘de-linking’ of the king and the sources of sovereignty (i.e. French civilisation) 
is regularly expressed through an ‘assessment’ of the state of religion in France. As 
discussed in Chapter 3 religion is central for the achievement of sovereignty in sixteenth-
century France. The prospect of having a Protestant king97 deeply destabilises the idea of 
the French king as the Most Christian (read ‘Catholic’) king. In his Péronne address the 
Cardinal of Bourbon accuses Protestantism to bring the subversion of the ancient religion 
of his ancestors that was “the strongest link [maintaining] the state” (A.E., M.D. France 761: 
f. 118). The Parisian Conseil des Seize also expresses its disapproval at the attack on 
Catholicism that they associate with Henry III and ‘describes’ 
 
the general affliction of the house of God (…) the contamination of the holy 
temples, the ruin of the sacred altars, the discontinuation in a lot of places of the 
holy sacrifice and exercise of religion, the cruel and inhuman persecutions against 
the priests and prophets of God (…) our city deserted, our beautiful colleges empty 
(B.N.F., Français 15591: f. 195v). 
 
In short, and as written in a Catholic treatise glorifying the Cardinal of Bourbon, the 
‘reformed religion’ is accused of turning everything upside down (B.N.F., 8-LB34 (291): 34). 
The Duke of Mayenne repeats these accusations in a public poster at the end of 1592, this 
time directly against Henry of Navarre, by recalling the links between previous kings and 
the Catholic faith. For him having a Catholic king is a custom that dates back to the ancient 
king Clovis and that ensures the obedience of the subjects (who are therefore allowed or 
required to rebel against a non-Catholic king). He adds that the French sovereign kings have 
always been helped by the nobility in “the conservation of the Religion [Catholic faith] in 
their country or in the establishment of it in distant countries where the noun and cult of 
our God was not yet known” (A.E., M.D. Espagne 331: f. 57v-59v). ‘History’ is thus called 
                                                          
97
 This prospect is reinforced by the support that Henry III gave to Henry of Navarre at different 
periods of the conflict 
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again to the rescue with clear political motives: denying the French kings their civilisation 
and thus their sovereignty. 
 
 
Attacking the current king, preserving the institution of (sovereign) 
monarchy 
 
In these attacks on the sovereignty of the king(s) one crucial element needs emphasising: 
these critiques and ‘de-linkings’ of sovereignty and the king(s) mainly apply to the current 
king(s) and the way they exercise their sovereignty. If they are directed at the person of the 
king (and not at the way sovereignty is conceptualised), these attacks also impact to a 
certain extent on the model of sovereignty itself. It is indeed undeniable that the Catholics 
(represented by the League) promote a change in the ideal of civilised sovereignty: for 
them, only a Catholic king is able to achieve the good life that justifies and informs 
sovereignty. But the other elements of civilised sovereignty explored in Chapter 3 are 
accepted by the League as well as by the king(s). Thus, and while agreeing on the idea of a 
civilised (because monarchical) model of sovereignty, the League criticises the possibility of 
achieving this sovereignty in France through a Protestant king. With this emphasis on 
Catholicism put forward by the League, this crisis in France presents us with a critique of 
the current holder of sovereignty and its associated concept of a Protestant (or potentially 
Protestant) civilised sovereignty. It is not, however, a complete overhaul of the model of 
sovereignty, or a critique of the entire notion of sovereignty as conceptualised until that 
time. This crisis is thus not comparable with the delegitimisation of the Amerindian political 
structures: in the case of the Amerindians the values that support their model of political 
authority are directly under attack and most of the times completely ignored (and rendered 
as inexistent) by the French. 
 
The League thus concentrated its attacks on the fact that the sovereign power 
could be exercised in a better way by a Catholic king. These paternalistic discourses are 
carefully constructed in order to criticise the way power was exercised by the king without 
criticising the possibility of a civilised (and monarchical) sovereignty in France. Both the 
Cardinal of Bourbon and the Duke of Mayenne use similar expressions. Bourbon declares in 
1585 that “it is not against the King our sovereign lord that we go to war but for the 
protection and defence of his person, his life and his state” (A.E., M.D. France 761: f. 120). 
In a similar vein Mayenne argues that his only goal is to “preserve the State and to follow 
the laws of the Kingdom” (A.E., M.D. Espagne 331: f. 58v). Acting in the interest of the king 
(i.e. helping him to re-establish his sovereignty according to the civilisational values he had 
supposedly stopped defending) is also an argument used by Henry of Navarre when he was 
not yet allied to Henry III. In a public declaration at the occasion of the entry of his army in 
the king’s territory he begs the king to “believe that we only join the war for him, for his 
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liberty and for his service” (B.N.F., Dupuy 322: f. 271v). These attacks are therefore directed 
at the king qua person and not at his function. Put differently, what is criticised by the 
League is the possibility for the king(s) to achieve sovereignty, not the possibility of a 
French sovereignty. Another way that this is achieved is through the further deconstruction 
of the image of the king as a sovereign ruler. The pamphlet Contre les fausses allegations 
(1589) for instance clearly points to the supposed ‘femininity’ of the king: 
 
Please stop, virtuous Frenchmen, to value your king [who is only] a man-woman 
ghost: who calls himself a zealous Christian but does not remove his hat [in 
respect] of God in fear that he might derange his attires… who wears a mirror and 
scissors at his belt and a gauntlet like a woman (B.N.F., Contre les fausses 
allegations: 51). 
 
Building on the idea developed in chapter 3 – of the necessary ‘masculinity’ of the 
sovereign – the king is further stripped of his authority through his supposed ‘femininity’. 
 
 This line of critique is reinforced by blaming the mismanagement of the kingdom 
on the king’s advisors, thus distancing the ideal of a sovereign kingdom from the un-
sovereign ‘reality’ created by the current king. This argument appears in 1585 when 
Bourbon evokes the ‘usurpers’ who surround the king (Goulart and Goujet, 1758a: 58). 
When Henry III tries to protect Paris against the League by placing sentinels and armed 
force in the city Guise writes that this decision has been pushed by “the enemies of public 
tranquillity” that advise him (B.N.F., Français 3363: f. 176v). In a 1588 petition to the king 
the League members remind the king of his (supposedly) own words: that he has “been 
induced by the advice and persuasion of others and not by his own judgement and 
movement” (B.N.F., Dupuy 549: f. 80v). Opposing these advisors thus becomes 
synonymous with protecting and supporting the real (i.e. legitimate) sovereignty of the 
king. At the start of their military action against the king the inhabitants of Lyon declare in 
1589 that  
 
When the orders of the King and his actions have as their objective the protection 
and defence of the Catholic Religion, maintenance of the State and our particular 
conservation, we have to obey, and even use our lives and wealth for them 
[because] they come from good advice. But when, on the contrary, his ordnances 
and pleasures tend to the dissipation of the religion, of the State and his subjects, 
we do not have to obey them but should oppose them like things coming from bad 
and pernicious advice. By opposing them we preserve him [the king], and with him 




This declaration thus offers an illustration of how both elements are combined: the critique 
of the king as insufficiently sovereign to be obeyed, and the source of this lack of 
sovereignty in the bad advice that the king has received. Thus, the separation of King and 
king, of Sovereignty and the person of the king (or of King and Crown, as Kantorowicz (1957) 
would put it) is crucial in the double action of preserving the ideal of French sovereignty 
and criticising the actions of a particular king. An external element – the advisors – is 
introduced when the reality of the acts of the king collide with the ideal of his sovereign 
function, i.e. what he should really be. 
 
Losing sovereignty: the threat of the state of nature 
 
This state of France performed by the enemies of the kings (and sometimes by the 
Protestants before 1589) is particularly dangerous as it entails the failure of the king to 
ensure civilisation and therefore sovereignty. These ‘descriptions’ of the kingdom help 
destabilise the king’s sovereignty but a particular strand of argument also emerges that 
pushes this ‘de-linking’ further onto dangerous terrain. Indeed, analogies between the 
previous ‘descriptions’ of the state of nature of the Amerindians and the ‘descriptions’ of 
the internal state of France are common at the time. The League regularly uses the image 
of savagery against the king and his supporters. These analogies range from ‘mere’ denials 
of humanity to the main actors of the crisis to fully fledged ‘descriptions’ of France as a 
state of nature. There are particularly striking as they reveal how the Western sphere of 
sovereignty was populated by instances of less-than-civilised behaviours. Far from being 
restricted to the non-West, then, savagery is clearly present (because performed) in the 
West.  
 
The images of bestiality and savagery are indeed invoked frequently during the 
period. After the assassinations of the leaders of the League by Henry III, Mayenne qualifies 
these murders as “cruelties and barbarity” perpetrated by the king (B.N.F., Dupuy 87: f. 
279). A pamphlet published after these same events describe them as “cruelties inhumanly 
exercised” (B.N.F., Contre les fausses allegations: 39). In another pamphlet of 1589 the 
author estimates that the factions and divisions experienced in the kingdom transform the 
inhabitants from “reasonable men” to “very wild and very cruel beasts” (B.N.F., Dupuy 203: 
f. 110). The nobility sometimes combines this ‘observation’ with an anti-popular sentiment: 
the Parisian popular revolt, despite supporting Catholicism, is compared to a “brute beast” 
in 1589 (A.E., M.D. France 373: f. 16-17v). 
 
The remonstrances of the Estates General of 1588 also establish links between 
France and the classic image of the state of nature. In 1598 one such remonstrance 
explains how those who escaped the troubles “had to take refuge in the woods where they 
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hoped to find more humanity among the brute, savage, and unreasonable beasts than 
among men that they found without mercy or compassion” (Goulart and Goujet, 1758e: 
601-602). This image is all the more effective as it plays with the association of the ‘woods’ 
with savagery and an absence of civility that we also observed with the Amerindians. 
Another use of this association is made in yet another remonstrance to the king: 
 
How many great and productive souls are buried and hidden (…) if they were called 
to the responsibilities they would correct all the demolitions and ruins of this State: 
but these souls are only known to God and a few good people. But, Lord, if in your 
court was present a desire to make amend and to salvation we would be looking 
for the caverns and refuges in which they retreated, we would throw ourselves at 
their feet and beg them to come [back and] moderate this savage and barbaric life 
into which we degenerate (Goulart and Goujet, 1758b: 109-110). 
 
All these expressions seek to oppose the king’s expected sovereign conduct – the 
attainment of a civil(ised) state – with his actual achievements: a disordered and barely 
social way of life. This type of discourse alone is reminiscent of the state of nature image 
used to describe the Amerindians, but some go further and explicitly perform the 
similarities between the French internal situation and the (supposed) state of nature of the 
Amerindians. France, for instance, is performed as deprived of justice. In a public discourse 
to the Estates one official declares that “we can actually call France the Mother of Laws, 
but a poor protector of them” (Goulart and Goujet, 1758b: 99). A remonstrance to the king 
goes further: “As for what concerns justice (the first firmament of the Kingdom, the anchor 
of the state, and the main link of love and obedience of the People for its prince), it is not 
half-perverted but completely gone and lost” in France (Goulart and Goujet, 1758b: 102). 
The murders of the League leaders are clear illustrations of this destruction of justice: 
 
What is it to kill a Prince… to stab him in the Royal Cabinet without announcing 
why or pronouncing some sort of condemnation if not the corruption of all divine 
and human law, the introduction of tyranny where justice should sit, and the 
preference for a brutal and disordered will… to the maturity of judgements and the 
study of the causes (without which the Kings cannot call themselves Lieutenants of 
God nor reign royally)? (B.N.F., Contre les fausses allegations: 31-32).  
 
Having lost justice and what makes a sovereign state sovereign the French kingdom 
becomes mere chaos (Goulart and Goujet, 1758b: 99). It has lost all the traits of a civilised 
and sovereign state, in particular its ‘valid’ institutions. In the ultimate depiction of chaos 
the leaguers compare France (and here Paris more specifically) to a new Babylon “without 
Law, without King, without Justice, where everyone is pulling in his direction” (Goulart and 
Goujet, 1758c: 280; for another comparison to Babylon see Goulart and Goujet, 1758b: 
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271). As soon as 1585 some pamphleteers warn the king that his kingdom “is today almost 
without justice, without order and without police” (Goulart, 1590: 161). In a 1589 treatise 
to justify his entering the war Louis de Gonzague (a fervent Catholic) writes that the 
consequences of the current troubles are  
 
the entire desolation of this kingdom, so flourishing and formidable to all nations, 
be they Christian, barbaric or infidel; the depravation of the ecclesiastical 
discipline; the ruin of several beautiful and important buildings; the cessation of 
justice, trade, ploughing, communication that we used to have among ourselves 
(B.N.F., Dupuy 579: f. 104v-105). 
 
In this discourse are repeated the exact same elements that made the Amerindians live in a 
state of nature: an absence of religion, of justice, of arts and of agriculture. All the 
institutions of a civilised – and thus sovereign – society seems therefore lost in France; a 
clear accusation against the king and his rule. In a discourse to the Parliament one 
councillor expresses his sorrow to see “this brilliant and dazzling splendour and light fading 
away and dying slowly”. He then adds about the French themselves: 
 
how miserable the current condition of us Frenchmen is; sons of the same country 
but worse than the brutal beasts because we hate each other to death and kill each 
other (something these animals have a horror of). We walk and run together 
towards stealing each other’s life and goods, violating the human and fraternal 
society, natural and people’s law, and civil law even more. We irritate God and 
trouble the elements by our wrong, impious and villainous behaviours, being 
ourselves furious and enraged (B.N.F., Dupuy 240: f. 180-180v). 
 
The image of the French as a civilised people – and as social and rational subjects – is here 
directly under attack. In one of the most violent pamphlets published against the king one 
pamphleteer accuses him of ‘sorcery’ and of being influenced by the devil. This is added to 
a charge against the ‘cannibal’ advisors that surround the king (all references are from 
B.N.F., Contre les fausses allegations: 20, 22, 34, 38, 43 and 48).98 The League is thus using 
the classical ‘state of nature’ image to argue against the sovereignty of the king and for the 
replacement of this ‘less than sovereign’ king by a proper, civilised ruler. 
 
As shown in the previous section the adversaries of the king(s) paint a bleak image 
of the French kingdom. Crucially, they also resort to the idea of state of nature in order to 
                                                          
98
 The use of ‘cannibalism’ in this context refers to the recent murders perpetrated against the Guise 
and to the suspicion of ‘Protestantism’ against Henry III and his advisors.  
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reinforce their attack. This means that France is moved as far as possible from the civilised 
reality that the country supposedly represents. How is France performed as a state of 
nature? The first striking element of similarity is that of misery and disorder. The lack of 
sovereignty of the king is regularly associated with a lack of social order: the presence of 
‘factions’ and divisions inside of France is a sign of an absence of social life. The use of 
references to the ‘woods’ is also one of the tropes used by the League in its attacks against 
the king(s). As we saw in the previous section different actors linked to the League declare 
that (civilised) people had to take refuge in the woods. Additionally, the economic state of 
the kingdom – characterised by poverty and misery – is lamented by the League. Taken 
together, the attacks of the League clearly point to a lack of civil society in France that is 
reminiscent of the seminal image of the state of nature. 
 
 The resemblance also extends to the state of war performed by the king’s 
adversaries: the repeated references to civil war inside of France offer a striking parallel 
between the (supposedly) civilised French and the usual images of savages waging unjust, 
dissolute, and unregulated wars. Treason, surprise and irrationality are used to ‘describe’ 
the French internal situation. The murder of the League leaders by Henry III is considered 
treason and the division of the French people as leading to internal strife. More generally, 
the king’s adversaries perform an absence of justice in the kingdom, an interruption of 
religious practice, and a clear lack of what makes the French civilised (in particular 
agriculture and trade). The bad administration of the kingdom for which the king(s) are 
blamed can also be seen in a general disrespect for religion (an accusation that is all the 
more important in the context of the War of Religion). Despite the centrality of religion for 
any civilised society (Perrière, 1567: f. 104v; Madeleine, 1575: f. 15; Chesne, 1609: 14) the 
French show disregard for (the true) religion and (legitimate) religious practices. These very 
accusations can be found in the French context in order to delegitimise the sovereignty of 
the king(s): religious persecutions, attacks against priests, interruption of the divine service 
and more broadly disrespect for religion are central elements that characterise the 
kingdom for the League. 
 
Ultimately, these troubles deprive France of all the attributes of civilisation, in 
particular of agriculture and commerce. Due to civil unrest and conflict land in France is no 
longer cultivated. France becomes a terra nullius or an “uncultivated wilderness” (Pateman, 
2007: 36). France seems to move from the once ‘flourishing’ kingdom – a clear sign of 
civilisation and of its potentiality to grow and generate – to the savage state of bareness 
that we have come to expect from European characterisations of America. The loss of 
agriculture is also combined with the impossibility of practising trade: the cities of the 
kingdom thus lose their status and cannot be regarded any longer as signs of French 
civilisation. By bringing France close to what was held at the time as the antithesis of 
civilisation – the state of nature – the League thereby tries to destabilise the legitimacy of 
the king(s)’ sovereignty. In this process two aspects are revealed: first, that discourses of 
sovereignty are reliant upon notions of civilisation and savagery both ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ 
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the sovereign state. Second, that the civilised identity supporting the supposedly natural 
claims to sovereignty in Christian Europe had to be forged out of strong contestations that 





The discourses of sovereignty deployed in the West and in the non-West reveal that 
constructing sovereignty and statecraft implies a necessary use of the notions of civilisation 
and savagery (which confirms the theoretical conclusions of the previous chapter). In both 
instances, the discourses used to establish the presence of absence of sovereignty are 
intimately linked to the presence of a civil society, i.e. a society offering ‘civil’ or ‘civilised’ 
conditions of existence. But these discourses also cast a doubt on the supposedly stabilised 
associations of the West with civilisation and of the non-West with savagery. These 
associations emerge from the theoretical discussion of sovereignty offered by French 
theorists and mainstream IR scholars alike; French theorists postulate France as the perfect 
example of a sovereign state while mainstream IR scholars unwillingly conceptualise 
sovereignty as the achievement of a Western political order. As seen in this chapter, 
however, the West is regularly portrayed as savage and the non-West as civilised. The first 
contacts of the French with America analysed in this chapter show how traces of civilisation 
were clearly identified/performed by the French, thus placing the Amerindians in the civil 
sphere. Recognising their sovereignty thus becomes almost logical and necessary: the 
inherent association between civilisation and sovereignty means that wherever the former 
is identified the latter usually follows. Indeed, (the recognition of) the presence of 
institutions and social practices among the Amerindians forces the French to draw parallels 
between their own self-image and these recently ‘discovered’ peoples. As explained in the 
following chapter, though, this recognition is never complete and these signs of civilisation 
always delegitimised through the inscription of the Amerindians as familiar Others who 
have either degenerated from the European model or have not (yet) achieved it. 
 
 On the other side of the Atlantic, the process is similar but reversed. This chapter 
has shown how the self-image constructed by French theorists of a naturally civilised 
French state does not survive the troubles experienced by the kingdom. The discourses 
analysed indeed reveal how savagery occupies the French ‘domestic’ sphere. Against the 
image of civilised and sovereign kings (and kingdom) innumerable discourses perform 
France as living in a state of nature and devoid of the basic elements of civilisation that the 
West has come to accept as its own. Divisions, absence of religion and savage practices 
occupy the central ground of these discourses. And their centrality in the public debates of 
the time indicates that these discourses were not marginal: expressions of savagery and of 
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(a return to) a state of nature in France abound. Just as for the Amerindians, it will take a 
lot of efforts to re-establish the image of civilisation of France. 
 
This crossing of the colonial frontier has important implications. Indeed, this 
rhetorical use of ‘savagery’ to characterise Europe is not identical to the way it will be used 
in the American context: indeed, the idea of ‘savagery’ acquired a more significant force 
precisely because it was not expected in these supposedly self-proclaimed civilised 
countries. Accusations of savagery therefore became even more shocking and 
unacceptable than when they were used against the distant Amerindian. The civilised man 
who ‘degenerates’ into savagery is indeed “more savage than the savage” (Whatley, 1986: 
324) because he is expected to know better. His superior rationality should have prevented 
such a degeneration. This is sometimes apparent in French writings on the Amerindians: 
Thévet, for instance, recounts a specific episode that is regularly mentioned in the French 
texts on America of the period. On their way back from ‘Florida’, a starving French crew 
had to sacrifice one of the sailors and his body was eaten by the others. Thévet (1575: f. 
1006) finishes the description of this episode in the following way: “This thing [episode] is 
so pitiable that my very quill defers to write it”. What is striking in these last words is that 
the Amerindians of South America that Thévet previously described as ‘cannibals’ never 
attracted such pity and reluctance. This reluctance is only present because it is French 
people who are found to eat human flesh when they are supposed to be civilised and 
above such savage practices. As such, we can assume that accusations of ‘savagery’ 
acquired more weight when directed at (supposedly) civilised peoples like the French.99 
 
Before explaining in the next chapter how colonial frontiers are re-established one 
important element should be noted. The discourses performing civilisation in America and 
savagery in Europe mirror themselves but they are also written and voiced by actors who in 
one case will play a crucial role in the final establishment of the colonial frontier while in 
the other these actors will fail to achieve their goals. As far as the Amerindians are 
concerned, the signs of civilisation are performed by those – the French colonisers – who 
will eventually establish themselves as sovereign (and thus civilised). In France, on the 
contrary, those raising objections to the civilisation of the kings will finally be defeated and 
their claims to (civilised) sovereignty will fail. As such, one could say that for the 
Amerindians the discursive control of the French is total in the sense that it does not suffer 
interruptions and contradictions from the encountered peoples of America. In contrast, 
French kings were facing an internal challenge to their civilised sovereignty. This total 
discursive control over the Amerindians, however, should not be overstated: French 
discourses still had to deal with the (embarrassing and potentially destabilising) presence of 
                                                          
99
 Nevertheless, and as we will explore in the next chapters, the use of savagery in the European 
context should not be seen as putting the savage Europeans below the Amerindians. Indeed, 
Europeans are still postulated as naturally civilised and thus as only temporarily (and by mistake, so 
to speak) savage-in-essence. In other words, they know the path to civilisation that the Amerindians 
ignore because of their essential savagery. 
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civilised traits among the Amerindians. One could thus conclude that the alternatives to 
judging the Amerindians as inferior (savage) Others are in fact contained in the very 
discourses that will establish this reality. While this point is further explored in the 
conclusion, this thesis now turns to a discussion of the way the colonial frontier is being re-
established: savagery is strongly associated with the Amerindians while the French regain 








(Re-)establishing the sovereign, 








The previous chapter has shown a de-stabilisation of the images of the sovereign West and 
savage non-West. This represents a transgression of the classical frontier perceived to exist 
between civilised and savage. The very construction of sovereignty is thus complicated by 
these crossings: how could one establish sovereignty over the Amerindians if they are, in 
fact, (performed as) civilised? Similarly, how are the French kings to reclaim their 
sovereignty when the kingdom exhibits so many traits of savagery? 
 
 This chapter will explore how this (re-)establishment of a civilised and sovereign 
identity and the denial of this identity to the Amerindians is performed by the French 
(kings), and how they (re-)establish themselves as sovereign authorities through these 
discourses. For the Amerindians, the civilised signs identified by French explorers are 
overwhelmed by a general movement of delegitimisation of the Amerindian institutions 
and practices; these practices never achieved a full civilised status because they are 
understood as familiar signs of savagery. It is thus their very familiarity as savage traits that 
helps the French to construct civilisational difference (and ultimately hierarchy) between 
themselves and the Amerindians. As will appear clearly from the discussion below the 
natives of Canada are always perceived as imperfect or under-realised version of an 
idealised Western civilised self. What is constructed through these discourses is the 
savagery of the Amerindians through their interpretation as familiar Others. It is thus 
through their inscription in a familiar framework of civilisation that their existence is 
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domesticated and rendered inoffensive.100 And these interpretations draw heavily on pre-
existing ideas of civilisation and savagery and on the accepted evolutionary theories 
described at the end of chapter 3. 
 
 Mirroring this process, the French kings counter the discourses of savagery that de-
stabilise their sovereignty by placing the blame on their adversaries: the League. Referring 
once again to accepted notions of savagery and similar tropes as those used in America the 
French kings and their supporters differentiate themselves from the ‘rebels’ and their 
savage manners. Given the centrality of civilisation and savagery for the very definition of 
sovereignty it is not surprising to find the notions being widely used in the context of 
French political debates. Civilisation and savagery are indeed key terms used to establish an 
internal or domestic hierarchy between rulers and ruled. And this applies equally between 
the non-West and the West as inside of the West. Sovereignty towards the external Others 
is thus established in the same way as sovereignty towards the internal Others: by 
differentiation (masquerading as an identification) of the civilised from the savage. And it is 
because sovereignty requires this differentiation that both spheres are populated with 
civilised and savage figures.  
 
 Both in the West and in the encounter of the West with the non-West, the 
performed presence of an inferior Other is thus central for the establishment of 
sovereignty. This Other, however, is not radical or challenging but on the contrary familiar 
and already-known. In other words, she belongs to a mapped category of inferiority that 
forms an intrinsic part of the worldview of the French. If this is not surprising when one 
considers the French internal debates, that the Amerindians of Canada could be rendered 
as familiar savages is less easy to explain. Indeed, one could expect the French to be 
familiar with their ‘own’ internal Others. But this is also the case for the Amerindians: they 
appear in the French texts as illustrations of categories of Otherness already held by the 
French. While this illustrative role should not be underestimated (as has been shown by 
Meek (1976) and Jahn (2000), among others) this chapter will show that they do not bring 
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Writing the Amerindians as familiar but inferior 
Others 
 
Anyone familiar with the literature on encounters and the Age of Discovery knows that the 
Amerindians encountered (or rather: written) by the Europeans were portrayed as savage, 
inferior and as such different beings. But this process was somehow complicated by the 
presence of the civilised signs discussed in the previous chapter. In other words, deciding 
on the (lack of) civilisation of the Amerindians is for the French a potentially ambiguous 
exercise involving the creation of an inferior and ‘different’ Amerindian out of 
characteristics that appeared in some respects as civilised and thus similar to the French 
self-image. The assumption of difference thus needs to be re-politicised (Sabaratnam, 
2013), denaturalised, and explored as “a cultural construction” (Sayre, 1997: 111). 
Throughout this process difference and inferiority are constructed and established thanks 
to the idea that only civilised peoples (like the French) know what is true. They possess an 
epistemic superiority: they are able to ‘see’ the world as it really is (and therefore also as it 
should be) since they possess natural law and reason. As a result, only the French 
institutions and practices are conducive to the public good and to justice; only these 
institutions are sovereign. Hence, the ‘evidence’ gathered about the New World and its 
potentially civilised characteristics is discarded or accepted – i.e. interpreted – through the 
prism of cultural or civilisational framework of the French.101 As argued by Pagden (1982: 
79) in the case of the Spanish intellectuals’ conceptualisation of the American Indians, the 
key is not the presence of potentially civilised characteristics but their interpretation as 
civilised or savage. Cultural mediation forms the ‘reality’ perceived by the observers and 
then later by political leaders. This is why the familiarity of the Amerindian practices is 
crucial: this familiarity (that is in some ways unavoidable insofar as the Amerindians were 
written by the French from their own European/provincial perspective)102 enables the 
French to make sense of and domesticate their American experience. The imperialist and 
colonialist policies that the Europeans developed will then find their sources in these 
culturally-mediated perceptions of the Amerindians as familiar Others. 
 
 In practice, this process of inscribing the Amerindians as familiar Others takes the 
form of a delegitimation of the ‘sociality’ of their practices. In other words, the 
Amerindians are denied the possession of a proper culture leading to social life. This is 
done through an inscription of these practices as evidence of savagery and as such as less 
developed or degenerated when compared to their European model (a model that is, as we 
saw in the last chapter, vastly idealised). The performed ‘religion’ of the Amerindians, for 
instance, follows such a process. Despite the identification of some familiar elements (as 
shown in the previous chapter) these practices witnessed by the French are discarded and 
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 On the importance of the culture of the viewer/writer in ‘describing’ ‘new’ peoples and places 
see for instance Campbell (1988) and Pratt (1992). 
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understood as a form of idolatry (Thévet, 1575: f. 1015v). In other words, ceremonies and 
practices understood as religious in the Amerindian cultural framework are represented by 
the French as an inferior or immature form of religion that cannot be called ‘religious’. This 
perceived immaturity leads the French explorers to describe the Amerindians as “poor 
fools” succumbing to farce and jesting. Biard writes with a condescending tone that the 
Amerindians believe their dreams have a meaning “so there is absolutely no folly that they 
lack” (Biard, 1616: 82-86 and 94). Cartier and Champlain both describe these superstitious 
practices contemptuously, insisting on the ‘tricks’ used by the Amerindians’ shamans 
(Julien et al., 1946: 139; B.N.F., Rothschild 1967: tome 1, 144). During his second trip to 
Canada, the reaction of Cartier’s expedition to a manifestation of the Amerindians’ ‘god’ is 
telling: the French start laughing and consider this false god to be stupid. 
 
In another move that delegitimises the Amerindian ‘religious’ practices by 
inscribing them in a known cultural framework the French perceive the Amerindians 
‘religion(s)’ as diabolical. The influence of the Devil is clearly established for Biard (1616: vii 
and 93). For Champlain (1603: f. 10) “God is benevolent, and certainly it is the Devil who 
has shown himself to these people”. Thévet (1575: f. 1018v) also explains how he 
(effectively) cured several Amerindians who were attacked by the devil: 
 
Often in the places where I stayed the Savages, being tormented by the malign 
spirit that is familiar to them (…) would throw themselves shyly into my arms, 
screaming aloud Hipouchi Agnan Omamo Atoupaué, i.e. the malevolent spirit 
Agnan is beating and tormenting me, please help me. Immediately after, and 
holding them, I would say the Gospel of St John, and halfway through it these 
barbarians would feel delivered from the malign spirit, and I guarantee to the 
reader that I have done such a holy and Catholic act more than a hundred times at 
least. 
 
As surprising as it may seem for a contemporary reader this charge of devil worship that is 
amply documented among the Amerindians does not lead the French to argue that the 
Amerindians might actually possess a religion (if not the right one). In fact “[t]he charge of 
devil worship does not seem to have been perceived as implying a contradiction with the 
companion claim that Amerindians had no God and no religion” (Dickason, 1997: 31). 
Because the institutions and mores of the Amerindians did not equate with those of the 
Christian observers the latter discounted the presence of a religion. But at the same time, 
this performed difference enables the ‘imperial eyes’ (Pratt, 1992) to include these Others 
at the bottom of a known human hierarchy.103 An illuminating example is provided by 
Sagard, one of the missionaries who wrote on the Amerindians. Sagard first manifests his 
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surprise at the fact that some of the basic concepts of Catholicism (such as ‘temptation’, 
‘Trinity’ or ‘Holy Spirit’) are difficult if not impossible to explain to the Amerindians (Sagard, 
1632: 88-89).104 Nevertheless, and because he identifies some inconsistencies in the stories 
they tell and in their practices, he quickly concludes that: 
 
from what they say, there is no agreement on nor reality [of this religion], as we 
saw and learned from experience, which makes us know that they do not truly 
recognise nor adore any Divinity nor God of which they can give a reasonable 
account, and that we could know of (Sagard, 1632: 230). 
 
Here, the inability to understand and express different ‘religious’ practices in a 
“reasonable” way leads the French missionary to resort to the solution that all his 
predecessors have adopted: in a rather surprising move Sagard blames the Amerindians for 
his own incomprehension by accusing them of having no religion.  
 
 Therefore, it becomes clear that the ‘absence’ of religious ceremonies is in fact an 
impossibility to understand these ceremonies as religious rather than an actual lack of 
ceremonies. The French are indeed clearly unable to identify the type of ceremonies that 
they associate with a civilised society. For Biard (1616: 96), the Amerindians “believe in a 
god, at least that is what they say” but they “know neither prayers nor ways to adore him”. 
Verrazano writes similarly that “We did not see that they did sacrifices or prayers or that 
they possessed temples or places for cult” (Julien et al., 1946: 72). Almost a century later, 
Champlain reiterates what has become a widespread opinion: the Amerindians “do not 
know how to adore nor how to pray God, living like brutal beasts” (B.N.F., Rothschild 1967: 
tome 1, 126). It thus becomes established as a fact that this “brutish people” has “neither 
ceremony nor any form of praying God” (Thévet, 1575: f. 1013v). Lescarbot (1617: 713) 
also concludes with the absence of religion because he is unable or unwilling to identify the 
familiar “adorations” and “divine service” that he is accustomed to.105 In essence, rather 
than simply concluding that these people have no Christian religion, the French conclude 
that the absence of Christianity equates with a lack of a religion tout court. What emerges, 
then, is a coherent account of the (lack of) religiousness of the Amerindians that is centred 
around a European system of values and not around the perception of the Amerindian 
other as a credible alternative to the European order. The general conclusion drawn from 
these observations is that the Amerindians do not possess any form of religion whatsoever: 
“we don’t know what they believe in or which God they worship” (Alfonse, 1545/1904: 
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 This is reminiscent of recurrent observations made about the ‘inferiority’ of the Amerindians’ 
languages in particular when it comes to abstract concepts (Padgen, 1982: 181-183). 
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 Thévet adopts a similar strategy when he talks about the Peruvian Amerindians; he estimates 
that “their gods are imaginary, without them having any form of religion”. Hence, by discarding the 
validity of these gods (that the Amerindians mentioned and that he was aware of) Thévet is able to 
maintain his conviction that the Amerindians have no religion. 
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494). Hence, it seems that the Amerindians “have no more god than the beasts do” 
(Alfonse, 1559: f. 27v). For Champlain the Amerindians “have no knowledge of God” 
(B.N.F., Rothschild 1967: tome 1, 4). In a similar vein, Lescarbot (1617: 712) writes that they 
“are destitute of any knowledge of God, have no worshipping, no divine service, and live in 
a pitiable ignorance”. What could have been performed as Amerindian religious practices 
does not even qualify as ‘idolatry’ for Verrazano and Lescarbot (Julien et al., 1946: 72; 
Lescarbot, 1617: 710). Instead of questioning their own perceptions (and the difficulties 
associated with them, for instance in terms of communication with the Amerindians) the 
French generally remain very confident in their ability to understand (and make themselves 
understood by) the Amerindians – an attitude that is common among European explorers 
(Greenblatt, 1991: 93).  
 
As a consequence, and rather logically due to their absence of religion, the 
Amerindians are performed as easily convertible to the Christian faith. The French are 
particularly confident that they can achieve this goal readily.106 Indeed, and in a classic way, 
difference is interpreted as a lack (Todorov, 1989: 155) or an absence that can readily be 
filled by Christianity.107 This conviction is repeatedly expressed by the explorers and 
cosmographers: Lescarbot (1617: 710-711) is probably the most eloquent, writing that the 
Amerindian is “like an empty canvas which is ready to receive any colour one would like to 
paint on it”. And “this is why,” he adds, “our peoples of New France will easily accept to 
receive the Christian doctrine”. This conviction in the religious blankness of the 
Amerindians appears very early on in the explorers’ accounts. Verrazano writes that “they 
[the Amerindians] are indeed very easy to persuade and they imitated the zeal and fervour 
with which we practiced our Christian rites” (Julien et al., 1946: 72). Similarly, and after 
only a few brief contacts with the Amerindians, Cartier confidently claims that “we knew 
that these people could be easily converted to our faith” (Cartier, 1865: 50). This conviction 
is based on the experience of spreading Christianity among the Amerindians: “[we] 
exposed to them several other things of our faith, in which they easily believed”, so much 
that they repeatedly asked Cartier to baptise them (Julien et al., 1946: 157). In his book on 
the forms of the state Lucinge (1588: 114) also recalls “a beautiful treatise that the Jesuits 
wrote about a Prince of these newly discovered lands: he was so wise and shrewd that 
having seen the simplicity and purity of the Christian doctrine (and even if he was 
idolatrous) he allowed his subjects to be Baptised”. Unsurprisingly, and at the beginning of 
the 17th century, Champlain will draw the same conclusion from the performed absence of 
religion of the Amerindians: “I believe that they would soon be converted to Christianism if 
we settle here and cultivate their land, something that most of them desire” (B.N.F., 
Rothschild 1967: tome 1: 126). Champlain (1603: f. 8v-11) also recalls several direct 
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 This is not to deny that the goal of conversion, just as the belief in the presence of gold at the 
beginning of the exploration, is part of a larger strategy to maintain – political, religious and 
commercial – interest in the exploration and domination over Canada. 
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 This confidence in the possibility of converting the pagans to the ‘true’ faith is repeated by 
Europeans in all their encounters with alien peoples. Bitterli (1986: 153) for instance described how 
the Portuguese misperceived the Chinese as neglecting their religious practices and thus as easily 
convertible to the Christian faith. 
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experiences of easy conversions in his dealings with the Amerindians. The religious actors 
of the exploration are understandably eager to propagate the same views. The Franciscan 
Récollets write to the king that they have counted “three hundred thousand souls (…) easy 
to attract to the knowledge of God since they are not bound by any [pre-existing] cult” 
(B.N.F., N.A.F. 9269: f. 45v). Identically, Sagard explains how the Amerindians “regularly 
used our prayers (…) and frankly acknowledged that these prayers were more efficient than 
their ceremonies” (Sagard, 1632: 235).  
 
These conceptions on the (lack of) religion of the Amerindians later found their way 
into political documents. When du Monts is named the king’s lieutenant general in Canada 
in 1603 his mission states that he should “convert, bring to and instruct to Christianism and 
the belief in our faith and religion the peoples who live on these lands (who are at present 
real barbarians, atheists without faith or religion), and to bring them out of their ignorance 
and infidelity” (B.N.F., Dupuy 318: f. 100). The king only reproduces the views of several 
explorers and advisors, in particular Champlain who suggested that the French king will be 
able to “establish the Christian faith among an infinite number of souls who do not have 
any form of religion whatsoever” (Champlain, 1993: 230 and for a similar expression in a 
letter Champlain wrote to Richelieu see B.N.F., N.A.F. 9269: f. 295). Writing at the same 
period, Razilly (1626/1886: 455) also comments on those millions of poor souls willing and 
waiting to be instructed in the divine law. 
 
 If the delegitimation of the ‘religious’ practices of the Amerindians occupies a 
considerable space in the texts on Canada the other aspects of the ‘social’ life of the 
Amerindians are not neglected. Unsurprisingly, and through the same process as for 
religion, these elements that were observed and performed by the French are re-inscribed 
in a framework of expectations about human societies that necessarily places the 
Amerindians at the bottom of the civilisational hierarchy (or in the first stage of an 
evolutionary view of humankind). Some French observers noticed that the Amerindians 
practice agriculture, for instance, but these observations are quickly subordinated to the 
overwhelming consensus on the imperfection or incompleteness of the Amerindian 
agriculture. Firstly, the Amerindians do not have the techniques that the French possess 
and which make their agriculture a ‘real’ agriculture. One of the tropes of French discourses 
is the difference between French (cultivated) and Canadian (savage) vines. Verrazano is the 
first to observe that “if the vines [of Canada] were taken care of by informed cultivators, 
they would certainly produce excellent wines” (Julien et al., 1946: 61). Thévet (1575: f. 
1014v) uses similar expressions and adds that the Amerindian vines grow “without labour 
or cultivation” (for a similar expression see also Montchrestien (1615/1889: 327)). But this 
does not mean that the vines are not planted; on the contrary for Cartier they are, which 
means that Amerindians do indeed practice agriculture. But he nevertheless re-inscribes 
Amerindian agriculture as inferior: the land he visits has “so many vines, loaded with 
grapes, all along the said river, that it seems that they must have been planted by men; but 
because they are not cultivated, nor trimmed, the grapes are not as sweet or big as our 
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own” (Julien et al., 1946: 140). This is particularly important since what is performed here is 
not an explicit absence of agriculture but a lack of perfection in the practice of agriculture 
according to French standards. The Amerindians thus appear to be incomplete or lacking 
Selves rather than radical Others. For the French the Amerindian practices are illustrations 
of notions of development and social efficiency already held. In fact, the example of the 
vines was already a classic trope used in the Middle Ages (see the examples mentioned in 
Boas, 1978). 
 
 The Amerindians also lack the tools to make their practice worthy of an advanced 
and civilised agriculture. For Sagard (1632: 103 and 133), the Amerindians do not possess 
the tools that could make their agriculture efficient. More importantly, the Amerindians’ 
productivity is compared to the fertility of the land. For the French, Canada is “very fertile 
with all sorts of fruit” (B.N.F., N.A.F. 9384: f. 153v). This idealised fertility means that the 
Amerindians do not have to make much efforts to obtain what they need to live (Dickason, 
1997: 13). This is reminiscent of the ‘political economy’ doctrines held about ‘temperate’ 
and ‘torrid’ zones: living in a world of abundance, the Amerindians barely need to cultivate 
to obtain their food and are “not hardworking” (Montchrestien, 1615/1889: 321). In 
general, the Amerindians are performed as “lazy when it comes to difficult exercise such as 
ploughing and our mechanical crafts” (Lescarbot, 1617: 890).108 
 
 Consequently, if the Amerindians practice some form of agriculture, it is only an 
incomplete and inferior form of agriculture that could (and has to) be improved with the 
introduction of efficient French agricultural practices. Champlain estimates that “[h]e who 
would show them how to live, who would teach them how to plough the land, and other 
things, they would learn well, because some of them have a rather good judgement” 
(B.N.F., Rothschild 1967: tome 1, 125).109 The idea of the ‘potentiality’ of the Amerindians – 
their potentiality of achieving Western ideals of civilisation – serves as an expedient 
intellectual tool to discard potential traits of civilisation: even if some traces of agriculture 
are identified (and once again, just as for religion, there is no empirical determinism or 
naturalness to this ‘identification’), these can only be imperfect examples that can and 
should be improved thanks to the teachings of those who have achieved the ideal of social 
efficiency. Classifying the Amerindians as inferior Selves (or familiar Others) both preserves 
the hierarchy between French and Amerindians and gives the French a justification for their 
intervention. Indeed, the ranking of the Amerindian agricultural practice as 
underdeveloped ones opens the possibility of denying the presence of agriculture 
(understood as ‘real’ agriculture) all together: for Biard (1616: 42) the Amerindians “do not 
plough the land”. Verrazano also indicates that “we saw no trace of cultivation” (Julien et 
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 This is linked to the perceived absence of private property among the Amerindians, an absence 
that was regarded as problematic by the French. For a defence of the necessity of private property 
(or the ‘distinction of the property of goods’) for any civil society see Gentillet (1576: 295).  
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 As Vitoria also observes in his writings these simplistic practices are not a sign of a ‘diligent’ 
agriculture (Padgen, 1982: 91). 
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al., 1946: 70) and the Récollets add that the Amerindians desire to learn ploughing (B.N.F., 
N.A.F. 9269: f. 45v). This vision of the Amerindians is reminiscent of the idea of terra nullius 
or res nullius usually invoked by the Europeans who “claimed that the lands were 
uncultivated wilderness” (Pateman, 2007: 36; see also Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 88; 
Benton and Straumann, 2010: 2).  
 
Other aspects of Amerindian life go through the prism of French cultural 
expectations. Clothing, for instance, provides yet another opportunity for the French to 
reproduce the vision of the Amerindians as incomplete, underdeveloped or degenerate 
peoples. For the French observers, the Amerindians encountered in Canada wear animal 
skins and furs. Verrazano observes that “[t]hese peoples go completely naked, except for 
their privates which they cover with small animal skins” (Julien et al., 1946: 55). Cartier and 
Popelinière make similar observations (Cartier, 1865: 28; Popelinière, 1582: Second book, f. 
25). For Cartier (1865: 53), “their whole clothing is only a small [animal] skin”. Bellenger’s 
short description of his voyage also reinforces this view: “They go all naked saving their 
privates which they cover with an Apron of some Beastes skyn” (Quinn, 1962: 340). Finally, 
Thévet (1575: f. 1009) mentions the “savage beasts skins” that they use, no doubt making a 
link between these beast skins and the Amerindians’ own bestiality. Only one discordant 
voice, that of Roberval, expresses a different view: for him, the Amerindians “go all naked: 
and if they wore clothes as French people do, they would be as white and good looking” 
(Julien et al., 1946: 205).110 
 
This isolated remark, interesting for the link it establishes between (lack of) clothes 
and skin colour, does not destabilise the overarching opinion of the French: if the 
Amerindians are generally compared favourably to the (entirely naked) Brazilians, their 
clothes are seen as unsophisticated and a clear sign of their savagery. It is thus the 
interpretation given to the observations that possesses a major importance (rather than 
the observation itself). Champlain, for instance, estimates that their clothes are imperfect 
due to their lack of know-how (B.N.F., Rothschild 1967: tome 1, 71). The French thus gave a 
cultural interpretation to this ‘reality’: the Amerindians’ near-nudity is a sign of their lack of 
sophistication, technical but also spiritual. It is indeed possible to notice an association 
between physical nudity and spiritual nudity in the French texts. Lescarbot (1617: 789) is 
probably the most eloquent on this question: “in the beginnings God had created Man 
naked, and innocence meant that all the body parts were respectable to look at. But sin has 
made the genitals shameful, but not for the beasts which do not have sin”.111 Lescarbot 
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 Since most voyages took place during the summer (the only time of the year when the French 
were able to explore Canada) most descriptions of clothing correspond to these summer months. 
When references are made to the winter period the image does not change drastically: the 
Amerindians still wear furs and beast skins (but in greater quantity in order to protect themselves 
from the cold). 
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 Crucially, and in a similar way as the ‘Wild Man’, the Amerindians are not sinners but ignore the 
very idea of sin. See White (1972: 22) on this point. Boas (1978: 129-153) also explains how the 
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(1617: 829) does not conclude that the Amerindians are pure beasts in that respect since 
they cover some parts of their body, but he insists on their innocence and their purity. 
Other authors make similar claims, linking physical near-nudity with the “extreme nudity of 
the attires and wealth of [their] soul” (Biard, 1616: vii) or associating lack of religion with 
nudity (Razilly, 1626/1886: 455). This is logical since the Amerindians are believed to live in 
a state of nature, without cultural proprieties, and therefore with no need to wear clothes 
– which is itself a result of a cultural trait (Todorov, 1982: 49). 
 
Interestingly, this near-nudity is also considered to be a sign of (cultural and 
physical) poverty or ‘underdevelopment’. For Champlain, “their life is miserable when 
compared to ours, but happy [i.e. satisfying] among themselves who have not seen another 
and who believe that there is no other” (B.N.F., Rothschild 1967: tome 1, 286). According to 
the French, famine is also a recurrent problem for the Amerindians who are “always 
threatened by the fear of hunger” (Biard, 1616: 76-77; see also Champlain, 1603: f. 8). 
Cartier concludes that “[t]hese peoples can really be called savages since it is not possible 
to find poorer peoples in the world, and [I] believe that taken all together they do not own 
the value of five sous [pennies]” (Cartier, 1865: 53). The Amerindians practice of clothing is 
thus quickly transformed into yet another sign of Amerindian (familiar) inferiority. Their 
performed poverty is also revealed by their ‘poor’ housing conditions. For Verrazano, “a lot 
of inhabitants sleep outside and do not have another roof than the sky” (Julien et al., 1946: 
61). Cartier also observes that “they have no other house than below their boats which 
they turn upside down, and they lay below them on the ground” (Cartier, 1865: 53). This is 
connected to the ‘observation’ that the Amerindians are nomads: they live in the woods 
“because they have no assured place [since] they always run from one land to another” 
(Alfonse, 1545/1904: 493). This nomadism is also noticed by Roberval (Julien et al., 1946: 
205): “They have no fixed home but go from one place to the other depending on where 
they think they can find their food”. Nevertheless, villages and houses are mentioned by 
the French. Popelinière (1582: Second book: f. 25) identifies wood cabins, just as Thévet 
(1575: f. 1011v) who writes about their “small villages and poor hamlets of a few houses 
(…) some covered with wood bark, others with skins and with rush. God knows if the cold 
really harms them in their houses since the wind enters from all sides”. Re-iterating the 
‘social efficiency’ argument used to connote the Amerindians’ lack of a proper agriculture 
Verrazano estimates that “it is certain that if they had our technique, they would build 
great buildings, since this entire coast is full of blue rocks” (Julien et al., 1946: 67). Hence, 
even if some recognise a certain sophistication to their housing (Biard, 1616: 42), the 
general conclusion is rather that “it is not to be housed to be always wandering and to 
shelter under four poles” (Lescarbot, 1617: 714). In addition, their nomadic life in the 
woods also connects them to the idea of the Wild Man which was popular in European 
folklore at the time (Padgen, 1982: 21; Dickason, 1997: 77). Once again, the ‘reality’ of the 
Amerindians is the result of an interpretation based on French (idealised) civilisation: here, 
nomadism and wood houses or tents are perceived as inferior to the French lifestyle. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Greek and early Christian use of the noble savage concept entails that the ‘savage’ are not guilty of 
their sins as the Christians since they ignore the true god. 
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Performing the Amerindians as nomads also reinforces the ‘observations’ about 
Amerindian agriculture. Indeed, one cannot practice a ‘real’ agriculture if one is not 
sedentary. For the French, therefore, all the signs of savagery that they perceive reinforce 
each other and enable them to avoid potential contradictions (the perceived ‘agriculture’ 
practiced by the Amerindians, for instance, is naturally inferior and imperfect due to the 
Amerindians’ nomadism). 
 
Finally, and perhaps even more strikingly, the political institutions identified by the 
French go un-recognised as ‘political’ or are discarded. Through different strategies, French 
authors and explorers ‘perform away’ the elements of order that they nevertheless ‘see’ 
among the Amerindians. Champlain, for instance, reduces the role of the Amerindian kings 
to that of temporary leaders: “They have some leaders to whom they obey in times of war, 
but not outside of these moments, and these chiefs work, and do not have a higher rank 
than the others” (B.N.F., Rothschild 1967: tome 1, 91). Thévet (1575: f. 1012) also restricts 
the power of the kings to that of war leaders. In a similar vein Bodin (1576: 49) observes 
that the leaders in the “West Indies” are mere heads of family who do not take their 
authority from God and can therefore not be considered as properly sovereign. It was 
common for European writers to consider that “Indians had chiefs for leaders while early 
modern Europeans had kings” (Shoemaker, 2004: 36). Moreover, because the Amerindian 
leaders’ form of rule was different from the expectations of the French they concluded that 
the Indian chiefs “did not seem to rule at all” (Shoemaker, 2004: 47). Accordingly, their role 
was diminished and undervalued by the French.  
 
More generally, then, the lack of an identifiable – i.e. similar – hierarchical order in 
the Amerindian and French ‘societies’ leads to the conclusion that the Amerindians are 
“society-less creatures” (Padgen, 1982: 8). Additionally, and because the Amerindians “did 
not have externalized institutions, such as written codes of law” (Dickason, 1997: xii), they 
were culturally written as living outside an organised political order. The Amerindians 
become characterised by an absence of law: “These people in the main have no law, from 
what I could see” (Champlain, 1603: f. 8v). Describing a group of Amerindians, Champlain 
adds: “I do not know what law they uphold, and I believe that for that matter they 
resemble their neighbours, who do not have a law at all” (B.N.F., Rothschild 1967: tome 1: 
85). For others, their only law is to follow nature and the Amerindians live according to 
their natural instinct (Thévet, 1575: f. 1013v).112 Hence, and “[a]s far as justice is concerned 
they have neither divine nor human law but the law that Nature teaches them” (Lescarbot, 
1617: 887). Their (performed) nomadism is also linked to this lack of government. Indeed, 
and because they constantly move, the Amerindians cannot create a society (Lescarbot, 
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 There is a difference for the French between ‘natural law’, i.e. a set of (supposedly universal) 
principles that men should follow and apply because of their humanity, and the ‘law of nature’ which 
is synonymous with an absence of (social) law and the domination of the strongest. Despite a 
reference to ‘nature’ in both cases these two terms must be differentiated: ‘natural law’ requires 
the exercise of ‘reason’, something which the Amerindians are considered incapable of. As a result, 
they are bound to follow the ‘law of nature’, i.e. their (savage) instincts. 
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1612: 19), let alone a government. Biard for instance discusses the police (i.e. the 
government or administration) of the Amerindians in the following terms: “One cannot 
have a police in the absence of a community (…) Yet these savages having no big 
community, living one day at a time, not being linked to one another, because they are 
scattered and vagabonds, so they cannot have a great police” (Biard, 1616: 49-50). 
 
 
A familiar Otherness: the Amerindians and evolutionary theories 
 
The Amerindians are thus inscribed as inferior – a key move for the French to later claim 
sovereignty over them – through their depiction as incomplete or lacking Selves more than 
as radical Others. In fact, the very possibility of ‘radicality’ is questioned due to the 
prevalence of the French cultural framework in the enactment of the Amerindians. Given 
this centrality of ‘culture’ in enacting what is true, empirical observations – the ‘facts’ – 
cannot be detached from interpretation (as Jahn (2000: 66) argued in the context of the 
Spanish encounters with the Amerindians). Hence, when Cartier observes a potential ‘city’, 
it quickly becomes clear that this evidence is discarded on cultural terms. Bodin (1576: 54) 
for instance states that:  
 
It is possible that the city is well-built and walled. And that it is filled with people. 
Nevertheless it is not a city if there is no law and magistrates to establish a right 
government (…) but a pure anarchy. 
 
Clearly, thus, ‘material’ elements never speak for themselves. This is why most aspects of 
the Amerindian world never entered the realm of the ‘real’ since they always fell short of 
the French standards. In most cases discarding these elements happens through an 
insistence on the law of nature as a central defining characteristic of civilised institutions 
such as social order or agriculture (Padgen, 1982: 79). This natural law is clearly universal 
for the French: L’Hospital (1825: 60-61) for instance insists on the universality of the French 
conception of justice when he says that “just like it is the same sun that shines in Paris and 
gives light and warmth in Rome and Constantinople, divine justice and natural law are not 
different among the savages of America and among the Christians of Europe”. (European) 
natural law is thus universalised because it is linked to Christianity.113 It is also linked to the 
idea of ‘truth’. Budé (1547: 70) explains that “God made Man virtuous, that is, capable of 
reason, and gave him sound judgement, which is the faculty of discerning good from bad 
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 In his analysis of Vitoria Pagden (1982: 63) notices that Europeans considered the source of 
knowledge to be God. As such, the knowledge they possessed cannot be but universal and absolute 
(except if the reality and power of God are doubted, which is unacceptable). Local variations thus 
become interpreted as ‘errors’ and deviations from a universal truth. 
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and true from false”. Hence, the French endow themselves with the capacity of seeing 
‘truth’ or what really exists. On the contrary the Amerindians are not seeing the ‘true 
nature of things’ (Bain, 2003: 21 and 24) as shown by their incapacity to adopt desirable 
institutions and civilised practices. They do not “see the world as it really is” (Padgen, 1982: 
89) according to Europeans. As Inayatullah and Blaney (2004: 63) argue about Spain 
“Vitoria is led to conclude that the Indians have fallen into a kind of social and religious 
disorder because they are consistently unable to see the world as it really is”. Thanks to the 
confidence they placed in their ‘empirical descriptions’ the French held their views on the 
Amerindians and on their lack of a proper culture as “luminously and self-evidently true” 
(Greenblatt, 1991: 9). This epistemic deficiency – the Amerindians are incapable of seeing 
reality as it really is, i.e. how the French perceive it – is central to the process of classifying 
the Amerindians as inferior Others (and by opposition in awarding the French a prescience 
far exceeding that of the savages).  
 
The performance of French sovereignty over the Amerindians thus involved writing 
the Amerindians as inferior but familiar others. Strongly convinced of their epistemic 
superiority, the French perform a ‘reality’ of the Amerindians that corresponds to the 
already well-established fiction of the state of nature. This state of nature is peopled by 
‘lacking’ and ‘incomplete’ Selves who are “culturally naked” like a “tabula rasa" (Whatley, 
1986: 321). This can be seen in the long list of deficiencies attributed to the Amerindians by 
the French. Biard (1616: 331) is probably the most explicit about the Amerindians’ state of 
nature: for him the land of Canada is a “wilderness”, full of barbarism and pageantry. It 
leaves no doubt that the French are held as the superior referent: “And certainly (from 
what I see) to value oneself excessively is an illness from which no one is exempted except 
by the mercy of God. You could see these poor barbarians, despite their great lack of 
police, power, letters, arts and wealth, yet esteeming themselves very highly, despising us 
greatly, and glorifying themselves as superior to us” (Biard, 1616: 39). The Amerindians 
becomes a familiar Other in relation to what Europeans perform themselves as being:114 
 
Across a wide spectrum of cultural attributes, European classified Indians as 
inferiors. They made proper use of the land; Indians did not. Europeans had kings 
for leaders; Indians had chiefs. Europeans could write; Indians could not. European 
men behaved with civility; Indian men behaved like animals (Shoemaker, 2004: 
142). 
 
An example of these lacks or absences is the Amerindian ignorance of writing: “everyone 
knows that these Western peoples do not know writing” (Lescarbot, 1617: 786).115 This is 
confirmed by the (performed) Amerindian belief that the French writings are some magical 
                                                          
114
 Thus highlighting once again the inherent connection between savagery and civilisation and  their 
necessary definition by opposition to each other. 
115
 ‘Western’ here refers to the West Indies (America) by opposition to the East Indies (Asia). 
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artefacts. Hence, the Amerindians ignore the ‘arts’ of the French (Montchrestien, 
1615/1889: 321) and their social conventions and norms (Lescarbot, 1617: 875; Sagard, 
1632: 186). Their savagery is also performed in the way they wage war, resulting in an 
unambiguous illustration of the classical Hobbesian state of nature: “these Canadians, who 
are the fiercest we know, and who do not practice any job or art whatsoever, are 
constantly waging war on some of their neighbours” (Thévet, 1575: f. 1011v).116 Their wars 
are considered irrational since they are not motivated by legitimate and rational reasons. 
The Amerindians are thus performed as only going to war to avenge “wrongdoings” 
(Thévet, 1575: f. 1013), which is seen as irrational and illogical from the French vantage 
point. Indeed, land is the principal asset in the Late European Middle Ages, and is what 
justifies waging a war. When talking about the Amerindians the French generally consider 
their wars to be irrational because they are not motivated by legitimate reasons. As Sagard 
(1632: 219-220) explained about the Amerindians: 
 
There is almost no nation that is not fighting or in discord with the others, not 
because they want to possess their lands or conquer their country; but only to 
exterminate them when they can and take revenge for small wrongdoings or 
displeasures which are of negligible importance; but their bad [social] order and 
the fact that they do not punish the faulty citizens is the source of all this evil. 
 
 The gap between French and Amerindian principles regarding war is thus so wide 
(Dickason, 1997: xiii) that the French perceive Amerindian wars as ‘unnecessary violence’. 
On the contrary, the French praise themselves for their cultural practice of war: they do not 
resort to ‘natural’ or instinctive violence. 
 
A key part of this practice of distancing is to inscribe the Amerindians in a familiar 
temporality and alterity that builds upon accepted notions of savagery and wilderness. 
Indeed, in order to ascertain their civilisational superiority – a necessary move to claim 
sovereignty over the Amerindians – the familiar cultural difference of the Amerindians is 
explained in chronological terms.117 Talking about the Amerindian practices Lescarbot 
(1617: 963-964) observes that “these ways of doing were formerly common to a lot of 
nations”. This “temporalizing of difference” (Hindess, 2007: 327) is shown by the recurrent 
comparisons between the Amerindians and ancient civilisations and peoples. If the 
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 The French thus participate in the classic “narrative of small, warlike Indian polities and peoples 
in perpetual conflict” (Benton, 2009: 234). 
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 On the transformation of cultural difference into temporal difference see for instance Hogden 
(1964) and Blaney and Inayatullah (2006). As noticed by Bernheimer (1970: 120) “[i]t was in the 
Renaissance that the wild man of native folklore, who had so faithfully accompanied his civilized 
brother through the involutions and contortions of his history, found himself for the first time 
relegated to the past and treated as a creature that had become instinct; a view which originated in 




Amerindians have no beard, for instance, there is no reason to be surprised since according 
to Sagard (1632: 181) “even the Romans (…) did not have them until the emperor Adrien”. 
Lescarbot (1617: 860) also explains that the long life of the savages can be attributed to 
their “way of life à l’Antique and without complication”. The Jesuits in New France also 
compared the Amerindians’ ways of waging war with that of the Scythians and Parthians 
(Dickason, 1997: 34). Here, “by placing [the] Amerindians in the early stages of a universal 
cultural development”, the French “opened up the possibility that in time, [the 
Amerindians] would become like Europeans” (Dickason, 1997: 55). As Pateman (2007: 54-
55) writes: 
 
Europeans have discovered a world that is in its first stage of history; a state of 
nature that exists in the seventeenth century. This (actual) state of nature waits to 
be transformed and developed, to be turned into a civil society. The settlers know 
what they have to build because they are familiar with the opposition between the 
“natural” and the “civil”. 
 
This is a crucial move in order to legitimise for the mission civilisatrice designed to 
‘improve’ the backward way of life of the Amerindians and to start or accelerate their 
‘development’. 
 
This temporalising of difference also entails an enactment of the Amerindians as 
“less mature versions of the European adult” (Hindess, 2007: 326; see also Todorov, 1989: 
358). The Amerindians are portrayed as children not yet fully developed. This “constructed 
temporal backwardness of the savages” (Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 56) is most clearly 
expressed by Biard (1616: 74) when he compares the Amerindians to “wild children” and 
estimates that: 
 
these poor people (…) when with the time and experience of the centuries will 
have arrived at some perfection in the arts, sciences and reason: When they would 
have produced some result in philosophy, police, mores, and convenience of life; 
when they would be actually predisposed to the maturity of the Saint Gospel, so 
that they are received in the house of God: we see them [now] puny and scarce, 
and used as food by the ravens.  
 
This evolution from the state of nature to civilisation is not automatic and the Amerindians 
will need the help of patient (adult and mature) teachers (Biard, 1616: 101-103). For now, 
they are ‘prisoners’ of their own stagnant nature and of their isolated way of life. The 
Amerindians are thus performed as living in “a state of primordial innocence” and “in the 
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early stages of a universal cultural development” (Dickason, 1997: 51 and 55). This classic 
analogy between uncivilised peoples and children118 leads to “paternalistic implications” 
(Aalberts, 2014: 774) and enables the French to establish themselves at the pinnacle of 
civilisation and moral maturity, having themselves evolved from this state of nature a long 
time ago. Thévet (1575: f. 1013) indeed indicates that the great Hercules, coming to France, 
“found the people living almost in the way that these savages do today”, while Lescarbot 
(1617: 875) affirms that “the old Gaullois were not better” than the present-day 
Amerindians. 
 
This general absence of the signs of social life confirms the French in their 
“understanding of humanity, in which the development of moral and intellectual capacities 
is associated with the development of [identifiable] institutions – marriage, agriculture, 
writing, money, law, the state, and so on” (Hindess, 2007: 326). The conviction in the lack 
of culture of the Amerindians leads to the conclusion that they inhabit the first stages of 
human development: Cartier (1865: 53-54) notices that the Amerindians eat their meat raw 
and Thévet (1575: f. 1012v-1013) offers a long description of the barbaric treatment of 
their enemies (even though he also notices that they are not cannibals). These conceptions 
of the Amerindians are informed by and help illustrate the evolutionary theories used by 
French political theorists when they discuss ‘political order’ and sovereignty. As explained 
in chapter 3 these theories are central to the construction (masquerading as identification) 
of a proper sovereign state. One example is offered by Roy (1575b: f. 25) who argues 
 
In the beginnings men were very rude and ignorant of all things, not too dissimilar 
from beasts [they] ate what the earth produced on its own [and] wore skins instead 
of clothes. To protect themselves from the heat and cold, from winds, rains and 
snow, they retreated inside the trunk of big trees, or below their leafy branches, or 
in deep pits, hideous caverns, or sheds and huts made out of heavy poles (…) 
Because they were more robust they nourishes themselves with stronger food, and 
thus lives longer (…) But becoming weaker they could not digest these meats [any 
more], nor stayed naked and barefoot; they had to find ways to soften their savage 
and harsh life that they could not bear any longer. 
 
Disregarding the fact that Roy (like his contemporaries) does not provide a particularly 
convincing reason for the transition from the state of nature to the cultural/civilised state, 
we find in this quote the main elements that were ‘characteristic’ of the Amerindians and 
that confirm their lack of sovereignty. Roy adds that when men decided to abandon their 
savage life they started agriculture (when previously all their food, including wheat for 
instance, would grow spontaneously from the earth). They also assembled themselves and 
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 For other examples see Pagden (1982: 106) and Bowden (2009: 58). 
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from their ‘brutal life’ became ‘gentle and civil’ and “started to feed, clothe and live more 
honestly” (Roy, 1575a: f. 25v).  
 
 The process of denying the Amerindians their sovereignty thus follows an 
established pattern of ‘dealing with’ difference. In order to explain the Other, similarities 
are established as a necessity (the culture of this Other can only be perceived through the 
eyes of the viewer and thus through her own culture) but also as a methodological tool 
(Hodgen, 1964). Indeed, these similarities participate in the depiction of this Other as a 
familiar Other through her inscription into a known framework of human development and 
evolution. In other words, the differences perceived and performed attribute a place on 
the civilisational ladder to the Amerindians, thus domesticating a potentially threatening 
difference (an alternative) into a known (and backward because less successful) difference. 
This process is central when it comes to sovereignty: in fact, it is this very inscription of the 
Other as inferior, uncivilised and unthreatening that will in turn enable Europeans to 
confirm their civilisational dominance and as such their sovereignty over the Other (as 
explored in the next chapter). 
 
 
The League as an internal Other responsible for the 
lack of civilisation of the kingdom 
 
Through this interpretation of the Amerindians as familiar Others, the French succeed in re-
establishing the civilisational difference on which sovereignty depends. As explained in the 
next chapter, the way is now open for the French to claim sovereignty over the 
Amerindians thanks to their civilisational superiority. In a similar way, the ‘civilised’ must 
differentiate himself from the ‘savage’ inside of France. Indeed, after the destabilisation of 
the civilised image of the kingdom explored in the previous chapter, the French kings are 
compelled to perform civilisation and savagery in a way that can support their claims to 
sovereignty. 
 
Amid such extreme destabilisation of the image of a sovereign and civilised France 
several actors struggle to re-establish the civilised sovereignty of the king. Such discourses 
are usually written or pronounced by the kings – both Henry III and Henry of Navarre 
(before and after his coronation as Henry IV) – or by their supporters. Their interest in 
doing so is clear: they need to show how successful they have been and are at maintaining 
France in its ‘glory’. As such, and to ensure that the king does not lose his association with 
civilisation and thus his sovereignty, these discourses are built around the (re)affirmation of 
the civilised and therefore sovereign identity of France. The origin of the (uncivilised) 
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troubles is thus placed in an actor constructed as exterior to the sovereign monarchy: the 
League. Due to the imperative of establishing themselves against internal competitors the 
French kings make only limited reference to the paradigmatic external savage: the 
Amerindians. 
 
The discursive (re-)construction of civilised sovereignty involves the identification 
by the Protestants of the excesses of the Catholics during the conflict (thereby 
delegitimising their claim to act in defence of the kingdom’s civilisation). The Catholics are 
usually accused of misconduct and their practices are seen as revealing their true nature as 
‘enemies of civilisation’ and, according to Henry of Navarre, as ‘cruel barbarians’ (B.N.F., 
N.A.F. 17874: f. 7v). But more precisely, it is the League that the Catholics generally support 
that is at the centre of a multitude of attacks which can be classified according to their 
intensity. Some imply that the League is at the source of the current troubles, others that 
the League is a barbaric or savage actor and the most extreme attacks focus on how the 
League contributes to the creation of a state of nature inside of France. In this way, the 
imagery of savagery is turned against the League and made to support the kings. First, the 
League is identified as the main reason for the existence of the troubles that de-stabilised 
the (civilised image of the) kingdom. As soon as 1585 such attacks are frequent: Henry of 
Navarre estimates that the League “troubles today the tranquillity of this Kingdom” and 
creates “civil wars” that have brought a “great confusion to all things, poverty to the 
people, a decline of the Nobility, have ruined the clergy and made justice despised” (B.N.F., 
F-47170 (17): 5 and 40). He reiterates this view in 1586 in a letter to the nobility, qualifying 
the League as acting against the tranquillity of the kingdom (B.N.F., N.A.F. 17874: f. 2). Near 
the end of the conflict Henry IV still mentions the “disorders, ruins, murders, pillages, 
sacrileges and other types of evils that they [the League] have brought to this Kingdom, 
thus turning it from the most beautiful and flourishing of Europe into the most misshapen, 
confused and miserable of the entire Earth” (Goulart and Goujet, 1758e: 108). The idea of 
‘confusion’ is also repeatedly used by Henry IV (before and after his coronation). He 
deplores this confusion created by the League in 1585 (Goulart and Goujet, 1758a: 132) 
and in 1593 explains how “extreme poverty and desolation” as well as “disorder and 
confusion” will continue to characterise the kingdom if the troubles do not end (Goulart 
and Goujet, 1758d: 147).  
 
 The second ‘stage’ of these attacks further associates the League with the ‘state of 
nature’ idea through the use of the concepts of ‘barbarism’ and ‘inhumanity’. These 
concepts are used by Henry III to qualify the acts of the rebels (B.N.F., FZ-2052: 4; see also 
Goulart and Goujet (1758b: 301-302)) but also by Henry of Navarre to characterise the 
murder of Henry III as “the most barbarous act” (B.N.F. F-46889 (25)). This is a murder that 
even “the thieves and barbarians, and the enemies of humankind” would have not 
executed (Goulart and Goujet, 1758b: 253). The construction of the League’s savagery thus 
draws upon well-known ‘facts’ about the behaviour of barbarians. When officially joining 
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Henry of Navarre in 1589 Henry III publishes a declaration that reinforces the idea of 
uncivilised behaviour of the rebels: 
 
[The League] has again filled France with troubles and civil war, universal sedition 
and disregard for the Magistrates, blood, pillages, extortions, vandalizing of 
religious and profane goods, rapes of women and girls, and an infinity of 
inhumanities and disorders such as we have never seen or heard of (B.N.F. F-46889 
(5): 7-8 (my emphasis)). 
 
Building upon the evolutionary theories that populate discussions of sovereignty the king 
also notices that France has degenerated into a pre-civil or pre-social state and can now be 
called a “den of thieves” instead of a proper civil society (Goulart and Goujet, 1758a: 196). 
This accusation also extends to the rebellious cities in 1589 when the king depicts them as 
practising all sorts of “cruel barbarism” (B.N.F., Français 3876: 362v; see also B.N.F. FZ-
2052: 4). Finally, an anti-League pamphlet of 1592 ‘describes’ the Leaguers as “deprived of 
all humanity” and following their “violent appetites” (Goulart and Goujet, 1758d: 194). 
These depictions of savagery all relate to the concept of bestiality (and thus to the Wild 
Man and the monstrous races that were widespread and accepted at the time).  
 
 These expressions culminate in the explicit association of the League with the 
creation of a state of nature in France. When entering the king’s territory Henry of Navarre 
evokes the “dissipation and usurpation of this state” and the “confusion of all things divine 
and human, the annihilation of all order, police and justice” (Goulart and Goujet, 1758b: 
252). The Parliament expresses similar concerns that the League is leading to “the entire 
ruin and overthrow of all police and human society instituted by God, and even of this 
renowned and flourishing Monarchy” (Goulart and Goujet, 1758d: 177). The dissipation of 
‘order’ and ‘hierarchy’ – such crucial ideas when identifying a civil society – are repeated in 
a 1589 pamphlet stating that “all the [social] positions are perverted, the temple of justice 
polluted, crimes not punished, innocence oppressed [and] laws without authority” (B.N.F., 
Français 6546 (3)). The ‘state of nature’ analogy is also used in a 1593 declaration written 
against the League and in support of the new king Henry IV after his conversion. In this 
declaration the author estimates that the current troubles 
 
prevent working the land, remove all trade from the fair cities, award impunity to 
the vices, deprive an infinite number of places of priest, the priests of revenue, the 
poor people of divine service. In a nutshell, if we do not put an end to these 
unfortunate dissensions with a good agreement, it will not be long until we see 
France – the ancient house of the Catholic faith and of all humanity, the main 
support of the liberty and safety of the Christian countries, the name of a virtuous 
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freedom – become a name for servitude, with her ancient humanity being turned 
into the most barbaric inhumanity of the Indies (Goulart and Goujet, 1758d: 396). 
 
Here, it is striking to notice that some of the categories used to describe the (lack of) 
civilisation of the Amerindians are being turned against the League supporters who still 
refuse to swear allegiance to the king. The absence of the traditional signs of civilisation 
transforms France into what was supposedly external, foreign and different to itself and its 
sovereign identity. And the kings are not to blame for this state of affairs: it is the League 
which is performed as responsible. In a 1593 letter to the Duke of Mayenne the deputies 
assembled around the king develop the same powerful analogy: 
 
This war ruins the Catholic Religion, brings confusion and malfunction to all the 
Orders of the Kingdom, fills our Nation with vices, corruption of mores, disregard 
for the divine and human laws; Justice is flouted and submitted to the violence of 
the strongest and meanest… some of the Subjects of this kingdom are without 
Ecclesiastic Minister… In what decadence, ruin and despair all the cities of this 
Kingdom have fallen! (Goulart and Goujet, 1758d: 374-375). 
 
While reaffirming most of the tropes of the state of nature this document also emphasises 
the importance of cities as signs of civility. If France is deprived of its great cities then its 
civilisation is lost as well. A 1591 pamphlet establishes the same link in its attack against the 
League rebels:   
 
They [the rebels] control the cities, and it will not take long for these cities to lose 
this name and substance. We see them either deserted, without justice, without 
community, or without trade. All of our youth is being lost because of the lack of 
education and schools. In the countryside fields are not cultivated and Parishes are 
without priest and minister (B.N.F., Français 15591: f. 211). 
 
Recalling Bodin’s remark mentioned earlier, cities are only cities when they show clear 
signs of civilisation (which they do not because of the League). In the rest of the country, it 
is a paradigmatic state of nature that has come to dominate because of the rebels. The 
League is thus performed as the source of the state of nature France has degenerated into 
because of the rebellion. This act of othering the non-sovereign is done, unsurprisingly, 
through familiar references to civilisation and savagery. These categories are once again 
called for in order to re-establish a clear civilisational difference on which sovereignty can 







The attribution of images of savagery and civilisation to the unexpected side of the Atlantic 
disappears in this chapter with the re-establishment of the civilisational difference upon 
which sovereignty depends. Whether these inversions were exceptions, signs of early 
cultural relativism, or wilful political attacks, they dissipate under the authority of the 
sovereign and civilised voice. In Canada, the French explorers and observers reintroduce 
the Amerindians at the bottom of the civilisational hierarchy with which they are familiar. 
One can see in this reinscription the effect of the authority of the evolutionary theories 
inherited from Antiquity and the Middle Ages. And in turn the acceptation of these 
concepts gave confidence to the Europeans in their encounter with the ‘New World’. As 
explained by Pratt (1992: 219) for the travel literature post-1750, “[t]he possibility of 
limitations on the speaker’s authority is never hinted at” and the seeing imperial eye is all-
powerful. It is this authority that in turn authorises the French to write the Amerindians 
with such confidence and to discard, through the idea of epistemic inferiority, any potential 
alternative that the Amerindians could have offered to their eyes. With this chapter it 
becomes clear that the self-proclaimed views of early modern travelers arguing that they 
represent the first modern ‘empirical’ scientists are misleading.119 In fact, most conceptions 
about Amerindian savagery have their roots in previously accepted notions of savagery and 
thus do not reflect an un-mediated ‘empirical’ reality:  
 
The early chroniclers and natural historians of the Americas, for instance, were not 
committed to an accurate description of the world ‘out there’. They were 
attempting to bring within their intellectual grasp phenomena which they 
recognised as new and which they could only make familiar, and hence intelligible, 
in the terms of an anthropology made authoritative precisely by the fact that its 
sources ran back to the Greeks (Padgen, 1982: 6; see also Todorov, 1982: 141). 
 
As Todorov (1982: 30) argues when talking about Columbus the strategy employed by 
Europeans was to search for the confirmations of a truth already known. As such, the 
relative coherence achieved by the French does not reflect the singularity of the object 
‘Amerindians’ but rather the common cultural framework from which the French performed 
them. In one sense, these discourses tell us more about the French than about the 
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 This view is sometimes reinforced by contemporary scholars who associate the Age of Discovery 
and the Renaissance with the development of empirical (and objective) science. Hodgen (1964: 33), 
for instance, argues that “until the sixteenth century little effort was ever made by anybody to take 
a long, fresh look at the way of life of any people, or to report results free of the misapprehensions 
attending an unswerving fidelity to tradition” (an approach she then contrasts with the ‘modern 
scientific approach’ (66)). 
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Amerindians even though they remain crucial when it comes to understanding French 
sovereignty over Canada. In more abstract terms (and as revealed by an emphasis on the 
performativity of these discourses) there is no natural Amerindian untouched by French 
culture; rather, the ‘nature’ of the Amerindians as natural beings, underdeveloped or 
backwards beings is produced out of French culture in the enactment of the reality of 
America. And in so doing some myths (like that one about monstrous races) were vital in 
order to provide “a ready and familiar way of looking at the native people of the New 
World” (Friedman, 1981: 207). 
 
In reality, then, the ‘Discovery’ of the Amerindians was compatible with these 
views held by Europeans and offered a new (and contemporaneous) illustration of them.120 
If the Amerindians do not qualify as civilised human beings it is because they are judged 
according to the French scale of civilisation. As such, the Amerindians as a group are not 
‘radically’ different (as if incomprehensible for the French) but more simply inferior in 
relation to French expectations. The very authority of the French texts on the Amerindians 
in fact emerges from this re-inscription into a singular cultural reality.121 One can in fact 
doubt that these self-confident discourses would have been present in the face of ‘radical’ 
difference. I have shown in this chapter how the resemblance between French and 
Amerindians helps performing them as differently situated on a scale of progress and 
civilisation instead of casting the Amerindians out of this scale altogether. The result is that 
the French are attributed a sovereignty that the Amerindians are unworthy of. 
 
In France, civilised and savage identities are also re-attributed in line with the will 
of the self-proclaimed sovereign and civilised voice. Drawing on similar references to the 
woods, to disorder and to misery, among others, the French kings are able to contain 
savagery to specific actors: the League rebels. This confirms the observation made by 
Walker (1993: 163) that “sovereignty is not a permanent principle of political order; the 
appearance of permanence is simply an effect of complex practices working to affirm 
continuities and to shift disruptions and dangers to the margin”. The ‘unsovereign’ actors 
are here placed by the French kings to the margin of the political and civilised order in 
order to recreate the illusion of unity and permanence of the sovereign order. Discourses 
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 This is not to deny that the Amerindians were not compatible with the Christian worldview or 
cosmos (Dickason, 1997: 29; Jahn, 2000: 45). But inscribing them in European political thought did 
not necessitate the complete rejection and re-thinking of earlier ideological systems. As Jahn (2000: 
51) rightly argues “cultures frequently accommodate contradictory concepts” and this 
incompatibility of the Amerindians was not crucial in triggering an interest in the Amerindians’ (lack 
of) social life. Furthermore, and as Hodgen (1964: 49) observed, “medieval thought, though 
grounded in the Hebrew Scriptures, contained so large an ingredient of the pagan, the fantastic, the 
monstrous, and the fabulous”. In reality, then, it is not that Christianity per se could accommodate 
monsters and savages but simply that Christianity was not the totalising system it is sometimes 
portrayed to have been. 
121
 Fernández-Armesto (1982: 281) similarly explained how the men of the Middle Ages “had to 
describe (and therefore distort) alien societies in the familiar terms of feudal organisation” in order 
to ‘make sense’ of them. 
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of sovereignty reveal how the task of othering is central to statecraft. Hence, what an 
internal account reveals is that the domestic construction of sovereignty is equally 
dependent on references to savagery as its external construction. In other words, the 
presence of savagery – that should logically be absent from a civilised state like France – is 
necessarily and repeatedly performed in the contest over sovereignty. Because the 
identification of civilisation cannot be disconnected from the identification of the savages, 
the discourse of savagery is equally important to performing sovereignty in the West. 
 
 Performing sovereignty thus depends on the existence of colonial frontiers. Yet 
these frontiers, i.e. distinctions between civilised and savage, are only temporally (if at all) 
stabilised. The usual separation between West and non-West should thus not detract our 
attention from the resemblance between the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ processes of 
statecraft. Moreover, colonial frontiers do not only exist between the West and the non-
West: a similar differentiation is equally present inside the West itself. Putting these two 
dimensions of sovereignty side by side shows that the task of statecraft follows similar 
paths in both spheres. This is, to a certain extent, unsurprising: one could have imagined 
that the Western state is not performed in radically different way ‘domestically’ and 
‘internationally’. Since the concept stays the same, the discursive construction of 
sovereignty logically rests on the same references to civilisation and differentiations 
between the civilised and savage. What is revealed by this analysis of France in the 
sixteenth century, however, is that the crucial task of differentiation (or othering) that is at 
the core of the establishment of a colonial frontier and thus of the task of statecraft is 
complex and contested. Civilisational doubts and savage crossings – which are only 
crossings when the West is clearly separated from the non-West – are frequent and they 
require disciplining from the voice establishing itself as sovereign. Differentiation and 
classification serve to justify the superiority of the sovereign (and of the sovereign state 
model defended). This justifies why an exploration of civilised sovereignty is more 
complete when both ‘sides’ of statecraft are explored jointly: these two processes are 
closely related and similar in a number of ways (in particular when one considers the 
importance of the imperative to differentiate the civilised from the savage).  
 
The basis of sovereignty, then, is in this act of othering alternatives, whether these 
come from the ‘domestic’ sphere (and promotes rather limited changes) or whether they 
originate from the ‘outside’ and represent a more comprehensive revision of the sovereign 
model. Both types of alternatives are discarded through their qualification as familiar yet 
inferior and savage. More precisely, two key ideas are used: degeneration or lack of 
evolution. Alternative (social) orders are judged either as degenerated forms of a perfect 
example – this is the case for the French rebels who were civilised subjects but have 
become ‘worse than beasts’122 – or as underdeveloped like the Amerindians. These 
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 This strategy was used, for instance, to explain the existence of the Wild Man during the Middle 
Ages. Indeed, “[t]he status of the wild man was thus reached not by gradual ascent from the brute, 
but by a descent” (Bernheimer, 1970: 8). 
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strategies are by no means new or innovative. They in fact reiterate previous ways of 
explaining the presence of difference. This is why Otherness seems more familiar than 
disturbing: it serves to highlight what has been lost or is still lacking in the Other but found 
in the (sovereign) Self. 






The triumph of sovereignty: 








While the previous chapter has discussed how colonial frontiers are performed by 
sovereign authorities this is not the last element of the process of enacting sovereignty and 
the sovereign state. Heuristically, a last strategy can be identify that will cement (as far as 
this is possible for discourses built on such fluid notions as civilisation and savagery) the 
distinction on which sovereignty depends. These discourses restrict sovereignty to the 
civilised, deny it to the savage, but they also naturalise this distinction and thus reinforce 
this civilisational differentiation. Recalling the earlier distinction made when talking about 
performativity, it is clear that discourses such as the discourse of sovereignty work to 
naturalise realities: they strive to sediment or materialise them. As argued by Bartelson 
(1995: 239) sovereignty is “profoundly involved in the naturalization and reification of 
political reality”. The ultimate goal behind this strategy is to make reality appear as 
(empirically) self-evident. Here, it is the realities of civilisation and savagery that are in 
need of naturalisation: the discourse of sovereignty of the French are remarkable for their 
attempt at making essential the distinction savage/civilised that they build. In fact, and to a 
large extent, the success of their discursive strategies depends on the naturalness of the 
claims. Hence, it is crucial that sovereign discourses appear to only reflect an ‘obvious’ 
(because external) reality.  
 
Different methods are used to achieve this naturalisation of sovereignty. In the 
case of the Amerindians, the French render the colonial frontier which separates them 
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from these ‘newly discovered’ peoples evident and pre-existing. They naturalise the state 
of nature by removing the doubts and the evidence of civilisation nevertheless identified. 
This reinforcement of the colonial frontier has also the effect of making French civilisation 
appear, by contrast, natural and undeniable. The second strategy used by the French relies 
on performing the Amerindians as welcoming and desiring French rule. Their savagery is 
thus further entrenched by these performed invitations of the Amerindians who, living in a 
miserable state, call on the French to civilise them. Back in ‘domestic’ France, the kings 
distance themselves from savagery by re-establishing their ‘natural’ civilisation by 
appealing to ‘history’. The kings also insist, despite doubts and attacks, on the self-image of 
France as a civilised country – a move that both reinforces this ideal self-image and further 
delegitimises the attacks carried out by the League. Finally, the League is further 
essentialised as savage by its association to the close savages of the times: the Spanish. 
 
What this chapter reveals, therefore, is the centrality of this ‘appeal to nature’ 
upon which performed realities – as most of our intellectual systems – depend upon. As 
explained by Boas (1978: 87), Greek and Roman scholars used what they called ‘nature’ in 
order to offer “a normative corrective to the variations in standards”. The advantages of 
such an intellectual tool are obvious: by defining as ‘natural’ one set of behaviours or 
realities one is able to dismiss counter-arguments by connecting her views to a higher, 
external and thus (supposedly) objective element. In its own way, and as explained in this 
chapter, this is also what the French sovereign voice manages to do in order to reinforce its 
claims to sovereign superiority. Deconstructing the discourse of sovereignty through 
performativity thus reveals the presence of what McClintock called “the alibi of nature” 
(quoted by Dunn (2003: 68)), i.e. judgements made on the basis of ‘natural’ elements, by 
arguing that those ‘natural’ elements are constructed by a discourse that treat them as 
exterior and pre-existing. 
 
 
From the Amerindian ‘state of nature’ to French 
sovereignty  
 
Having established that the Amerindians live in a state of nature, the French discourse of 
sovereignty over them is already well-entrenched. Indeed, if the Amerindians are ‘in the 
making’ (i.e. in the process of becoming complete and social human beings), then French 
intervention can only be beneficial to start or accelerate this evolution. In a series of 
documents (all similar in terms of their argumentation) the French kings and officials refer 
to the state of nature of the Amerindians in order to explain their decisions. In doing so, 
they naturalise a state of nature that is the result of a cultural process of writing the 
Amerindians as uncivilised. By referring to this reality and excluding the doubts and 
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crossings explored in chapter 4 the French render obvious and evident a reality that they 
have culturally constructed. Undoubtedly, this naturalisation reinforces their claims to 
sovereignty over the Amerindians. 
 
These naturalisations appear early one in the encounter. As soon as 1540, François 
I explicitly refers to the reality enacted by the early explorers when he sends Roberval and 
Cartier to Canada: 
 
Driven by the desire to understand and have knowledge of several territories that 
are said to be uninhabited and others possessed by savage peoples living without 
knowledge of God and without the use of reason, we have sent a certain time ago 
costly expeditions to discover several of said countries by some of our good pilots 
and some other subjects of good understanding, knowledge and experience (…) we 
have decided and deliberated to send back [Frenchmen] to the said countries of 
Canada and Ochelaga and other neighbouring lands across the sea not inhabited 
nor possessed nor dominated by any Christian ruler (…) with the objective that you 
live with these foreign peoples if possible and that you establish yourselves on 
these lands and countries, build there towns and numerous temples and churches 
to communicate our holy catholic faith and Christian doctrine, establish laws and 
justice officers to make them live reasonably and in the love of God (B.N.F., 
Français 5503, f. 190). 
 
Here, one can identify a clear opposition between the irrational Amerindians and the 
rational French. This difference places the Amerindians at a sufficient – social – distance so 
that they can be naturally conquered, and it becomes a duty for the French to do so. Only 
through imperialist policies (and French domination) can the Amerindians improve their life 
(in particular through the development or activation of a potential that has been latent so 
far). The powers given by François I to his representatives in 1540 are therefore “near-royal 
powers” (Trudel, 1973: 36): 
 
And to attract the said peoples [the Amerindians] to the knowledge and love of god 
and to bring them and keep them under our obedience [I give you the right] to 
maintain the law and punish the disobedient ones, the rebels and the wrongdoers 
(be they from the said [French] expedition or from these lands) either with death 
or another exemplary punishment (B.N.F., N.A.F. 9384: f. 262).  
 
As shown in these two quotes the Amerindians need to be educated (presumably to reach 
the same stage of civilisation as the French). Their constructed savagery is taken as a given 
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by French kings. The practical consequence of performing the Amerindians as familiar and 
inferior Others is thus their subsequent lack of any political right to self-government and 
sovereignty. Hence, the colonising mission of the French is framed around and is 
dependent upon a vision of the Amerindians living in the state of nature. French colonial 
policies are thus ‘logically’ beneficial to the Amerindians: they will allow them to enter the 
realm of ‘culture’ and to become socially efficient (according to French standards). 
 
If the sovereignty of the Amerindians is disregarded – or rather is inconceivable for 
the French – the sovereignty of the civilised European monarchs is further naturalised 
(even when they are not French allies): François I insists that the countries where the 
French can establish themselves should not be “occupied, possessed or dominated or be 
under the subjection and obedience of any princes our allies and confederated and even of 
our dear and loved brothers the (Spanish) Emperor and the King of Portugal” (A.N., U754: f. 
59v; this is also specified in other contemporary documents such as in B.N.F., N.A.F. 9269: f. 
3). For the Europeans, "it was well established practice, amounting to law, that the state in 
whose name a settlement was established in territory formerly unsettled by the nationals 
of any European monarch, became sovereign of the territory in question (…) at no time 
were [the Amerindians] considered as the owners of their land or as being entitled to any 
role in connection with its disposition” (Green and Dickason, 1989: 38-39). The ‘natural’ 
superiority of the French is thus simply expressed through a legitimate and smooth 
silencing of the Amerindians’ civilisation and rights. 
 
Little change can be noticed in subsequent official documents giving permission to 
the French to colonise Canada. The same “barbaric peoples” are mentioned in 1578 
(Michelant and Ramé, 1867: 8) when the king gives commission to de la Roche to be his 
Lieutenant in Canada. His instructions in the main repeat the previous official documents 
(while contributing to (re-)perform the Amerindians as ‘naturally’ savage that are 
discursively deprived of sovereign agency): 
 
Without offense to the princes our good friends, neighbours, allies and 
confederate, and without undertaking anything that could cause them some 
wrong, there is possibility to conquer and take some lands and countries newly 
discovered and occupied by barbaric peoples (Michelant and Ramé, 1867: 8). 
 
In 1605, Henry IV gives commission to his admiral to “discover some coasts and remote 
lands uninhabited or inhabited by people still savage, barbarians and deprived of any 
religion, laws and civility, with the objective to settle there and build forts, and try to bring 
these peoples to the Christian faith, to civilise their mores, regulate their lives, and their 
collaboration with the French for what concerns trade. And to this aim bring them to 
recognise and submit themselves to the authority and domination of the French crown” 
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(B.N.F., F-46912 (22): 13). The establishment of civilisational difference not only shapes but 
is also further reinforced and naturalised by the successive French political decisions. The 
insistence on teaching and ‘transmission of knowledge’ (be it religious, agricultural or social) 
happening through French sovereignty are all directly related to the performed nature of 
the Amerindians. The legitimacy of French sovereignty is then simply established thanks to 
a short ceremony recorded in an official report (B.N.F., Rothschild 1967: tome 2: 4).123 This 
type of sovereign acquisition becomes ingrained and by the mid-seventeenth century the 
major treatise on sovereignty written by Le Bret (1643: 121) mentions the legitimacy of 
these practices of grabbing land that is “abandoned and that remain without Lord”.  
 
The creation of companies also plays a role in the naturalisation and repetition of 
the savagery of the Amerindians. Several companies will be created in the 17th century to 
improve the mediocre results obtained in colonising Canada. The first one appears in 1627 
(A.E., M.D. France 782: f. 97), and in the act of creation the French king mentions his desire 
that “the French reputation be spread far away in these foreign lands, and that our piety be 
publicised by the conversion of peoples buried in infidelity and barbarism” (B.N.F., N.A.F. 
9269: f. 198). Far from being restricted to commercial interests the company is set up with 
the objective of “populating the said land [of Canada] with French Catholics who by their 
example will incline these populations to the Christian faith, to civil life, and will establish 
there the royal authority” (B.N.F., N.A.F. 9269: f. 222). This is important to notice as one 
could expect French colonial policy to be orientated only towards commercial gains. This 
should be even truer in the case of a commercial company. But even in its founding 
document the company is included in the French civilising mission, thus showing the 
prevalence of the idea of the cultural blankness of the Amerindians in deciding the shape of 
French policies. Through these discourses and statements what emerges is the ‘naturalness’ 
of the natural Amerindian, i.e. the obvious and undeniable reality of the Amerindian living a 
natural (and savage) lifestyle. 
 
Due to the co-constitution of the notions of civilisation and savagery it is not 
surprising to find several expressions of French civilisation juxtaposed with the affirmations 
of Amerindian savagery. Cartier notes the “good order and police” existing in the French 
kingdom (Julien et al., 1946: 117) and Thévet (1558: 68) refers to France as a “country of 
law and police”. Montchrestien (1615/1889: 322) expresses this sense of superiority 
eloquently when he writes that “if it belongs to one nation in the world to participate [in 
this colonisation] it is the French nation, which has inherited (as its own) the glory of the 
letters and warfare, of the arts and civility, and more importantly of the real Christianity”. 
124 Hence, it is not only “fair titles” that explain the king’s rights on Canada but also 
“relevant reasons and honest conscience” (Biard, 1616: 320) linked to the moral and 
religious superiority of the French. Writing to Richelieu in 1635, a Jesuit estimates that the 
people of Canada begin to enjoy the “sweet fruits” of French benevolence, and that the 
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 On the use European legal tools and techniques in these (supposedly) lawless lands of the ‘New 
World’ see Benton (2009). 
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 As Grovogui (1996: 51) writes “European intellectuals (…) claimed that the actions of the colonists 
were guided by a certain natural reason that resided only in Christianity”. 
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presence of the French contribute to breathing life into “an infinity of barbaric peoples’ 
souls who die every day in the slavery of the devil” (B.N.F., N.A.F. 9269: f. 303-303v). 
Certainly defending their role in the eyes of the king, the Breton merchants also claim to 
have made the savages “obliging and gentle” thanks to their trade with them (B.N.F., N.A.F. 
9269: f. 31). The civilising mission that cements claims to French sovereignty is thus 
reinforced and in its turn contribute to naturalising the colonial frontier between the 
French and the Amerindians. 
 
 The expression of French sovereignty over the Amerindians is further naturalised 
by the ‘description’ of the Amerindians as welcoming French sovereignty. In fact, the 
Amerindians have the bon goût to desire French rule! The Amerindians are reported as 
“loving and admiring our mores and ways of living” (Montchrestien, 1615/1889: 322) and 
Champlain is convinced that they are inviting the French to rule over them:  
 
These peoples do not possess a malevolent spirit as some of the other, distant 
savages, which make me believe that they would accept the knowledge of God, if 
their country was populated by people who spent time and effort to teach them by 
their good example how to live. Because if today they have a desire to improve 
their life, this desire will disappear tomorrow, when it will be time to suppress their 
bad habits, the debauchery of their mores, and their incivility. I talked with them 
several times about our beliefs, laws and customs, and they listened very 
attentively and then replied: ‘You are telling me things that exceed my mind and 
understanding, and that we cannot understand by discourses. But if you desire us to 
understand them, it is necessary that you bring in this country women and children 
so that we can learn about the way you live, how you worship your God, how you 
obey the laws of your King, how you cultivate the land and feed the animals. 
Because by seeing these things, we would learn more in a year than in twenty, and 
would judge our life miserable compared to yours’. Their discourse seemed to me 
natural common sense, and a proof of their desire to know God (B.N.F., Rothschild 
1967: tome 1, 296-297). 
 
Here, the Amerindians are deprived of agency through ‘their’ active desire for French rule. 
Unsurprisingly, ‘their’ aspirations are aligned to the French ones. The same strategy is used 
by Montchrestien (1615/1889: 320): 
 
God made us not only men, but men above the other men, and, what is even more 
important, Christians (…) to make us deserve this position, we should not fear 
crossing oceans and storms in order to make the name of God our creator known 
to so many barbaric peoples deprived of all civility, peoples who call us, who open 
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their arms to us, and are ready to become our subjects so that by our holy 
teachings and our good example we set them on the path to salvation. 
 
In these two examples French writers perform a ‘desire for submission’, a discursive 
strategy that one can also notice in one of Columbus’ letters (Dickason, 1997: 5) and more 
generally in the dual process of formal acknowledgement and silencing of the Amerindians 
performed by the Europeans (Greenblatt, 1991: 61). This discursive strategy is made 
available to the French through to their belief in the truthfulness of their perceptions and 
ideals and through the way they perform the Amerindians as incomplete and always 
lacking. Hence “the French found the actions of the natives in greeting them and 
participating in their ceremonies as unambiguously communicating their wishes to have 
the French rule over them” (Seed, 1995: 66). Added to the image of the Amerindians living 
in a state of nature, these interpretations render French sovereignty in Canada not only 
possible but natural and desirable for everyone involved. 
 
 
The French kings as civilised and sovereign rulers 
 
These strategies of naturalisation also play a crucial role in the domestic struggle between 
the kings and their adversaries. In their fight against the League and in order to defend 
their civilised sovereignty the French kings also attempt to naturalise their civilisation in 
different ways. Particularly noteworthy are the discourses that re-establish the French 
kings as historical purveyors of stability and civilisation. Generally speaking, then, this 
naturalisation of French sovereignty/civilisation takes the form of an appeal to ‘history’. 
Henry III, for instance, states that he is above the savageries of the conflict: “I am legitimate 
King by succession, as you all know, and from a lineage that has always ruled gently” 
(Goulart, 1590: 568). Indeed, is not the French king from the oldest Christian race of kings? 
(Goulart and Goujet, 1758d: 278). The French kings are thus made to appear superior to – 
and untouched by – the savagery of the League and its supporters. In 1586 Henry of 
Navarre writes to the clergy supporting the League that “the war that you conduct so 
intensely is unworthy of Christians [and] unworthy among Christians” (B.N.F., N.A.F. 17874: 
f. 4). This civilised king is also one who has announced “the Gospel to the most remote 
parts of the world that were unknown to our predecessors” (Goulart and Goujet, 1758d: 
332). The superiority of the king above the League thus rests in his achievement of the 
ideal of a civilised ruler able to “soften the toughest and most barbaric hearts with the 
sound of his words” (B.N.F., Dupuy 313: f. 150). The kings are portrayed as ideal rulers – 
corresponding to the ‘descriptions’ outlined in chapter 3 – and as fathers to their people 
(B.N.F., Français 15591: f. 212v). In a declaration to the Parliament in 1585 Henry III 
reinforces this image by stating his “care to see [his] Kingdom flourish in the Glory of God 




 Additionally, the two successive kings are careful to be identified with a peaceful 
kingdom bringing the possibility of progress and civilisation to their subjects. As such, they 
and their supporters depict an idealised image of (civilised) France before the troubles with 
the League which works to re-establish the ‘natural’ because normal state of the kingdom. 
Such expressions can be found throughout the troubled period under study. As soon as the 
revolt starts Henry III is keen to reaffirm how he has established “repose and public 
tranquillity that our Subjects have begun to enjoy a few years ago” through his hard work 
and his care (Goulart and Goujet, 1758a: 54). In 1587 the king presents his actions as 
aiming at the re-establishment of the peace and tranquillity enjoyed in the kingdom before 
the troubles (B.N.F., Français 3363: f. 116). He repeatedly refers back “to the previous years 
1583 and 1584 and the good order that we had given and started to establish in our 
kingdom to the honour of God and the relief of our poor people” (B.N.F., Français 3876: f. 
357v). When the Estates general are called in 1588, Henry III argues that if nothing is done 
“there will not remain any vestige of the character and highness of this kingdom of ours 
that used to be admired by all the foreign nations” (B.N.F., F-46886 (23): 5-7). In a public 
letter denouncing the recent Parisian takeover organised by the League, the king writes 
that he would have “never believed and estimated that a true and natural domination and 
power such as our own, that has been established so legitimately and for so long (and from 
which our subjects have received such good treatment and gratification…), would have had 
to be strengthened and reinforced with other forces or columns than those of piety and 
justice” (Goulart, 1590: 512). When Henry of Navarre succeeds Henry III he replicates the 
same discourses with the objective of establishing the legitimacy of his rule. In different 
public documents he argues that his “intensions… have always been to re-establish a good 
and durable peace in this Kingdom; we have always hoped to re-institute repose, splendour 
and opulence that due to the continuous civil wars have been lost” (A.E., M.D. France 762: 
f. 48; see also a similar expression in B.N.F., FZ-2069: 4). The insistence of the kings on their 
work towards the tranquillity and flourishment of France is thus crucial in their attempt at 
naturalising their civilisation and as a consequence their sovereignty. 
 
Consequently, by placing the kings as historical defenders of civilisation, these 
discourses depict the monarchs as naturally acting for the preservation of French 
sovereignty and civilisation. Henry IV can thus affirm that his “principal desire and goal, and 
that towards which all our actions have tended, has been to establish in our Kingdom a 
good and certain tranquillity in order to put an end to the disorders, violence and miseries 
of the war, so that God can be worshiped according to his holy orders and the authority of 
the Laws and of justice can be re-established” (Goulart and Goujet, 1758e: 71). This 
involvement and interest of the king in taking care of his kingdom is reminiscent of the idea 
of the King’s two bodies (Kantorowicz, 1957): 
 
Every sensible man will always presume (without other evidence) that the King in 
his function as King – without considering the dementia and goodness that are 
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specific and natural to him – would have done what he could and should have to 
pacify his state… given that it is obviously his own good that is lost in the 
continuation of the civil miseries, his house that is burning, his blood that is 
spreading, and his life that is fading away (A.E., M.D. France 373: f. 77) 
 
Implicit in this statement is the impossibility of conceiving of the king as acting for any 
other purpose than the preservation of the civilisation of the kingdom. Naturalisation here 
takes the form of a discursive closure. By discursively associating the kings to the civilised 
state of France these actors are able to support the view that if the monarchy is lost, then 
all civilisation and sovereignty will be lost as well. The role of the kings is thus to re-
establish the ‘normal’ state of civilisation that has been lost due to the League. Hence, 
supporting the king(s) means ensuring the maintenance of social order, peace, and 
civilisation. Conversely, without a king, “[w]hat would the notable inhabitants who hold the 
offices of the Monarchy, the Finances, the Justice, the Police, the Army do?… All of this is 
lost, if the monarchy is lost. Who would provide them with the freedom to trade? Who 
would guarantee their possession of the land? What would become of the authority of 
their justice and their degrees? Who would command their army? In the end, what would 
be their order?” (B.N.F., N.A.F. 17874: f. 18). A similar discourse is used to promote 
reconciliation around Henry IV in 1593: 
 
the Catholic Faith would be restored, the Churches preserved, the Clergy 
maintained in its dignities and possessions, Justice re-established, the Nobility 
would regain its strength and vigour for the defence and peace of the Kingdom, the 
Cities would recover from their losses and ruins thanks to the re-establishment of 
trade, of the arts and crafts that feed the people but are almost completely 
forgotten, of the Universities and the Sciences which have in the past made our 
Kingdom flourish, but which now languish and perish slowly; the fields would be 
cultivated again instead of being abandoned as they are in many places and would 
produce food for men instead of being covered with thistles and spines (which 
make them odious to see). In sum with peace everyone will take back his function 
(B.N.F., Français 4045: f. 28-28v). 
 
The naturalisation of French sovereignty thus takes the form of an ‘idealisation’ 
(masquerading as a description) of the kingdom before the troubles. What these texts do is 
to remind to the reader the self-image of France as a civilised place and as such reconnect 
(in a particularly conservative manner) the preponderance of the kings to the magnificence 
of the kingdom. In other words, if France is necessarily sovereign, then the attacks 
performed by the League are false and misleading. This is why the kings and their 
supporters perform France as the pinnacle of civilisation so that they can re-establish their 
exemplary image of sovereignty. In an edict of 1588 Henry III explains how he rules over 
the “most noble kingdom on earth” (Goulart, 1590: 574). In a public answer to the Duke of 
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Mayenne, Henry IV presents himself as an extraordinary monarch: “It has pleased God to 
have us been born from the most ancient lineage of Christian kings, and by legitimate 
succession to reach the Crown of the most beautiful and flourishing Kingdom of 
Christianity” (Goulart and Goujet, 1758d: 278). The Parliament of Paris reiterates this view 
by mentioning this “renowned and flourishing Monarchy” (Goulart and Goujet, 1758d: 
177), playing with the dichotomy encountered in previous chapters between the flourishing 
and civilised kingdom of France and the barren land – or terra nullius – of the Amerindians. 
Naturalising French superiority and civilisation therefore involves references to (traditional) 
external Others: “so as not to neglect any part of the world, is not this [royal] house 
renowned in Africa (…) and even among the Oriental Indians who, when they saw the 
Portuguese arriving towards them, called them Franques?” (Goulart and Goujet, 1758b: 
332). Hence, France’s perfection means that “there is no people on earth that have ever 
had such beautiful and holy Laws like ours” (Goulart and Goujet, 1758b: 332; see also 
B.N.F., F-23610 (483b): 3). A remonstrance dating from 1598 adds that the ‘fleurs de lys’ 
(the emblem of the king) are “rich jewels and the invaluable price of so many conquests 
that [the French kings] have won over their Enemies, the foreign Princes and the barbaric 
peoples” (Goulart and Goujet, 1758e: 596). What is clear, then, is that France is considered 
to be “the soul of the world… the essential form of a true and perfect Monarchy” (Goulart 
and Goujet, 1758e: 308).125 The naturalisation of French sovereignty thus re-activates the 
political theories analysed in Chapter 3 and their essentialisation of France as sovereign and 
civilised.  
 
A final strategy used by the French kings to naturalise their civilisation and thus 
support their sovereignty is to essentialise the League as barbaric by associating it with the 
widespread view of Spanish savagery. Participating in the ‘Black Legend’ the French kings 
insists on Spain as a savage Other which reinforces the naturalness of the kings’ 
sovereignty. Surprisingly, it is not the Amerindians that are associated to the League in 
order to further reinforce the image of savagery; rather, the French kings use a supposedly 
civilised, Christian, state for this purpose. Of course, and as a collateral damage, the 
Amerindians are reproduced as savages as well. But their role is not to create a stark 
contrast between French sovereignty and the League savagery. They are used instead as 
poor (and noble) savages suffering under the barbarian Spanish yoke. 
 
As mentioned previously, Spain played a key role in helping the League (in 
particular financially) with the objective of weakening the French kings. There is therefore a 
logical sense of animosity against Spain in most anti-League discourses. But this animosity 
takes a specific form: Spain is indeed associated with an image of savagery and barbarism. 
Talking about – and in favour of – the rights of the French king, one author writes that the 
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king and the French people “have been strong [in their faith], for the Church, when Asia, 
Africa, Spain, Italy, and almost the entire universe was full of Arianism and heresies” 
(Goulart and Goujet, 1758d: 694). The attack becomes even more precise in 1595 regarding 
the failed attempt of a Jesuit to kill the French king: “Africa does not give birth to monsters 
anymore; our Europe does, France nourishes them and brings them up, Spain grants them 
recognition, and Italy [the Pope] sanctifies them” (Goulart and Goujet, 1758e: 251).  
 
More than the support of Spain to the League, it is the “unfair and tyrannical 
domination” (Goulart and Goujet, 1758e: 59) of Spain over its possessions in America that 
is the most commonly used idea that sustains, by contrast, the good administration and 
good civilisation of the French king(s) (see B.N.F., F-46893 (9)). These discourses emerge 
out of the widespread image of Spanish misconduct towards the Amerindians. In 1579 an 
extensive account of the cruelties of the Spanish in the Americas was written by Benzoni 
and adapted into French by Chauveton (Benzoni, 1579). These ideas in turn informed the 
strong nationalist and anti-League discourses emerging from 1593 (Weill, 1892). Indeed, 
Spain becomes naturalised as savage. Some sources associate Spain with the idea of 
barbarism, arguing for instance that Spain “puts the Indies upside down by dint of 
searching for gold mines” (Goulart and Goujet, 1758b: 40). The League becomes associated 
with Spanish exploitation of its colonial possessions, with explicit references to the Indies 
(Goulart and Goujet, 1758e: 169). It is thus the evidence of uncivilised government of the 
Spanish in America that helps the French establish Spain as an inferior Other. Evoking the 
promise of the Spanish king to financially help the League, a 1593 pamphlet accuses Spain 
of barbarism in ‘Peru’ 
 
where he [the Spanish king] drained all the mines and killed two millions of these 
poor peoples [the Amerindians] in the process due to all the detestable cruelties 
that Antiquity invented and that time has added (…) [talking to the Spanish:] 
Fearless butchers, your hands are impatient to find out if the French stomach (…) is 
softer than the savage one (Goulart and Goujet, 1758c: 215-216). 
 
Crucially here, both the Spanish and the savages are performed as inferior Others. By 
appealing to ‘incontestable’ evidence of Spanish misconduct in America, the French 
naturalise their civilised identities and the savage identity of Spain and of the Amerindians. 
As a consequence, the prospect of Spanish rule over France is strongly opposed. Spain is 
qualified as a “barbaric and foreign power” to which the League is subjected (B.N.F., Dupuy 
549: f. 147).126 The Spanish also use “intolerable cruelties” (Goulart and Goujet, 1758d: 
690). L’Hospital (1825: 102-104) stated this view as early as the 1560s: for him the Spanish 
“ruin these poor Indians with their tyrannies and barbaric and unbearable cruelties”; even 
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 For similar expressions by the Parliament see Goulart and Goujet (1758d: 178) and in a pamphlet 
see Goulart and Goujet (1758e: 105). 
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worse, the Spanish conduct themselves as “brute beasts” towards the Amerindians. The 
catastrophic prospect of being ruled by the Spanish is thus repeatedly used to foster unity 
around the king during the League. As a 1590 pamphlet declares “all the Christian nations, 
and even the Barbarians and Indians, give ample testimony of the harshness and tyranny 
that the Spanish use on those who are subjected to their sovereignty” (B.N.F., Dupuy 579: 
158v; other associations with tyranny are made in B.N.F., Français 6546 (3) and B.N.F., F-
46893 (9)). Interestingly, the very people of Spain is also associated with unsovereign traits 
such as disobedience to the ruler (Goulart and Goujet, 1758e: 37). As such, letting Spain 
govern France is intolerable. In a 1594 public discourse in Parliament one member declares 
that it would be unacceptable to “mould France on this wonderful and miserable part of 
the earth… really another world, formerly so peopled and today so vast and wasted” 
(B.N.F., Dupuy 240: f. 191). And not only have the Spanish used “inhuman” and “barbaric” 
methods against the Amerindians (Goulart and Goujet, 1758e: 105): they are in fact 
becoming savage themselves. The reformed churches indeed describe them as “already 
half-savage due to their sustained company with the savages” (Goulart and Goujet, 1758e: 
482). 
 
Different naturalisation strategies are thus added by the French kings in order to 
perform the naturalness of their civilisation. The French kings and the French kingdom are 
re-installed as historical exemplars of civilisation. The self-image identified by the theorists 
is thus (re-)established by the kings themselves as the timeless essence of France. Another 
strategy involves America, but not in the way we would expect. Instead of the French kings 
comparing themselves favourably to the seminal savages of America, what the task of 
statecraft reveals is that the Amerindians are indeed established as savages but it is the 
misconduct of Spain – and by extension of the League – that is central in these discursive 
strategies. By reinforcing and naturalising the image of Spain as a barbaric actor the French 





Performativity works through the naturalisation of realities. These realities are reiterated 
until they appear normal, pre-existing, acceptable, in one word: natural. The discourses of 
sovereignty are no different: in order to reinforce the colonial frontiers created at the time 
of the European explorations the French naturalise, through different strategies, the 
identities on which their sovereignty is built and depends. These strategies involve 
reiterative assertions that the Amerindian are savage beings living in a state of nature but 
also a remarkably effective shaping of Amerindian desires and wishes. Through the French 
discourses we discover that the Amerindians desire French rule and welcome French 
sovereignty over them as their only hope to progress and improve their conditions. This 
157 
 
discursive strategy has two effects: it legitimises French domination over the Amerindians 
by removing any obstacles to it but it also reinforces the image of the French as civilised 
teachers involved in a civilising mission. 
 
On the other side of the Atlantic, the civilised sovereignty of the French kings is 
performed as eternal and attached to the (self-)image of France as a civilised country. By 
associating themselves with this traditional way of portraying France the kings naturalise 
their civilisation and as such reinforce their claims to sovereignty. Their appeal to an 
idealised ‘history’ is thus crucial in the process of reinforcing their claims to sovereignty; 
thanks to this strategy, it becomes difficult (if not impossible) to destabilise the naturalness 
of French civilisation and sovereignty. In addition, these discourses of sovereignty reveal 
how another actor – Spain – is naturalised as savage. Thanks to their appeals to 
‘incontestable’ evidence, the French kings can, by contrast, demonstrate the strength and 
incontestability of their civilised behaviours. 
 
 The naturalisations at play in this chapter thus further emphasise the co-
constitution of identities and their subsequent normalisation as pre-existing to the 
discourses that call them into being. The standard of civilised normality of the French is 
variously established as undeniable through a reiteration of the civilised-savage frontier, 
through a conservative appeal to ‘history’ or through the very recognition of the standard 
‘by’ those who have not achieved it. The two colonial frontiers also reinforce each other: 
the superiority of the French performed during the encounter with  the Amerindians feeds 
into the domestic naturalisation of French sovereignty while the case of Spain reveals how 
the reinforcement of the domestic colonial frontier strengthens the exclusion of the 
Amerindians as savages. After these naturalisations, the external and internal colonial 













This thesis has sought to explore the missing internal dimension of the construction of 
civilised sovereignty and to juxtapose this dimension to the well-known external (or 
international) construction of sovereignty over colonised peoples. Moving beyond what 
was identified as a limitation of post-colonial analyses – namely their exclusive focus on the 
external side of the colonial encounter, i.e. how Western states construct their sovereignty 
over the non-West – this thesis has problematised the establishment of this internal-
external boundary by revealing how sovereignty is constructed through discourses of 
civilisation and savagery both in the West and the non-West. 
 
First, I have discussed how French conceptualisations of sovereignty in the 16th 
century are necessarily linked to civilised standards of what an acceptable form of political 
authority and, more fundamentally, what a political society are. The conceptual 
construction of sovereignty in France always involved references to civilisation and 
culturally specific forms of exercising political authority. These scholarly discourses have 
also been shown to contain countless references to the ideas of savagery and state of 
nature. The idea of a progress of humankind from savagery to civilisation is indeed 
essential in constructing sovereignty and justifying the exercise of a final political authority 
in a political community. The concept of ‘civilised sovereignty’ is thus not another way to 
qualify sovereignty (like positive sovereignty or Westphalian sovereignty) but it is rather 
the very nature of sovereignty to be attached to a civilisational framework. Given the 
inherent normativity of references to a superior civilisation the naturalness of sovereignty 
(and thus its objectivity) are thus further problematised. Indeed, revealing the necessary 
link between sovereignty and civilisation enables one to insist on the necessity of a cultural 
frame of reference for identifying a ‘true’ sovereign state. This is reminiscent of Anghie’s 
analysis of nineteenth-century international lawyers and their difficulty in articulating in 




 This thesis has then explored the task of statecraft through the writing of the 
savage (and non-sovereign) identity of the Amerindians and of the civilised (and sovereign) 
identity of the French. In both contexts, claims to civilised sovereignty have been revealed 
to be more complex than expected when the Western and non-Western worlds are taken 
as already different before their encounter. In particular, I have shown how elements of 
civilisation and savagery are present on both sides of the Atlantic: the Amerindians seem to 
possess traits of civilisation while the French kingdom is portrayed as a savage state of 
nature. The colonial frontier between civilised and savage is thus destabilised. As such, 
‘different’ identities have to be created out of ‘similarities’ and shared characteristics 
between the two sides of the Atlantic. Statecraft thus becomes the process of ‘attributing’ 
civilised and savage identities to the sovereign and the unsovereign – or rather as the 
process of constructing such identities in order to support claims to sovereignty. 
 
 This is why Chapters 5 and 6 have explored the way(s) sovereignty relies on a 
construction (masquerading as identification) of the civilised and the savage. the 
Amerindians are culturally inscribed as savage thanks to the identification by the French of 
a large number of similarities that never fully qualify as complete or valid. Always falling 
short of being a complete Self the Amerindian is interpreted as a (familiar) Other living at 
the bottom of the civilisational hierarchy dominated and defined by the French. The state 
of nature in which the Amerindians live is thus built out of the familiar traits of savagery 
that the French carry with them in their encounters. Hence, the Amerindians fail to live up 
to civilised standards because they embody the familiar notions of savagery that were 
widespread in Europe at the time. In a similar way ‘inside’ of France, French sovereignty is 
constructed through a recurrent ‘distancing’ from French savage Others. Using the same 
references as for the Amerindians, the French kings and their supporters paint the League 
as an internal savage Other in order to represent their own political actions and values as 
civilised. These identities are further entrenched through a variety of strategies that make 
them appear ‘natural’ and self-evident. But when compared to the previous 
destabilisations of the colonial frontier, one is able to see their artificiality and 
constructedness.  
 
In sum, sovereignty is shown to be a political struggle between self-appointed 
civilised actors and the savage Others that they construct by opposition to them. Such a 
process of building civilised and savage identities is riddled with doubts and can only be 
disciplined by the sovereign voice. What emerges, then, is a necessary yet threatening 
construction and subsequent differentiation of the civilised sovereign state from savage 
Others: these Others are both necessary for the state actors to ground their claims to 
sovereignty but they also need to be domesticated and placed in a familiar, unthreatening 
framework. As a consequence, these unavoidable Others occupy the margins of the 
political order. The hyper agency of the Western state is established thanks to this key 




Additionally, this thesis has discussed how discourses of sovereignty rest on an 
arbitrary and always temporarily established distinction between civilised and savage. 
Sovereignty is not only constructed on similar ideas of civilisation and savagery inside and 
outside the West: it is also constructing hierarchies internally and externally. Indeed, and 
while the inferiorisation of the non-West has been discussed extensively in the post-
colonial literature on sovereignty and colonial encounters, the same process is mirrored 
inside the West with some parts of the population performed as savage and inferior. In 
other words, the presence of savagery – that should logically be absent from a civilised 
state like France – is necessarily and repeatedly performed in the contest over sovereignty. 
Paradoxically, then, a refocus on the Western dimension of civilised sovereignty reveals a 
fuller and more balanced picture of the Eurocentrism of the concept since the same 
discriminatory processes can be identified on both sides of what are, essentially, two 
civilised frontiers constructed on similar ideas of progress.  
 
 
Re-assessing sovereignty and its role as an organising 
principle of our international society 
 
Several conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of sovereignty. First, 
sovereignty participates in the establishment of (i) a domestic hierarchy between the 
legitimate ruler (or rulers) and those who have to obey and (ii) an international hierarchy 
between the legitimate form of rule (the civilised values) and the values that are denied 
this legitimacy and importance. The first hierarchy is ‘internal’ to the sovereign state and 
enables a minority to maintain its power. This domination is justified by the achievement of 
civilisation through the sovereign and by the savage (and thus illegitimate) nature of any 
alternative. Civilisation is thus clearly involved in the political struggles accompanying 
statecraft. Far from its image of objective and ‘descriptive’ concept, sovereignty depends 
on the political process of establishing civilised and savage identities. This is why the 
attribution of an unproblematic civilised identity to the West misses the essential idea that 
the West (as any other actor claiming civilisation) can only be temporarily and imperfectly 
civilised. Hansen (2006: 30) wrote that “the state only knows who and what it is through its 
juxtaposition against the radical, threatening Other. And, the protection of the state 
against an external Other is often intimately linked with the delineation of an internal 
Other”. Sovereignty is thus the ever-reproduced (and always in need of a further 
reproduction) performance of a civilised Self and a savage Other. The second form of 
hierarchy to which sovereignty is connected (and to which I come back below) is between 
the civilised sovereign state and the uncivilised dependent Other. By classifying some 
societies as less advanced – or backwards, to use a more politicised (and less now less 
frequent) term – the sovereign can impose his authority and legitimate his domination. 
Sovereignty thus seems to escape our simplistic analytical categories and disciplinary 
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boundaries: it plays a key role both towards the ‘inside’ and towards the ‘outside and it 
orders the world in both spheres by constructing civilised and savage identities.127 
 
Because sovereignty has been shown to be necessarily associated with civilised 
values, this thesis also represents another critique of the IR desire to describe sovereignty 
as an objective and unlimited form of political authority. Attributing some objectivity to a 
political concept like sovereignty is particularly problematic. Indeed, sovereignty is 
necessarily associated with a standard (of civilisation). Because of its inherent normativity 
sovereignty should rather be studied through the lens of performativity. Such an approach 
reveals that the realities of sovereignty are always naturalised and never natural (or 
naturally there for the observer to see). Judgements on the reality of sovereignty can thus 
only be made by looking at the naturalised realities that state actors (and their 
competitors) perform. These “[p]erformances of the state [constitute] ephemeral moments 
which seek to claim permanence” (Jeffrey, 2013: 73). The objectiveness that scholars find 
lacking in sovereignty is thus the result of a mismatch between their own analytical and 
epistemological expectations and the way sovereignty functions. Pointing to the lack of 
control that most states exhibit over their own borders and territory Benton (2009: 279) 
argues that “sovereignty is often more myth than reality, more a story that polities tell 
about their own power than a definite quality they possess”. Such a statement is 
problematic insofar as it conflates the idea of constructedness with that of artificiality 
(sovereignty as a ‘myth’). As shown in this thesis, sovereignty functions as a set of claims 
referring to (supposedly pre-existing) civilised foundations. Its constructedness does not 
make it less ‘real’. Rather, it makes it ‘real’ in a different way. 
 
As far as the ideas of ‘unlimitedness’ or ‘absoluteness’ are concerned this thesis 
supports the view that sovereignty is attached to responsibilities (Glanville, 2014). 
Nevertheless, IR scholars also need to recognise that sovereignty is attached to Western 
responsibilities. This has important implications for contemporary international relations. 
Just like the idea of trusteeship, sovereignty has been constructed on paternalistic 
implications, namely “to redeem peoples that fell well short of the (self-affirmed) 
perfection of European civilization” (Bain, 2003: 7). My analysis of civilised sovereignty has 
shown how certain non-Western features are devalued and delegitimised if they do not 
correspond to the Western (here: French) model of a civil society. As a consequence, the 
ideas of equality and independence attached to the concept should be questioned. In fact, 
these non-Western features are usually ignored altogether (or seen as inexistent). But 
crucially, there is nothing intrinsically superior or more successful in the attributes of 
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Western states. The only reason for this delegitimisation is the perceived difference of 
these features from the accepted features conducive to social life (and thus to a superior 
and more desirable way of life). Such judgements are normative and based on a 
Eurocentric understanding of the development of human societies. This is why when using 
sovereignty we need to recognise “the political implications of our categories” and the only 
apparent neutrality and timelessness of our language (Barkawi and Laffey, 2006: 344). As 
Puchala (1997: 129) writes, IR scholars should abandon their “implicit assumption that 
Western analytical concepts are both universally acceptable and unquestionably valid”. 
Sovereignty is indeed always reproducing inferiority and dependence for some and as such 
plays a central role in the construction of hierarchy at the international level. 
 
Finally, this thesis has questioned the usual and common-sense association 
between sovereignty and independence. In the theoretical literature as well as in policy 
discussions sovereignty (as the inherent correlate of the nation-state) is attributed a key 
role for the emancipation of peoples around the world. Taken at a high level of generality, 
sovereignty seems universal enough; it simply refers to a right to independence held by the 
highest authority of any given polity. But as shown in this thesis this restricted 
understanding is not the one that has been used by the West. In fact, political writers and 
actors have found it impossible to identify what sovereignty is outside of their (or the 
dominant) cultural framework. This is why IR scholars need to question the association 
between sovereignty and independence. Sovereignty promotes (at best) the independence 
of the sovereign elite adhering to the values considered as civilised in the West. Even when 
they recognise the Western content of the concept, some scholars still reproduce this 
standard view. Bull (1984: 222-223), for instance, writes that the revolt against the West he 
describes has been “conducted (...) in the name of ideas or values that are themselves 
Western”, including “the rights of states to sovereign equality”. Such an argument both 
acknowledges the provincial nature of sovereignty but still universalises the concept by 
referring to its use by actors in the non-West. Bull does not consider how such a spread of 
the concept of sovereignty could be considered as a problematic imposition of Western 
values. Not because sovereignty means freedom and because the West is supposedly the 
‘inventor’ of this idea but because sovereignty is built on a specific Western understand of 
freedom. Given the strong cultural content of sovereignty (i.e. the way it serves as a vehicle 
for Western values) this reliance on a concept supposedly bringing equality led to a further 
domination of the West. As argued by Nandy (1983: 3), “the specific variants of the 
concepts with which many anti-colonial movements in our times have worked have often 
been the products of the imperial culture itself and, even in opposition, these movements 
have paid homage to their respective cultural origins”. In this acceptation, the problem 
with sovereignty in the non-West is not its lack of achievement but rather the 
consequences of fully achieving it. Inayatullah and Blaney (1995) indeed argued that if 
Third World states had capacities to be ‘units of meaning’ then the promise of 
independence that sovereignty holds could be achieved. But even if the non-West was to 
acquire such capacities, would their independence be recognised by other (Western) states 
if the form taken by this independence was to differ substantially from Western 
expectations? In other words, is the problem with the adoption of sovereignty by the non-
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West one of achievement – realising sovereignty – or one of cultural specificity of the 
concept (in which case the non-West will always lag behind)? In this thesis I defended the 
latter answer on the basis of the intrinsic links between sovereignty and Western 
civilisation. From this perspective, sovereignty seems badly adapted (to say the least) to the 
goal of non-Western independence and emancipation. 
 
 
Implications beyond sovereignty: from international 
to intercultural relations? 
 
 
 Beyond the (central) concept of sovereignty, the conclusions of this thesis are also 
relevant to the question of culture and identity and their role in a narrowly-defined field of 
international relations. Sovereignty is indeed a prime example of how culture is generally 
excluded from IR as a non-topic (or as irrelevant for out conceptualisations of relations 
between already-formed states). As shown in the review of the literature on sovereignty, 
the role of culture is silenced in different ways (that are sometimes combined): Western 
culture can be portrayed as neutral or as accommodating difference and the Other since it 
is relatively open and non-directive. Another way through which culture is silenced is 
through the presentation of the dominant (Western) culture as indeed provincial, but as 
the most desirable form of culture. Western culture is therefore universalised based on its 
undeniable superiority. Finally, the role of culture(s) can be relegated to the past, either to 
pre-modern (and pre-international) relations or to the imperial past. In both cases, cultures 
or civilisations are seen as not (or less) relevant in the current universal global order.128 
 
 As discussed throughout this thesis, though, international relations presuppose 
encounters between cultures. Approaching international relations as intercultural relations 
opens up new ways of looking at the topics that IR as a discipline focuses on. It also raises 
different questions that IR has so far evacuated (except for a few exceptions). In particular, 
and if international relations are primarily about interactions guided by culture, how does 
culture shape these encounters? How is the Other perceived and conceptualised? What 
can a focus on these cultural encounters reveal for the relations that we study as 
international? 
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 These are important questions and this thesis has only provided partial answers to 
some of them. Indeed, through the study of the French encounter with the Amerindians of 
present-day Canada, one is afforded a glimpse of what encounters between cultures 
entail.129 One of the main conclusions of this analysis is that the ‘different’ Other is always 
read through pre-existing categories of difference. She is, essentially, a familiar Other. In 
practice, this means that the signs identified by the French were always re-inscribed into a 
familiar framework (which, in this case, was that of ‘savagery’). This is consistent with what 
studies on early ethnography and on travel literature have revealed. In their studies of pre-
Renaissance travels, scholars have concluded that ‘encounters’ reveal more about the 
familiar frameworks used than about the peoples ‘discovered’. In the late Middle Ages, 
early ethnographers “had to describe (and therefore distort) alien societies in the familiar 
terms of feudal organisation” and would assimilate newly found peoples into known 
categories (Fernández-Armesto, 1982: 281-282). Strangeness is thus always familiar: Marco 
Polo, for instance, “travels across a landscape half created in advance of him” (Campbell, 
1988: 88). Hodgen (1964: 54) similarly argues that  
 
Medieval anthropogeography in this sense was tough mental stuff, so often 
repeated, so durable, so satisfying, that by the time of the Renaissance many of its 
preconceptions had been accepted as received experience, and were employed, to 
the confusion of thought, in the interpretation of the new peoples of the New 
World. 
 
Cultural encounters are here reduced from the heroic and idealised transformative act of 
discovery to a mere allocation of the exotic “within the context of a familiar web of 
discourse” (Ryan, 1981: 523). 130 The Other is incorporated into the “language of the 
system” (Pratt, 1992: 31). The ‘difference’ that is seen is in fact already-known:  “Almost 
without effort, the new worlds were co-opted into a style of thinking as if they had been 
part of the argument from the beginning” (Ryan, 1981: 530). 
 
Just like other cultural ‘encounters’, then, the French ‘encounter’ with the 
Amerindians was heavily influenced by previous concepts and theories. These explorers 
were no different from the early anthropologists studied by Hodgen (1964: 184): “When 
abroad, their eyes saw no more than their minds, shaped at home, were prepared to 
accept”. One could even ask whether this type of identification by association to familiar 
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point is explored below. 
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frameworks is not a universal feature also used by the non-West: this seems to be the way 
the Tainos integrated the Spanish who arrived from a ‘different’ land and with a ‘different’ 
culture (Bitterli, 1986: 73). Taking one’s culture as a reference point, the ‘explorers’ 
construct the Other as lacking when compared to their idealised Self-image. The other 
becomes a distortion of the Self (Campbell, 1988: 177-178). And the identity of the Other 
changes as the identity of the Self is transformed. Indeed, a common feature of Western 
encounters with the non-West is the classification of the different Other as the antithesis 
or negative of the positive West. More specifically, the non-West is identified by its lack 
when compared to the West (Hodgen, 1964: 25-26; Bernheimer, 1970: 9). This confirms the 
idea that the Other is always defined in relation to the Self. As explored in this thesis, the 
civilised and the savage function as a nexus: one would not exist without the other. 
Encounters are thus events during which this nexus is established, reproduced or 
destabilised. 
 
International/intercultural relations thus reveal an unexpectedly disappointing 
picture: the cultural encounters can be summarised by an assimilation or domestication of 
the Other by the Self. Indeed, historians have concluded that “[t]he assimilation of the new 
worlds, in other words, involved their domestication” (Ryan, 1981: 523). One way the 
presence of an Other is explained in this context is through the idea of ‘degeneration’. 
Degeneration offers a convenient way to domesticate the Other: it both explains and 
renders the Other inoffensive or unthreatening. This strategy was widely used in the pre-
modern era (Bernheimer, 1970: 8; Fernández-Armesto, 1982: 281) but also during the Age 
of ‘Discoveries’: according to Blaney and Inayatullah (2006: 124) many Europeans 
“regarded the New World peoples’ physical and social distance from the singular moment 
of Edenic creation as a correlate of their degeneration from Christian faith and civilized 
behaviour”. By placing the ‘new’ and ‘unknown’ – these terms being somewhat deceptive, 
as explained below – into familiar frameworks (for instance through the idea of 
degeneration) encounters are made inoffensive: they do not and logically cannot 
destabilise one’s own worldview or perspectives since the encountered Other is always 
already established and re-established into the known. Alternatives are erased and 
intercultural relations become self-validating exercises, at least for the dominant actors. 
 
The relations that IR focuses on thus seem to be mainly concerned with escaping 
true cultural questioning of one’s own culture. They become “openly self-validating” 
exercises (Ryan, 1981: 536). This is not surprising: given that “the self is 
constituted/constructed in relation to the other” (Guillaume, 2002: 12), this Other is never 
read or seen on her own terms. Some discussions in IR could be enriched by such insights 
on intercultural relations. The search for the local and non-Western must for instance deal 
with these limitations if it is to produce a convincing account of this elusive Other. This is 
not only a theoretical issue: recently state-building scholars and practitioners have shown a 
renewed interest in the non-Western or ‘local’ (particular through the ‘local ownership’ 
agenda and the critiques of liberal state-building). State-building actors have been criticised 
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for basing their approach on the idea of a non-West state of nature or tabula rasa 
(Autesserre, 2009; Lemay-Hébert, 2011). But escaping this deadlock will prove difficult if 
the perceptions of the non-West by the West are not deconstructed and analysed in depth. 
Indeed, and even with the best intentions, finding the ‘local’ is no easy task while 
reproducing the non-West as the antithesis of the West appear as the commonest option. 
 
IR as a discipline should thus focus on encounters between cultures and how they 
could provide a more meaningful questioning of the Self and the worldviews that she holds. 
A lot of what IR is concerned with (war and peace, the ordering of our international society, 
interventions and the post-colonial condition) is intimately related to these cultural 
‘encounters’. These practices are indeed shaped by the inability of the West to experience 
a genuine encounter with difference: imposing worldviews and the inability to dialogue is a 
common attitude denounced both by critical scholars (who see in it the persistence of 
imperialist reflexes) and mainstream actors (who consider this tendency as counter-
productive in the establishment of a global liberal order). The discipline should thus 
concentrate on the possibility of a true cultural encounter or dialogue of cultures. Ideally, 
this could enable the West to explore “alternative ways of life as a source of critical 
reflection on the present” (Blaney and Inayatullah, 2006: 126). This is how the inclusion-
exclusion dynamic (Aalberts, 2014) that characterises the colonial encounters could be 
avoided. Through this dynamic the colonial Other is included in the colonial order – they 
are perceived as part of this order – but they are also excluded at the same time by being 
placed at the margins of this order (as savage, underdeveloped or ‘traditional’). A genuine 
encounter with difference would break this dynamic and allow for an integration of the 
Other in her own terms. Nevertheless, the possibility of such a dialogue can seem remote: 
indeed, if one considers language to be central for our construction of the world, a true 
encounter with difference remains an unrealistic prospect. The Self will always construct 
the Other from the language that she holds (in the broad sense of ‘words’ and concepts), 
thus never offering a truthful representation of this Other. As Campbell (1988: 179) 
explains, 
 
the traveler’s medium is language, and the language he uses has evolved as an 
envelope specific to its region and culture. It has no words for what is alien – at 
least, no words that do not contain and express their roots in the state of 
alienation. 
 
This is why the Other is always already alienated from the Self and inscribed at the margins 
of the ‘normal’. The search for ‘true’ encounters might thus be seen as a desire inscribed in 
a traditional view of science as a positivist and rational enterprise of discovery and 
empirical description. Only in such a context is a true or genuine encounter possible. But as 
discussed throughout this thesis, such an approach is an idealisation of what cultural 
encounters – and science, for that matter – are. A culturally-infused language is 
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predominant in the shaping of the Other. As such, the critical approaches that idealise 
cultural encounters as opportunities for the discovery of the Other run the risk of 
contradicting some of their fundamental presupposition (for instance that the non-West is 
discursively constructed by the West and cannot be seen ‘as it is’). To postulate that there 
is an impossibility to access reality empirically and outside the medium of (culturally-
biased) language and concepts should lead to the logical conclusion that ‘true’ encounters 
– or the “representation of difference in its own terms” (Ryan, 1981: 536) – can never be 
achieved. This is a conclusion that is equally applicable to the assumptions underlying this 
project. 
 
 Related to the question of cultural encounter, a second major implication of this 
thesis for our understanding of international relations is the persistence of colonial 
frontiers (constituted precisely through the failure of achieving a true and genuine cultural 
encounter). These frontiers correspond to the differentiation between civilised and savage 
and the attribution of a seemingly fixed identity to ‘different’ subjects. These frontiers are 
well-known to post-colonial scholars who have been studying them in the establishment 
and maintenance of imperialism and colonialism. The non-West is placed in the category of 
the savage, relegated to the margins of the international order and portrayed as in need of 
the help of the West in order to improve its situation. International relations thus do not 
seem to have evolved dramatically since the Middle Ages: the Other is represented as 
abnormal and thus placed outside (or excluded) from the normal order of international 
politics. Campbell (1988: 63) explains how Christian intellectuals used the same expedient 
by placing the abnormal “outside the oikumene in spaces not under the control of the local 
bishop or bailiff” which reveals how intercultural studies have resonance for international 
relations. But throughout this thesis what has been emphasised is the proximity of the 
external Other with the internal Other: the external Other – the Amerindians and savage 
peoples more generally – are never far from internal Others such as the League or from 
close Others such as the Spanish. The same colonial frontier is thus present internally and is 
constructed in similar ways: the internal Other is a savage Other that is both included in 
existing frameworks and excluded (i.e. relegated to the margins of the political order). The 
inclusion-exclusion logics of the colonial order are at play both internally and externally. 
 
 As such, the discourses of sovereignty reveal that the use of savagery to 
characterise one’s own internal Others in Europe was widespread. As Inayatullah and 
Blaney (2004: 90) observe, the term ‘Indian’ and its associated savagery “came to be linked 
to all others” in the 16th and 17th centuries (including religious adversaries back in Europe). 
Hobbes also constructed his theory with the implication that Europeans could degenerate 
from their civilised achievements back into savagery (Ashcraft, 1971: 1108-1111). The 
question of cultural encounters addressed above is thus equally present inside the 
sovereign state. Using the example of travel writing, Pratt (1992: 35) explains that 
“European peasantry came to appear only somewhat less primitive than the inhabitant of 
the Amazon”. Thus, one should not arbitrarily restrict the idea of (mis)understanding 
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between cultures to the international sphere. Doing so would mean essentialising the 
external Other as different or more different than the internal Other. Furthermore, and as 
shown in this thesis, it is possible to identify commonalities between the internal and 
external processes of Othering. The arbitrary boundary between Politics and IR as separate 
displines is destabilised by the consideration of how difference is produced. But one crucial 
specificity remains: the Othering of the savage ‘at home’ relies on a juxtaposition between 
her savagery and her recently-held but now lost civilisation. As such, domestic savagery 
undeniably carries a specific weight: the European savage is indeed worse than the distant 
Other because the former lives in contact with and among the civilised Selves. In a way, the 
savage in the West should have known better and her savagery is portrayed as a somehow 
more offensive sin. Accusations of savagery – and as such the establishment of the colonial 
frontier – therefore play a specific role in the West: turned against those who have all the 
resources to be(come) civilised, the domestic savage is doubly-condemned since she has no 
excuse for her behaviour. 
 
 Numerous central preoccupations for IR also rely (or are constructed thanks to) 
colonial frontiers. War and its justifications, terrorism (and the identification of the 
‘terrorist’) or interventions: all rely on the important distinction between the civilised, 
advanced and rational and the savage, backwards or child-like. As revealed with 
sovereignty, these colonial frontiers are arbitrarily established for political purposes and 
regularly crossed. This civilisational difference is also constructed out of familiarity. These 
insights could find some resonance in the study of war, terrorism or interventions. All these 
areas are informed by these colonial logics of differentiation and hierarchical ordering. But 
all are equally troubled by the lack of stability and permanence of these colonial frontiers 
between civilised and savage. More generally, these international practices seem to create 
the very problem that they are designed to solve or reduce: difference. Indeed, they all rely 
on the presence of Others in order to establish their significance. In this way, they are all 
involved in the creation or reproduction of colonial frontiers. This is particularly 
contradictory since difference is also the source of the dangers and problems that these 
practices are designed to deal with. The international reality that is constructed though 
through these concepts – sovereignty, war, terrorism... – is thus ironically both a necessity 
and a danger: it is necessary for international relations as we know it to continue to exist 
(as a self-validating exercise) and dangerous since this constructed Otherness must be 
excluded and domesticated. The civilised Self therefore creates the very condition – and 
reason – of its maintenance by contributing to the establishment of an Other. 
 
 Finally, and through its exploration of sovereignty, this thesis has insisted on 
bringing the internal and external processes of othering closer together and on identifying 
commonalities between them. Such a choice raises an important question that has 
implications for IR more generally: can the discriminations suffered by the West be 
compared – or equalled – to the discriminations suffered by the non-West? If the colonial 
frontier is as important inside and outside, could it be concluded that the establishment of 
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these hierarchies placed an equal burden on the marginalised Others inside and outside the 
sovereign state? Is the imposition of a standard of civilisation in the West comparable to 
the imposition of the same standard to others? Bringing the internal and external 
processes together has thus the advantage of showing the similarities and shared logics of 
both but could also lead to difficult questions about the sufferings experienced by the 
internal and external ‘savages’. More importantly, the problem is not in having to decide 
who suffered the most (as if such a question was answerable) but whether colonial logics 
have the exact same effect on both the West and the non-West. When Nandy (1983) 
mentions the impact of colonialism on the British themselves, is he justified in arguing that 
the British were victims in the same way as the Indians they colonised? Some would 
probably argue that blurring the line between the colonised at home and the colonised 
abroad could obscure the way the non-West suffered from the establishment of the 
colonial frontier. But the other solution – to treat the internal colonial frontier as a minor 
issue irrelevant for IR – would mean to arbitrarily restrict colonial logics to the 
international. Once again, it is IR as a discipline – and its desire to conceptualise the 
international as separate and distinct – that is being interrogated. Some will answer that 
blurring the lines between IR and Politics will obscure more than clarify; this thesis, on the 
contrary, has sought to demonstrate the benefits of doing so.  
 
 
Analytical choices and limitations of the thesis 
 
While this thesis can make valuable contributions to the debates about sovereignty and IR 
more generally, it is also restricted by some of the analytical choices made. This section will 
discuss them, try to assess their importance and finally relate them to the future research 
areas that this thesis could lead to.  
 
 The first limitation of this thesis is linked to the choice of a specific case and period. 
In this thesis the emphasis has been on French external and internal sovereignty. In the 
case of external sovereignty, the focus has been on the first contacts between the French 
and the Amerindians. Despite the geographical limitedness of this encounter I have been 
able to identify similar discourses in the broader literature on the ‘Discovery’ of America. 
This literature, which includes the works by Pagden, Todorov and Greenblatt, among 
others, is usually focused on the Spanish encounter. But interestingly the Spanish reactions 
discussed by these scholars mirror that of the French in their encounter with the 
Amerindians. In its external dimension, then, France represents an under-studied example 
but comes as a confirmation of broader trends.131 As such, the focus on one country seems 
                                                          
131
 This is not to say, of course, that the French reacted in exactly the same way as the Spanish but 
simply that their reactions are broadly similar to that of the Spanish. In a more general sense, the 
processes through which the French (mis)understood the Amerindians are similar to other European 
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sufficient to reveal the ways in which sovereignty was constructed on discourses of 
civilisation during colonial encounters. When one considers the prevalence of colonial 
logics in our contemporary international society these observations are valid for later 
periods as well. Turning to the internal side of the construction of civilised sovereignty, the 
particularity of the French case could be problematic: not every country in Europe was 
experiencing similar issues and contestations. The French religious crisis thus exhibits a 
high level of particularity (especially when it comes to the identification of internal and 
external Others) that cannot be transposed to other Europeans states. These results are 
thus not directly applicable to other European states and comparative analyses would  be 
required. What seems to be certain, however, is that the French case – when taken at a 
sufficient level of abstraction – seems illustrative of some broader patterns of the 
construction of the sovereign state (in particular in terms of identifying Others and 
constructing a civilised identity). Similar processes happened in England, for instance, and 
the discourses of ‘civility’ played an equally important role in legitimising political authority 
(Braddick, 2002). Lastly, this thesis has focused on a specific period offering a fruitful 
example of debates about civilised sovereignty in Europe (and about European sovereignty 
over the non-West). Due to time and space limitations I have not explored previous or 
subsequent periods. This is a clear limitation of this thesis and additional research could be 
conducted on the following periods up to the present day. But more importantly the choice 
of a specific time period could mislead the reader into believing that French civilised 
sovereignty did not exist before that period and that the civilised identity of France was 
established once and for all at the end of the 16th century. As an answer to this 
misunderstanding it is crucial to remember that the processes of construction of civilised 
sovereignty (and the denial of sovereignty to the non-West) are continuous, only 
temporarily established and always in need of reproduction. The task of statecraft involves 
both a reaffirmation (or transformation) of the ideal of civilised sovereignty and a 
reaffirmation or critique of the capacity of the current ruler to realise this ideal. Due to the 
continuity of this process the time limits of this thesis should not be understood as a 
‘beginning’ and an ‘end’ but rather as a snapshot in a continuous process of (re)creation of 
the civilised and sovereign Self. 
 
 The second objection to this thesis lies in the exclusive focus on French discourses. 
This thesis is thus potentially (and ironically given the objectives outlined in the 
introduction) Eurocentric. In Eurocentric approaches “non-European societies are either 
completely excluded from, or rendered contingent in, theorizing modern transformation in 
Europe” (Matin, 2013: 354). There is thus a clear risk of “emphasizing ‘Western’ agency as 
the terrain of the political” (Sabaratnam, 2013: 264), i.e. as the only place to look for when 
one wishes to explore political ideas and processes. There is a real concern that agency is 
attributed to the West only or that Western agency is over-emphasised to the detriment of 
the non-West. As an answer to this critique I concur with Doty (1996: 12-13) who writes in 
Imperial Encounters: 
                                                                                                                                                                    
reactions towards these ‘newly discovered’ peoples. For an example see how Smith explains the 




this study is intended to emphasize the fact that encounters between the North 
and the South were (and are) such that the North’s representations of “reality” 
enabled practices of domination, exploitation, and brutality, practices that 
probably would have been considered unthinkable, reprehensible, and unjustifiable 
were an alternative “reality” taken seriously. Alternative representations did 
indeed exist, but they were either marginalized or systematically silenced. 
 
In a similar way as Doty I choose to emphasise the (representational) power of the West 
and how its discourses of civilisation and sovereignty enabled certain practices. It is this 
imbalance in terms of performative capacity that usually orients scholars towards Western 
discourses. Additionally, reliable sources on the Amerindian’s reactions to the encounter 
with Europeans are sparse and when they exist it is usually only through European texts. 
These sources are thus highly questionable and cannot be taken as representing the 
indigenous ‘voice’. Ironically, then, focusing on Western discourses and revealing the 
civilisational ambiguities they contain might be the only way to access the agency of the 
Amerindians in the 16th century. Indeed, if alternatives are not revealed through the voice 
of the Amerindians themselves, the complex process of writing difference studied here 
brings to light the suppressed possibilities of this encounter. From my analysis, for instance, 
emerges the possibility that the Amerindians could have been considered civilised (and 
thus equal). This is a possibility present in the French discourses themselves and in 
particular in the mention of everything that is comparable and familiar in Amerindian 
societies.132 Hence, and because understanding “language as political is to see it as a site 
for the production and reproduction of particular subjectivities and identities while others 
are simultaneously excluded” (Hansen, 2006: 16), alternatives can be revealed through the 
dominant discourses. 
 
 Finally, and interlinked with the previous objection, the choice of performativity in 
order to study discourses is also problematic in one key respect. Concerns can indeed be 
raised about the reproductive aspect of performativity. If the goal is to denaturalise 
‘sovereignty’, alternatives need to be identified. Looking at sovereignty discourses, 
however, hardly seems to be the right place to start to contest the very framework of 
sovereignty. Hence, “[t]o endeavor to think the state is to take the risk of taking over (or 
being taken over by) a thought of the state, i.e. of applying to the state categories of 
thought produced and guaranteed by the state and hence to misrecognize its most 
profound truth" (Bourdieu et al., 1994: 1). This is particularly worrying if we consider 
academic works as performative in their own right. As Gregson and Rose (2000: 447) write 
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 This is equally true for internal or domestic alternatives. Indeed, showing how competitors tried 
to contest sovereignty in France enables me to deconstruct how the ‘hyper agency’ of the civilised 
West comes to life. In other words, such an exploration offers “insights into the ways in which 
agents subvert or rework ideas of state, not as forms of resistance ‘outside’ state structures, but 
within the processes through which structures are reproduced” (Jeffrey, 2013: 176). 
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“research projects, their writing, and their dissemination are supreme examples of 
academic performance and performativity”. As I have tried to show in this thesis, looking at 
the very discourses of domination cannot offer us alternatives but it does not mean either 
that reality is taken as granted (and thus that alternatives are not possible). Performativity 
enabled me to explore the contingent and always unstable construction of civilised 
sovereignty contra scholars who take sovereignty as a pure reflection of an (inescapable 
and desirable) reality. In addition, I focus on “the conflicts and confrontations of the early 
beginnings” as a way to recover “discarded possibles” (Bourdieu et al., 1994: 4). Butler 
(1990: 147) argues similarly that 
 
Paradoxically, the reconceptualization of identity as an effect, that is, as produced 
or generated, opens up possibilities of “agency” that are insidiously foreclosed by 
positions that take identity categories as foundational and fixed. For an identity to 
be an effect means that it is neither fatally determined nor fully artificial and 
arbitrary.  
 
Alternatives (or ‘agency’) are thus present at the very heart of dominant discourses. The 
analyst therefore has two options: either focusing on dominant discourses of sovereignty in 
order to reveal their constructedness or focusing on alternatives to sovereignty. Crucially, 
though, both options point towards the same conclusion: sovereignty is neither 
inescapable nor is it the only possibility. These two options contribute in their own way to 





Taking into account the limitations mentioned above as well as the broader implications of 
this thesis I want to close by outlining some future directions worth exploring. In particular, 
three areas could provide fruitful results for our conceptualisation of the construction and 
management of difference between political communities. 
 
 First, our understanding of the Other (and of its production) needs to be further 
interrogated. As written by Grovogui (1996: 7) “the ‘other’ is the product of a textuality 
that, through intellectual assumptions and methods, has transformed mere cultural and 
historical variations into essential distances”. But these essential differences need to be 
questioned. More specifically, this thesis calls for a greater emphasis on the ways 
Otherness is constructed and the influence of these processes on international relations. In 
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some cases, the Other seems to be strictly separated from the Self. Inayatullah and Blaney 
(2004: 53), for instance, estimate that “[s]elf and other had to be radically separated” 
during the encounter with Amerindians. In my analysis, the Other is different from the Self 
because inscribed in a familiar European framework. But are there other ways through 
which the different Other could come to be (or was historically constructed)? Are non-
Western ways of understanding difference similar? Furthermore, this thesis points at a 
specific way difference is understood, namely difference as defect (Bain, 2003: 24), but 
other possibilities certainly exist. Havercroft (2008: 118), for instance, identifies both a 
misrecognition of indigenous institutions and an impossibility to translate indigenous 
conceptions into European categories as key sources of the inferiority of indigenous 
peoples in international relations. What is called for, thus, is an exploration of the different 
dimensions of Otherness and a rejection of the Other as necessarily (and simply) ‘radically’ 
different. At the same time, this thesis has raised an important epistemological question 
with regards to ‘difference’ and its study. Indeed, from what position is one able to identify 
what is (and is not) different? In other words, if difference is always portrayed under the 
guise of the familiar, where is ‘difference’ actually located and by whom can it be 
perceived? This concern relates to the uneasiness of talking about difference while 
recognising the centrality of familiarity for its interpretation. For Ryan (1981: 524), for 
instance, “novelty and change were expected to confirm rather than break with tradition”. 
But how does one perceive this ‘novelty’ and this ‘change’ – this ‘difference’ – and from 
what vantage point can the analyst decide that or if ‘difference’ was there? Although very 
abstract, this issue brings us back to the desire to find the exotic and the different in the 
non-West (or assuming that the non-West is different) which can lead to an essentialisation 
of this non-Western Other as necessarily different. 
 
 Second, the language of sovereignty has erased ‘local’ realities and institutions. But 
perhaps more importantly, it has also erased alternative political systems or orders. In 
other words, the imposition of sovereignty as a universal template has forced other forms 
of political community to disappear or adopt the language of the sovereign state. This is 
particularly worrying since sovereignty can contradict non-Western forms of political 
organisation and more widely non-Western worldviews. Cocks (2014: 79) indicates that 
“[i]f the early North American Indian relationship to the land is at odds with the idea of 
sovereign power over a fixed territory, so is the traditional North American Indian penchant 
for community self-rule by consensus as opposed to rule by a centralized state 
differentiated from society”. As a coercive and hierarchical form of authority sovereignty is 
not necessarily the most adapted form of political rule (especially for societies upon which 
it is being imposed). But self-determination, autonomy and independence are now widely 
associated with the grammar of sovereignty, both in the West and in the non-West (Cocks, 
2014: 77). This is problematic, for insofar as sovereignty is deeply provincial, 
“understanding the indigenous right of self-determination in terms of state sovereignty 
ironically is at best inappropriate and at worst a form of imperialist co-optation itself” 
(Havercroft, 2008: 128-129). Some future research could be conducted, therefore, not only 
on alternatives to sovereignty as the only form of political rule but also on how the 
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adoption of the language of sovereignty is actually not conducive to independence or 
freedom for non-Western peoples. In this context, is it desirable to ‘go beyond’ the horizon 
offered by the concept of sovereignty? A first task would be to analyse how sovereignty has 
been established as the only option. In this respect, IR scholars might be part of the 
problem. Indeed, sovereignty is portrayed as a culturally-open and equalitarian concept 
having been embraced throughout the world and thus as supposedly culturally-open, or as 
an equalitarian concept opposed to the previous unsatisfying, medieval system of suzerain 
states (which stands as the only alternative to the current system of sovereign states). 
Sovereignty is thus presented as in the best interest of all societies (including non-Western 
ones).133 Looking beyond sovereignty, however, necessitates rejecting key elements of 
Western modern thought and the answers that sovereignty has come to provide inside of 
this intellectual framework (Walker, 1993). If the options are not restricted to the 
alternative ‘cosmopolitanism versus sovereign states’, imagining other orders still prove 
difficult. 
 
 Finally, a last line of enquiry concerns the ever-reproduced ‘neutrality’ of the 
concept of sovereignty (something that this thesis has not been able to explore given the 
focus on one specific period of history). This thesis has argued that no conception of 
sovereignty can be detached from a specific (Western) civilisational content. But 
‘civilisation’ as a normative ideal is constantly evolving and re-invented. Ironically, this has 
provided an opportunity for positivist scholars to preserve the image of sovereignty as a 
neutral and objective concept. Indeed, the discrimination that lies at the centre of civilised 
sovereignty is repeatedly hidden behind the positive elements of the last embodiment of 
civilisation.134 The hierarchical ordering of peoples and cultures that form the core of how 
the international order of sovereign states functions is thus constantly reproduced but also 
re-invented under a different guise. These ever-reproduced discriminatory 
conceptualisations of sovereignty presented as neutral, universal and objective can still be 
seen at work in some contemporary analyses. At the end of his historical exploration of the 
links between sovereignty and responsibility, Glanville makes a distinction between earlier 
forms of external enforcement of sovereign responsibilities and the use of the 
contemporary Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. For him, previous interventions 
were targeted at ‘subjects’ while contemporary interventions are designed to protect 
‘citizens’. He also explains how contemporary operations are not design to conquer 
territory but rather to build sovereignty and respect “the will of a sovereign people” 
(Glanville, 2014: 219). Glanville is thus oblivious to the ‘hierarchical ordering’ that pervades 
the notion of R2P. Here, an apparent change from one form of sovereignty to another 
seems to be the condition for survival of colonial logics: by demonising the past and past 
practices of sovereignty as violent, colonial or imperialistic, scholars are able to reproduce a 
supposedly more acceptable and neutral contemporary notion of sovereignty. On closer 
analysis, though, their notion of sovereignty is equally normative and Eurocentric. This 
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 Those arguments can be found, for instance, in Bull and Watson (1984: 433-434). 
134
 One could say that the last version of civilisation that supports sovereignty is stripped of its 
political dimension and presented as apolitical, acultural and thus universal. 
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perpetual reproduction of colonial logics – the integration of “cultural distinctions into a 
hierarchical ordering of developmental levels” (Koskenniemi, 2001: 130) – is at the heart of 
the ever-changing yet always discriminatory concept of sovereignty. In order to build upon 
the critique of sovereignty presented in this thesis a deconstruction of this reinvention of 






Throughout this thesis the idea of difference and of its management (i.e. how difference is 
perceived, represented and acted upon/with) has been at the centre of the analysis. 
Sovereignty – especially when understood as ‘civilised sovereignty’ – plays a crucial role in 
this process. It is through sovereignty that the rules of coexistence with difference – and 
difference itself – are constructed and reconstructed. It is also in relation to sovereignty 
that the (civilised Western) Self is established. Despite recurrent discourses about the 
curtailment of sovereignty, its lack of contemporary relevance or its supposed limitations in 
the face of globalisation, neither sovereignty nor civilisation seem close to disappearing 
from the Western conceptual framework. Rather, they are transformed and re-created on 
a daily basis in order to fit new expectations and ideals. This explains why studies of 
sovereignty are still crucial. 
 
But beyond sovereignty, this thesis has been centrally concerned with recovering 
diversity and difference. As argued, this objective has been informed by a belief in the 
intrinsic value of Otherness as a tool for self-reflection (so as instrumental for the West to 
reflect on its own choices) but also by a recognition that Western values have no intrinsic 
superiority. At the same time, though, there is a need to remain conscious about the 
unintended effect that such a project could carry with it. Indeed, difference has always 
been approached as a problem in the colonial order: as stated by Hodgen (1964: 482), 
“diversity is the problem which underlies and qualified the statement of all other problems 
in modern anthropology”. It is important, thus, that such a project designed to recover 
difference is not transformed into a colonial attempt at domesticating difference in order 
to reach (a biblical) unity or uniformity. In addition, this thesis has sought to improve the 
way the Other is perceived by denouncing the domestication of the Other through familiar 
language and framework. Although clearly anti-colonial, such a project could also be read 
as (yet another) attempt at bolstering the Western project of (re)unification of human 
beings assembled thanks to a better cross-cultural understanding of each other. Both 
dangers reveal the difficulty of escaping the modern colonial frames that inform our 










With the exception of Bellenger’s short account of his voyage (that is only available in 
English) all the archives used are translated from French by the author. The orthography 
and syntax have been modernised where necessary. Published books and materials are 
cited in the same way as recent works (with mention of the date, publisher and place 
published). This allows for an easy identification of the edition used. For page numbers, a 
simple number is indicated; for folio numbers, a ‘f.’ comes before the number, and a ‘v’ 
indicates that it is the verso side of the folio.  
 
Archives that have not been published are cited as follows: 
- The place of conservation: A.N. [Archives Nationales], A.E. [Archives du Ministère des 
Affaires Etrangères], B.N.F. [Bibliothèque Nationale de France]; 
- Collection and manuscript number in the collection (e.g. “N.A.F. 9384” or “K1485”), or 
reference number of the item (e.g. “F-23610”); an explanation of the meaning of the 
abbreviation is given for each place of conservation below; 
- Document number when available, in parentheses (e.g. “K1485 (22)” means manuscript 
K1485, document 22). 





• K: série K. 
 
A.N., K1485: Archives de Simancas. 
 
• U: série U. 
 





Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères: 
 
• M.D.: Mémoires et documents. 
 
A.E., M.D. France 242 : (Affaires Intérieures et Extérieures, 3.) — 1573-1614. 
 
A.E., M.D. France 360 : (France et Divers États, 10.) — 1270-1517. 
 
A.E., M.D. France 373 : (France et Divers États, 23.) — 1588-1620.  
 
A.E., M.D. France 761 : (Affaires Intérieures, 18.) — 1406-1589. 
 
A.E., M.D. France 762 : (Affaires Intérieures, 19.) — 1590-1596. 
 
A.E., M.D. France 782 : (Affaires Intérieures, 39.) — 1626. 
 




Bibliothèque Nationale de France: 
 
• F and combination of letters and numbers: Documents available through 
the general catalogue 
 
B.N.F., 8-LB34 (291): La saincte et tres chrestienne resolution de monseigneur l'illustrissime 
& reverendissime cardinal de Bourbon, pour maintenir l'Eglise catholique & romaine [Texte 
imprimé]... Par F. I. Berson, parisien, docteur en theologie & frere mineur, 23 Janvier 1586. 
 
B.N.F., F-23610 (483b): Edict du Roy sur l’union de ses subjects catholiques, 1588. 
 
B.N.F., F-46912 (22): Commissions du Roy (du 8 novembre 1603) et de Monseigneur 
l'admiral (du 31 octobre 1603) au sieur de Monts pour l'habitation ès terres de Lacadie 
(sic), Canada et autres endroits en la Nouvelle France. Ensemble les défenses premières (du 
18 décembre 1603) et secondes (du 22 janvier 1605) à tous autres de trafiquer avec les 
sauvages desdites terres. Avec la vérification en la cour de parlement à Paris. 
 
B.N.F., F-46886 (23): Déclaration de la volonté du Roy faite depuis son département de 
Paris, 1588. 
 
B.N.F. F-46889 (5): Déclaration du Roy sur la trefve accordée par sa Majesté au Roy de 




B.N.F. F-46889 (25): [no title] Lettres d’Henri IV à ses conseillers et autres officiers de 
Chalon, 1589. 
 
B.N.F., F-46893 (9): Déclaration du roy en forme d’édit, sur la réduction de la ville 
d’Aucerre en son obeissance, avril 1594. 
 
B.N.F., F-47170 (17): Déclaration du roy de Navarre sur les calomnies publiées contre luy és 
protestations de ceux de la Ligue qui se sont esleuez en ce Royaume. 1585, Bergerac. 
 
B.N.F. FZ-2052: Déclaration du Roy sur l'attentat, félonnie et rébellion des villes de Paris, 
Orléans, Amiens, Abbeville, et autres leurs adhérans... – février 1589. 
 
B.N.F., FZ-2069: Déclaration du Roy confirmative d’autre déclaration par luy faicte à son 
advenement à la Couronne, de vouloir maintenir & conserver la Religion Catholique… et 
arrest de la Cour de Parlement intervenu sur icelle, 1591. 
 
B.N.F., Contre les fausses allegations que les plus qu'Achitofels, conseillers cabinalistes, 
proposent pour excuser Henry le meutrier de l'assassinat par luy perfidement commis en la 
personne du tres illustre Duc de Guise (1589, J. Pillehotte, Lyon). 
 
 
• Cinq Cents de Colbert : Collection Cinq Cents de Colbert  
 




• Dupuy: Collection Dupuy 
 
B.N.F., Dupuy 87 : Recueil de pièces concernant le règne de Henri III. 
 
B.N.F., Dupuy 121 : Recueil d'instructions données à divers ambassadeurs, de 1527 à 1617. 
 
B.N.F., Dupuy 203 : Recueil de discours, avis et lettres politiques du président Jeannin, du 
maréchal de Bouillon, d'Anne d'Autriche, du duc de Guise, d'Ant. d'Espeisses, du duc 
d'Épernon, du chancelier Pomponne de Bellièvre, de Sully, etc. (1588 à 1623 environ). 
 
B.N.F., Dupuy 240 : Recueil de Mémoires et de Discours Politiques, intitulé : « Mémoires et 
discours sur diverses matières de conséquence. III. ». 
 
B.N.F., Dupuy 313 : Harangues, remontrances, plaidoiries, arrêts et mémoires politiques. — 
De 1572 à 1596 environ. 
 
B.N.F., Dupuy 318 : Recueil d'ordonnances et de documents divers concernant 




B.N.F., Dupuy 322 : Édits, actes et mémoires concernant les Protestants, de 1533 à 1620 
environ. 
 
B.N.F., Dupuy 549 : Recueil de pièces relatives aux règnes des rois Louis XI, François Ier, 
Charles IX, Henri III, Henri IV, et Louis XIII. 
 
B.N.F., Dupuy 579 : Recueil de pièces et mémoires relatifs à l'histoire de France (1587-
1589). 
 
B.N.F., Dupuy 844 : Recueil de pièces historiques, formé par Laurent Bouchel (1364-1628.) 
 
 
• Français : Collection Manuscrit Français 
 
B.N.F., Français 1520 : Anc. 7576(2) • Baluze 417 • L'Heptaméron, par Marguerite de 
Valois. 
 
B.N.F., Français 3363 : Recueil de lettres et de pièces originales, et de copies de pièces 
indiquées comme telles dans le dépouillement qui suit. 
 
B.N.F., Français 3876 : Anc. 8431(8), de Mesmes 397 • Recueil de copies de pièces. 
 
B.N.F., Français 4045 : « Registre de la chambre du tiers estat, lors de l'assemblée des III 
estats de Paris du party de la Ligue ». Du 12 janvier au 1er août 1593. 
 
B.N.F., Français 5503 : Recueil d'actes de Louis XII, François Ier, Henri II, dauphin, etc. 
 
B.N.F., Français 6546 : Supplément français 1269 • Recueil de pièces du XVIe siècle. 
 
B.N.F., Français 10270 : Supplément français 2926 • Journal historique du temps de la 
Ligue. (1587-1589). 
 
B.N.F., Français 12125 : « Discours touchant le droict des princes absolutz et souverains et 
l'obéissance que leur doibvent les vassaulx et subjects, et au contraire les droicts des 
princes qui ne sont point absolutz et souverains, ains électifs..., servant d'apologie pour la 
défence des seigneurs les Estatz généraulx des Provinces et Villes Unies des Pays-Bas... 
contre Philippe d'Austrice, second de ce nom, roy d'Espaigne, etc., et de tout ceulx qui 
tiennent son party ». 
 
B.N.F., Français 15534 : Recueil de pièces, presque toutes en copies, manuscrites et 





B.N.F., Français 15591 : Recueil de pièces, manuscrites et imprimées (mémoires, édits, 
libelles, lettres, etc.), pour servir à l'histoire de la Ligue. (1568-1598). 
 
B.N.F., Français 15628 : Dépense. 1531-1532, ancien style. 
 
B.N.F., Français 18888 : Recueil, formé probablement par Théodore Godefroy, de pièces et 
de « mémoires concernant les droits du Roy et de la Couronne de France sur le duché de 
Bar et autres terres et seigneuries tenües par les ducs de Lorraine ». (1539-1604). 
 
 
• Rothschild: Collection Rothschild 
 
B.N.F., Rothschild 1967: Les Voyages de la Nouvelle France Occidentale, dicte Canada, Faits 
par le Sr de Champlain Xainctongeois, Capitaine pour le Roy en la Marine du Ponant, & 
toutes les Descouuertes qu'il a faites en ce païs depuis l'an 1603. iusques en l'an 1629.  
 
 
• N.A.F.: Collection Nouvelles Acquisitions Françaises 
 
B.N.F., N.A.F. 9269 : Canada (1534-1674). — Jacques Cartier, les Récollets ; mémoire de 
Dollier de Casson, sulpicien, sur les commencements de Montréal ; compagnie des Cent 
associés, etc. 
 
B.N.F., N.A.F. 9384 : Voyages de découvertes. 
 





Alfonse J. (1545/1904) La cosmographie avec l'espère et régime du soleil et du Nord, Paris: 
E. Leroux. 
Alfonse J. (1559) Les Voyages avantureux du capitaine Jan Alfonce, Sainctongeois, Poitiers: 
J. de Marnef. 
Aurigny G. (1554) Le livre de police humaine, contenant briève description de plusieurs 
choses dignes de mémoire, Paris: G. Thiboust. 
Benzoni G. (1579) Histoire nouvelle du nouveau monde : contenant en somme ce que les 
Hespagnols ont fait jusqu'à présent aux Indes occidentales, & le rude traitement 
qu'ils font à ces poures peuples là : ensemble, une petite histoire d'un massacre 
commis par les Hespagnols sur quelques François en la Floride, avec un indice des 
choses les plus remarquables / extraite de l'italien de M. Hierosme Benzoni... par M. 
Urbain Chauveton, Geneva: Eustace Vignon. 
Biard P. (1616) Relation de la Nouvelle France, de ses terres, naturel du pais, et de ses 
habitants, Lyon: Louys Muguet. 
Bignon J. (1610) De l'Excellence des roys et du royaume de France, Paris: Hierosme Drovart. 
Bodin J. (1576) Les six livres de la République Paris: Jacques du Puys. 
Bret CL. (1643) Les Oeuvres de Messire C. Le Bret,... Reveuës et Augmentées par Luy de 
Plusieurs Choses Notables depuis la Dernière Edition, Paris: Vve T. Du Bray. 
Budé G. (1547) De l'institution du Prince, Ivry: N. Paris. 
Caron Ll. (1556) Les dialogues de Loys le Caron, Parisien, Paris: Jean Longis. 
Cartier J. (1865) Voyage de Jaques Cartier au Canada en 1534. Nouvelle édition d'après 
l'édition de 1598 et d'après Ramusio, par M. H. Michelant, Paris: Tross. 
Champlain Sd. (1603) Des sauvages, ou Voyage de Samuel Champlain, de Brouage, fait en la 
France nouvelle l'an mil six cens trois, Paris: Claude de Monstroeil. 
Champlain Sd. (1993) Des sauvages ou voyage de Samuel de Champlain. Texte établi, 
présenté et annoté par Alain Beaulieu et Réal Ouellet, Montréal: Typo. 
Chesne AD. (1609) Les antiquitez et recherches de la grandeur et majesté des roys de 
France, recueillies tant des auteurs anciens que des meilleurs escrivains de ce siècle 
et divisées en 3 livres, Paris: Jean Petit-Pas. 
Coquille G. (1607) Institution au droict des François, Paris: A L'Angelier. 
d'Albon C. (1575) De la Majesté royalle, institution et prééminence, et des faveurs divines 
particulières envers icelle. , Lyon: Benoist Rigaud. 
d'Avity P. (1613) Les Estats, Empires et Principautez du Monde, Paris: Pierre Chevalier. 
d'Espence C. (1575) Deux notables traictez, composez par feu Monsieur Despence, docteur 
en théologie, l'un desquels monstre combien les lettres et sciences sont utiles et 
proufitables aux rois et princes, l'autre contient une forme de devis et discours à la 
louange des trois lys de France Paris: Guillaume Auvray. 
Gentillet I. (1576) Discours sur les moyens de bien gouverner et maintenir en bonne paix un 
royaume ou autre principauté. Divisez en tois parties : asavoir, du Conseil, de la 
Religion & Police que doit tenir un Prince. Contre Nicolas Machiavel, n/a: n/a. 
Goulart S. (1590) Le second recueil contenant l'histoire des choses plus mémorables 
advenues sous la Ligue, Tome 2. 
184 
 
Goulart S and Goujet C-P. (1758a) Mémoires de la ligue, contenant les evenements les plus 
remarquables depuis 1576, jusqu’à la Paix accordee entre le roi de France et le roi 
d’Espagne, en 1598. Nouvelle Edition. Tome 1, Amsterdam: Arkstee & Merkus. 
Goulart S and Goujet C-P. (1758b) Mémoires De La Ligue, Contenant Les Evenements Les 
Plus Remarquables Depuis 1576, Jusqu’à La Paix Accordee Entre Le Roi De France Et 
Le Roi D’espagne, En 1598. Nouvelle Edition. Tome 3, Amsterdam: Arkstee & 
Merkus. 
Goulart S and Goujet C-P. (1758c) Mémoires De La Ligue, Contenant Les Evenements Les 
Plus Remarquables Depuis 1576, Jusqu’à La Paix Accordee Entre Le Roi De France Et 
Le Roi D’espagne, En 1598. Nouvelle Edition. Tome 4, Amsterdam: Arkstee & 
Merkus. 
Goulart S and Goujet C-P. (1758d) Mémoires De La Ligue, Contenant Les Evenements Les 
Plus Remarquables Depuis 1576, Jusqu’à La Paix Accordee Entre Le Roi De France Et 
Le Roi D’espagne, En 1598. Nouvelle Edition. Tome 5, Amsterdam: Arkstee & 
Merkus. 
Goulart S and Goujet C-P. (1758e) Mémoires De La Ligue, Contenant Les Evenements Les 
Plus Remarquables Depuis 1576, Jusqu’à La Paix Accordee Entre Le Roi De France Et 
Le Roi D’espagne, En 1598. Nouvelle Edition. Tome 6, Amsterdam: Arkstee & 
Merkus. 
Haillan BdGD. (1611) De l'estat et succez des affaires de France (nouvelle édition), Paris: 
Pierre le Mur. 
Hamel JD. (1586/1611) Acoubar : tragédie tirée des Amours de Pistion et Fortunie en leur 
voyage de Canada, Rouen: Raphaël du Petit Val. 
Hotman F. (1711) Franco-Gallia, or an Account of the ancient free state of France and most 
other parts of Europe before the loss of their liberties, written originally in Latin by 
the famous civilian Francis Hotoman in the year 1574 and translated into English, 
London: T. Goodwin. 
Hurault M. (1588) Excellent et libre discours, sur l'Estat present de la France, par un docte 
personnage, bienversé aux affaires d'Estat de la France  
Jay FL. (1589) De la Dignité des rois et princes souverains, du droict inviolable de leurs 
successeurs légitimes et du devoir des peuples et subjectz envers eux., Tours: 
Mathurin Le Mercier. 
Julien CA, Herval R and Beauchesne T. (1946) Les français en Amérique pendant la première 
moitié du XVIe siècle. Textes des voyages de Gonneville, Verrazano, Cartier et 
Roberval, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 
L'Alouëte Fd. (1597) Des affaires d’Estat, des finances, du prince et de sa noblesse, seconde 
édition., Metz: Jean d’Arras. 
L'Hospital Md. (1824-1825) Oeuvres complètes de Michel L'Hospital, Tome 1, Paris: A. 
Boulland. 
L'Hospital Md. (1825) Oeuvres inédites de Michel L'Hospital, tome 1, Paris: A. Boulland. 
Léry Jd. (1585) Histoire d'un voyage faict en la terre du Brésil : autrement dite Amérique, 
Genève A. Chuppin  
Lescarbot M. (1612) Relation Dernière de ce qui s’est passé au Voyage du Sieur de 
Poutrincourt en la Nouvelle-France depuis 20 mois ença, Paris: Jean Millot. 
185 
 
Lescarbot M. (1617) Histoire de la Nouvelle France : contenant les navigations, découvertes, 
& habitations faites par les François és Indes Occidentales & Nouvelle-France, par 
commission de nos Roys Tres-Chretiens, & les diverses fortunes d’iceux en 
lexecution de ces choses, depuis cens ans jusques à hui : en quoy est comprise 
l'histoire morale, naturele & géographique des provinces cy décrites, Paris: Adrian 
Perier  
Loyseau C. (1608) Traité des seigneuries, Paris: A. L'Angelier. 
Lucinge Rd. (1588) De la Naissance, durée et cheute des estats, où sont traittées plusieurs 
notables questions sur l'establissement des empires et monarchies, Paris: Marc 
Orry. 
Madeleine JdL. (1575) Discours de l'estat et office d'un bon roy, prince ou monarque, pour 
bien et heureusement régner sur la terre et pour garder et maintenir ses subjectz en 
paix, union et obéissance, Paris: Lucas Brayer. 
Michelant HV and Ramé A. (1867) Relation originale du voyage de Jacques Cartier au 
Canada en 1534 : documents inédits sur Jacques Cartier et le Canada (nouvelle 
série), Paris: Tross. 
Montchrestien Ad. (1615/1889) Traicté de l'oeconomie politique : dédié en 1615 au Roy et à 
la Reyne mère du Roy ; avec introd. et notes par Théophile Funck-Brentano, Paris: E. 
Plon. 
Moulin CD. (1561) La premiere partie du Traicté de l'origine, progres et excellence du 
Royaume & Monarchie des Françoys, & Couronne de France, Lyon: chez les frères 
Senneton. 
Pasquier É. (1621) Les Recherches de la France d'Estienne Pasquier,... augmentées en ceste 
dernière édition de trois livres entiers, outre plusieurs chapitres entrelassez en 
chacun des autres livres, tirez de la bibliothèque de l'autheur, Paris: L. Sonnius. 
Périer AD. (1601/1973) Les Amours de Pistion et de Fortunie. Edition critique avec 
introduction et notes par Roméo Arbour, Ottawa: Editions de l'Université d'Ottawa. 
Perrière GdL. (1567) Le miroir politique : contenant diverses manières de gouverner et 
policer les républiques, qui sont et ont esté par cy devant, Paris: V. Norment, J. 
Bruneau. 
Poisson P. (1597) Traicté de la majesté royalle en France, Paris: Jamet Mettayer. 
Popelinière HLVdL. (1582) Les trois mondes, Paris: L'Huillier. 
Postel G. (1551) Les raisons de la monarchie, et quelz moyens sont necessaires pour y 
parvenir, Paris: N/A. 
Postel G. (1552) La loy salique : livret de la première humaine vérité, là où sont en brief les 
origines & auctoritez de la loy gallique nommée communément salique, Paris: en la 
rue Sainct Jacques aux cicongnes  
Quinn DB. (1962) The Voyage of Etienne Bellenger to the Maritimes in 1583: A New 
Document. Canadian Historical Review 3: 328-343. 
Razilly Id. (1626/1886) Mémoire du Chevalier de Razilly. Revue de Geographie 19 453-464. 
Roy LL. (1575a) De l’excellence du gouvernement royal, avec exhortation aux François de 
persévérer en iceluy, Paris: Frédéric Morel. 
Roy Ll. (1575b) De la vicissitude ou variété des choses en l’univers, et concurrence des armes 
et des lettres par les premières et plus illustres nations du monde, depuis le temps 
186 
 
où a commencé la civilité, & mémoire humaine jusques à présent, Paris: Pierre 
l’Huilier. 
Sagard G. (1632) Le grand voyage du pays des Hurons, situé en l'Amérique vers la mer 
douce, és derniers confins de la nouvelle France, dite Canada : où il est amplement 
traité de tout ce qui est du pays, des moeurs , du naturel des sauvages, de leur 
gouvernement , façon de faire... ; avec un Dictionnaire de la langue, Paris: Denys 
Moreau. 
Seyssel Cd. (1557a) Appian Alexandrin Historien Grec des Guerres des Rommeins, Traduit en 
François par Claude de Seyssel, Lyon: Jean de Tournes. 
Seyssel Cd. (1557b) La Grand'monarchie de France Paris: Galiot du Pré. 
Thévet A. (1558) Les singularitez de la France antarctique, autrement nommée Amérique, & 
de plusieurs terres et isles découvertes de nostre temps, Paris: chez les héritiers de 
Maurice de La Porte  
Thévet A. (1575) La Cosmographie Universelle, Tome Second, Paris: Guillaume Chaudière. 
Tillet JD. (1578) Les mémoires et recherches de Jean Du Tillet, greffier de la Cour de 
Parlement à Paris, contenans plusieurs choses memorables pour l'intelligence de 
l'estat des affaires de France, Rouen: Philippe de Tours. 
Tillet Jd. (1607) Recueil des rois de France, leurs couronne et maison, ensemble le rang des 
grands de France, Plus une "Chronique abbrégée contenant tout ce qui est advenu, 
tant en fait de guerre, qu'autrement, entre les Roys et princes, Républiques et 
potentats étrangers, Paris: Macé. 
Vair Gd. (1680) Les œuvres du Sieur du Vair, garde des Sceaux de France, Paris: Pierre 
Billaine. 
Wytfliet C and Magin A. (1611) Histoire universelle des Indes Occidentales et Orientales et 





Aalberts TE. (2014) Rethinking the Principle of (Sovereign) Equality as a Standard of 
Civilisation. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 42: 767-789. 
Aalberts TE and Werner WG. (2011) Mobilising Uncertainty and the Making of Responsible 
Sovereigns. Review of International Studies 37: 2183-2200. 
Adler-Nissen R. (2013) Sovereignty. The state’s symbolic power and transnational fields. In: 
Adler-Nissen R (ed) Bourdieu in International Relations. London and New York: 
Routledge. 
Agius C. (2013) Performing identity: The Danish cartoon crisis and discourses of identity and 
security. Security Dialogue 44: 241-258. 
Alexander JC and Mast JL. (2006) Introduction: symbolic action in theory and practice: the 
cultural pragmatics of symbolic action. In: Alexander JC, Giesen B and Mast JL (eds) 
Social Performance: Symbolic Action, Cultural Pragmatics, and Ritual. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1-28. 
Anghie A. (2005) Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Archambault P. (1967) The analogy of the "body" in Renaissance political literature. 
Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance 21: 21-53. 
Ashcraft R. (1971) Hobbes's Natural Man: A Study in Ideology Formation. The Journal of 
Politics 33: 1076-1117. 
Ashley RK. (1987) Foreign Policy as Political Performance. International Studies Notes 13: 
51-54. 
Ashley RK and Walker RBJ. (1990) Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the 
Question of Sovereignty in International Studies. International Studies Quarterly 34: 
367-416. 
Autesserre S. (2009) Hobbes and the Congo: Frames, Local Violence, and International 
Intervention. International Organization 63: 249-280. 
Ayoob M. (2002) Inequality and Theorizing in International Relations: The Case for 
Subaltern Realism. International Studies Review 4: 27-48. 
Bain W. (2003) Between Anarchy and Society: Trusteeship and the Obligations of Power, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Barkawi T and Laffey M. (2006) The Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies. Review of 
International Studies 32: 329-352. 
Barkin JS. (1998) The Evolution of the Constitution of Sovereignty and the Emergence of 
Human Rights Norms. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 27: 229-252. 
Barkin JS and Cronin B. (1994) The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of 
Sovereignty in International Relations. International Organization 48: 107-130. 
Bartelson J. (1995) A Genealogy of Sovereignty, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bartelson J. (2006) The Concept of Sovereignty Revisited. The European Journal of 
International Law 17: 463-474. 
Baumgartner FJ. (1995) France in the sixteenth century, New York: St Martin’s Press. 
Benton L. (2009) A search for sovereignty : law and geography in European Empires, 1400-
1900, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Benton L and Straumann B. (2010) Acquiring Empire by Law: From Roman Doctrine to Early 
Modern European Practice. Law and History Review 28: 1-38. 
Berg E and Kuusk E. (2010) What Makes Sovereignty a Relative Concept? Empirical 
Approaches to International Society. Political Geography 29: 40-49. 
Bernheimer R. (1970) Wild Men in the Middle Ages. A study in art, sentiment, and 
demonology, New York: Octagon Books. 
188 
 
Bettiza G. (2014) Civilizational Analysis in International Relations: Mapping the Field and 
Advancing a “Civilizational Politics” Line of Research. International Studies Review 
16: 1-28. 
Bialasiewicz L, Campbell D, Elden S, et al. (2007) Performing security: The imaginative 
geographies of current US strategy. Political Geography 26: 405-422. 
Biersteker TJ and Weber C. (1996a) The Social Construction of State Sovereignty. In: 
Biersteker TJ and Weber C (eds) State Sovereignty as Social Construct. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1-21. 
Biersteker TJ and Weber C. (1996b) State Sovereignty as Social Construct. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Bignon J. (1610) De l'Excellence des roys et du royaume de France, Paris: Hierosme Drovart. 
Bilgin P. (2008) Thinking past ‘Western’ IR? Third World Quarterly 29: 5-23. 
Bitterli U. (1986) Cultures in conflict. Encounters between European and non-European 
cultures, 1492-1800, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Blaney DL and Inayatullah N. (2000) The Westphalian Deferral. International Studies Review 
2: 29-64. 
Blaney DL and Inayatullah N. (2006) The savage Smith and the temporal walls of capitalism. 
In: Jahn B (ed) Classical theory in International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 123-155. 
Boas G. (1978) Essays on primitivism and related ideas in the Middle Ages, New York: 
Octogon Books. 
Bodin J. (1576) Les six livres de la République Paris: Jacques du Puys. 
Boli J. (2001) Sovereignty from a World Polity Perspective. In: Krasner SD (ed) Problematic 
Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 53-82. 
Boucher PP. (2004) Les Nouvelles-Frances: la France en Amérique, 1500-1815, Québec: 
Editions du Septentrion. 
Bourdieu P. (1991) Language and Symbolic Power, Cambridge: Polity in association with 
Basil Blackwell. 
Bourdieu P. (2012) Sur l'Etat, Paris: Raisons d'Agir/Seuil. 
Bourdieu P, Wacquant LJD and Farage S. (1994) Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure 
of the Bureaucratic Field. Sociological Theory 12: 1-18. 
Bowden B. (2009) The Empire of Civilization: The Evolution of an Imperial Idea, Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press. 
Braddick MJ. (2002) Civility and Authority. In: Armitage D and Braddick MJ (eds) The British 
Atlantic world, 1500-1800. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 93-112. 
Brassett J and Vaughan-Williams N. (2015) Security and the performative politics of 
resilience: Critical infrastructure protection and humanitarian emergency 
preparedness. Security Dialogue 46: 32-50. 
Bull H. (1984) The revolt against the West. In: Bull H and Watson A (eds) The expansion of 
international society. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 217-228. 
Bull H and Watson A. (1984) Conclusion. In: Bull H and Watson A (eds) The expansion of 
international society. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 425-435. 
Butler J. (1990) Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, New York - 
London: Routledge. 
Butler J. (1992) Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of "Postmodernism". 
In: Butler J and Scott JW (eds) Feminists Theorize the Political. New York - London: 
Routledge, 3-21. 




Butler J. (1997) Excitable Speech. A Politics of the Performative, New York and London: 
Routledge. 
Butler J. (2009) Performativity, Precariety and Sexual Politics. AIBR. Revista de Antropología 
Iberoamericana 4: i-xiii. 
Butler J. (2010) Performative Agency. Journal of Cultural Economy 3: 147-161. 
Callon M. (2007) What does it mean to say that economics is performative? In: MacKenzie 
D, Muniesa F and Siu L (eds) Do economists make markets? On the performativity 
of economics. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
Campbell D. (1992) Writing Security : United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of 
Identity, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Campbell D. (1997) Violent Performances: Identity, Sovereignty, Responsability. In: Lapid Y 
and Kratochwil F (eds) The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory. London: 
Lynne Rienner, 163-180. 
Campbell MB. (1988) The witness and the other world: Exotic European travel writing, 400-
1600, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. 
Carvalho Bd, Leira H and Hobson JM. (2011) The Big Bangs of IR: The Myths That Your 
Teachers Still Tell You about 1648 and 1919. Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies 39: 735-759. 
Carver T. (2008) Men in the Feminist Gaze: What Does this Mean in IR? Millenium: Journal 
of International Studies 37: 107-122. 
Champlain Sd. (1603) Des sauvages, ou Voyage de Samuel Champlain, de Brouage, fait en la 
France nouvelle l'an mil six cens trois, Paris: Claude de Monstroeil. 
Champlain Sd. (1993) Des sauvages ou voyage de Samuel de Champlain. Texte établi, 
présenté et annoté par Alain Beaulieu et Réal Ouellet, Montréal: Typo. 
Chinard G. (1911) L’exotisme américain dans la littérature française au XVIe siècle, Paris: 
Hachette. 
Chopra J and Weiss TG. (1992) Sovereignty Is No Longer Sacrosanct: Codifying 
Humanitarian Intervention. Ethics & International Affairs 6: 95-117. 
Church WF. (1969) Constitutional thought in sixteenth-century France : a study in the 
evolution of ideas., New York: Octagon Books. 
Clapham C. (1998) Degrees of Statehood. Review of International Studies 24: 143-157. 
Cocks J. (2014) On sovereignty and other political delusions, London, New York: 
Bloomsbury. 
Cutler AC. (2001) Critical Reflections on the Westphalian Assumptions of International Law 
and Organization: A Crisis of Legitimacy. Review of International Studies 27: 133-
150. 
Davenport FG. (1917) European treaties bearing on the history of the United States and its 
dependencies. Volume 1, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington. 
Delsalle P. (2007) La recherche historique en archives. XVIe-XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles. Paris: 
Ophrys. 
Derrida J. (1986) Declarations of Independence. New Political Science 7: 7-15. 
Derrida J. (1994) Force de Loi. Le Fondement Mystique de l' "Autorité", Paris: Editions 
Galilée. 
Dickason OP. (1997) The Myth of the Savage and the Beginnings of French Colonialism in 
the Americas, Edmonton: The University of Alberta Press. 
Dillon GM and Everard J. (1992) Stat(e)ing Australia: Squid Jigging and the Masque of State. 
Alternatives 17: 281-312. 
Donnelly J. (2006) Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy: American Power and 
International Society. European Journal of International Relations 12: 139-170. 
Doty RL. (1996) Imperial Encounters: the Politics of Representation in North-South 
Relations, Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press. 
190 
 
Dunn KC. (2001) MadLib #32: The (Blank) African State: Rethinking the Sovereign State in 
International Relations Theory. In: Dunn KC and Shaw TM (eds) Africa’s Challenge 
to International Relations Theory. New York: Palgrave, 46-63. 
Dunn KC. (2003) Imagining the Congo: The International Relations of Identity, New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan. 
Dunn KC. (2009) Contested State Spaces: African National Parks and the State. European 
Journal of International Relations 15: 423-446. 
Epstein C. (2010) Who speaks? Discourse, the subject and the study of identity in 
international politics. European Journal of International Relations 17: 327-350. 
Fabry M. (2010) Recognizing States. International Society and the Establishment of New 
States since 1776, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Fearon JD and Laitin DD. (2004) Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States. 
International Security 28: 5-43. 
Fernández-Armesto F. (1982) Medieval ethnography. Journal of the Anthropological Society 
of Oxford 13: 275-286. 
Fowler MR and Bunck JM. (1996) What Constitutes the Sovereign State? Review of 
International Studies 22: 381-404. 
Friedman JB. (1981) The monstrous races in medieval art and thought, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, and London, England.: Harvard University Press. 
Fukuyama F. (2004) State Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First 
Century, London: Profile Books. 
Geertz C. (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures, New York: Basic Books. 
Glanville L. (2011) The Antecedents of 'Sovereignty as Responsibility'. European Journal of 
International Relations 17: 233-255. 
Glanville L. (2014) Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: A New History, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Goffman E. (1974) Les rites d'interaction, Paris: Les Editions de Minuit. 
Goulart S. (1590) Le second recueil contenant l'histoire des choses plus mémorables  
Green LC and Dickason OP. (1989) The law of nations and the New World Edmonton: 
University of Alberta Press. 
Greenblatt S. (1991) Marvellous possessions: the wonders of the New World, Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press. 
Gregson N and Rose G. (2000) Taking Butler elsewhere: performativities, spatialities and 
subjectivities. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 18: 433-452. 
Grimm S, Lemay-Hébert N and Nay O. (2014) ‘Fragile States’: introducing a political 
concept. Third World Quarterly 35: 197-209. 
Grovogui SN. (1996) Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns, and Africans. Race and Self-
Determination  in International  Law, Minneapolis - London: University of 
Minneapolis Press. 
Grovogui SN. (2002) Regimes of Sovereignty: International Morality and the African 
Condition. European Journal of International Relations 8: 315-338. 
Grovogui SN. (2009) The Secret Livres of the "Sovereign": Rethinking Sovereignty as 
International Morality. In: Howland D and White L (eds) The State of Sovereignty. 
Territories, Laws, Populations. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 261-275. 
Guenée B. (1971) L'occident aux XIVe et XVe siècles : les états, Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France. 
Guillaume X. (2002) Foreign Policy and the Politics of Alterity: A Dialogical Understanding of 
International Relations. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 31: 1-26. 
Hansen L. (2006) Security as Practice. Discourse analysis and the Bosnian war, London ; 
New York: Routledge. 
191 
 
Havercroft J. (2008) Sovereignty, recognition and indigenous peoples. In: Price RM (ed) 
Moral Limit and Possibility in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Heller TC and Sofaer AD. (2001) Sovereignty: The Practitioners' Perspective. In: Krasner SD 
(ed) Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 24-52. 
Helman GB and Ratner SR. (1992-1993) Saving Failed States. Foreign Policy: 3-20. 
Hexter JH. (1968) Claude de Seyssel and normal politics in the age of Machiavelli. In: 
Singleton CS (ed) Art, science, and history in the Renaissance. Baltimore, London: 
Johns Hopkins Press, 389-415. 
Hindess B. (2007) The Past Is Another Culture. International Political Sociology 1: 325-338. 
Hinsley FH. (1986) Sovereignty, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hobson JM. (2012) The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics. Western International 
Theory, 1760-2010, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hobson JM and Lawson G. (2008) What is History in International Relations? Millenium: 
Journal of International Studies 37: 415-435. 
Hobson JM and Sharman JC. (2005) The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics: 
Tracing the Social Logics of Hierarchy and Political Change. European Journal of 
International Relations 11: 63-98. 
Hodgen MT. (1964) Early anthropology in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Howland D and White L. (2009) Introduction: Sovereignty and the Study of States. In: 
Howland D and White L (eds) The State of Sovereignty. Territories, Laws, 
Populations. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1-18. 
Husband T. (1980) The wild man. Medieval myth and symbolism, New York: The 
Metropolitan Museum of Art. 
Inayatullah N and Blaney DL. (1995) Realizing Sovereignty. Review of International Studies 
21: 3-20. 
Inayatullah N and Blaney DL. (1996) Knowing encounters: Beyond parochialism in 
International Relations theory. In: Lapid Y and Kratochwil F (eds) The return of 
culture and identity in IR theory. Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 65-84. 
Inayatullah N and Blaney DL. (2004) International Relations and the Problem of Difference, 
New York: Routledge. 
Inayatullah N and Blaney DL. (2012) Sovereignty. In: Chimni BS and Mallavarapu S (eds) 
International Relations: Perspectives for the Global South. India: Pearson, 124-134. 
Jackson J, Richardson NJM, Butterfield H, et al. (1974) A Short History of France (second 
edition), London, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Jackson JH. (2003) Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept. The 
American Journal of International Law 97: 782-802. 
Jackson RH. (1987) Quasi-States, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory: International 
Jurisprudence and the Third World. International Organization 41: 519-549. 
Jackson RH. (1990) Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Jackson RH. (1998) Surrogate Sovereignty? Great Power Responsibility and "Failed States". 
Jackson RH. (1999) Sovereignty in World Politics: a Glance at the Conceptual and Historical 
Landscape. Political Studies 47: 431-456. 
Jackson RH. (2005) Classical and Modern Thought on International Relations. From Anarchy 
to Cosmopolis, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Jahn B. (2000) The Cultural Construction of International Relations: the Invention of the 
State of Nature, New York: Palgrave. 
192 
 
Jahoda G. (1999) Images of savages. Ancient roots of modern prejudice in Western culture, 
London and New York: Routledge. 
James A. (1986) Sovereign Statehood: the Basis of International Society, London: Allen & 
Unwin. 
James A. (1999) The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International 
Society. Political Studies 47: 457-473. 
Jeffrey A. (2013) The Improvised State. Sovereignty, Performance and Agency in Dayton 
Bosnia, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Jennings F. (1976) The invasion of America: Indians, colonialism, and the cant of conquest, 
New York ; London: W. W. Norton & Company. 
Jouanna A. (1989) Le devoir de révolte : la noblesse française et la gestation de l'État 
moderne (1559-1661), Paris: Fayard. 
Kalmo H and Skinner Q. (2010) Introduction: A Concept in Fragments. In: Kalmo H and 
Skinner Q (eds) Sovereignty in Fragments: The Past, Present and Future of a 
Contested Concept. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1-25. 
Kantorowicz EH. (1957) The king's two bodies: a study in mediaeval political theology, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Keene E. (2004) Beyond the Anarchical Society. Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World 
Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Keohane NO. (1980) Philosophy and the state in France: the Renaissance to the 
Enlightenment, Princeton, Guildford: Princeton University Press. 
Keohane RO. (2002) Ironies of Sovereignty: the European Union and the United States. 
Journal of Common Market Studies 4: 743-765. 
Knecht RJ. (2000) The French civil wars, 1562-1598, Harlow: Longman. 
Koskenniemi M. (1994) The Wonderful Artificiality of States. Proceedings of the Annual 
Meeting (American Society of International Law): The Transformation of 
Sovereignty. 22-29. 
Koskenniemi M. (2001) The Gentle Civilizer of Nations : The Rise and Fall of International 
Law 1870–1960, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Koskenniemi M. (2010) Conclusion: Vocabularies of Sovereignty - Powers of a Paradox. In: 
Kalmo H and Skinner Q (eds) Sovereignty in Fragments: The Past, Present and 
Future of a Contested Concept. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 222-242. 
Krasner SD. (1999) Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Krasner SD. (2001) Rethinking the Sovereign State Model. Review of International Studies 
27: 17-42. 
Krasner SD. (2004) Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States. 
International Security 29: 85-120. 
Krasner SD. (2005) Building Democracy After Conflict: The Case for Shared Sovereignty. 
Journal of Democracy 16: 69-83. 
Krasner SD. (2010) The Durability of Organized Hypocrisy. In: Kalmo H and Skinner Q (eds) 
Sovereignty in Fragments: The Past, Present and Future of a Contested Concept. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 96-113. 
L'Eplattenier BE. (2009) An Argument for Archival Research Methods: Thinking Beyond 
Methodology. College English 72: 67-79. 
Laclau E and Mouffe C. (1985/2001) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics (Second Edition), London - New York: Verso. 
Ladurie ELR. (1994) The Royal French State 1460-1610, Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell. 
Laffey M. (2000) Locating Identity: Performativity, Foreign Policy and State Action. Review 
of International Studies 26: 429-444  
Lake DA. (2003) The New Sovereignty in International Relations. International Studies 
Review 5: 303-323. 
193 
 
Lawson G. (2010) The eternal divide? History and International Relations. European Journal 
of International Relations 18: 203-226. 
Lee J. (2012) Metanarratives and Performative Perversity in the War on Terror. The 
Monitor: Journal of International Studies 17: 56-64. 
Lemaire A. (1907) Les lois fondamentales de la monarchie française d’après les théoriciens 
de l’Ancien Régime, Paris: Albert Fontemoing. 
Lemay-Hébert N. (2011) The ‘‘Empty-Shell’’ Approach: The Setup Process of International 
Administrations in Timor-Leste and Kosovo, Its Consequences and Lessons. 
International Studies Perspectives 12: 190-211. 
Lesaffer R. (1999) La paix de Vervins (2 mai 1598): Souveraineté, territorialité en 
développement du droit public européen. In: Cauchies J-M (ed) Personnalité, 
territorialité et droit. Actes des journées internationales de la Société d'Histoire du 
Droit tenues à Bruxelles du 28 au 31 mai 1998. Bruxelles: Facultés Universitaires 
Saint-Louis, 131-152. 
Lipping J. (2010) Sovereignty Beyond the State. In: Kalmo H and Skinner Q (eds) Sovereignty 
in Fragments: The Past, Present and Future of a Contested Concept. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 186-204. 
Maldonado‐Torres N. (2004) The topology of being and the geopolitics of knowledge. City 
8: 2956. 
Malmvig H. (2006) State Sovereignty and Intervention: A discourse analysis of 
interventionary and non-interventionary practices in Kosovo and Algeria, New York: 
Routledge. 
Matin K. (2013) Redeeming the universal: Postcolonialism and the inner life of 
Eurocentrism. European Journal of International Relations 19: 353-377. 
Mbembe A. (2002) The power of the archive and its limits. In: Hamilton C (ed) Refiguring 
the archive. Dordrecht ; London: Kluwer Academic, 19-26. 
Mbembe A. (2003) Necropolitics. Public Culture 15: 11-40. 
Meek RL. (1976) Social science and the ignoble savage, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Mignolo WD. (2002) The Geopolitics of Knowledge and the Colonial Difference. The South 
Atlantic Quarterly 101: 57-96. 
Mitchell T. (1999) Society, Economy, and the State Effect. In: Steinmetz G (ed) 
State/culture: State-formation After the Cultural Turn. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press. 
Mol A. (1999) Ontological politics. A word and some questions. The Sociological Review 47: 
74-89. 
Montchrestien Ad. (1615/1889) Traicté de l'oeconomie politique : dédié en 1615 au Roy et à 
la Reyne mère du Roy ; avec introd. et notes par Théophile Funck-Brentano, Paris: E. 
Plon. 
Morgan A. (2007) Sovereignty's New Story. The Monist 90: 26-47. 
Morgenthau HJ. (1948/1973) Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 
New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
Nandy A. (1983) The intimate enemy. Loss and recovery of self under colonialism, Oxford – 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Neumann IB. (2007) "A Speech That the Entire Ministry May Stand for," or: Why Diplomats 
Never Produce Anything New. International Political Sociology 1: 183-200. 
Oksenberg M. (2001) The Issue of Sovereignty in the Asian Historical Context. In: Krasner 
SD (ed) Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 83-104. 
Onuf N. (1991) Sovereignty: Outline of a Conceptual History. Alternatives 16: 425-446. 
194 
 
Osiander A. (2001) Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth. 
International Organization 55: 251-287. 
Padgen A. (1982) The fall of natural man. The American Indian and the origins of 
comparative ethonology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Pagden A. (1986) ‘The impact of the new world on the old’: The history of an idea. 
Renaissance and Modern Studies 30: 1-11. 
Pateman C. (2007) The settler contract. In: Pateman C and Mills C (eds) Contract and 
Domination. Cambridge: Polity Press, 35-78. 
Peters A. (2009) Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty. The European Journal of 
International Law 20: 513-544. 
Philpott D. (2001a) Revolutions in Sovereignty. How Ideas Shaped Modern International 
Relations, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Philpott D. (2001b) Usurping the Sovereignty of Sovereignty? World Politics 53: 297-324. 
Pourmokhtari N. (2013) A Postcolonial Critique of State Sovereignty in IR: the contradictory 
legacy of a ‘West-centric’ discipline. Third World Quarterly 34: 1767-1793. 
Pratt ML. (1992) Imperial eyes. Travel writing and transculturation, London and New York: 
Routledge. 
Prokhovnik R. (2007) Sovereignties. Contemporary Theory and Practice, New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Puchala DJ. (1997) Some Non-Western Perspectives on International Relations. Journal of 
Peace Research 34: 129-134. 
Quijano A. (2000) Coloniality of power and Eurocentrism in Latin America. International 
Sociology 15: 215-232. 
Quinn DB. (1962) The Voyage of Etienne Bellenger to the Maritimes in 1583: A New 
Document. Canadian Historical Review 3: 328-343. 
Reus-Smit C. (1997) The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of 
Fundamental Institutions. International Organization 51: 555-589. 
Reus-Smit C. (2001) Human Rights and the Social Construction of Sovereignty. Review of 
International Studies 27: 519-538. 
Ringmar E. (2014) Performance, not performativity: An embodied critique of post-
structural IR theory. Workshop ‘Performativity and Agency in International Politics’. 
Goethe University Frankfurt. 
Roberts WA. (1942) The French in the West Indies, Indianapolis; New York: Bobbs-Merrill. 
Ryan MT. (1981) Assimilating New Worlds in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 23: 519-538. 
Sabaratnam M. (2013) Avatars of Eurocentrism in the critique of the liberal peace. Security 
Dialogue 44: 259-278. 
Sagard G. (1632) Le grand voyage du pays des Hurons, situé en l'Amérique vers la mer 
douce, és derniers confins de la nouvelle France, dite Canada : où il est amplement 
traité de tout ce qui est du pays, des moeurs , du naturel des sauvages, de leur 
gouvernement , façon de faire... ; avec un Dictionnaire de la langue, Paris: Denys 
Moreau. 
Sayre GM. (1997) Les sauvages américains: representations of Native Americans in French 
and English colonial literature, Chapel Hill ; London: University of North Carolina 
Press. 
Schmidt BC. (1998) The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International 
Relations, Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Schnapper B. (1954) A propos de la doctrine et de la politique coloniales au temps de 
Richelieu. Revue d'histoire des colonies 41: 314-328. 
Seed P. (1995) Ceremonies of possession in Europe's conquest of the New World, 1492-
1640, Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
195 
 
Seth S. (2000) A 'Postcolonial World'? In: Fry G and O'Hagan J (eds) Contending Images of 
World Politics. London: Macmillan, 214-226. 
Seth S. (2011) Postcolonial Theory and the Critique of International Relations. Millenium: 
Journal of International Studies 40: 167-183. 
Seth V. (2001) Self and similitude: translating difference (modern colonialism and 
renaissance conquests). Postcolonial Studies 4: 297-309. 
Shapiro MJ. (2002) Bourdieu, the State and Method. Review of International Political 
Economy 9: 610-618. 
Shepard MA. (1930) Sovereignty at the Crossroads: A Study of Bodin. Political Science 
Quarterly 45: 580-603. 
Shinko RE. (2010) Sovereignty as a Problematic Conceptual Core. In: Denemark RA (ed) The 
International Studies Encyclopedia. Blackwell Reference Online: Blackwell 
Publishing. 
Shoemaker N. (2004) A strange likeness : becoming red and white in eighteenth-century 
North America, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sikkink K. (1993) Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin 
America. International Organization 47: 411-441. 
Simpson G. (2004) Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the 
International Legal Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Simpson G. (2005) The guises of sovereignty. Conference End of Westphalia? Camberra. 
Skinner Q. (2008) A Genealogy of the Modern State. Proceedings of the British Academy 
162: 325-370. 
Slattery B. (1978) French Claims in North America, 1500-59. Canadian Historical Review 59: 
139-169. 
Sørensen G. (1999) Sovereignty: Change and Continuity in a fundamental institution. 
Political Studies 47: 590-604. 
Spruyt H. (1994) The Sovereign State and Its Competitors. An Analysis of Systems Change, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Stoler AL. (2002) Colonial archives and the arts of governance. In: Hamilton C (ed) 
Refiguring the archive. Dordrecht ; London: Kluwer Academic, 83-100. 
Strange D. (1996) Contested Sovereignty: the Social Construction of Colonial Imperialism In: 
Biersteker TJ and Weber C (eds) State Sovereignty as Social Construct. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 22-49. 
Strayer J. (1969) France: the Holy land, the chosen people, and the most Christian King. In: 
Rabb TK and Seigel J (eds) Action and conviction in early modern Europe: essays in 
memory of E.H. Harbison. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 3-16. 
Suzuki S. (2009) Civilization and Empire. China and Japan's Encounter with European 
International Society, London: Routledge. 
Taylor P. (1999) The United Nations in the 1990s: Proactive Cosmopolitanism and the Issue 
of Sovereignty. Political Studies 47: 538-565. 
Thompson H. (2006) The Case for External Sovereignty. European Journal of International 
Relations 12: 251-274. 
Thomson JE. (1995) State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap between 
Theory and Empirical Research. International Studies Quarterly 39: 213-233. 
Todorov T. (1982) La conquête de l'Amérique. La question de l'autre, Paris: Editions du 
Seuil. 
Todorov T. (1989) Nous et les Autres. La Réflexion Française sur la Diversité Humaine, Paris: 
Editions du Seuil. 
Trachtenberg M. (2006) The craft of international history: a guide to method, Princeton, 
N.J. ; Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
196 
 
Trudel M. (1973) The beginnings of New France, 1524-1663, Toronto: McClelland and 
Steward Limited. 
Walker N. (2003a) Late Sovereignty in the European Union. In: Walker N (ed) Sovereignty in 
Transition. Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 3-32. 
Walker N. (2003b) Preface. In: Walker N (ed) Sovereignty in Transition. Oxford and 
Portland: Hart Publishing, vii-x. 
Walker RBJ. (1993) Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Walker RBJ and Mendlovitz SH. (1990) Interrogating State Sovereignty. In: Walker RBJ and 
Mendlovitz SH (eds) Contending Sovereignties: Redefining Political Community. 
London: Lynne Rienner, 1-12. 
Waltz KN. (1979) Theory of International Politics, New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Weber C. (1992) Reconsidering Statehood: Examining the Sovereignty/Intervention 
Boundary. Review of International Studies 18: 199-216. 
Weber C. (1995) Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, The State and Symbolic Exchange, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Weber C. (1998) Performative States. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 27: 77-
95. 
Weber C and Biersteker TJ. (1996) Reconstructing the Analysis of Sovereignty: Concluding 
Reflections and Directions for Future Research In: Biersteker TJ and Weber C (eds) 
State Sovereignty as Social Construct. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 278-
286. 
Weill G. (1892) Les théories sur le pouvoir royal en France pendant les guerres de religion, 
Paris: Hachette. 
Wendt A. (1992) Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power 
Politics International Organization 46: 391-425. 
Werner WG and Wilde JHD. (2001) The Endurance of Sovereignty. European Journal of 
International Relations 7: 283-313. 
Whatley J. (1986) Savage Hierarchies: French Catholic Observers of the New World. The 
Sixteenth Century Journal 17: 319-330. 
White H. (1972) The forms of wildness: Archaeology of an idea. In: Dudley E (ed) The wild 
man within : an image in western thought from the Renaissance to Romanticism. 
Pittsburgh University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Wilcox L. (2014) Making Bodies Matter in IR. Millenium: Journal of International Studies 43: 
359-364. 
Wintroub M. (1998) Civilizing the Savage and Making a King: The Royal Entry Festival of 
Henri II (Rouen, 1550). The Sixteenth Century Journal 29: 465-494. 
Wintroub M. (2001) L'ordre du rituel et l'ordre des choses: l'entrée royale d'Henri II àRouen 
(1550). Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales 56: 479-505. 
Zarakol A. (2011) After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live With the West, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Zaum D. (2007) The Sovereignty Paradox. Norms and Politics of International Statebuilding, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
